

three sections. The first deals with the man and his position, the second with the man and his doctrine, and the third with the man and his background. In the last section the spiritual genealogy of Spinoza is fully described and Spinozism manifests itself as the last tremor of Buddhism in the Western world.

To demonstrate this thesis more fully the opposite side of the picture will be shown in a second volume entitled *Kant and Plato*, superimposed upon the background of the prophets of Israel. In the present volume the history of man's visions of a dead God is described. In the following volume the history of the struggle for a living God will be developed.

If this thesis is correct, then much of the Spinoza literature must be re-written, for he cannot at the same time be both a Western philosopher and an Eastern religionist.

It goes without saying that to demonstrate my thesis, which in the final analysis is only an attempt to demonstrate a new philosophy of history, it was necessary to re-examine Spinoza's doctrine thoroughly and to lay bare all its inconsistencies, contradictions, false suppositions, and untenable hypotheses. In this, too, a break with the tradition that Spinozism is *terra sacra* was necessary. Truth is not compatible with dogma. Besides, the greatness of Spinoza will not be lessened, even though he is assigned a different position. Spinoza's creative religious genius is as immortal as is Plato's creative philosophical genius. The critique of Spinozism offered in this book is not a devastating devaluation, but a constructive transvaluation.

I earnestly believe that this volume will contribute to an understanding, not only of the doctrine of Spinoza,

but also to a new clarification of the spiritual process in man's history.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. William Kritchevsky and A. K. Epstein for enabling me to produce this volume. I am also grateful to Judge Emanuel Eller for the many courtesies and services he rendered to me while engaged in the writing of this book.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	I
------------------------	---

I. THE MAN AND HIS POSITION

SPINOZA'S INFLUENCE ON MODERN CULTURE	29
THE MAN AND HIS RACE	118

II. THE MAN AND HIS DOCTRINE

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF GOD AND THE WORLD	153
---------------------------------------	-----

III. VISIONS OF A DEAD GOD

THE BACKGROUND OF HINDU METAPHYSICS AND BUDDHISM	235
THE WORLD-PICTURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT	276
INDIA IN THE WEST	299
FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO BARUCH SPINOZA	352

NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	367
----------------------------------	-----

INDEX

INDEX	385
-----------------	-----

INTRODUCTION

I

IN THIS book an attempt is made to reconstruct a part of white man's spiritual history, and to establish some of the laws by which it is governed. It will be shown that the spiritual history of man, while originally anchored in the physical world, continues as a separate realm, guided by basic types of tendencies from which it can never free itself. These types of consciousness continue to express themselves even when far removed from the scene in which they were created. Variety, manifoldness and multitudinousness in the domain of the spirit are manifestations of elemental forces no less than are phenomena of the physical world.

All philosophy of history is, in the final analysis, an attempt to establish and formulate the laws governing the historical process. The term "law," however, in the sense of a law of nature is as little applicable to history as the geometric axiom is to philosophy. History is a realm of ethical ends and purposes and not of laws, and its phenomena are not isolated or products of blind chance, but are all organically interlinked.

While there are no laws of history in the sense that there are laws of nature, there surely is a rhythm or a logic in history which partly guides its course. To see this logic operate in the historical process, is to see its uninterrupted continuity. There is no silent moment in history, just as there is no still moment in nature. Forms of civilization and groups representing a certain type of consciousness may change, but the basic

driving forces in the realm of the spirit continue to be effective in a definite order. Though the Buddha Gautama has been dead for more than twenty-five hundred years and Buddhism has long ceased to be a religious force in its native land, the type of consciousness that is summed up in the term "Buddhism" is as alive and as effective today as ever. There are still millions of people both in the East and in the West who, although formally not adherents of Buddhism, still have a Buddhistic outlook upon life. While this type of consciousness may express itself today in a different form than it did in the past, it yet remains a steady force in the spiritual life of man. Buddhism, with its universalism, asceticism, pessimism, salvationism, and serenity of the mind born of the deepest gloom, still fills the hearts of religionists and the minds of philosophers and shapes their spiritual destinies. Even if Buddhism, as an organized religion, with all its votaries, monks and temples should disappear, the Buddhistic consciousness would still remain a steady force in man's spiritual history. It will live as long as man will be overwhelmed by the phenomena of pain and suffering which he will accept as the reality of life.

In the west, man's outlook upon life differed from that in the east, from earliest times. Owing to environmental factors, he concerned himself first with single cosmic elements through which he came into contact with the whole of the cosmos. There developed in him a feeling for the individual with all its attending phenomena—the will to live, a sense of beauty, unbounded optimism, a pugnacious spirit, and a feeling of his own importance in this life.

The permanence of basic types of consciousnesses,

such as the universalistic, pessimistic, and acosmistic tendencies of the East and the individualistic, optimistic, and anthropocentric currents of the West, and their continued struggle for supremacy is one of the vantage points from which we must examine the historical process.

This examination necessitates, first, the differentiation between dead forms and living processes; second, the position of the individual in history; and, third, the supreme force of the historical tendency.

From time immemorial man struggled and labored to understand both dead forms and living processes. Number, measure, and weight helped him to understand the one; comparison, analogy, and analysis the other. To the materialist the historical process is very simple, for he approaches it in the same manner that the scientist approaches the natural process. To him who worships at the shrine of mathematics, statistics explain everything. Statistics, however, will no more explain the whole of human life than will geometry, which is applicable only to dead forms, for man, being a citizen of two worlds, cannot be mathematized. Only by analogy, comparison, and analysis can we understand living forms. To press the dreaming, meditating, and pensive human soul into algebraic or geometric formulas is as wise as attempting to translate quality into quantity.

Heretofore, historians and statesmen have attempted to fix the laws of history by establishing the eternal cycle of the reproduction of the historical process in all its details. To do so they have made many comparisons of personalities. Napoleon believed himself to be another edition of Charlemagne, while Leon Trotsky imagined himself to be a second Robespierre. Innumerable histo-

rians have compared Christ to Buddha and Spinoza to Socrates. Weimar has been compared to ancient Athens and Heidelberg to Milet. Yet these comparisons, no matter how exact or intriguing they may be, will not lead to a discovery of the historical rhythm. Not analogies of personalities, situations, and scenes but analogies of tendencies will betray the secrets of history. When we compare world-views instead of personalities and great spiritual tendencies instead of situations, the historicity of Moses, Buddha, or Jesus becomes of no importance. Even if it were conclusively proved that Moses or Buddha are mythical figures it would still not affect the logic of history, for not Buddha but Buddhism and not Moses but Mosaism is the center of gravity. Just as the individual sees not only with but also through the eye, so does history work not only with but also through the individual.

All the great episodes, occurrences, and events of the past, all the great men and their achievements, can be understood only from the vantage point of spiritual tendencies. Such an interpretation of history is more satisfactory than the materialistic prescription of Karl Marx, the individualistic conception of Nietzsche, the pan-logical of Hegel, the sociological of Max Weber, the physical of Buckle, or the environmental of Taine. Whether or not nature is a manifestation of the mind as Hegel thought is a subject of debate for metaphysicists, but there can be no doubt that man's history is a manifestation of the mind. Even the most naturalistic historiography is a product of the mind, from historic catastrophes of cosmic dimensions like major wars to such local events as bridging a river, which require both volitional and intellectual intervention. Unless

one denies the spiritual character of history or assumes that history is only a series of incoherent episodes and occurrences, it becomes necessary to seek in man's mind the rhythm which governs it. Man's history is mind-made, spirit-made, and is not a brew of nature. The rhythm of history is so visible and its tendencies so definite that they can almost be drawn as straight lines. World-history reveals two basic tendencies from which originate, on the one hand, the line extending from the Upanishads to Buddha, St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Spinoza, and, on the other hand, the line extending from Moses, the prophets of Israel, Socrates, Plato, the Reformation, Leibnitz, and Kant.

Spinoza, being the last powerful expression of universalism in the West, is not merely a great figure in the history of philosophy, but is a world-historic figure like Buddha or St. Paul. His doctrine represents a "Platonic idea," a steady stream in history. His biography is a chapter in the history of culture. His spiritual ancestry as well as his outlook upon life is not Western but Eastern, and his theory can be understood only in terms of a great world-historic tendency. Therefore, his influence upon modern thought must be traced and the origin of his doctrine sought.

II

World-history to the European is primarily his history. Most of the philosophic-historical speculations in the West have only European history as their object. The assumption is made that the world-historic process is geographically limited. Oswald Spengler is the only outstanding historian of recent times who has dared to question this historiographic wisdom. However, the

world-historic process is not limited to the countries inhabited by Western man but by far transcends his realm.

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Hermann Cohen, the greatest intellectual spellbinders of the nineteenth century, have revitalized in the Occident many ancient oriental ideas. Schopenhauer revived ancient Brahmanism and Buddhism; Nietzsche, ancient Parseeism; and Hermann Cohen, ancient Hebraism. White man, through his reliance upon the Old and New Testaments, is still influenced by the heritage of ancient Palestine. Even ancient Egypt, which was outside the stream of the historic process, has, through its mythology and art, profoundly affected Western culture. Thus world-history is not identical with occidental history and our cultural fabric is a synthesis of the creations of both the Orient and the Occident.

If these are the true perspectives of a reorientated historiography, then the man of Plato, the prophets of Israel, Buddha, St. Paul, Confucius, and Laotze is the same spiritual being with the same tendencies and inclinations, regardless of space and time. Spengler's contention that ancient man possessed a specific type of mentality, which with his aversion for distances deprived him of world-historic perspectives, is empty speculation for which there is no basis in fact. Even in Hellas the philosophers and scientists sought the infinite. Ancient Greek historiography, while not highly developed, nevertheless testifies to a historical consciousness. In ancient Palestine, however, the understanding of the past assumed high forms. Thus, the fifth chapter of Genesis begins with the sentence "This is the book of the generations of man," while the tenth chapter

already presents a broad picture of human history. Hence, historical consciousness is not the exclusive heritage of the modern Occident. Man's sameness in all climes makes the traditional division of history into ancient, medieval, and modern arbitrary and artificial. A civilization is a living organism subject to the processes of decay and death. When it perishes, a new organism grows in its place. The period of transition from the old to the new can validly be called the "middle period," and the so-called Middle Ages represents such an epoch. However, to say that the period from the downfall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the Renaissance in the thirteenth century represents an organic unity which can never return is sheer superstition. When our civilization will be destroyed and history will begin to spin and weave a new order, a new Middle Ages will arise which will repeat the experiences of the men of the thousand years between the downfall of the Roman Empire and the rise of modern civilization.

The traditional divisions of history and the limiting of the world-historic process to the Occident were primarily inspired by the political motives with which historiography has been overwhelmed. To the average man history still means primarily the history and destinies of states. This identification of political with general history is as artificial as the divisions of history. Political catastrophes such as great wars, revolutions, the fall of empires, and the establishment of new states are actually only passing historical episodes and are not the content of the historical process. Thus Napoleon to us is only a sensational and a tragic episode in the history of Western Europe, who left no heritage that might be considered a steady force in history. This is

equally true of almost all great conquerors who made and unmade empires, who changed forms of government, and who brought about a revision of the political map. However, Isaiah, Buddha, Plato, and Jesus left a heritage to man which still stirs his mind and moves his heart.

Man everywhere has the same spiritual yearnings because he must contend with the same forces of destiny and is everywhere subject to the same laws of nature. Consequently, the mechanism of his mind operates in the same manner and the differences in its manifestations are determined by soil and clime. The same universal consciousness also creates the same universal reality.

The local coloring of man's mind does not impair its universality. Because a Hindu would not understand Dostoevsky, a Chinaman Nietzsche, or a Russian Pascal does not testify to the ethnic confinement of the human mind. It merely indicates that these men were concerned primarily with local and temporary problems which they could not express in terms of universal truth.

Modern man considers the phenomena of nature not as isolated manifestations but as a unity and a totality. The same approach must be applied to a consideration of historical phenomena. If there is a living nature, there surely must be a living history embracing all phenomena, movements, tendencies, and manifestations in the realm of man. This living history, however, is not a ghost completely detached from and independent of living nature and yet at the same time is not identical with it. It is a suzerain guided by its own rhythm and logic. To understand this relationship is the task of modern historiography.

If we wish to penetrate into the mysteries of nature, we first examine its individual phenomena and their correlation. So, too, if we desire to understand the historical process we must begin with an inquiry into its major manifestations. Buddha, Moses, Plato, St. Paul, and Spinoza are such revelations. It may be urged that these manifestations are only accidents of history, yet could Buddhism have arisen in ancient Rome, or could ancient Hebraic monotheism have been born in Greece? This objection, reasonable though it may appear to be, is not valid because time and space necessitated the appearance of these forces. Historical manifestations are as much a product of contact with reality as are the manifestations of the mind. The major tendencies in history often arise and move independently of the individual. The creative mind, being the expression of a given movement, is often more its agent than its creator. If Buddha had lived in Greece, some other figure would have created Buddhism in India; or if Isaiah, Jeremiah, or Micah had not lived in Palestine, others would have conveyed their message.

Spinozism was as necessary a phenomenon in seventeenth-century Europe as was Christianity in its time. Spinoza is the culmination point of one of the most conspicuous tendencies in history. He is important not so much as a literary but as a world-historic figure. He is one of the major historical phenomena, comparable only with characters like Buddha and St. Paul, a steady and stirring force in history.

III

Buddhism negates life, Judaism affirms it. The negation of life is a symptom of decadence, for healthy races

cling tenaciously to it. Those who deny life also deny its value. But who can say whether life is valuable or valueless? Nietzsche already asked: "Who can sit in judgment over it? Surely not the living; they are a party to it. And as to the dead. . . ." If the dead cannot and the living should not sit in judgment, who, then, may pass judgment upon the value of life? Yet this devaluation of life by the Eastern Aryans is the very basis of their negative attitude to it. However, not a metaphysical but a physical state predetermined the ancient Hindu's attitude toward life. The tropical sun and the jungle destroyed his appetite for it, for they annihilated in him the courage to fight and the will to live. He who does not struggle for life sees it as an uninterrupted suffering, and a perpetual martyrdom. He tires quickly of life, for he is lacking in virility and becomes a victim of physical and moral decadence. Out of this deterioration arose the lifeless and anonymous universalism of the East.

The man who emerged from the jungle denied life, while he who came out of the desert affirmed it. The sterility of the desert constantly drove him in quest of food, and in this search the weak and the inefficient perished while only the strong survived. Thus a natural process of selection took place which created a virile race. The ancient Jews became individualistic to the same extent that the ancient Eastern Aryans grew universalistic. Ancient Hindu universalism expressed itself in anonymity; ancient Hebraic individualism in biography. The Upanishads are filled with deep and subtle thought, but the Old Testament is crowded with powerful figures. Who are the personalities of the Upanishads; when and how did they live? What was

their destiny and what part did they play in life? We know only the names of some of the supposed authors of the work, but of their lives we are ignorant. However, we are familiar with the biography of every important figure in the Old Testament. We know when and how he lived and what he accomplished. Even the New Testament opens with a biography, and to that extent it is not only a continuation but an accentuation of Old Testament religiosity. In the Upanishads man is not visible and we hear only his cosmic wails and lamentations. In the Old Testament we see man not in the abstract, but with pangs of hunger engraved upon his face. Both the cosmic and the national myths of man in the Old Testament begin with hunger. The first we see in "By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat thy bread," and the second, "And there was a famine in the land." In the Old Testament the will to eat is coequal with the will to live. But in the Upanishads man is neither hungry nor desirous of living. He is a meditating and pensive individual, a vague figure without expression or passion. He is only an insignificant part of this miserable world, one of its myriads of atoms which flows from one existence to another, without aim or goal. In the end he entirely disappears, leaving only the echo of a sigh in his wake. To the extent that the Bible is anthropocentric, the Upanishads are cosmocentric. The personal, living God of the Bible is only a correlation to its living, passionate, and powerful man. The universal and dead God of the Upanishads is equal in reality to its dead universalism. Out of the jungle crawled a dead God, and out of the desert roared a living God.

The religious history of Western man is, in the final analysis, the history of a struggle between the living

Jehovah and the dead Brahma. For the last two thousand years all Aryan and Semitic religiosity expressed itself either in a synthesis or in a combination of these two basic types of piety. Thus, Christianity is the synthesis of Eastern universalism and Hebraic and Western individualism. In Christianity God dies, but since its cradle, Palestine, was not conducive of a dead God, he rose again. This struggle between a living and a dead God continued in the various Christological doctrines of the first five centuries after Christ, in medieval mysticism, and finally in Spinoza. Spinoza's God has neither will nor intellect. He is impersonal and hence dead. However, since Spinoza was steeped in Hebraic tradition he often forgets that his God is dead and ascribes to Him the characteristics of a living God.

IV

Buddhism is coequal with pessimism. To the pessimist this is the most miserable world possible; it is one uninterrupted suffering, a valley of tears. He always looks backward, and to him the future holds nothing in store for man. Buddha, too, speaks constantly of the preceding existences of man. The future to him is only Nirvana, the state of not being. The optimist, on the other hand, hates the past, despises the present, but has faith in the future. Just as Buddhism is identical with pessimism, so ancient Judaism is synonymous with optimism. Buddhism ends with Nirvana, ancient Judaism with Messiah. Messiah is not the incarnation of redemption or of salvation, but the inauguration of a new period in the world's history. He is the very apotheosis of Old Testament optimism. He is the vision of the future. He will not redeem but help; he will not save but

relieve. He will concern himself with the oppressed and downtrodden, not with the sin-laden.

And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord. And shall make him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord; and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears. But with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide with equity for the meek of the land; and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked. And righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins. The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.²

Ancient India was permeated with entirely different motives. Its central problem was not man but sin, which is recognized as the greatest phenomenon in life. Man is reduced to a shadow, to an illusion. Not man but his metaphysical self constitutes reality. Since reality is eliminated and there is "neither slain nor slayer, neither oppressed nor oppressor"—to use a Buddhistic figure of speech—of what avail is it for the oppressed to resist the oppressor in this world of illusion? This deep-seated belief made it possible for the Brahmin caste to debase a goodly portion of Hindu humanity to the depths of the Chandalah order, the lowest form of organized human life in the world. The Chandalah was deprived of the most elementary human rights. He was even forbidden to drink fresh water but was compelled to drink from the sewer. Yet he made no effort to rebel against this cruelty.

Buddha, too, was not concerned with the lot of the lower castes. He who was disinterested in man and his

² Isa. 11:2.

welfare was equally indifferent to economic, political, or social justice. Just as there is no Buddhistic theory of the state, so there is no Buddhistic theory of sociology and economics. The New Testament, too, with the possible exception of psychology, is lacking in a science of man. It, too, expressed its indifference to his political destinies: "Render unto Caesar what is to Caesar and unto God what is to God." St. Paul even said that man should remain in the station in which God found him and should remain content with it. Baruch Spinoza, the spiritual heir of Buddha and St. Paul, incorporated these views in his philosophical system. He, too, was willing to make peace with any form of government or society, no matter how iniquitous, because not man but nature was his main guide. However, the Old Testament, together with the Reformation and Kant, formulated a science of man. All of them contain jurisprudence, ethics, economics, and politics because man is their main concern.

V

Buddha and Jesus suggested to man a moral conduct, whereas the prophets of Israel, Plato, and Kant spoke to man in terms of the categorical imperative. Redemptive religiosity suggests that man be good; legalistic religiosity commands him to do good. The one recommends morality; the other teaches ethics. The one overflows with sympathy and compassion for all creatures; the other concerns itself with stern justice for man. Redemptive religiosity regards man as only a suffering creature, a victim of fate. It addresses itself to man in an abnormal state. It beholds only the crippled, the sick, the poor, the beggar, the aged, the blind,

and the leper. To this suffering, bleeding, and agonizing humanity it conveys a message of salvation. But legalistic religiosity imposes itself upon men in all stations of life and it addresses itself not only to a part of humanity but to all of humanity.

Redemptive religiosity conquered the world because of its appeal to the lowly. The lionizing of the poor represents the piety of the Aryan, but not the religiosity of the Semite. Legalistic religiosity is indissolubly interlinked with ethics, which becomes the grammar of conscience for all men in all stations in life. Its central theme is not living creatures or suffering humanity but active man. It sympathizes not only with lowly man but with struggling humanity. In this attitude legalistic religiosity is in accord with Platonic and Kantian ethics.

Like Buddha and St. Paul, Spinoza speaks the language of moralism, not of ethicism. His main theme is salvation, not welfare; spiritual happiness, not political or economic reform. He who said that we are only slaves of nature and of God could not possibly have been the creator of ethics, which implies activism. His heart was full of compassion and pity for the down-trodden and the oppressed. A teacher of immanent religiosity, he heard only the voice of nature in all creatures, of which man was only one.

Morality is the logic of a dead God; ethics, of a living God. A God who is identical with nature has no power, for he needs none. He cannot love or be loved, reward or punish. The mystic may love God with an intense love and imagine that he is loved by Him until he reaches a point of ecstasy in which he feels himself at one with Him. But then this love of God becomes only love for himself. Thus that which Spinoza calls the

highest is in fact the lowest form of love, for it degenerates into a ghastly, perverted self-love. Communion with God presumes a personal and a living God. All other communion is only contact with nature and its voice. This call is the call of compassion not of justice, of pity not of reason, and of sympathy not of retribution.

Together with Schopenhauer and Hartmann, Houston Stewart Chamberlain correctly observed that morality is a fact of nature and is not man's invention. When man hears his dog cry, his sympathy is instinctively aroused, for he stands face to face with the phenomenon of morality. Morality is the reaction to physical suffering by any creature, but ethics which is mind-made and not born in the emotions is not to be found in nature because only man is its theme. It is the primogeniture of logics. Its anchor ground is recognition, not sentimentality. It is stimulated by the attributes of a living God, not by the properties of a dead one.

A dead God spells pantheism and its inevitable consequence, fatalism. This doctrine surrenders man to fate before which he cowers in mortal terror. He visualizes it as a force which rules supreme and unopposed. Therefore, Spinoza proclaimed aloud, "There is no redemption for man, he cannot escape his fate."

VI

Medieval Europe and India were products of deadening universalism overwhelmed by gloom and pessimism. One of the outstanding features of the Middle Ages is that it was the time of the forgotten personality which flattened life to one church, one faith, one language, and eventually one world-monarchy. Medieval man was carried away by the frightful thought of sin from which

he sought to purge himself by self-denial. His yearning for redemption assumed pathological forms, expressing itself in mysticism and witchcraft in the north and in the inquisition in the south. Not the organization of life but its suppression became the ideal.

This ascetic state of mind inculcated a passive attitude in man and caused him to lay aside his cares and worries. Only the rediscovery of man by the Reformation and the Renaissance made him grasp the significance of the term "care." He began again to care for this life, for earthly happiness, for the future of his family and for his nation. The expression "*amor soli natalis*," the "love for one's native soil," the slogan of modern patriotism, reverberated throughout Europe. Man fixed his eye upon the future, which he sought to secure.

In planning for the future he discovered the pleasures and joys of life, and waxed bold. Man's passing from universalism to individualism can be said to have been inaugurated by the papal bull *Unam Sanctam*, written in 1302 by Boniface VIII. The following two centuries witnessed a life-and-death struggle between these basic forces, resulting in the defeat of pessimistic ascetic universalism.

Life received a new impetus to which the entire literature of the age testified. God as a holy spirit was forced to retreat before God as a personality. Martin Luther, who replaced papal authority with biblical spirituality, symbolized this new tendency. But even more than he was concerned with the Kingdom of God was he interested in the state and in man. He, too, was a planner of man's future, and the very embodiment of German Sorge.

In Southern Europe the rediscovery of man was brought about not by the rediscovery of the Bible but by the rebirth of interest in individualistic Hellas and Rome. Europe thereby acquired a new cast of features. Not the monk, the symbol of asceticism, self-denial, and of the end of life, but the statesman and soldier, the embodiment of the lover of life, became the predominant figures.

Just as medieval Europe was universalistic, pessimistic, and static, so is modern Europe individualistic, optimistic, and dynamic. Therein the historical process manifested itself by replacing one main stream with the other. This vacillation characterizes the development of all great cultures and is conditioned upon the law of the exhaustion of spiritual energy. Thus universalistic Christianity rose upon the ruins of individualistic, classical, and Hebraic antiquity, which was spent by the struggle of a millennium. From the fall of the Roman Empire another one thousand years passed before man gathered sufficient strength to regain his own personality.

The development of individualism in Europe was finally checked by two forces—by Bruno in the south and by Spinoza in the north. The virile, passionate, and rhapsodic Bruno stormed and thundered against the personal God while the frail, weak Spinoza did away with Him silently. Bruno attempted to shout God out of existence; while Spinoza systematically incased Him in dead formulae. A dead God spreads the spirit of gloom, and over the world of Spinoza hovers a spirit of resignation and despair.

Just when Western man was planning to secure the future, to conquer for himself an impregnable position

in life and to make it more comfortable, joyous, and satisfactory, Spinoza with his dead God and his spirit of gloom announced to bustling Western humanity that man is irretrievably lost in this life. This pessimistic tone in an optimistic world, this message of universalism to an individualistic humanity, caused man to change Spinoza's first name from *Benedictus* to *Maledictus*. This turn of fate foreshadowed the influence he was about to wield.

VII

Every world-picture, no matter how abstract, complicated, subtle, or detached from religiosity it may be, contains a religious message and addresses itself to humanity. There is a sharp line of demarcation separating religion and philosophy. The goal of religion is salvation and that of philosophy is truth. Yet even the most abstract type of philosophy contains a religious element, and the greater its development the faster its expansion. What is true of religiosity in philosophy is all the more true of religiosity in religion. Buddhism spread with amazing rapidity because it is the incarnation of genuine religiosity. It also has a deep metaphysical background which is not religious but philosophical in character, for it contains its own theory of knowledge, logics, and morals. Philosophically, Buddhism is too subtle to captivate the masses, yet because of its deep religious content it has a wide appeal. Of Judaism the reverse is true. From the point of view of Aryan religiosity it is much inferior to Buddhism. It addresses itself not to man's emotions but to his reason, and seeks to regulate his feelings by his intellect. Such an attitude is not compatible with true religiosity, which teaches the primacy of feeling. Everyone responds to a power-

ful emotional appeal, but only a few can respond to an intellectual call. For this reason Judaism has been confined to only one people.

To the extent that philosophy aims at salvation and redemption does it possess possibilities of conquering and subjugating man. The triumphs of heretic Spinozism illustrate this principle. Spinoza's teachings were already known outside of Holland during the final years of his life. So fast did his fame spread that at a time when no Jew could occupy an academic position in Central and Western Europe he was invited to fill the chair of philosophy in the University of Heidelberg, one of the most important seats of learning of the time in Germany. However, his contemporary, Leibnitz, the father of the German enlightenment, who created an optimistic world-picture, always remained only a philosopher for philosophers. Even Immanuel Kant, although always famous, was never popular. In his own fatherland he was all but forgotten for most of the nineteenth century until revived by Hermann Cohen and his school. Spinoza, however, was never exhumed because he was never buried. Kant, because of his exclusive intellectuality, has influenced only his students, while Spinoza, because of his emotional appeal, has ruled even those who have never heard his name.

The rise, triumph, and victory of Spinozism in Europe are reminiscent of the power of ancient Buddhism because both are religiosity rather than philosophy. Spinozism is religion even when it operates with bizarre formulas. Its starting-point is a dead God, who is reminiscent of Buddha's Brahma. It is man's metaphysical fear and not the idea of a living God which is the driving force in religiosity. True religiosity is not an

understanding of how God is correlated to man and to the world but the feeling of man's insignificance in the cosmos, giving birth to a state of meekness, humbleness, compassion, and pity. Only when man is crushed and overwhelmed by the thought of his insignificance in this vast universe does he become truly religious. These feelings are as present in Spinozism as they are in Buddhism. Judaism, however, which stresses the supremacy of man, fills him with the feeling of his own strength. It encourages him to become a stormer of heaven and to measure his strength not only with nature but with God Himself. Nothing is more characteristic of the Old Testament than the expression, "Thou shalt be like God." Buddhism, by teaching that only naught is truth and only when life will again reach a state of naught will it again be truth, thereby paralyzed man's initiative. Instead of commanding him to carry on his struggle with the forces of eternity, it teaches him to resign from life. His only relationship to his fellow-creatures is his compassion and pity for them. The Buddhistic Spinoza, too, exclaimed that we are only slaves of nature and consequently slaves of God. What can be more terrifying and frightening to living man than to be subject to a dead God? Yet this doctrine has made a stirring appeal to the vast circle of salvation-seekers who find an asylum in it. It was, therefore, for good reason that the earliest Spinozists were members of pious sects.

VIII

In ancient times it was a Jew, St. Paul, who stormed westward with the message of Christianity, spelling redemption and salvation. In the seventeenth century it was a Jew, Spinoza, who duplicated this feat. Both

men were, at the same time, rabbinic as well as westernized Jews. They appeared at a time when humanity was satiated with intellectualism. When Hellenistic culture with its pagan motives, its lascivious festivities, its carnal joys and intoxicating orgies, its illuminated temples and its great theaters, held sway over Western Asia and parts of Northern Africa, a sickly, ascetic, and epileptic Jew, preaching self-denial and the negation of life, arose and undermined its foundation. His message silenced a noisy world, transforming joy into sadness, arrogance into humility, aggressiveness into meekness, and the call of the flesh into abject self-denial. This message of salvation determined the destinies of Europe for a thousand years.

In the seventeenth century the echoes of the Renaissance were still ringing throughout Western Europe. Man was still reaching for the stars and striving with nature to wrest from it its deepest secrets and beautiful forms. Furthermore, the self-denial of the Dark Ages gave way to a hedonistic age. Rabelais roared, Montaigne doubted, and Descartes was convinced. Each, in his affirmation of life, expressed the sentiments of his day. In this world of joy and restiveness, aggressiveness, and creativeness, stirring man to memorable triumphs over nature, arose a poor, frail, and consumptive Jew who announced that man is only a slave of nature, that his position in the universe is insignificant, that he is wandering upon this planet without rhyme or reason, that like God he is chained to eternal and immutable laws, is deprived of his freedom and can find happiness only in the recognition of life's futility.

What more striking analogy to St. Paul can be found? Both men were irrationalistic in their rationalism. Both

were mystics, who denied life, teaching predestination and thereby delivering man to fate. They sought only salvation, not truth. The doctrines of these two rabbinic Jews have been interpreted by the synagogue as being a betrayal of Judaism. This attitude can be readily understood from the very nature of the Jewish mind. The Jew has always been an extremist. On the one hand, he produced a Moses, who was so enamored with earthly life that he was ashamed to die, and, on the other, a Jesus, who so despised earthly life that he was almost ashamed to live. Prophet and wrongdoer, patriot and traitor, saint and sinner, scholar and ignoramus, were all Jews. The intellectual Hillel and the mystical St. Paul were Jews. In modern times Fritz Stahl, the founder of Prussian Junkerism, and Karl Marx, the founder of socialism, Leon Trotsky, the true founder of the Bolshevik state, and David Pasmanik, the theoretician of the Russian Czarists and pogromists, were all Jews. Therefore, it is not shocking to see St. Paul as only the other self of Rabbi Saul of Tarsus and Baruch d'Espinosa as the other cheek of Benedictus Spinoza. It is one of history's little ironies that Jewish thought upon reaching a certain height should turn into its contrary and that two Jews should become the foremost representatives of anti-Judaism.

IX

One of the most stupefying phenomena in the history of the Occident is the enormous influence which ancient Judaism has had upon the march of events for the last two thousand years. This influence has made itself felt particularly in the north. From pre-Reformation days to the present all branches of the Teutonic race have

engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the Bible and against Rome. On the Continent, Martin Luther, by his translation of the Bible into German, was instrumental in creating one German language which united all Germanic tribes into one nation. In England, the King James translation of the Bible became the source of modern English culture. In the heyday of biblicism in England it was even proposed in the House of Commons that English be replaced by ancient Hebrew. Even the Romantic school could not interrupt the continued influence of Old Testament religiosity upon English intellectual life.

In the sixteenth century European culture was still Latinized. Latin was the universal language of science, philosophy, and theology. Suddenly, because of the Reformation, ancient Rome lost its hold upon the entire land and was replaced by ancient Judea. The change was not merely one of masters but also of spirit. This change can be seen in the new lyrical approach to nature and in the new conception of the importance of man. In Germany this new tendency reached its height in Klopstock and Handel and in England in Milton. This biblical tendency not only shaped the spiritual destinies of the Germanic peoples, but also affected their political outlook. By emancipating them from Rome it guided them along the path of nationalism.

What has been the lure of Old Testament religiosity for the Teutonic peoples? It did not emphasize beauty, Eros, and the cult of the senses. The magic power of this religiosity lies in its individualism. The northerner, who is constantly engaged and absorbed in a struggle with nature, must rely upon his own powers to overcome it. He thereby becomes an individualist and can-

not possibly feel himself to be a part of nature. Just as monistic pantheism is a product of the Tropics, so is individualistic religiosity a product of temperate climes. The distinct individualism of the Bible could not but affect the northerner, who himself considered nature to be the domain of highly individualistic forces. Not so much the beliefs, views, and ideas of the Old Testament captivated him as did its living figures in whom he readily recognized eternal characters, and its ethical percepts which reflected his own conception of justice. The appearance of Spinoza came as such a shock because, living in a Western individualistic world and hailing from an individualistic people, he conveyed to the Occidental an Eastern universalistic message in Western terms.

X

Philosophy has definite schools consisting of rights and lefts, but religion not emanating from the intellect is an irregular stream. The lines of Kantianism or of Hegelianism are sharply drawn, but those of Spinozism are not. Like every great expression of deep religious consciousness, it is rather vague despite its precise formulas. Nor is it of one color, for it has attracted a variety of people with a variety of temperaments. It inspired the men of the enlightenment of the eighteenth century because of its critical and often negative attitude toward organized religions. It influenced the liberals because of its doctrine of freedom of speech and thought. It captivated the imagination of despots and tyrants because of its identification of might and right. It electrified poets because of the grandeur of its conception of nature. It fascinated philosophers and psychologists with its doctrine of the *una substantia*. It fasci-

nated the pious and the impious, the rationalists and the irrationalists. The multitude of the rays and colors which emanate from it has been the source of both its strength and its weakness. However, its multicolored prism testifies to its religious character. Purely philosophical thought is either an affirmation or a negation. But Spinozism teaches both oneness and multitudinousness, rationalism and mysticism. The realization of this contrast will help to explain the paradoxical phenomenon called Spinozism.

■

I
THE MAN AND HIS POSITION

■

SPINOZA'S INFLUENCE ON MODERN CULTURE

I

IVAN THE TERRIBLE'S magnificent cathedral, Gabriel the Redeemer, looks down with mixed feelings upon the holy sepulcher of Nikolai Lenin the Terrible on the Red Square, abutting the Kremlin Wall. It beholds with amazement the milling throngs winding across the square to and from the low iron railing around the mausoleum. In deathlike silence masses of people ascend and descend a red-carpeted staircase and turn right, to where a corridor leads them into the little squat cellar. There lies Lenin on a simple couch beneath a glass pyramid. He is enshrouded in khaki tunic with the Order of the Red Flag on his breast. Red soldiers with fixed bayonets stand motionless at the head and foot of the squat base and along the walls of the tomb which taper up in conical slant and give to the whole structure an exotic, oriental appearance. This tomb is the Russian shrine. Here hundreds of thousands of people from all parts of the Red Russian Empire worship with the same religious fervor and devotion as do the Christian faithful at the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, or as do the devout Jews at the Wailing Wall, for Lenin, symbol of the new Russia, is in himself the apotheosis of the communist creed.

It is perhaps no stupid coincidence that Ivan the Terrible's cathedral, Gabriel the Redeemer, overlooks the Red holy sepulcher, for Russia's destiny was always presided over by someone "terrible." If not Ivan, it was

Paul, or Alexander, or Nikolai, the Terrible. Russian terribleness is the secret of Russian might and the method of Russian domination. Both Ivan the Terrible and Nikolai Lenin imposed their rule upon the Russian people, since both were Russia personified. The fact that Ivan was black and Lenin red makes little difference. The figure of Lenin would be altogether enigmatic had it not the figure of Ivan as its background. Lenin more than Ivan the Terrible is the apotheosis of modern Russia.

Nikolai Lenin, the first great inquisitorial figure since Torquemada, like his black predecessor in Spain, was concerned with saving souls, or, as he called it in his language, "minds." He, too, was ready to kill the body to save the mind (the soul). In one of his letters to Maxim Gorky he speaks of the necessity of breaking skulls; and upon this principle he established his ruthless régime, to which there is no analogy in the political annals of white humanity. Leninism is the inquisition régime reincarnated. It is the régime of brute force, which completely disregards the individual and his rights. It is the triumph of absolute universalism over individualism, and leaves no room for personality, freedom, or individual expression. Leninism is brute nature's force translated into politics.

The philosophic patron saint of Lenin's state is none other than Baruch Spinoza, the lonely Dutch Jew from Portugal whose earthly remains found a final resting-place in a Christian church. Although Lenin's relationship to the doctrine of Spinoza is, as far as I know, not recorded, his disciples understood that the two were linked indissolubly. Therefore, when in 1927 the two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of Baruch Spinoza's death was observed throughout the Western world, the

reigning powers in Lenin's state proclaimed Spinoza the official philosopher of Red Russia. Until that time this position had been held by Immanuel Kant, and many Bolshevik theoreticians considered themselves to be neo-Kantians. But, when they discovered that neo-Kantianism with its doctrine of the autonomy of will, or even of free will, is not compatible with their deterministic world-concept, they immediately replaced Kant with Spinoza. Thus it came to pass that the philosophy of the lonely Jew of Amsterdam became the official creed of this state which occupies a sixth part of the habitable globe.

Nikolai Lenin was a man of action who was but little interested in matters purely metaphysical.¹ Although he was a follower of Karl Marx, he entertained no relationship to any of the other major philosophers of ancient or modern times. Yet as determinist, universalist, and naturalist he was actually nearer to Spinoza than to any other philosopher. If he was not consciously a follower of Spinoza, he was surely his adherent subconsciously, for otherwise Spinoza would never have been proclaimed as the philosophic patron saint of Lenin's state. Lenin's mind was hewn from the rock of Spinozism, and, because his mind imposed itself firmly upon Russia, Christianity in Russia actually was replaced with Spinozism.

¹ In all the thirty-four volumes of the collected works of Lenin, published by the Lenin Institute in Moscow, Spinoza's name occurs only once. The manner in which he refers to Spinoza makes it almost certain that if he knew him at all he knew him secondhand.

Lenin's interest in philosophy was of a purely partisan nature. His measure of truth was historical materialism and, whenever he suspected in a system of philosophy a challenge to his truth, he fought it in a typical Bolshevik manner. It is for this reason that he fought Mach and Avenarius and their followers in Russia. The struggle of the classes is to Lenin, a metaphysical category; he traces it to his category of polarity.

Lenin, however, was not the only ruthless politician who embraced Spinozism *de facto*. Bismarck, the iron chancellor, who forged the Wilhelminic German Empire, was also a disciple of Spinoza. He was as symbolic of Teutonic might as was Lenin of Russian power. The man who waged three wars within seven years, who humbled the Hapsburg realm and annihilated the second French Empire, was both a believer in and an admirer of the lonely Jewish lens-grinder.² Intimate friends of the chancellor often related that in moments of restlessness he would always concentrate on Spinoza's *Ethics*. He admitted that the reading of Spinoza had the same calming effect on his mind as his occupation with geometric problems.

To Bismarck, however, Spinoza was not merely a comforter and a spiritual guide but was a political inspiration. Although Bismarck made the first attempt to socialize the German Empire, and regarded the state as being much more than an insurance company, he was, nevertheless, greatly impressed by Spinoza's political doctrine. Spinoza's predilection for the aristocratically governed state, as well as his dictum that the sphere of right is delimited by the sphere of might, appealed greatly to Bismarck. Hence, it is not blind chance that men like Lenin and Bismarck were Spinozists, either in fact or in theory.

Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher of the superman,

² About Bismarck's relationship to Spinoza, the iron chancellor's biographer, Busch, is very explicit "Bismarck occupied himself with Spinoza in his student days, and though we do not know exactly to what an extent he had adjusted himself to the latter's world concept, we have a right to assume that it influenced him considerably and that it was one of the causes of his *Weltschmerz*, which attacked him in those days and which later on colored his entire mentality."

All of Bismarck's other biographers mention the chancellor's deep interest in Spinoza.

of the blond beast, and the rhapsodist of brute power, was also a Spinoza enthusiast. This seems to be the more unnatural since Nietzsche was an ultra-individualist and Spinoza was the incarnation of universalism. In addition, Nietzsche was one of the very few outspoken atheists of the West while Spinoza is commonly referred to as a God-intoxicated Jew. At first, it is not discernible what Nietzsche could have had in common with Spinoza, but the author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* expressed himself very clearly on his attitude and relationship to him.

I am quite astonished! I am full of delight! I have a predecessor and what a predecessor! I almost did not know Spinoza! That I have an urge for him now was a turn of the instinct. Not only does his whole tendency equal mine to make recognition the most powerful effect—but in five principal points of his doctrine, I rediscover mine. This most abnormal and lonely thinker is nearest to me in just these things; he denies the freedom of will—; the ends—; the moral world order—; the unegotistic—; the evil—; Though the differences are immense, they are rather to be found in time, culture, and science; but on the whole, my solitude, which like on the peak of high mountains, has caused me hard breathing and made my blood pour forth, is now at least a dualitude.

This is a remarkable confession of faith. Innumerable historians of philosophy and of culture have traced Nietzsche's creed to all sorts of philosophies, religions, cultures, and schools of thought. Yet Nietzsche, himself, traced not only his philosophy but his entire personality³ to Spinoza. Just as Richard Wagner furnished

³ Nietzsche's philosophy has been described by Rudolf Eisler as naturalistic pantheism. Fritz Mauthner, in his *History of Atheism in the West*, IV, 360, glorifies him as the greatest atheist of modern times, quoting the remarkable passage from Zarathustra, "I am Zarathustra the atheist. I still cook every accident in my own pot."

Benedict Lachman, in his book *Protagoras, Nietzsche, Stirner*, stresses the solipsist Nietzsche. Nietzsche's philosophy is best summed up in Hans Vaihinger's *Nietzsche als Philosoph* (Berlin, 1912).

the music to Bismarck's roaring guns, so did Nietzsche furnish the rhapsodies to Bismarck's fiery cannons. If Bismarck stood with one foot in Spinozism, Nietzsche stood with both feet in it. So enamored was he with Spinoza that he regarded him as a kindred atheistic spirit,⁴ which was the highest compliment he could pay him.

Nietzsche, Lenin, and Bismarck were all more pre-occupied with the future than with the present. Lenin wished to redeem the entire human race and to become its Messiah, for he believed himself to be eschatology personified. His future-consciousness was almost ancient Hebraic in character and was full of messianic motives. He visualized the last day as being flaming red with communism reigning supreme. Bismarck was less ambitious, for he was anxious to redeem only the Teutonic race. Nietzsche's future-consciousness actually borders on the psychopathological. The impetuosity with which he expected the superman of the future, as a redeemer of the human race, is characteristic of his future-consciousness.

These three men, representing the motives of might, visualized the future in their own way, and strove to impose upon it their personality and their spirit: Bismarck, the spirit of the rule of the bourgeoisie; Lenin, the rule of the proletariat; and Nietzsche, the rule of the superman or of the aristocrat. All three men, thirsty

"AN SPINOZA

"Dem 'Eins in allem' liebend zugewandt
 Amor Dei, selig *aus Verstand*
 Die Schuhe aus! Welch dreimal heilig Land!
 Doch unter dieser Liebe frass
 Ein heimlich glimmender Rachebrand
 —Am Judengott frass Judenhals—
 Einsiedler, hab' ich dich erkannt?"

for power and overwhelmed with future-consciousness, were influenced by Spinoza. But his true political influence does not end with Lenin, or Bismarck, or Nietzsche. He helped to shape the philosophy of Hegel, the philosophical patron saint of Prussian reactionism. To the extent that Hegelianism had been a political force in the Western world⁵ has Spinoza's political influence been a positive and a potent factor in white man's land.

Four major cultural streams spring from Hegel's system: right Hegelianism, which determined the course of German political life and thought for over half a century; left Hegelianism, as applied to the historic and economic process, which resulted in the communist manifesto of 1848; left Hegelianism as it determined the course of religious development in Germany; and the Hegelian theory of the state as embodied in the doctrines of La Salle, which are a synthesis of Hegel's theory of the state and Fichte's theory of German nationalism. Behind all these major tendencies which have reshaped not only German but European life and thought for almost a century lurks the enigmatic figure of the lonely Jew of Amsterdam.

Hegel's interest in Spinoza dates back to his acquaintance with Spinoza's political philosophy. He was so captivated by it that he actually said that to be a philosopher one must first be a Spinozist. He discovered in Spinoza what he missed in Kant, namely, a more intimate connection between knowledge and action and theory and practice. Hegel's infamous saying, "That which is, is rational," bears the brand of Spinoza.

Not so much Hegel's general philosophy, panlogi-

⁵ Hitlerism is Hegelianism via Spengler. His "third realm" is the synthesis of the thesis of the first and the antithesis of the second German Reich.

cism, as his philosophy of law and politics, of which the right Hegelians, the representatives of both Prussian and Russian reaction,⁶ made ample use, can be easily traced to Spinoza. Spinoza's preference for the aristocracy as a ruling power appealed strongly to them.

It may be noted in passing that in spite of Spinoza's vast influence on modern political thought and action, his name is not connected with any emancipation movement, or with any revolutionary tendency. The French Revolution ignored him. While this may be partly due to Bayle's misrepresentation of Spinoza's doctrine and also to the fact that during the first half of the eighteenth century Spinoza was more the target of theologians than a magnet to philosophers and statesmen, one must admit that even without those incidents Spinoza could not have had any appreciable influence on the emancipation movement. The term "emancipation" involves the term of freedom, and implies a vitalistic process instead of a mechanical course. Every forward movement in history presumes a dynamic personality and progress-consciousness. None of these conceptions had any meaning to Spinoza.

Neither the French Revolution nor any of its great figures such as Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Condillac, or Holbach were influenced by him. Although neither his general works nor his political philosophy appealed to them, many of them were more or less familiar with his teachings. But to the irreligious among them he was too much the religionist, and to the religiously in-

⁶ Czaristic Russia, to the extent that it was philosophically oriented, drew its inspiration from right Hegelianism, while Bolshevik Russia, being Marxistic, is politically an offshoot of left Hegelianism. Both political orientations can be traced to Spinoza.

clined he was too much the atheist.⁷ But his political philosophy could not possibly appeal to them. They urged political freedom, and their slogan was "Equality, Liberty, and Fraternity." They were permeated with the spirit of humanitarianism, and looked upon this world *sub specie boni*, from the purely human point of view. To them man was both their starting-point and their goal, and his political, economic, and social happiness was of primary concern and importance. But Spinoza looked at the world not from the human but from the cosmic point of view, and in his world-system man occupies but an insignificant position. It, therefore, could not be expected that the intellectual leaders of the French Revolution should take their cue from Spinoza. Voltaire was the only one of them who concerned himself in any manner with Spinoza. While he examined Spinoza's philosophy critically, he admired Spinoza only for his religiosity and piety. The man who said that "if God did not exist He would have to be invented" could not have been influenced by Spinoza's philosophy.⁸ He was deeply puzzled that such a pious man as Spinoza could produce so impious a philosophy: "Il renversait tout les principes de la morale, en étant lui-même d'une vertu rigide."

Thus we see the pious and genial recluse of Amsterdam becoming the delight of all autocrats and despots and

⁷ See Montesquieu, *Persian Letters*, 59.

⁸ "Alors un petit Juif, au long nez, au teint blême,
Pauvre, mais satisfait, pensif et retiré,
Esprit subtil et creux, moins lu que célèbre,
Caché sous le manteau de Descartes, son maître,
Marchant à pas comptés, s'approcha du grant être:
'Pardonnez-moi,' dit-il, en lui parlant tout bas,
Mais je pense, entre nous, que vous n'existez pas."

the hope of those who thirst for power, but the same became the source of inspiration to lyrical poets and philosophical romanticists as well. How strange a spectacle that from one and the same source darkness and light emanated.

II

The influence Spinoza exercised over philosophical idealists and poets such as the romantic school of philosophy and poetry made it appear that his own doctrine is idealistic in nature. But the test of all philosophic idealism is not the influence which a certain philosophical system has upon succeeding generations but the position which man occupies in that system. In them man is the central theme, the starting-point, and the goal. Wherein consists the greatness of Socrates? By discovering ethics he discovered man, for man is the central figure of ethics. The man with whom ethics is concerned is not empiric man, nor even man as a social atom. Ethics is interested in man only in so far as he is capable of the good. Empiric man is only part of nature, which is not within the purview of ethics. The origin of ethics in the Occident bears out this assertion. When Socrates discovered man, he placed him in contradistinction to nature.⁹ Socrates' positive attitudes to man grew parallel with his negative attitude to physics. His interest in man grew out of a wild negative reaction to biological nature. Many later Greek philosophers followed in Socrates' footsteps.

Plato, like all great philosophers, was disinterested in the isolated individual or in biological man. He quickly discovered that only within organized society is an in-

⁹ "I can learn nothing from the stone or from the tree, but from man I can learn everything," he is reported to have said.

dividual an organic part of humanity. The state, so he sets forth in his *Republic*, has a soul, and he is concerned only with man who participates in that soul. It is only within the state that man loses his beastliness. It is only as a citizen who participates in the common weal that he becomes part of humanity. The isolated individual never rises to the heights of humaneness. Only organized humanity within the state frees the individual from the shackles of self-consciousness and makes him recognize his fellow-man as a shareholder in a spiritual community.

Aristotle's conception of man is less idealistic, but, nevertheless, it expresses all the character of the genius of classical antiquity. Man is a social and a political being because he is the weakest of all the higher animals. He can triumph in his struggle for existence only as a social being with the assistance of his fellow-men. Thus, from whatever point of view the genius of classical antiquity regarded man, it surely did not visualize empiric man. The state was not merely a mechanism, or an insurance company. It was an organic whole of which the individual was a part.

In the world of Spinoza, however, man and his position sink into insignificance. He becomes only one of the *modi*, one of transient things, and vanishes from sight the moment everything that stretches before us in infinite space is viewed cosmically, or, in the language of Spinoza, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Thus man, who considers himself to be the crown of creation, becomes a shadow of an illusion. An isolated social atom, a mere *modus*, requires no culture or civilization, for in comparison to eternity he is so insignificant, so meaningless, that any attempt to correct his fate would be ludicrous.

All philosophical idealists have viewed man *sub specie boni*, from the point of view of man, and have thus become great consolers and comforters. If there is anything in this world that is likely to fill man's soul with sadness, it is the message that he is only some insignificant accident in the cosmic fabric, that he is unimportant and meaningless. The purely cosmic conception of man is the kindling point of all pessimism.

Religion, the great consoler and comforter of man, has with the exception of Hinduism always refused to view him from the cosmic angle. Man is the measure of all things. The greatest message of Christianity is that man is the central figure of world-history. For does it not begin with a biography which has man as its main theme? Man's position in Christianity made it irresistible to Western man. In the Old Testament, too, man is the central figure. He is the last stage of development and the aim and purpose of the cosmos. Not mute nature, but man, is God's man concern.

Judaism and Christianity may disagree about God, his essence, his attributes, and his functions, but to both man is the most important force in the cosmos. Physically man's insignificance is obvious, and were he merely a part of nature, he would be no more valuable than any other creature. Yet all religions except Hinduism, as well as all major philosophies except Spinozism, agree that man cannot be measured by nature's yardstick. Man's own accomplishments bear out this attitude of religion to him. If he were only subject to the immutable laws of nature, he surely would have been unable to have bent nature, for the part cannot bend the whole. He conquered the air, although he has no wings. He conquered space, although his physical motive pow-

er is insignificant. He conquered the vast bodies of water, although he cannot swim very far. To assume that he accomplished these conquests only as a part of nature must puzzle the ox and the elephant, who could not accomplish any of these things. Neither idealistic philosophy nor religion intends merely to humor man by assigning to him an extraordinary place in the universe. They do it because man owes a double allegiance to two realms—to that of nature and to that of the spirit. All other creatures only have a position in the realm of nature. Hence nature alone cannot explain man.

Spinoza, the mechanist, knows man only as an empiric being, as a part of nature subject to nature's laws. Hence his state, too, is only a mechanism. If his cosmos is a mechanical macrocosmos, his state is a mechanical microcosmos. Just as Spinoza's nature, governed by the absolute laws of causation, is stiff, rigid, and cold, so is his state completely despiritualized. It has no functions to perform other than the maintenance of law and order because man is not a social being by nature. It aims to satisfy only external needs and to secure existence for the individual. Only to the extent that the individual depends upon the state for his security must he subject himself to its laws. Even Hobbes, the philosophical founder of political absolutism, whose state emerged from a war of all against all, and who also considered organized government as a sort of insurance company, imposed upon the state more tasks than Spinoza.¹⁰

History to Spinoza was nothing more than a continuation of nature's mechanical process, for he evaluated man and things *sub specie aeternitatis*. Consequently,

¹⁰ *Problems and the Tasks of the State*

the state as the greatest and most powerful phenomenon in history is also a continuation of nature. To him politics is only a department of natural science.

Theoretically, Spinoza's starting-point is quite different from that of Hobbes and Machiavelli. Machiavelli's nature is the nature of history; Hobbes's nature is a hypothetical and fictitious nature; but Spinoza's nature is neither fictitious nor hypothetical, but nature as it is governed by the laws of causation. Since his state is an extension of his nature, he cannot possibly accept any of the other social and philosophical doctrines propounded before him. It is not man's task to realize a certain state idea, just as it is not the task of the state to realize the highest good, that is to say, moral perfectibility. The *status civilis* is deduced directly from the *status naturalis*. In the natural state, the sphere of right is delimited by the fulness of might, and has neither law nor justice, nor virtue. The only norm of law is nature, and whatever is contrary to nature is also contrary to law. In the natural state, man has no property rights, for such rights arise in the state only through the medium of compromise and double-dealing. In biological nature, antagonisms and unevennesses are smoothed out by nature, but in man's realm nature itself creates causes of division. This very nature brings about the transition from the *status naturalis* by the manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation. Only purely utilitarian considerations force man from the natural state of things into that of organized government, because only the latter can secure life and property to the individual.

All things in the universe, according to Spinoza, are absolutely determined. They are completely dependent upon one substance and its attributes, from which all

forces emanate. And yet, out of a clear sky, Spinoza says that man is animated by the desire to preserve himself. Whence does this desire come from? It does not follow from what Spinoza has to say about man. Yet it is this desire, suddenly discovered, with which he explains the phenomenon called "state."

Hobbes's state is a suspended law of nature, Spinoza's a tamed beast. It does not mitigate against Spinoza's political naturalism when he declares that the best state is that which is guided by reason, for the state was not created by and for reason. His starting-point is mechanical nature, which is a-rational and a-ethical. It is a machine, and therefore cannot be a source of inspiration. Organized government requires loyalty, allegiance, a spirit of self-sacrifice and patriotism. It also requires the *amor soli natalis*, the love of one's native land, which is an infinite source of inspiration to the individual. The man who has no feeling for his native soil is neither emotionally nor intellectually normal. One's native soil is not just a piece of mechanical nature. Your attitude toward the house in which you were born, toward the street in which you first moved about, toward the brook-let in your native city, toward the fields, the prairies, mountains, or valleys surrounding your city, is infinitely more than an attitude toward mechanical nature. Often the development of man's mind and individuality is greatly influenced, if not determined, by the first impressions he received in his native city or village. They constitute an organic whole, to which man can be loyal or disloyal. He cannot, however, be loyal to a machine. Will anyone sacrifice himself, or his family, or the future of his tribe, for a machine? Can a machine arouse feelings, sentiments, enthusiasms, wrath, anger, and joy?

Can a machine impose duties and ethical tasks? Hence, political naturalism is not natural at all but is something fictitious and mythical, which has been grafted upon man's mind.

How different is the political philosophy of his contemporary, Leibnitz. He, too, was a realist, but to him the state was not a machine or the outgrowth of man's will to security, but a cultural community and an ethical institution. To him, as to all true philosophers, man is more than a part of biological nature. He has a great task to fulfil in this world—moral perfectibility. Like his great master, Plato, Leibnitz, too, insists that moral perfectibility is possible only within the state. Its task is much more than merely to underwrite the security of the individual. One of its main goals is the realization of justice and the intellectual elevation of the individual. Its ruler need not be a philosopher, but he must be a supervisor of the arts and sciences, for the state has a cultural mission to perform. Leibnitz, although politically conservative, was idealist enough to concede to each citizen the right to resist a despot. As the father and founder of German enlightenment, he was also the founder of a new political era in Germany, and many modern political thoughts are traceable to him. Leibnitz' starting-point was idealistic in character, and although he made political deals he would not recede from his position vis-à-vis the state as a cultural and ethical institution, with cultural and ethical tasks.

In his political philosophy as well as in his metaphysics, Spinoza is the antipode to the basic doctrines of his own race. If there is a gulf between the states of Spinoza and Leibnitz, there is an unpassable abyss between Spinoza's state and that visualized by the an-

cient prophets of Israel. The latter stressed the ethical and cultural mission of the state. If it fails as an ethical institution to maintain justice and to serve as man's ethical guide, it is only a miserable, unworthy makeshift comparable to a state of nature. There can be no ethics without an organized community just as there can be no justice without law. The contradistinction to law is chaos, and chaos is nature. Man, however, is more than a part of nature, for he is a creature made in God's image and as such must be conscious of his dignity, serving as an example to others. The state must be an ethical institution. It must be an example of goodness, from which life goes forth. To the prophets of Israel the state is the medium between the nation and humanity. The degradation of the state constitutes not only a danger to its own people but to humanity at large. The state as an example to others is the ethical ambition of the prophets of Israel and thereby becomes the cornerstone of general ethics.¹¹

Is it any wonder that Spinoza's theory of the state fits both the Russian Soviet State with its veneration of the masses and Junker Prussia with its deep contempt for them? The Junker may hate Spinoza's secularism and his absolute neutrality in state spiritual matters, yet Spinoza is his philosophical patron saint, for he justifies the absolute control of the many by the few.

Although Spinoza's conception of the state is shocking in its profanity and dazzling in its naturalism, yet great poets, religionists and philosophers, historians and statesmen, considered him to be a saint. Heinrich Heine, who, like all great poets, had a sensitive nose for

¹¹ See my book, *Der Staat im Wandel der Jahrtausende* (Stuttgart, 1910), pp 16-33.

man, thought that the life of Spinoza was free from all blame and so morally spotless that he is reminiscent of his divine cousin, Jesus Christ. In a similar vein Renan speaks about Spinoza.¹²

It would be easy to quote the greatest master-minds of the last two centuries to demonstrate that they all believed in the great piety and humbleness of Spinoza. There is not a gleam of lyricism in his whole system. There is nothing reminiscent of the soulfulness of Plato, or the emotionalism of Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche. Everything is mathematics, necessary and cruel. How could a pious soul create such an impious theory? If the style is the man, as Bouffon said, surely the theory is the man. Have there been two Spinozas, one the saintly hermit—the very personification of piety—and the other the Machiavellist? All of his biographers testify to the fact that his was a harmonious character, that he bore no two souls in his breast, and that his was not a split personality. Yet Spinoza, the mechanist and determinist, attracted and overwhelmed the highly sensitive minds of poets and mystics. Is this not a puzzling phenomenon?

Over the pious thinker of Amsterdam hovers the spirit of acosmism—the denial of the world. Acosmism makes all ethics impossible for it denies all ethical values and purposes. But then what does life, with its eternal coming and going, without purpose or goal, without even the possibility of redemption, mean? Man is chained to certain eternal and immutable laws from which he can-

¹² "Il ne demande pas qu'on le suive, il est comme Moïse, à qui se révèlent sur la montagne des secrets à inconnus and vulgaires, mais, croyez-le, Messieurs, il a été le Voyant de son âge; il a été à son heure celui qui a vu le plus profond en Dieu."

Matthew Arnold says of Baruch Spinoza that his food is in the *vera vita* and his eyes on the beatific vision.

not free himself. He must obey them or be destroyed. Since they direct him in all his actions, how can he change or improve this world? The purpose of ethics is to improve life, but Spinoza's ethics and politics are merely a description of social mechanics. But then did not Spinoza say that man is only a slave of nature?

III

Spinoza, the acosmist, eliminated at one stroke many of the worries which tortured man's mind and heart. The problems of personality and individuality in the realm of man and of nature vanish. It was Spinoza's acosmism and not his pantheism, mechanism, or naturalism which eliminated personality from his world, for certain types of pantheism feature personality and individuality and make man the center of the world. When man vanishes from the world all of his problems vanish with him. Hence, the problem of world's history does not exist for Spinoza. Spinozism is coequal with a-historism. Spinoza could not have had any true relationship to reality, for just as personality is the most striking feature in the realm of nature so is history the most powerful factor in the life of man.

Just as Spinoza had no attitude toward history, so, too, did he not have any attitude toward the nation, for to him only the state, as a continuation of nature, had reality. It should be borne in mind, however, that a nation is much more than a mere continuation of nature. Nation means the general will, as formulated by Jean Jacques Rousseau. It is an organic entity, connoting a group consciousness, a collective will, and many other phenomena. While the organic nature of the state may be debatable, the organic nature of the nation can-

not be questioned. The nation, like everything else that is soulful and that emerges from the realm of the spirit, is not subject only to mechanistic laws of causation. While the state may have no feeling or sentiment and may move with machine-like precision, the nation is moved by spiritual factors. One basic idea expressed by one individual may determine the destiny of a nation for centuries. One basic thought, one powerful image, may carry the nation in a thousand-and-one directions. Yet the nation's response to spiritual appeals cannot be measured with Spinoza's mathematical yardstick.

The state may be a characterless *ad hoc* creation, but a nation cannot be an artificial product for it has character, depth, height, lyricism, and drama. It is governed more by anonymous than by personal and visible forces. One unexpected catastrophe of unknown origin in the life of a nation will transform its whole character and determine its future course and development. The soul of America was born on the bloody battlefields of the South. Before the Civil War the American was a European immigrant; yet this catastrophe transformed him spiritually and politically into a different ethnic being.

The memory of a great national figure helps to form a nation's character and to enrich it with certain traditions, which become driving forces in its life. Can one measure scientifically the value of Bismarck, Hindenburg, Lincoln, Clemenceau, Mussolini, or Lenin to their respective nations? They imposed their will, character, and views upon their peoples, although these attempted to resist their all-dominating personalities. After these powerful personalities triumphed, they continued to bend the nation's will, to mold its character, to give it direction, and to shape its destinies.

Why is one nation more musically gifted than another? Why did one nation develop the ear and the other the eye? Why is one nation creative and the other sterile? These are not optic illusions but daily phenomena. Yet these qualities do not exist in Spinoza's world-picture.

IV

Spinoza the seer who denied the world, personality, history, and the nation has, nevertheless, attracted the most powerful creative minds and the most ambitious personalities of the last two hundred years. How can this almost incredible paradox be explained?

Occidental humanity has been trained religiously in the mysteries of the Trinity, upon which scholastic and dogmatic structures were erected. Philosophically, however, white humanity was trained in dualism. Both Trinity and dualism tortured man's mind, and created for him thousands of insoluble problems, and often estranged him from reality. They almost made him forget his own ego and doubt his own existence. But Spinoza's monism seemed to solve many of man's problems and brought happiness and salvation to the seekers after truth. The speed with which this doctrine impressed itself upon later generations can be discerned from even a casual reading of the history of modern science, literature, and philosophy. Spinozism as pantheistic religiosity wrested for itself a position in the Western world even more rapidly than did Islam in the Eastern world. This Spinozistic inundation proves that the Western Aryan mind was tired of the spiritual heritage of ancient Judea, which was brought to it by the Reformation of the north and the Renaissance of the south. By attempting to demolish the spiritual structure erected by

his race in the course of thousands of years, Spinoza attracted to himself many of the most powerful minds of modern times.

It may be observed, however, that Spinoza was not the first prominent monist and pantheist in modern Europe. A generation before him Bruno conveyed a similar message to humanity. Yet Bruno is merely a beautiful episode in the history of the human mind, while Spinoza is one of its most potent forces. Bruno was a rhapsodist and a poet, who was overwhelmed with artistic emotions; Spinoza, however, was *spiritus purus* and in his method the prototype of the philosopher. Bruno expressed himself in poetic terms; Spinoza, in geometric axioms. Bruno's *élan vital* may edify and intoxicate the heart, but it does not convince the mind. Spinoza's more geometrico, however, if not convincing, is at least assuring. The philosophic seeker after truth does not desire to be moved or touched, but wishes to be convinced and assured.

Although Bruno is, next to Socrates, the greatest martyr in the history of philosophy, Spinoza's character is more reassuring and appealed more powerfully to the truth-seekers. His personality, calm, retired, reticent, cautious, monastic, and saintly, has conquered posterity for himself as much as has his philosophy.¹³

V

The Germans were responsible for three great rediscoveries in the realm of culture: the rediscoveries of the Bible, Spinoza,¹⁴ and Shakespeare. The rediscovery of the Bible, through Luther's translation, shaped not only

¹³ Even Houston Stewart Chamberlain, that arch anti-Semite, admitted that Spinoza was the type of an ideal rabbi.

¹⁴ See bibliographical notes.

the religious but also the political destinies of the German nation. It helped to unite all of the German tribes into one nation, with a unified language. The oneness of the language gave birth to the oneness of the nation.

The rediscovery of Spinoza by the Germans contributed to the shaping of the cultural destinies of the German people for almost two hundred years. Just as at the time of the Reformation no other spiritual force was as potent in German life as the Bible, so during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries no other intellectual force so dominated German life as Spinozism. Spinoza became the magnet to German steel. Except for Immanuel Kant and Herbart, Spinoza attracted every great intellectual figure in Germany during the last two centuries, from the greatest, Goethe, to the purest, Lessing.

Spinoza was already known in Germany during the last third of the seventeenth century, principally for his *Theological Political Tractate*, which aroused the ire of the theologians and theologizing philosophers. Not only was his theory attacked, misrepresented, falsified, and disfigured, but his character was maligned as well. Thus one venomous pamphleteer said in 1702, "Especially Spinoza seems to have been hired by Satan to develop atheism."¹⁵ Some of the early German critics called him "son of hell," "dog," and "skunk." Even scholars of reputation, such as Dayling, the great theologian of Leipzig University, and Mosheim, the great preacher, called Spinozism "impious doctrine" and Spinoza "absurd atheist." Mosheim asks:

Is there anything more ridiculous than the thought that God and the world are one? The only consequence that arose from Spi-

¹⁵ Max Grunwald, *Spinoza in Deutschland*, p. 84.

noza's philosophy is that this dust under our feet also belongs to the essence of God. Are dogs and fleas God's organs? Is there anything more ridiculous than that?

The feeling against him assumed such ugly forms that even his sympathizers dared not speak well of him.

This constant attack upon Spinoza was one of the causes of his later popularity. Because of this barrage, men of dispassionate judgment and moderation deemed it necessary to familiarize themselves with all of Spinoza instead of with only one of his works. The reaction against the predominance of scholasticism and theological dogmatism conquered for him a lofty position in German cultural life. By the end of the seventeenth century the force of the Reformation in Germany had spent itself. Intellectual Germany was bored with the spirituality of the Reformation, which lost sight of nature and considered man as an exclusively intellectual being. A great longing for nature, which was enhanced by Spinoza's naturalism, arose. And so it came to pass that he who taught philosophy more *geometrico* was co-responsible for the rise of the romantic movement in Germany.

Out of these conflicting currents the figure of Spinoza emerged and soon impressed itself upon the German mind. The prior anti-Spinoza movement in Germany was not the work of obscure fanatics, but represented the labor pains of a new culture, Spinozism. Its rise was not a continuation of, but a revolt against, the preceding culture of the Reformation. The Reformation spelled biblicism, while Spinozism meant anti-biblicism. For two hundred years previously the Germans thought in biblical terms, images, symbols, and similes. Their metaphysics was only biblical metaphysics, that there is

one God who moves the world from beyond. Spinozism completely changed this picture. He taught immanence rather than transcendence, pantheism instead of relative monotheism; naturalism in place of spiritualism, and determinism in lieu of freedom of will. Such transitions from one extreme to the other could not proceed without difficulties and disturbances. The attacks against Spinozism were the last agonizing twitches of a culture that was about to die.

Because of the specific epistemological interests of English philosophy and the dominance of Cartesianism in French thought, Spinoza's philosophical influence was centered in Germany. Of the great German figures Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was the first to come under the spell of Spinoza.¹⁶ He was a man of broad vision, with a hundred cultural interests and a critical disposition of mind, and would not accept any philosophical system in its totality. While he did not accept Spinozism in its entirety, he subscribed to its pantheistic doctrines.¹⁷

But more than he admired Spinoza's philosophy, he was attracted to him by his great earnestness of purpose, his strength of character, and his moral courage. He said, "I would rather be named after Spinoza than after anyone else."¹⁸ He even felt that the highest compliment he could confer on his friend Moses Mendelssohn, whom he greatly admired, was to call him a "second Spinoza."

Mendelssohn, one of the fathers of the modern Ger-

¹⁶ See bibliographical notes.

¹⁷ See Carl Schwartz, *Lessing as a Theologian*, and Karl Hettner, *Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*

¹⁸ This admission is the more remarkable since his intimate friend, Moses Mendelssohn, warned him against Spinoza.

man enlightenment, was an adherent of Leibnitz. As such he could not be a follower of Spinoza, although he, too, admired his personality. Furthermore, he failed to understand Spinoza, for he could never free himself from Bayle's presentation of Spinoza's doctrine. Nevertheless, this very Mendelssohn, by his controversy with Jacobi²⁹ about Lessing's relationship to Spinoza, was instrumental in making the latter a potent force in German letters. It is interesting to observe that even those thinkers who dedicated their lives to the cause of anti-Spinozism paid the highest tribute to his personality.²⁰

The influence of Spinozism attained its height in Germany when it overwhelmed Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, the mental giants of Weimar. Weimar was the cradle of modern German culture. It is to the new Germany what Athens was to ancient Hellas, or Jerusalem to ancient Judea, a sea of light and the center of creative genius. From Weimar emanated all the great cultural traditions of the Fatherland, which secured for Germany her proud position in the realm of European culture. Over this spirit of Weimar hovered the genius of Baruch Spinoza.

²⁹ Jacobi was primarily a religious philosopher, sharing the religious philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau and emphasizing the needs and interest of the heart over those of the intellect. Religion, he said, transforms beastly men into human beings, and it also makes men philosophers. If religiosity aims to reveal the will of God, religious recognition strives to reveal that which is hidden. Just as Rousseau resisted the onslaught of French materialism, so Jacobi resisted the tendency of German intellectualism. He recognized in Spinoza the very root of modern materialism. It was Jacobi who presented Spinoza to Germany. In his letters on Spinoza, addressed to Moses Mendelssohn, he asserts that Spinozism is identical with atheism, and that even the philosophies of Wolf and Leibnitz must lead to Spinozism. All attempts to demonstrate truth lead to fatalism. All true recognition is belief, immediate inner knowledge. Jacobi fought not only against Spinoza, but also against Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, because he was opposed to the main intellectual tendencies of his time.

²⁰ Jacobi says of Spinoza, "Be blessed, you great and saintly Benedictus. Though you might err in philosophizing about the nature of the Highest Being, His truth was in your soul and His love in your life."

It was here that Spinozism became a dominating influence in the life of the new German culture. But in this process of expansion it was transformed into something different from the original doctrine of the philosopher. The creative geniuses of Weimar could not possibly become reconciled to the mechanistic world-picture from which personality was banished. To Goethe personality was the highest gift of the Gods to man and enjoyed an even higher place in his affections than did Spinozism. The same can be said of many other poets who later embraced some form of Spinozism.

Of the Weimarian trio, Herder—theologian, poet, historian, critic, philosopher, and metrician—was the first to apply Spinozism to historiography and to literary history. He was also the only one to recognize in Spinoza the renovator of a form of ancient theism. Living under the shadow of Goethe and his personality cult, he conceived pantheism under the aspect of personality. But most of all he appreciated Spinoza for being consequential and for Spinoza's merits, which consisted primarily in thinking a thought through to the bitter end.²¹

To Herder, Spinoza's God was not a dead term but a dynamic reality—in fact, the most active oneness that says to itself, "I shall be that I shall be." Here the monotheistic tradition and the pantheistic concept met peacefully for the first as well as for the last time. But in this identification Herder was in error. The "I shall be that I shall be" of the Bible is a formula of ancient Hebraic monotheism, the synthesis of the two apparently contradictory elements of personality and universality—"I" and "being." Spinoza's God, however, is only being, deprived of all personality. But Herder,

²¹ See bibliographical notes.

Protestant theologian that he was, could not see this contradistinction and naïvely believed that unless God is conceived of pantheistically he cannot be conceived of at all.

In all the philosophical writings of Herder, as well as in his letters, Spinoza appears as the systematizer of a very ancient world-concept. He thought that all the ancient religions taught an immanent rather than a transcendental God, who was nevertheless an endowed personality. Although Herder recommended Spinozism to the Protestant pastors, he believed that Spinozism would become not the religion but the philosophy of the future, in which all philosophical systems will be united.

Herder, by applying Spinozistic universalism to his literary activities, helped to make Germany the spiritual center of Europe. He presented to his people many poetic treasures of all nations in superb German versions, thereby creating in his fellow-countrymen a desire to familiarize themselves with the outpourings of the spirit of other nations. To the present day Germany still remains the intellectual clearing house of Europe. Thus was Spinozistic universalism transformed into intellectual and spiritual internationalism.

The second of the Weimarian trio, Goethe, made Spinoza triumphant in the Fatherland.²² At first, owing to Bayle, Goethe was indifferent to him. It was only in 1774, after disputing with Jacobi about Spinoza, that he discovered in the hermit of Amsterdam his master and guide. Thereupon he made a critical study of his works, and admitted his regret that he had not previously familiarized himself with the doctrines of Spinoza.

²² See bibliographical notes.

At first he believed that Spinozism proved not the existence of God, but only that existence is God. To him, Spinoza, far from being an atheist actually appeared as the greatest theist and Christian of his time. The older he became, the more he identified himself with Spinoza and estranged himself from all his traducers. Goethe was so overwhelmed by his philosophy that he admitted that his mind was not keen and great enough to understand him completely. Together with Lessing he felt that the highest intellectual compliment he could offer anyone was to call him a "second Spinoza."

Yet, despite Goethe's adulation of Spinoza, the pantheism of the two men was not the same. Spinoza's nature is mechanistic, possessing the stillness of the tomb. Goethe's nature is vitalistic and his pantheism resembles that of the mystics. God lives in an animated nature and is to nature what the blood stream is to the body—the first cause of all life. Goethe approached the world with the eye, not with the ear. He beheld a colorful nature full of life and saw the world as a continuous process of creation. He could not conceive of a still world, not of a silent moment in history. To him the world represented itself as *perpetuum mobile*. Nevertheless, the vastness and unity of Spinoza's world-picture attracted him irresistibly.

Spinoza was the first philosopher who satisfied all the doubts which agitated Goethe from his earliest youth. Scores of volumes and dissertations have been written upon Goethe's attitude towards Spinoza. Thus Wilhelm Dilthey, the foremost recent historian of the philosophy of Germany, has traced Spinoza's influence upon Goethe and illustrated its different phases. All

other historians of philosophy have followed this example because the chapter, Spinoza and Goethe, is one of the most important in the history of modern German culture. The only exception to this tradition was Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who in his hatred of Spinoza dared to belittle his influence upon Goethe, whom he represented as an adherent of Kant.²³ Yet this same Chamberlain pictured Jesus of Nazareth as a Nordic son. If Jesus could be an Aryan, why could Goethe not be a Kantian?

The third of the Weimarian trio, Friedrich Schiller, also succumbed to the magic of Spinoza's personality. Playwright, lyrical poet, philosopher, critic, historian, and Kantian, Schiller could not free himself from Spinoza's influence, as can be seen by many passages in his philosophical letters and poems. Just as Herder applied Spinozistic universalism to poetry, so did Schiller apply it to the drama in his English *Mary Stuart*, his Spanish *Don Carlos*, his French *Joan of Arc*, and his Swiss *William Tell*. His lyrical poetry reflects this universalism, for he draws his inspiration from the whole of nature and of human life. To the present day the Germans cannot forgive Friedrich Schiller for dramatizing great historical episodes of other nations.

The bulwark of Spinozism in Germany is to be found in philosophy and not, as in England, in poetry. The great philosophers of modern times, with the exception of Schelling and Hegel, knew very little about the history of philosophy. Spinoza, too, was a closed book to them. Yet the Spinoza controversy assumed such proportions in Germany that the subject burst in upon them from all sides. Even Immanuel Kant had to take

²³ *Immanuel Kant* (Munich, 1909), chap. 1.

a definite stand, since it became clear to him that many of his disciples were deserting him in favor of Spinoza.²⁴

It is not difficult to understand why Kant's contemporaries speculated so profusely about his possible attitude toward Spinoza. They should have understood his negative attitude toward Spinoza. In contradistinction to Spinoza the monist, Kant is a dualist. He distinguishes the realm of phenomena from the realm of noumena, or the world of nature from the world of spirit. This distinction enables him to assume a realm of transcendental freedom. In biological nature, the law of causation reigns supreme, but in the realm of the spirit freedom is unhampered. He thus shows himself to be a dualist of the purest water. All the differences between Kant and Spinoza can be thus summarized: Spinoza teaches pantheism, a dead God, a static world, a determinism which includes nature, man, and God, and that God is not the cause of substance. Kant, on the other hand, teaches theism, freedom for man and God, a living God, a dynamic world, and that God is the cause of substance. In addition, he rejects the application of mathematics to philosophy on theoretical grounds, while Spinoza mathematizes philosophy. It is interesting to note that eight years before his death, Kant discerned Spinozism to be a brand of eastern pantheism and as such correlated to Buddhism.

But nevertheless, Kant was not entirely justified in his moody negative attitude to Spinoza, for a more criti-

²⁴ In the *Kant Studien*, V, 291, by Friedrich Hemans, all the objections of Kant to Spinoza are enumerated and Kant's attitude to Spinoza summed up in the sentence, "That in his whole life Kant had a resentment against Spinoza." Especially did Kant object to Spinoza's mathematical method. To Kant, Spinoza's thinking represented something that is incompatible with genuine knowledge. Descartes is to him a model of clarity and precision, and Spinoza that of obscurity and vagueness—in spite of his mathematical method.

cal examination of the basic teachings of the two men must show that the fundamental hypothesis of both—namely, the substance of Spinoza and the thing in itself of Kant—had much in common since both posited the absolute. Kant did not notice that his own conception of the absolute supersensuous, from which both his realms emanated, greatly resembled Spinoza's theory of substance. It was this very oversight, together with his subjectivism, which finally resulted in the overthrow of his own system and in the victory of Spinozism in Germany. Kant's subjectivism, which was primarily concerned with the mechanism of man's reason, was forced to bow to Spinoza's objectivism which began from the All. Although Kant's critical philosophy smashed dogmatism and scholasticism in Germany, it, in its turn, shared a similar fate. While in the end Kant and Spinoza do not seem to be so far apart, they yet represent two different types of thinking. To this extent Kant found his antipode in Spinoza. Kant felt that his separation of both worlds left an unbridgeable abyss into which man was afraid to venture. Therefore he resorted to an attempt at monism by postulating the absolute supersensuous, which is responsible for the *Harmonia mundi*, the "Harmony of the World." In Kant this attempted monism is an afterthought which he resorted to in order to escape embarrassment, while in Spinoza it is the starting-point and the very basis of his entire structure.

The fate of Kant is one of the most paradoxical phenomena in the history of European culture. Upon him fell the task of completing the work of Martin Luther—purifying Christianity and leading it back to its original

sources. Kant's dualism can be understood only in connection with the theological thought which was crystallized by the Protestant Reformation. His phenomenal and intelligible ego is, in the final analysis, the biblical theology of Martin Luther. Man is a composite of matter and spirit, or in Kant's language of phenomenality and intelligibility. Although he thus stood with both feet in ancient Hebraic metaphysics, he yet rejected it as a source of religiosity.

Although Kant spoke the language of the Old Testament, two Jews, Baruch Spinoza and Solomon Maimon, overwhelmed and crushed him. Maimon pitilessly destroyed Kant's "thing in itself" which he described as an irrational magnitude. In so doing he enabled Spinoza to overwhelm the whole of Kant. If Maimon is correct in his stand, the abyss between Kant's two worlds remains unbridged, leaving only a dualistic or Jewish world-picture. Spinoza, the anti-Jew, overwhelmed Kant the Jew, whom the Teutons consider as being the greatest philosopher of their race. There is only one remote analogy to this paradoxical phenomenon in the history of the Western mind, St. Augustine, the founder of the Western church, who was converted from Manichaeism to Christianity and fought Manichean dualism in order to save Jewish monotheism. Such ludicrous and ironical phenomena illustrate the paradoxical situations in history.

Kant's famous *Categorical Imperative* smacked of the Prussian military drill, and it was felt to be too prosaic and sober. Therefore, many of the so-called Kantians, particularly those with deep religious interests, turned from their master to acclaim Spinoza. Solomon Mai-

mon, who destroyed the basis of Kant's metaphysics thereby, paved the way for a critical examination of his ethics.

Professor Paulus of Jena University, himself a Kantian, became the first translator and editor of Spinoza's works in German. He thereby became instrumental in furthering the cause of Spinozism in Germany. Many other eminent Kantian theologians of the time, particularly the more learned, became active in spreading Spinoza's gospel. So completely did they come under his spell that they considered it their duty not only to defend Spinoza against accusations of atheism but to represent him as a true theist.

Kant is Spinoza's only adversary in the realm of occidental culture. Constantin Bruner has aptly stated that everyone must be either a Spinozist or a Kantian. The modern intellectual world, however, is overwhelmingly Spinozistic. Kant created only a school of thought, but Spinoza gave birth to a new culture and religion. Kant was long forgotten in his own fatherland until he was revived by Hermann Cohen. Spinoza has always lived in the centers of modern culture. Although at first he was maligned, calumniated, and even damned, he came to be later blessed and admired. He was always a subject of discussion in religious, philosophical, and scientific circles, because he dangled before man's eye the picture of a world without contradictions or abuses.

Kant has accomplished only a special task. He examined and described the mechanism of the human mind rather than the mechanism of the world. He can be compared to Aristotle, as Spinoza can be likened to Plato. Kant is the very embodiment of idealism, while Spinoza is the representative of extreme naturalism.

To Spinoza everything is nature. God, the world, and the attributes are all nature. The *modi* are the phenomena of nature, the spirits are thinking nature, and the bodies extended nature. The rational order of things is that of natural necessity.

This naturalism was only a consequence of that monism of *una substantia*, the alpha and omega of Spinozism. But Immanuel Kant had no such preconceived idea, for his starting-point was the dogma of neither monism nor dualism. Not being a religionist, he was not concerned with satisfying the human mind, with finding an all-embracing answer to the multitudinous problems of life. He yearned for truth, and, therefore, began not with God but with critical investigation. Kant was interested in recognition, Spinoza in salvation. To Kant the philosopher is the legislator of human reason, while to Spinoza he is the harbinger of beatitude. Although not an Aristotelian, he follows Aristotle in conceiving philosophy as being a doctrine of the divine, whose main end consists in discovering the first principle. Kant, however, ignores this approach to the problem. His philosophy is not a discovery of first principles, but is the science of relationships.

The very starting-point of Spinoza, the search and discovery of the cause of causes, is hateful to Kant, who states that scientists err when they follow this path. He presumes and presupposes nothing, not even the possibility of the oneness of nature. Transcendental philosophy to him is only the theory of recognition of the possibility of nature itself. Spinoza, on the other hand, presumes and presupposes everything—God, nature, its phenomena, and their different relationships. He begins with the supreme cause, without knowing whether it is

and what it is. He sets out rationalistically and dogmatically while Kant begins critically. Kant is complicated, abstruse, and often dark, while Spinoza is simple, plain, and full of light. Kant's philosophy can be accepted either entirely or partly, but Spinoza's philosophy can be accepted only entirely. There can be no left or right Spinozists as there are left and right Kantians or Hegelians.

In spite of its mathematical form, Spinozism is, in the last analysis, an experience of man's soul, while Kantianism is the product of man's critical mind. The soul is often disturbed and subject to varying moods, while man's mind is more rigid. Feeling is common to all people, but intellectual meditations are the heritage of the few. We can thus understand Spinoza's influence upon the entire fabric of modern culture with the exception of the plastic arts and music, and Kant's influence upon philosophy alone. Spinoza created a new world-picture, Kant only a new school of philosophy. Kant definitely established the frontiers of the human mind, but Spinoza reconstructed a new world out of an old one. Everyone is interested in Spinoza, but only philosophers are concerned with Kant.

Va

By the end of the eighteenth century, these two world-pictures clashed. Both were the apotheosis of two different eras in European history, the era of idyllism, symbolizing the culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and the new era of activism, the modern civilization of the nineteenth century. The one world was universalistic and the other individualistic in its outlook. The Middle Ages were borne by the spirit of universalism—one church, one humanity, one super-ruler—

while the last half of the eighteenth century was carried away by the spirit of individualism. The sudden rise of this spirit was indicative of the extinction of the old spirit.

The appearance of a new Caesar and the machine age enhanced this new tendency. The crushing of Germany by Napoleon called forth a strong nationalistic movement in the Teutonic lands which came as a reaction against the universalism of the past. In addition, the appearance of the machine, replacing or extending the human hand, created new forms of economic life and laid the foundation for modern capitalism. This form of economic life presumed the entrepreneur, a new economic personality. The appearance of individualism contradicted Spinoza's universalism; and yet Kant's subjectivism could not remain the philosophical standard.

This spirit of individualism gave rise to the Romantic school at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. One might think that this individualistic school would spell ruin to universalistic Spinozism. Thus, Fichte, the philosophical patron saint of the Romantic movement, made the ego the source and center of all things. Yet, he was as overwhelmed by the spirit of Spinoza as were the cultural leaders of the preceding generations. There is but one explanation for this strange phenomenon. The Romantic school of thought, to the extent that it was philosophically orientated and inspired, considered its most noble task to be to create a synthesis of the subjective world of Kant and the objective world of Spinoza. Because of its aesthetic interests, it made individualism part of its world-picture but because of its metaphysical yearnings it was permeated with Spinoza's universalism.

This attempt at a synthesis found its most powerful expression in Fichte's philosophy. Already at the outset of his philosophical career, when he visualized an active world, he believed it to be identical with Spinoza's substance, requiring nothing else for its existence. To Fichte, too, the highest goal of ethical aspirations and salvation is man's union with the eternal by the way of the spirit. He asserts that the idea of God is already presumed in all recognition and that everything emanates only from substance. To him God does not exist as a special substance and, therefore, he is neither personal nor self-conscious. However, unlike Spinoza, he defines God's being as beauty, science, and state, or Logos, Ethos, and Mythos. One could hardly expect that a philosopher, whose symbols were individualism and activism, should accept Spinoza's acosmism and resignation. Despite his deep sympathy with Kant's ethicism he, nevertheless, does not tire of praising Spinoza as the discoverer of the absolute oneness, the *una substantia*.

Fichte's main desire was to create a secure basis for ethical idealism by means of theoretical idealism. Yet he is a salvationist rather than an ethicist. It is an irony of fate that the man who made it his mission to develop Kantian philosophy in Germany thereby strengthened Spinozism. Fichte, the individualist, who posits a pure metaphysical ego from which he deduces an empiric ego, wrestled with and succumbed to Spinoza, the universalist.

Another great philosophical figure of the German Romantic school, Frederick Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, made Spinozism one of the cornerstones of his system, which was a synthesis of the philosophies of Fichte and Spinoza. Schelling's comprehensive philosophy of na-

ture became the basis for later philosophical speculations. His doctrine of the identity of object and subject, real and ideal, nature and mind in the absolute, was already suggested by Kant. However, his revival of the doctrine of the cosmos and the soul, and of the gradual evolution of inorganic into organic nature, gave real impetus to his philosophy. Despite the fact that it is a mixture of Platonism, neo-Platonism, Brunoism, and Boehme mysticism, the absolute oneness of Spinoza is nevertheless its central motive.

Schelling attempted to mediate between the philosophies of Plato and Spinoza. He understood Plato's ideas not as abstract terms or as physical existences, but as metaphysical beings. He attempted to reduce the dualism of God and matter, by reducing matter to naught, leaving only a spiritual monism. He believed that in this manner he brought about a synthesis of Spinozism and Platonism.

Schelling, like Fichte, also attempted to reconcile Kant with Spinoza. At first he leaned toward Kant, but as he alienated himself from transcendental idealism he veered in the opposite direction. Schelling understood substance as substratum—that is to say as a stabilized and fixed being—which is corporeal and finite in itself. This corporeal substratum is only a projection of the imagination of the empirical ego. Thus, his substance emanates from man's mind. It is readily apparent that at this stage of Schelling's development he is caught between Spinoza's objectivism and Kantian subjectivism. Later Schelling became even more Spinozistic. His final conclusion is *natura naturans absoluta*, or the absolute all, an impersonal God—Spinozism. But this Spinozism is dissimilar to that of the original

Spinoza. Schelling's cosmos, like that of Goethe, is not mechanistic but vitalistic. The realm of nature is full of ends and purposes. The world of forms in organic nature is animated by desire to realize an ideal, to attain higher forms of manifoldness, multitudinous, and variety. Even inorganic nature has a soul and is permeated with the spirit of the ego. In every nook and corner of nature the world-soul is functioning. This is, of course, Brunoism rather than Spinozism and the fullest expression of the philosophy of identity. When this philosophy of the identity of subject and object—of real and ideal—of which Schelling was the center attained its full impetus in Germany, all its opponents argued that it was not original with its founders for Spinoza was its discoverer.

While Schelling was wrestling with Plato, Spinoza, and Kant, his contemporary Hegel was struggling with Spinoza exclusively. In Hegel, Spinoza reached the height of his influence upon the German mind. Hegel was the most influential, although not the most original, German philosopher since the days of Kant. His system was more an absorption of other systems than an original creation. Therein lies the secret of his influence. He brought all the philosophical tendencies and moods of his time to a conclusion. With him the pantheism of his period attained its highest development and became the conscious and necessary connection of the mind and the world. Its former mysticism was replaced by a more logical conception. He conceived the divine power as an order of evolution having a teleological aspect.

This remarkable reconstruction of pantheism can be understood from the activist tendencies of the time. In that period of storm and stress man desired to in-

crease his power and to display more energy. The old conception of the relationship of man to God, that He is the ruler and that man is the subject, was repudiated because man wished to be emancipated from all extramundane rule. Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of will was developed into a doctrine of the autonomy of man vis-à-vis God and the forces of nature. The theory of the evolution of the universe as an evolution of the mind, teleologically motivated, was an adequate world-picture for man who was destined to embark upon the new machine age, which required initiative and freedom.

In addition, two other factors greatly contributed to this remarkable development. The men of that age were bored with the prevailing rationalism and mathematical mind of the preceding period. They actually developed an antipathy toward the mathematical sciences because they tended to stifle religion and poetic emotions. The pantheistic tendencies of the time, as expressed in the poetry of Goethe and Holderlin and in Schelling's conception of the ego, betrayed the yearning for the poetic and an urge for the fantastic. Their goal was to create an emotional rather than a rationalistic attitude to the infinite by stressing the beautiful. The infinite dawns more upon the artists than upon the scientist, for the beautiful is the vision of oneness in its manifoldness. Its philosophical formula is a pantheism of the immanence of divine oneness in the manifoldness of its phenomena. Not the objective world, not the phenomena of nature, but man's inner self must be the source of all true recognition. Philosophy should be reduced to man's inner experience. To the more artistically inclined men of that age, emotion was the source of man's wisdom and the anchor ground from which he

looked at the cosmos; but to the more philosophically inclined it was logos. That which was all soul to Bruno became all logos to Hegel.

Another contributing factor to this remarkable development from objectivism to subjectivism, from realism to idealism, was the sharp reaction against the French materialistic theories of the eighteenth century. Men like Lamettrie, Helvetius, Cabanis, and Baron von Holbach, who attempted to reduce quality to quantity and mind to matter and to explain all phenomena of life materialistically or atomistically, called forth a powerful idealist opposition. To the thinkers of Jena and Tübingen these materialistic explanations of the world seemed puerile, for they offered nothing to the fantasy. They considered materialism as a world-concept, an aberration of the human mind. All these occurrences and reactions, moods and sentiments, contributed to the rise of neo-subjectivism and found its most powerful expression in Hegel's panlogicism or logical pantheism.

Hegel, like Maimon and Schelling, identified Spinozism with acosmism but accepted Spinoza's monism. To him, too, Spinoza's substance was inactive, restful, without development of the possibility of inner creativeness. Together with his contemporaries, he missed in it the ends—individuality and personality. Yet there is only one difference between the substance conception of Spinoza and of Hegel. The latter emphasizes teleological in addition to logical necessity which the former denies.

Hegel supplemented Schelling's philosophy of nature by his philosophy of the mind, which must not be coordinated with or subordinated to but superordinated upon nature, so that it can be understood as a transitional point and agency of development of the mind.

This conception of mind, however, must not be conceived as absolute objectivity, but as an objective force in which man is only participating. He thus creates a synthesis of Spinoza's universalism with his individualism. It is from this vantage point that his attitude to Spinoza must be understood.

After Hegel's death both his adherents and his opponents dissolved his philosophy into its different component parts. They recognized in it a reproduction of the philosophies of Heraclitus, Plato, Spinoza, and Schelling. Although they found the totality of the picture to be his own, they found little in it that was truly original. Yet for a variety of psychological and political reasons Hegel has become, next to Spinoza, the most potent force in Western culture. To the present day Hegelianism still rules in the cultural life of Europe and America. Oswald Spengler, the most influential German thinker of our day, is a right Hegelian, for he applies Hegel's triadic rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to the historical process.

Hegelianism, like Spinozism, has had its finger in every pie—in politics, religion, literary criticism, and the sciences. Many of Hegel's contemporaries have been forgotten but the personality and philosophy of Hegel cannot be ignored. The intellectual processes of the nineteenth century can be understood only through Hegel, just as those of the last half of the eighteenth century can only be seen through a Spinozistic prism. His influence is so deep-rooted and his philosophy so dominating in so many spheres of spiritual endeavor that one is almost inclined to believe that Hegel, like his great master, Spinoza, is not a philosophical but a religious figure.

During his entire philosophical career, Hegel constantly wrestled with Spinoza and for a time was entirely in his clutches. It was while under this influence that Hegel said that in order to refute Spinoza one must first accept him. In his lectures on the history of philosophy he says, "That Spinoza is the main point in modern philosophy, it is either Spinozism or no philosophy at all." He defended Spinoza against the reproach that his philosophy was atheistic and destructive of morality. In his later years, however, when he became more conservative, he changed his attitude toward Spinoza. He said, "that the philosophy of the 'Amsterdam hermit' was an antiquated point of view, that his method was 'wooden,' that his proofs were formal tortures, that the attributes did not emanate from the substance and that the modi did not emanate from the attributes." But it was reserved for his old age to discover that Spinozism was philosophically objectionable because it did not tally with Christianity.

In his later years Hegel attempted to stress the true Christian nature of his own philosophy. He suddenly discovered that Christianity affirmed the individual soul and gave it the possibility of redemption. But in Spinozism he missed the individual soul, the personal God, and true spirituality. Spinoza's substance became to him lifeless and static without spirit, because it contradicted the doctrine of the Trinity. Hegel found it rational that Spinoza died of consumption because he said that his substance consumes and swallows everything.

It is worthy of note that Hegel's disciples did not accept their Master's later attitude toward Spinoza. They not only defended him against Hegel, but stressed the

fact that Spinoza was not only not an atheist but was actually the incarnation of genuine religiosity. They regarded Spinoza's substance as the substratum of reality, and even said that Spinoza is a synthesis of idealism and realism, pantheism and individualism, who represents the peak of European philosophical thought.

V

Hegel's antipode in nineteenth-century German philosophy was Arthur Schopenhauer, the one being a pan-logicist and the other a pan-voluntarist. The arch-pessimist Schopenhauer, although he considered himself to be the heir of Kantian thought, nevertheless admitted that he was indebted to Spinoza. The relationship of his philosophy to that of Spinoza appeared to him like that of the New to the Old Testament.

What the Old Testament specifically has in common with the New is the same God-Creator, and by analogy to my system as well as to that of Spinoza's, the world exists by its own power and through itself. However, Spinoza's *substantia aeterna*, the inner character of the world, which he entitles *Deus*, is according to its character and value, the Jehovah, the God-Creator, who applauds His own creation and finds that everything has succeeded excellently. Spinoza has only deprived Him of His personality. To him also, the world and everything in it, is excellent and as it should be. For this reason, man has nothing to do but to live and enjoy himself. He should enjoy his life as long as it lasts exactly as Koheleth in IX, 7-10 suggests. In short, Spinozism is optimism pure and simple.

The alleged optimism of Spinoza could not find favor in the eyes of the pessimistic Schopenhauer. His pessimism, anchored in the doctrine that will is the primacy of life, and that the intellect is subservient to the will, caused Schopenhauer to object to Spinoza's identification of will and intellect. But in spite of his occasional

severe remarks about Spinoza and Spinozism, he admits that Bruno and Spinoza stand out conspicuously in the realm of thought and belong neither to their century nor to their Continent, which rewarded the one with death and the other with persecution. Their miserable existence and fate in the Occident may be compared to that of a tropical plant in Europe. Schopenhauer's eagle eye beheld instinctively that the mystic Spinoza was an Eastern plant on Western soil, and he rightly remarked that Spinoza's as well as Bruno's true spiritual homeland was on the banks of the holy Ganges, where they would have lived a much admired life among kindred spirits.

During his philosophical activities Schopenhauer's attitude toward Spinoza vacillated from the deepest to the darkest anti-Semitism. Yet he was one of the few major philosophers of the nineteenth century who made a positive contribution to the criticism of Spinoza's system. He was the first to offer a thorough analysis of Spinoza's geometric method and theory of attributes. Yet despite the divergencies between the basic doctrines of Spinoza and Schopenhauer they had several theories in common. Both denied free will, history, and man; both affirmed fatalism, universalism, and asceticism. Only their starting-points differed; but in their conclusions they are brethren of the same race.

While Schopenhauer admitted that he was only partly influenced by Spinoza, several scholars of the succeeding generation recognized in the German arch-pessimist's heart-rending lamentations about the misery of life a full-fledged disciple of Spinoza. Dr. Martin Berendt and Julius Friedlander, in their interesting book, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge in His Relation to Modern Science*

and Philosophy, stated that there exists a remarkable similarity between Schopenhauer and Spinoza. The latter teaches that *cupiditas*, "desire," is the main driving force in the character of every being, whereas Schopenhauer says that the will is the actual essence of every creature. The difference between Schopenhauer and Spinoza is that the former uses the term "desire" instead of "will." Both Berendt and Friendlander insist that the basic metaphysical principle of Schopenhauer, the will, is to be found in Spinoza's saying, "*Cupiditas essentia hominis est*," "Desire is the essence of man."

The heir and successor to Schopenhauer was Eduard von Hartmann. Although as a disciple of Leibnitz he was a severe critic of Spinoza, he yet constantly defended Spinoza's monism and doctrine of the substance. Many passages of his main opus, *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, give the impression that Hartmann identified himself with Spinoza. Although he criticized Spinoza's theory of attributes, he admitted that his own God conception was similar to that of Spinoza. Just as in Fichte, Kant and Spinoza met, so in Hartmann, Leibnitz and Spinoza appeared as peaceful associates.

To the very end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century Spinozism remained an important factor in Western philosophy. Herbert Spencer in England, Wundt and Lotze in Germany, Bergson and Renouvier in France, found many elements in Spinoza's philosophy to which they felt themselves attracted and by which they were greatly influenced. Spinozism as a rigid system dissolved itself into many component parts, and each part became an element in the systems of the modern philosophers.

Kant and Hegel still represent a definite system of

philosophy, but Spinozism today is no longer what it was a hundred years ago. It is either monism on the metaphysical side, moralism on the ethical side, subjective religiosity on the theological side, or mechanism on the scientific side.

Spinozism in modern philosophical thought appears like a sun from which myriads of rays emanate, carrying light and warmth in every direction, and fructifying a variety of fields. Like all true religiosity and mysticism, it is more a potential than an actual force in man's life. Like the pantheism it teaches, it is everywhere. It is constructive and destructive. Such is the influence of Baruch Spinoza upon modern philosophical thought.

VI

For many centuries civilized man was accustomed to think in theological terms. Church and state were identical and the church used the state for its own ends, wielding both spiritual and political power even in Protestant countries. The primacy of life was religion and man was taught to consider theology the source of all wisdom. Philosophy was the servant of theology and was valid only to the extent that the two agreed. Disagreement was heresy and was punishable by incarceration, exile, or death.

For many centuries the Bible was considered to be the sole source of all religiosity in the West. This was due not to a mere historical whim, but to the fact that the Bible has been the greatest religious document which man has wrested from his own genius. It impressed itself upon the mind of the European man because it is a book filled with poetic symbols and dazzling, captivating, and shocking reality. It has fascinated man's mind

because it is more a book of man than a book of God. In its pages is told the story of the eternal cycle in man's life. It describes his destinies and vicissitudes and is the history not only of his past but also of his future. It is eschatology rather than archaeology. The individualism of the Jew expressed itself in the Bible in great biography. Is it any wonder that the individualistic Western Aryan was necessarily fascinated by that document?

Although there is little real inner connection between the Old and the New Testaments, in one respect at least the latter is both a continuation of and an improvement upon the Old Testament. It makes a man the central figure of world's history. His position is so outspoken and so powerful that anthropocentric humanity could not but be dazzled by this vision.

The appearance of Spinoza, however, fundamentally changes the entire religious picture in the West. He emancipated philosophy from theology and taught man to think in metaphysical and universalistic rather than in theological and individualistic terms. He distinguished between the functions of recognition and piety. The aim of philosophy he says is truth, the recognition of things in their connection with one another and with God. The aim of theology is piety—obedience to God's laws. Hence, there is but little difference between the Old and the New Testaments, for both, like all theology, have a content apart from recognition. They teach certain doctrines, such as a personal God, His attributes, His relationship to the world, His moral ends, the aim of creation, etc. As practical piety, even the theological content of the Bible is acceptable, but as theoretical philosophy or as objective truth it must be rejected. Religion must have certain articles of creed which must

be accepted, including the belief in God, His justice and pity, His omnipresence and omniscience, and the belief that all religiosity can rest only on justice and brotherly love. Only those who accept these articles of creed attain salvation.

The intellectual truth of the articles of creed is subordinate to the function of religiosity and its attending ethical influences. An article of creed serves its purpose even though it may not be compatible with intellectual truth. This, Spinoza argues, becomes evident upon a careful reading of the Scriptures, which condemn not ignorance but disobedience. The highest form of religiosity is not that which is not compatible with intellectuality, but that which is productive of religious and ethical results, such as good deeds, justice, and brotherly love.

Spinoza thus makes a sharp distinction between religiosity and intellectual truth, and between religiosity and the practical mode of living. He is conscious that in so doing he is at one with the spirit of the Bible. Then he sets out to prove that the heroes of the Bible were actuated primarily by religious rather than by intellectual motives. They felt that it was not at all feasible to make the intellect the guide for the masses. Consequently they expressed themselves in images and proverbs, the language of the emotions not of the intellect, of fantasy and not of reason. The prophets were not necessarily men of superior knowledge, but were of pure heart and vivid imagination and, therefore, incapable of pure recognition. Apart from their deep religiosity and their knowledge of matters spiritual, they were not superior to their time and environment. They shared its ignorance and superstitions, and could never free themselves from its anthropomorphisms.

Spinoza, unlike many theologians, taught that the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible are to be taken literally, for, being a book for the masses and not for philosophers, it speaks the language of the people. The authors of the Bible spoke in terms of their time and environment.²⁵

Spinoza, like all representatives of higher criticism, denied the unity of thought in ancient Israel. He says that the assertion that all the prophets developed the same doctrine and thought is erroneous, for they expressed merely their individual temperaments. The pessimists among them saw the future only in gloomy colors—the optimists in light ones. Those of good taste and good style wrote elegantly, while the hillmen and peasants stuttered the patois of the soil. Princes spoke the language of the court; soldiers, of the military camp and shepherds of the flock. The prophets had their prejudices and their biases, for they were only children of their time and products of their respective localities and professions. Therefore, one need not respect the teachings of the prophets.

It is evident that while outwardly Spinoza appreciated the religious worth of the Bible, factually he belittled it. A century before, Bruno, too, had evolved a pantheistic world-concept and had attacked the Bible. The latter, however, was of little consequence because it was merely

²⁵ If these assertions are true, then the ancient Jewish demos in Palestine consisted of poets, rhapsodists, visionaries, metaphysicists, statesmen, rhetoricians, etc. To say that the prophets of ancient Israel were merely men of the masses, speaking their language, is as wise as to say that Shakespeare, Goethe, or Victor Hugo spoke the language of the English, German, or French masses. This assertion of Spinoza is as true as his other assertion that the prophets were not necessarily men of superior knowledge. Men who spoke in terms of eternity as did the ancient prophets of Israel must have been men of superior culture and knowledge. Impartial scholars admit that Spinoza was greatly prejudiced against the Bible and particularly against the Old Testament.

an outburst of the emotions and failed to convince either the masses or the scholars. In addition, the thinkers of the Italian Renaissance were not as vitally concerned with the Bible as were the men of the Reformation of the north. In the south the Bible was only an incidental source of religiosity and was orientated by neo-Platonism and the traditions of classical antiquity. In the Teutonic countries, however, the Reformation developed a new mentality, with the Bible as the main source of its religious inspiration. Spinoza was the first northerner who dared to make a direct attack upon the Bible. It was not only, however, an outburst of passion, but also the first scholarly attempt at an analysis of the historiography and theology of the Bible. He was the founder of modern biblical higher criticism in Europe. He impressed the north with his apparently impartial analysis and with his objective approach to the investigation of the historical, metaphysical, legal, and political content of the Bible. His influence on the religious development of succeeding generations was as powerful as was his influence on the philosophical development of modern Europe. Just as contemporary philosophy is either Kantian or Spinozistic, so is present-day religion either Spinozism or dogmatic theology.

Spinoza's religious teachings called forth storms of protest throughout the Protestant countries. In the first fifty years after his death, every pulpiteer invented new invectives against him and decried him as a crass atheist. Even noted theologians of the day like Deyling, Mosheim, and many others vied with clerical demagogues in heaping insults upon the philosophical lens-grinder. The fight against Spinoza became so bitter that it assumed the character of a moral pogrom. One venom-

ous writer said of him that he was hired by Satan to spread atheism in the world and that his theory of religion is a horrible doctrine consisting of miserable errors and "unsalted Jewish philosophy." In the last third of the seventeenth century the theologians in the Protestant countries were exercised by one favorite theme—Spinoza's atheism. This assault by the entire Protestant church has no analogy in the annals of religious controversy in Europe. In the first half of the eighteenth century the German philosopher, Wolff, was the first thinker of his time who while rejecting Spinoza's theories dared to offer a defense of his personality. This impersonal attitude gave rise to a more kindly attitude toward Spinoza.

The intensity of the anti-Spinozistic movement in the north testifies to the shock which theology suffered as a result of Spinoza's new doctrine. Nevertheless, the true influence of Spinoza upon modern religiosity began to manifest itself with the appearance of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.

The German enlightenment movement, begun by Leibnitz and continued by Wolff, reached its height in Lessing. Though he was its most colorful and greatest representative, he at the same time overcame it. In the great theological controversies of the time the contradictions and idiosyncrasies of the Bible were stressed. The heterodox rejected it as a source of religious inspiration while the ultra-orthodox clung to its letter and spirit. Lessing, who was captivated by Spinoza, appeared as a mediator between the two contending parties. While repelled by the religious shallowness of the "enlighteners" and disgusted with the point of view of the ultra-orthodox, he introduced a religious outlook

which was conducive to religiosity and at the same time assigned orthodoxy to its proper position.

The main theological problem that presented itself to him was whether or not the veracity of religion depended upon the veracity of the teachings of the Bible. He pointed out that the Bible and Christianity are not identical and that historical truth cannot always be intellectual truth. Christianity and similar religions antedate the Bible to the extent that they contain eternal truth. Religion was not created by one man or one group or one generation, but was the product of a long historical development. It is based upon ancient traditions, which were transmitted from father to son for many centuries before Christ. The old Christian church made the article of belief and not the Bible the highest authority in all religious matters. Just as the Bible is not the only source of religious truth, so is it not the pure source of general truth. It is a religious book, but not religion per se, for many sections in the Bible have no bearing upon religion. In addition, many of the figures of the Old Testament are anything but sources of religious or ethical inspiration.

Lessing, like most of his German contemporaries, was intensely interested in the problem of immortality, which he considered to be a problem of both religion and philosophy. Since the Old Testament ignored this question, it meant little to him from a religious point of view. Together with Spinoza, Lessing holds that the Old Testament is lacking in a full concept of the oneness of God, or of an adequate God-recognition. He says that neither priest nor layman draws his religiosity from the Scriptures, but finds it only in his own soul. What is true of the individual Christian is all the more true of

Christendom. In this manner Lessing, inspired by Spinoza's religiosity, fought and finally triumphed over the dogmatism which was rampant in the Germany of his day. Lessing was the first to apply the doctrine of gradual evolution to religion. To him the history of religion became the history of the education and training of the human race. The positive religions were the necessary evolutionary stages of the human mind, thus precluding the validity of any orthodox doctrine of revelation. He distinguished between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion. The former teaches ethical conduct, and the more amiable and refined a man's character may be, the more does he practice the religion of Christ. The Christian religion, on the other hand, considers Jesus a God and an object of divine worship. While the religion of Christ is clearly defined in the gospels, the Christian religion is always opportunistic and cannot be clearly evaluated ethically.

This religious theory, which is the conviction of the educated classes of Germany to the present day, did not originate with Lessing, but was suggested to him by Spinoza.

After Lessing the next important philosopher to influence religious development in Germany was Kant. Although his theory of religiosity is primarily philosophy of religion, it is reminiscent of that of his predecessor. To him, too, religion is primarily religiosity and practical piety as exemplified by Jesus. Just as Lessing distinguished between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion, so did Kant distinguish between statutory or church religion and genuine religiosity. Statutory religion, in so far as it is guided by true religiosity, can have a claim on truth. The various observances, rituals,

and ceremonies he considers as a garment in which true religiosity is enveloped but which, however, can outgrow its wearers. While ceremonies and rituals are subject to change, true religiosity is constant and is a permanent element in the flux of religious phenomena.

To Kant religious history is a record of the everlasting struggle between religious externalities, such as forms of worship, rituals, and ceremonies on the one hand and moral religious faith on the other. Together with Spinoza he affirms that ancient Judaism is an example of organized religion, but goes much farther when he describes it as a system of legality in contradistinction to what he calls "morality." Ancient Hebraic monotheism, he says, was without value because it was political in character. It was barely distinguishable from an economically managed polytheism and, like all other positive religions, it was superstition rather than religion. The true history of religiosity begins only with Christianity. Jesus by his life and death was the first great religious teacher who freed the masses from religious legality and implanted in them religious morality.

While in all other aspects of the philosophy of religion Kant pursues his own path, in respect to the problem of biblical religiosity he is a follower of Spinoza. Spinoza's negative attitude to the Old Testament finds its explanation in his excommunication from the synagogue. Kant, however, who was reared by pious Protestant parents and steeped in biblical traditions from his earliest youth, must have observed the universalistic tendencies in the teachings of the ancient prophets. Yet so overwhelmed was he by Spinoza, that he, too, adopted a hostile attitude toward the Old Testament.²⁶

²⁶ It may be noted in passing that while Kant was anti-Hebraic he was not anti-Semitic. When the theological faculty of the University of Königsberg was looking

The basic philosophic doctrines of Kant lay dormant after his death for a period of eighty years. However, his attitude toward the Old Testament, far from being forgotten, was adopted by the foremost religious thinkers of the nineteenth century, especially by Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel, the men of the Romantic school. To the present day this tendency is still prevalent in liberal Protestant circles in Europe.

The religion of the north is rationalistic while that of the south is emotional. It is therefore not surprising that the north finally succumbed to Spinoza's religious appeal for his religiosity is doubly rationalistic by virtue of his Hebraic background and his mathematical approach.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century when the forces of rationalistic Protestantism had spent themselves in Europe, there grew up a Romantic school which repudiated analytical reason as a source of knowledge and relapsed into emotionalism. Yet Spinoza, the rationalist, projected his personality even upon this school. The first prominent religious figure of this movement was Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher, like Goethe, did not stress positive religion or religious observances. To him it was not something speculative or abstract but was pragmatic in character. In beholding all finality, *sub specie aeternitatis*, he recognized a world free from passion and error. His religiosity is merely a definite attitude to the universe. Yet he discovered salvation and beatitude in Spinoza's intellectual love of God.

for a scholar to occupy the chair of the Old Testament theology, Kant intervened and offered a Jewish scholar who in his opinion was fitted to hold the position because of his thorough knowledge of Hebrew.

Schleiermacher injected emotion and fantasy into dry northern Protestantism and eliminated from it rationalism, morality, and metaphysics—the handmaidens of all other church religions. Religion to him was not identical with knowledge. It was not concerned with the relationship of the finite to the infinite, or with the recognition of the essence of the first or last causes in their relationship to the final cause. Its primary purpose was to visualize the universe in its every aspect and in all its manifoldness. Thereby man becomes overwhelmed by a sense of humility and meekness. Religion thus becomes the immediate consciousness of being, the recognition that all finality is part of the infinite and that all timeliness is part of eternity. To seek, to find, and to recognize eternity in everything that moves and lives, in all action and suffering, is religion. Hence it is only a state of mind bordering on passivity and mystical vision.

The universe and its immediate recognition is the object of all true religiosity. In the realm of nature the divine oneness reveals itself not only in ponderous matter or in beautiful forms, but in the eternal laws and unchangeability of matter. He thus conceived religion as a pious vision from which meekness, love, gratitude, pity, and repentance must be deduced. These phenomena are not ethical but religious in character. Consequently religion cannot be the handmaiden of morality or of ethics, but only the comforter and companion of man. It cannot be circumscribed or expressed in terms of laws or norms, for it is not reason but emotion. By identifying religion with emotion, Schleiermacher expressed the religious views of the Romantic school in Germany.

Schleiermacher's conception of religion isolated it

from intellectual cultural processes. If religion is only emotion, it cannot share in reason and in any of its manifestations. Besides, emotion is blind and there is no sharp line of demarcation between emotion and the various manifestations of passion. Unless emotion is controlled and checked by reason it may degenerate into wild passion and become the cause of social catastrophes and disasters such as the Spanish Inquisition of the south and the witchcraft superstition of the north. While Schleiermacher calls upon Spinoza as his crown witness, his theory of subjective religiosity is not Spinozistic. Spinoza attempted to formulate an intellectual rather than an emotional conception of the universe. He speaks of the intellectual and not of the emotional love of God. Although Schleiermacher began with Spinoza, he concluded with Schleiermacher.

The subjective religiosity of the German Romantic movement gained ascendancy in the religious life of England during the nineteenth century. There biblicism had been more deeply rooted than in Germany. In fact, seventeenth-century England was so permeated with the biblical spirit that every Englishman considered it a pious deed even to revive Old Testament names. In the nineteenth century, however, it veered as far from biblical religiosity as did eighteenth-century France from Pascal's mysticism.

It is no mere accident that Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle, the two foremost representatives of the new religious spirit in England,²⁷ were orientated in modern German philosophy and poetry. Like Schleiermacher and his circle, Coleridge, too, rejected all rationalistic proofs of religion, for his primary concern was

²⁷ See bibliographical notes.

religiosity. He says that it is peculiar to Christianity that first it appeals to the emotions and then to the intellect. After it has clarified the heart it clarifies the mind. He yearned for the religion of Christ but not for the Christian church. In all his religious writings Coleridge shows his dependence upon Schleiermacher.

Not only indirectly but directly did Spinoza affect Coleridge. In his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* he rejects all the dogmatic theories of revelation in the Holy Scripture; yet, being an Englishman, he remained deeply convinced of the religious and ethical value of the Bible, which he attempted to rationalize. He even admitted that the Bible as a whole is a steady source of faith. While Coleridge's contemporaries would not accept his attitude to the Bible, later biblical criticism in England was nevertheless influenced by him.

Thomas Carlyle expressed a similar attitude toward religion, although he did not think in theological terms. As the foremost Goethe student and interpreter of German culture in the England of his time, he could not but be influenced by Goethe's religious views, which he set forth in his *Polemics* and essays. He directed his attacks not only against the conservative Protestant theologians, but also against materialists, skeptics, and atheists. In his argument against the materialism of Holbach and Helvetius, he concluded that it is a vain effort to prove the existence of God or to rationalize about Him. The very approach of the materialists to this problem is dubious. Religion is a matter of the heart and of the emotions, originating not in man's intellect, but in his intuition. Together with Goethe and Spinoza, Carlyle rejected the conception of a Deity who pushes and moves the world from without, and said that God

can be found only in the human heart. While He cannot be said to be in any given place, He is, nevertheless, in one's very breath and in one's acting and thinking. Whoever fails to recognize God's omnipresence cannot explain any phenomenon of life.

Although God is the central problem of religion, man's activities must be included in its program. Man's aim on earth is not selfish happiness, be it even in the form of seeking after salvation. Spiritual life begins only with self-denial. Although Carlyle encroaches upon the threshold of asceticism, he was not an ascetic. To him self-denial originated in man's meekness and resignation, which was born when he compared himself with the forces of nature. The highest ideal in life is *amor Dei*. Yet Carlyle was too steeped in history not to understand that true religiosity could become the common heritage only of the select few. The masses can acquire an approach to religiosity only through externalities such as religious ceremonies, observances, and rituals, which fill a definite function in religious life. Religion is not something imposed upon man from without but is innate. All mortals are equipped with sufficient spirituality to have some intuitive conception of the divine in life and to obey it in silence and piety. Thus Carlyle's attitude toward religion was much more sober than that of the Romantic school of Germany.

Of the later English theologians, Francis Newman and Matthew Arnold mirrored the influence of Spinozism. Newman, a truly pious spirit, in his *Faith and Soul* partially adopted Spinoza's attitude toward the Bible. His critical approach and his doctrine of subjective religiosity, which were both inspired by Spinoza, made him one of the outstanding religious figures of his day.

His contemporary, Matthew Arnold, in his *Literature and Dogma* and *God and the Bible*, substituted ethical idealism for supernatural religion. Although theologically inclined, he could not reconcile his own deep religiosity with Christianity. An empirically orientated age, he said, will not accept biblical miracles and dogmas, or the existence of a supermundane God. The God of religion is not an engineer but a poetic symbol, who constitutes ethical religiosity.²⁸

Spinoza's pious personality made such a deep impression upon Matthew Arnold that he came to identify ethics with religion. In this identification Arnold was mistaken, for religion and ethics have two different functions to perform in life. Religion is a regulated relationship of man to the forces of eternity, while ethics is a regulated relationship of man to his fellow-man. Hence, ethics cannot replace religion. Yet it is remarkable to observe that except for Schleiermacher every thinker who came under the spell of Spinoza's personal piety overlooked this fundamental difference. Most of the disciples of Spinoza have assumed either a supercritical or a hostile attitude toward the Old Testament, which is

²⁸ Matthew Arnold introduces his religious creed with the sentence, "The eternal power and not ourselves makes for righteousness." But what is this "eternal power" and what is this "not ourselves"? The latter he often described as natural law or as a world-order. This is a mere re-expression of Spinozism.

To eliminate all doubt as to the source of Matthew Arnold's inspiration, it is necessary to quote his opinion of Spinoza: "A philosopher who professed that knowledge was its own reward, a devotee who professed that love of God was its own reward, this philosopher and this devotee believed in what he said. Spinoza led a life perhaps the most spotless to be found in the lives of philosophers; he lived simply, studious, even-tempered, kind, declining honors, declining riches, declining notoriety. Therefore, he has been in a certain sphere edifying, and has inspired in many powerful minds an interested admiration such as no other philosopher has inspired since Plato. In my father's house are many mansions, only, to reach any one of these mansions, there are needed the wings of a genuine sacred transport, of an immortal longing. These wings Spinoza had, and because he had them his own language about himself, about his aspirations and course are true, his foot is in the vera vita, his eye on the beatific vision."

often so bitter as to almost give the appearance of Jew-hatred.²⁹

Church religion is still a powerful factor in present-day England because the high church is conservative, has a sense of organization, and is property-hungry. Nevertheless, even here Spinozism has made heavy inroads. The most conservative English divines have become reconciled to higher criticism despite the fact that they are horrified by some of its consequences. In fact, for the past century England has become a hotbed of higher criticism.

Religious thought played a more important part in England during the nineteenth century than in any other European country. The Established Church has zealously sought to exclude the influx of foreign heresies in English theological life. Yet Spinoza, by coloring the theological thought of Coleridge, Carlyle, Arnold, and Newman, has influenced English theological thought to an extent second only to that of Germany.

In France, Spinoza's influence upon the cultural process has been much less effective, not only because of the towering figure of Descartes, but also because of the effect of eighteenth-century materialism upon nineteenth-century France. To the present day Descartes is the philosophical patron saint of France. Nevertheless, Spinoza's influence can be seen even here. Victor Cousin, Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, and many other great Frenchmen of the nineteenth century came under his sway. Thus Victor Cousin, while rejecting Spinoza's separation of religion and philosophy, was enamored with his piety and spirituality. Like Voltaire before him he defended Spinoza against the accusation of athe-

²⁹ Gratz, the great Jewish historian, actually accuses not only Schleiermacher but even Goethe with anti-Semitic bias.

ism, saying that "Spinoza was so absorbed by the idea of God that he lost sight of man." This militant defense of Spinoza in France destroyed the fable of Spinoza's atheism.

While Cousin was defending Spinoza, although he was an opponent, Ernest Renan championed him because he was a friend. His approach to Spinoza was historical and literary rather than philosophical. Thundering against Feurbach's atheism, he revealed himself as a staunch defender of pantheism. While religions, he said, are products of certain historical developments, religiosity is an expression of the human soul and is a great educational factor in human life. Deity is to be found in everyday life rather than in the abstract formulas of the philosophers. Because Renan, too, was a subjective religionist, he admitted that man's capacity for religion was variable.

The defense of Spinoza by Cousin and Renan contributed little to his popularity. Only with the coming of Hippolyte Taine did Spinoza's influence in France become more widespread. Taine, the theoretician of naturalism in French literature in his *History of English Literature*, was one of the first to apply the theory of environment to aesthetics. He admitted, however, that the theory itself he borrowed from Spinoza. Man's realm, he said, is not a separate empire but is only a part of nature; and the spirit of man is regulated only by the spirit of nature. Hence, man's accomplishments can be understood only in connection with the nature with which he is encompassed. From this principle he describes the spiritual manifestations of a race which he understands only as an outgrowth of its environment. Taine believed that his theories of race and milieu rested

upon Spinozistic ground. In this assumption he was mistaken. Just as Spinoza's single *modus* is not deducible from his substance, so is Taine's theory of race not deducible from Spinozism. Race implies personality, which is contrary to the spirit of Spinoza's universalism.

In addition to his philosophical and literary influences, Spinoza also gave direction to French theological thought. He broke down the opposition of the Catholic church to higher criticism, as can be seen by the works of Havet, Reville, Morris, and Loisy. Thanks to Spinoza's influence, biblical criticism made heavy inroads even in Catholic France.

The rise of Spinoza as a religious force means, first, the breaking-down of theological dogma; second, the ascendancy of subjective religiosity; third, the breaking-down of scholastic theology; fourth, the separation of theology and philosophy; fifth, higher biblical criticism; and, last, religious tolerance as a product of religious subjectivism.

VII

The poet is concerned with beauty, the philosopher with truth. The poet thinks in similes, symbols, and images. He is inspired by the objective world which he reproduces in his own imagery. He is given to intuitive and not to analytical or discursive thinking. The philosopher deals with formulas, terms, notions, and ideas which are manifestations of the intellectual, analytical mind. Because of the differences in motive, interest, and expression of the two, the one rarely invaded the province of the other. The coming of Spinoza smoothed the barriers which separated the two realms. Many of the great poetic creations of the last one hundred and fifty years, permeated with the spirit of *En Kai Pan*,

are reminiscent of the Upanishads of old, giving expression not only to the emotion but also to the philosophical pensiveness of the poet, and to his world-picture.

While Baruch Spinoza has shaped and molded man's philosophical mind for the last one hundred and fifty years, he has actually determined the course of the poetic mind during that period. The greatest poets of England, France, and Germany, among them Goethe, Shelley, and Hugo, have painted their pictures in Spinozistic colors. Spinoza's influence upon modern poetry testifies to the religious character of his philosophy for the poet and religionist both draw from the same source, the emotions.

Spinoza has revealed the totality of nature to the modern poet and has accomplished for poetry what Copernicus and Kepler achieved for philosophy. Before the days of Spinoza the poets of nature contented themselves with poetic descriptions of some of the natural phenomena and with the expression of an artificial enthusiasm about God's creation. However, when Spinozism overwhelmed the hearts of poets a new lyricism was born. Guided and inspired by his *Deus sive natura*, the poet felt himself at one with nature and his soul became permeated with a genuine longing and an indescribable love for it.

While Spinozistic philosophy necessitated a dead God, Spinozistic poetry created a living nature, abounding in fascinating colors and captivating sounds. Goethe's poetry is a striking illustration of this transformation. Although Spinoza's nature is still and petrified, Goethe's nature vibrates with life. Spinoza understands nature in its mechanical motion, Goethe visualizes it in its living movements. He hears its voice, he sees its myriad

faces, and he loves it with a thousand hearts. It becomes to him one great poem which he alone can recite. Facing a sovereign—living and pulsating nature—the Spinozistic poet was inspired to philosophical thought and to meditation upon the great problems which have stirred man's heart and mind, the problems of God and the world and man's final goal. Spinoza's nature, poetically translated, transformed the poet into a philosopher. The mystery of yesterday became the problem of today. What is man's destiny, his position in the universe, and his goal? None of the great poets of modern times has given such powerful expression to these stirring problems as has Goethe in his cycle of poems, *God and the World*. In the first poem of this cycle entitled "Procemion," Goethe exclaims:

In His blest name, who was His own creation,
 Who from all time makes *making* his vocation
 The name of Him who makes our faith so bright,
 Love, confidence, activity, and might;
 In that One's name, who, named though oft He be,
 Unknown is ever in Reality;
 As far as ear can reach, or eyesight dim,
 Thou findest but the known resembling Him;
 How high so'er thy fiery spirit hovers,
 Its simile and type it straight discovers;
 Onward thou'rt drawn, with feelings light and gay,
 Where'er thou goest, smiling is the way;
 No more thou num'rest, reckonest no time,
 Each step is infinite, each step sublime.

What God would *outwardly* alone control,
 And on his finger whirl the mighty Whole?
 He loves the *inner* world to move, to view
 Nature in Him, Himself in Nature too,
 So that what in Him works, and is, and lives,
 The measure of His strength, His spirit gives.
 Within us all a universe doth dwell;

And hence each people's usage laudable.
 That ev'ry one the Best that meets his eyes
 As God, year e'en *his* God, doth recognize:
 To Him both earth and heaven surrenders he,
 Fears Him, and loves Him too, if that may be.

He even views scientific investigations and discoveries in the light of *Deus sive natura*. Silently but systematically nature perpetually revitalizes itself. What we conceive as birth and death is, in the final analysis, only an eternal cycle of appearance and disappearance. This is the basic thought of his famous poem, "The Metamorphosis of Plants."

Spinoza's conception of indestructible existence is vividly described in the poem "Legacy," in which Goethe affirms that being is eternal and that there is no destruction of life, for the eternal laws of nature protect life's treasures. This, Goethe thinks, must be a source of inspiration to all. There is no past or future, only an eternal living present. Nor is there any within or without, for what is within is without. Nature has no shell or kernel, for the shell is the kernel.

Und so sag' ich zum letzten Male;
 Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale;
 Du prufe dich nur allermeist,
 Ob du Kern oder Schale seist.

In this poem Goethe reveals that he drew not only from Spinoza but also from the latter's spiritual ancestry.

Spinoza's hold upon the German poetic mind was so intense that it was not even interrupted by the turn from universalism to individualism, caused by the Napoleonic wars. Just as Spinoza captivated Goethe, the foremost representative of German classicism, so he also fascinated all the outstanding poets of the German Ro-

mantic school. Of them none gave such powerful expression to his teachings as did Friedrich Ruckert, one of the pillars of German lyrical poetry of the first half of the nineteenth century. He was not only familiar with ancient Hindu thought, but also understood the inner connection between Spinozism and ancient Hindu mysticism. So overwhelmed was he by Spinozism that he even argued that it was compatible with free will, with man's moral responsibility, and with dynamic ethics. His poetry is a powerful reflex of Spinozism in all of its phases, as can be seen from the following poem:

Gott ist die Geister sonn' und die Natur sein Glanz,
Zieh deine Selbstheit aus, und an die Göttlichkeit!
Die Selbstheit ist so eng, die Göttlichkeit so weit.
Sei selbst! Er selber will, dass selbst du sollest sein,
Dass du erkennest selbst, er sei dein Selbst allein.

Nicht fertig ist die Welt, sie ist im ew'gen Werden,
Und ihre Freiheit kann die deine nicht gefährden.
Mit totem Räderwerk greift sie in dich nicht ein:
Du bist ein Lebenstrieb in ihr, gross oder klein.
Sie strebt nach ihrem Ziel mit aller Geister Ringen,
Und nur, wenn auch dein Geist ihr hilft, wird sie's erringen.

Gott ist von keinem Raum, von keiner Zeit umzirt,
Denn Gott ist da und dann, wo er und wann er wirkt,
Und Gott wirkt überall, und Gott wirkt immerfort;
Immer ist seine Zeit, und überall sein Ort.

Der Geist des Menschen fühlt sich völlig zweierlei;
Abhängig ganz und gar, und unabhängig frei.
Abhängig, sofern er Gott im Auge hält,
Und unabhängig, wo er vor sich hat die Welt.

Ich bin von Gott gewusst, und bin dadurch allein!
Mein Selbstbewusstsein ist, von Gott gewusst zu sein,
Im Gottbewusstsein geht nicht mein Bewusstsein aus;
Eingeht es wie ein König in seines Vaters Haus.

In a similar vein most of the major German poets of the nineteenth century were Spinozistically orientated. The genius of Heine, Hoelderlin, Hebbel, Lenau, Immerman, Schefer, and Stefan George was guided by Spinoza. Thus Immerman insisted that Spinozism is more than a philosophical doctrine, for it is life's greatest experience. "God pulsed from me every moment in both directions of the universe," and "God is everywhere, even where early things and eternal things are in conflict." Finally he exclaims:

Sieh' mächt'ger Gott in der Natur
Sieh droben die Natur in Gott!

Nicholaus Lenau, restless and wandering poet of pessimism, and one of Germany's greatest lyrical poets of the nineteenth century, prescribed Spinozism as a cure for trembling souls. Yet Lenau cannot be called a full-fledged Spinozist for he was too whimsical to adhere to one doctrine. Although he wrestled with him and sought to overcome him, he still could never free himself from *En Kai Pan* to which he gave expression in the following verse:

Ich bin mitt Gott festinniglich
Verbunden und seit immerdar,
Mit ihm derselbe ganz und gar.

In England, Spinoza's influence on poetry is limited chiefly to the Romantic school. John Locke, who determined the course of English philosophical development by disposing of the problem of substance which had engaged the attention of all the major philosophers of the seventeenth century, thereby eliminated Spinozism from English philosophical thought of the succeeding generations. English poetry, like all other great

poetry of modern times, had a definite philosophical background. But since Spinozism was not at home in English intellectual life, it was also alien to English poetry. Only when the great Romantic poets broke with tradition and turned either to mysticism, as did Wordsworth, or to a cosmic consideration of life, as did Byron and Shelley, did Spinoza become a force in English cultural life. The lone exception was John Toland, Spinoza's first important English critic, who, strangely enough, was also the first author of a Spinozistic hymn.³⁰

Of all the Romantics, Shelley was the greatest interpreter of Spinozism to the Anglo-Saxon world. He devoted his poetic genius to spreading the gospel of Spinoza's monism. From his early youth he wrestled with the great religious and philosophical problems of his time, and it was only in Spinozism that he found peace of mind. Like Goethe, he could not visualize a world moved by an outside force. Seeking both truth and beauty, the entire religious fabric appeared to him as being ugly and puerile, and his resentment at organized religion was outspoken. His youthful idealism could not make peace with the established religious order. Truth, to him, was a much higher ideal than safety and convention. In his struggle with religious and philosophical conventions he found a haven in Spinozism.

"The world is one and one is the world "

"This, in itself, one world is God, eternal, immeasurable,
Without beginning and without end."

"In Him we are, we live, and weave."

"From Him everything originates, to Him everything returns:
He is the ground and the goal of all things."

"Let us sing a song in praise of the world."

Traces of Spinozistic influence can already be detected in his early works. In "Zastrossi," written at the age of eighteen, he asks, "Do you believe that the soul decays with the body, or if you do not, when this perishable body mingles with its parent earth, where goes the soul which now actuates its movements?" Similarly he asks in "St. Irvyne," "Will not this nature, will not the matter of which it is composed, exist for all eternity?" Furthermore, he says, "I believe nature to be self-sufficient and excelling. I should suppose, therefore, that there could be nothing beyond nature." The expression "nature is self-sufficient" indicates his indebtedness to Spinoza.

The growth of Spinoza's spell upon Shelley can be traced from year to year. As early as 1811 he says in a letter to a friend:

Before we deny or believe the existence of anything, it is necessary that we should have a tolerably clear idea of what it is. The word God has been and will continue to be the source of numberless errors, until it is erased from the nomenclature of philosophy. Does it not imply: the soul of the universe, the intelligent and necessarily beneficent, actuating principle? This it is impossible not to believe in. I may not be able to adduce proofs, but I think that the leaf of a tree, the meanest insect, on which we trample, are in themselves arguments more conclusive than any which can be advanced, that some vast intellect animates infinity. If we disbelieve this, the strongest argument in support of the existence of a future state instantly becomes annihilated. All are but part of a stupendous whole, something more than poetry. It has ever been my favorite theory for the immortal soul never to be able to die. . . . Love, love, infinite in extent, eternal in duration, yet perfectible, should be the reward, but can we suppose that this reward will arise spontaneously, as a necessary appendage to our nature, or that nature itself could be without a cause?

The words "the soul of the universe" and "the intelligent actuating principles" already show an intimate familiarity with Spinoza.

Like Byron, Shelley was greatly influenced by the prevailing scientific tendencies of the time. He was interested in natural philosophy and cosmology. At an early age he already attempted to combine the cosmological principles of the scientist with the deductive philosophy of Spinoza. The immanence of God was to him not merely a metaphysical conviction but a scientific certainty. In his notes to "Queen Mab" he develops the Spinozistic theory that all becoming and all movements of the universe follow eternal and immutable laws.

To Shelley, Spinoza was not only a poetic inspiration, but also an intellectual guide. He accepted Spinoza's world-picture as a philosophical doctrine. But Shelley also had cosmological interests which Spinoza could not satisfy. Thus, he missed in Spinoza the connecting link between analytical cosmology and deductive metaphysics. Therefore, he proceeded to create this link by a theory of atoms, reminiscent of Descartes.

All of Shelley's writings, both prose and poetry, drip with Spinozism. But while he attempted to penetrate the secrets of nature, he was neither a naturalist nor an atheist. Even though Shelley wrote "The Necessity of Atheism," he was not an atheist. Thus in a conversation with Trelawny shortly before his death he said, "It [atheism] is a word of abuse to stop discussion, a painted devil to frighten the foolish, a threat to intimidate the wise and good. I used it to express my abhorrence of superstition. I took up the word, as a knight takes up a gauntlet, in defiance of injustice."

Just as in his religious, so also in his ethical interests did he follow Spinoza's trail. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough he says:

Moral qualities are such as only a human being can possess. To attribute them to the Spirit of the Universe or to suppose that

it is capable of altering them, is to degrade God into Man and to annex to this incomprehensible qualities incompatible with any possible definition of nature. To attribute to God the moral qualities of man is to suppose him susceptible of passions, which, arising out of corporeal organization, it is plain that a pure spirit cannot possess. But even suppose with the vulgar, that God is a venerable old man, seated on a throne of clouds, his breast the theatre of various passions, analogous to those of humanity, His will, changeable and uncertain as that of an earthly king—still goodness and justice are qualities seldom nominally denied Him.

This is a reverberation of Spinoza's *Theological Political Tractate*.

In almost all his poetical works, notably in "Queen Mab," "Mont Blanc," "Laon and Cynthia," "Prometheus Unbound," and "Adonias and Hellas," Spinozistic pantheism breaks forth in him with irresistible forcefulness. Spinoza's substance he often calls spirit or spirit of nature. In "Laon and Cynthia" he exclaims:

O Spirit, vast and deep as Night and Heaven!
 Mother and soul of all to which is given
 The light of life, the loveliness of being,
 Nature, or God or Love.

In his hymn "To Intellectual Beauty" Shelley says about the supreme cause:

The awful shadow of some unseen Power
 Floats though unseen amongst us.

In "Queen Mab" he says:

Spirit of Nature, thou!
 Life of interminable multitudes;
 Soul of these mighty spheres
 Whose changeless paths thro' Heaven's
 deep silence lie:
 Soul of that smallest being,
 The dwelling of whose life
 Is one faint April sunbeam.

But nothing characterizes his pantheistic sentiments as much as the following passage from "Queen Mab":

Yet not the lightest leaf
That quivers to the passing breeze
Is less instinct with thee:
Yet not the meanest worm
That lurks in graves and fattens on the dead
Less shares thy eternal breath.

In heavy poetic images he announces the truth of the infinity of substance in the following terms:

Let Heaven and Earth, let man's revolving race,
His ceaseless generations tell their tale,
Let every part depending on the chain
That links it to the whole, point to the hand
That grasps its terms; let every seed that falls
In silent eloquence unfold its store
Of argument; infinity within,
Infinity without, belie creation:
The exterminable spirit it contains
Is Nature's only God.

The image of substance as a calm sea is used by Spinoza in his *Ethics* (III, prop. lix, schol. 182). Shelley paraphrases it in his "Laon and Cynthia" as follows:

My mind became the book through which I grew
Wise in all human wisdom, and its cave,
Which like a mine I rifled through and through,
To me the keeping of its secrets gave—
One mind, the type of all, the moveless wave
Whose calm reflects all moving things that are,
Necessity, and love, and life; the grave.

Equally in the spirit of Spinoza, he says in "Laon and Cynthia":

Unlike the God of human error, Thou
Requiest no prayer nor praises; the caprice
Of man's weak will belongs no more to Thee
Than do the changeful passions of his breast
To Thy unvarying harmony: the slave,

Whose horrible lusts spread misery o'er the world,
 And the good man, who lifts, with virtuous pride,
 His being, in the sight of happiness,
 That springs from his own works—the poison tree,
 Beneath whose shade all life is withered up,
 And the fair oak, whose leafy dome affords
 A temple where the view of happy love
 Are registered, are equal in thy sight:
 No love, no hate Thou cherishest:

.
 all that the wide world contains
 Are but Thy passive instruments, and Thou
 Regardst them all with an impartial eye,
 Whose joy or pain Thy nature cannot feel,
 Because Thou hast not human sense,
 Because Thou art not human mind.

Shelley transcribed almost all of Spinoza's metaphysical thoughts into poetic images. What Spinoza understood Shelley visualized. He was the poetic high priest in the temple of Spinozism.

If Shelley discovered the universe through mystical vision, Byron, his contemporary and friend, detected it through his observations of nature. He was driven into the arms of pantheism not from an inner religious urge but from "scientific" convictions. The pantheistic motives with which his poetry is permeated were conceived in scientific observations. In several of his letters he admits that his "Cain" was inspired by the discoveries of Cuvier. His interests in astronomy were supreme. His astrophysical interests imposed pantheism upon him from without. Awed by the star-bespangled skies, conveying the message of eternity, captivated by the majestic grandeur of the rhythmic movements of the celestial bodies, he succumbed to the consciousness of the oneness and the totality of the fabric of nature. He was nature-minded, for he felt himself to be at one with it.

This feeling manifested itself in his poems in which he applied astronomic-poetic terms to historical figures.

His burning interest in the laws governing the cosmos caused him to break with Christianity. To fill the gap he sought intellectual comfort and spiritual consolation in those philosophical and religious doctrines which best fitted his world-picture. This solace he found in the doctrines of Spinoza with which he familiarized himself at an early age. In a letter to Hodgson dated September 3, 1811, he already confessed that he would rather be a Spinozist than a Christian. Because he, too, begins with nature and not with man, he is at one with Spinoza, who said that it is ridiculous to make man the goal and crown of creation or the measure of all things. To him God is impersonal and without positive attributes other than infinity and eternity. He, too, characterizes God as "the cause of causes," as a state or a condition rather than as a conscious being.

While the spirit of Spinoza is clearly visible in many of Byron's poems, particularly in a "Prayer to Nature," it must be admitted that his conception of Spinozism was not as well rounded as that of Shelley or as much a part of his personality. To Shelley, Spinozism was as refreshing and as necessary as a drink of water to the exhausted wanderer in the desert. To Byron, it was only a philosophical commentary to his scientific text. *En Kai Pan* he discovered in nature, not in his own breast. His joy in Spinoza's unity of Man, Nature, and God was caused not by an inner light but by outer scientific observations and studies.

While Byron was vitally concerned with scientific studies, he was, strangely enough, not a scientist. He never enjoyed the advantages of an organized training

in any of the major sciences. His concern with astrophysical and cosmological problems sprang primarily from his poetic interests. His poetic imagery kindles in the great cosmic phenomena. Unlike some poets, he was not satisfied with the specific phases of nature but he yearned to embrace it in its totality. With two piercing eyes he attempted to look not only at nature but also through it. It was here that his scientific interests kindled and developed.

Together with Shelley, he believed the atom to be the source of life. However, it does not produce life but rather life is being produced in it. Who is the producer? In answering this problem he vacillated between Spinozism and theism. God produced the world, but He is an impersonal being. Yet in "Cain" he says that God created not the universe, but rather life in the universe. As a Spinozist he could not possibly assume the idea of a personal creator and instead speaks of "leaping into life."

While Byron's conception of the origin of organic life is only demi-Spinozistic, his theory of mechanical motion is orthodox Spinozism. The universe is eternal being, and in it purely mechanical motion is the fundamental and operating principle. Determinism reigns supreme and the eternal cycle is the order of life.

Byron and Shelley represent two distinct types of mystical consciousness. Shelley is the symbol of intellectual mysticism, which projects itself upon nature, and Byron is the apotheosis of mysticism of nature, which projects itself upon the mind. That both found in Spinoza a common anchor ground testifies to the magic power which the lonely Jew of Amsterdam exercised upon the great poetic minds of modern times.

To Goethe and Shelley, Spinozism was both a fact and an inner conviction. To Byron and to Victor Hugo, his heir in European literature, it was a problem. Like Byron, Hugo, too, was overwhelmed with the phenomena of nature, and often vacillated between theism and pantheism. However, he grappled with Spinoza more than did any other outstanding poet of the nineteenth century. Unlike Shelley and Byron, Hugo did not break entirely with religious tradition, for he could not free himself from the idea of a personal God. But, yet, he was a pantheist and a theist and constantly fluctuated between these two conflicting motives. While he identified God with the world, this pantheistic God retained his personality. His final conclusion was that God's personality is the ego of the infinite world. This is but a restatement of time-honored theism.

Hugo's vacillation between Spinozism and theism caused many of his critics, especially Lanson, the celebrated historian of modern French literature, to consider him to be intellectually a valley. The French mind is addicted to clarity, often at the expense of depth, and because there was no philosophical clarity in Hugo's mind his critics doubted his intelligence. A synthesis of Spinozistic pantheism and religious theism is not possible, and he who desires to reconcile the two is both inconsistent and a mystic. Victor Hugo was blessed with both qualities. However, mystics have the privilege of being inconsistent, as was so well expressed by Pascal when he said that the human heart has its reason which reason cannot understand.³¹

³¹ It is this mysticism which drove Victor Hugo into the arms of medieval Kabbala and caused him to befriend Alexandre Weill, an Alsatian Jew, who came to Paris in 1836 to teach him Kabbala. The Weill episode in Hugo's life throws a glaring light on the mystical inclination of the great poet. Weill taught Hugo the identity of God and man and of God and the world.

This mystic pantheism Hugo expressed in his poem:

Rien n'existe que lui, le Flamboiement profond
 Et les âmes, les grains de lumière, les mythes,
 Les moi mystérieux, atomes sans limites,
 Qui vont vers le grand moi, leur centre et leur aimant,
 Points touchant au zénith par leur rayonnement.
 La matière n'est pas, et l'âme seule existe.

Rising from pantheistic mysticism with all its inconsistencies, contradictions, and idiosyncrasies, Hugo slowly conceived of a purer pantheism reminiscent of Goethe and of Spinoza. His primary concern was with God and nature and with man and his soul. In his *Contemplations* (VI, x) Hugo attained Goethean heights in painting a picture of the manifoldness of nature as a totality.

L'être, éteignant dans l'ombre et l'extase ses fièvres
 Ouvrant ses flancs, ses seins, ses yeus, ses cœurs épars,
 Dans ses pores profonds reçoit des toutes parts
 La pénétration de la sève sacrée.
 La grande paix d'en haut vient comme une marée.
 Le brin d'herbe palpite aux fentes du pave;
 Et l'âme a chaud. On sent que le nid est couve.
 L'infini semble plein d'un frisson de feuilles,
 On croit être à cette heure ou la terre éveillée
 Entend le bruit que fait l'ouverture du jour,

.

L'horizon semble un rêve éblouissant ou nage
 L'écaille de la mer, la plume du nuage,
 Car l'océan est hydre et le nuage oiseau.
 Une lueur, rayon vague, part du berceau
 Qu'une femme balance au seuil d'une chaumière,
 Doré les champs, les fleurs, l'onde et devient lumière
 En touchant un tombeau qui dort près du clocher.
 Le jour plonge au plus noir du gouffre et va chercher
 L'ombre, et la baise au front sous l'eau sombre et 'hagarde.
 Tout est doux, calme, heureux, apaise; Dieu regarde.

Believing that God is beyond and hence inaccessible and incomprehensible, we have no right to speak of God's attributes or to ascribe to Him certain properties or qualities because God is unknowable and unrecognizable. "Even the attempt to praise Him in human words is already blasphemy."

In his God-conception Victor Hugo is guided not so much by Spinoza as by Spinoza's spiritual ancestors, the ancient Hindus. In many of his philosophical poems Victor Hugo attains the height of dazzling metaphysical realism comparable only to the Upanishads of old. Unlike Goethe, to whom living nature is a source of inexhaustible optimism and joy, Hugo discovers in the same nature the sources of evil and gloom.

C'est vraiment une chose amère de songer
Qu'en ce monde où l'esprit n'est qu'un morne étranger,
Où la volupté rit, jeune, et si décrépite!
Où dans les lits profonds l'aile d'en bas palpète,
Quand, pâmée, dans un nimbe ou bien dans un éclair,
On tend sa bouche ardente aux coupes de la chair,
A l'heure où l'on s'enivre aux lèvres d'une femme
De ce qu'on croit l'amour, de ce qu'on prend pour l'âme,
Sang du cœur, vins des sens acres et délicieux,
On fait rougir la-haut quelques passants des cieux!"

—*Contemplations*, VI, xl

This feeling of pessimism is strengthened by the thought that man himself, not being apart from but a part of nature, carries in himself all the cosmic elements, and is a source of both good and evil at the same time.

Qui, mon malheur irréparable,
C'est de pendre aux deux éléments,
C'est d'avoir en moi, misérable,
De la fange et des firmaments!

Hélas! hélas! c'est d'être un homme:
 C'est de songer que j'étais beau,
 D'ignorer comment je me nomme,
 D'être un ciel et d'être un tombeau!

C'est d'être un forcat qui promène
 Son vil labeur sous le ciel bleu;
 C'est de porter à la hotte humaine
 Ou j'avais vos ailes, mon Dieu!

C'est de traîner de la matière,
 C'est d'être plein, moi, fils du jour,
 De la terre du cimetière,
 Même quand je m'écrie: Amour!

His metaphysical pessimism is much closer to that of Spinoza than that of Goethe and his German contemporaries. Hugo's logic is unimpeachable. If man is only a part of nature, governed by the same immutable laws and only driven by blind passions, his realm must be that of cruelty and terribleness. This thought he expresses most particularly in "La légende de siècle." He refers to the gods as being only matter, permeated with evil. Hugo is no longer satisfied with Spinoza but harks back to ancient India. Yet, since Victor Hugo was a westerner, he could not be satisfied with the identification of nature and man, and man and evil. In his great allegory, "The End of Satan," he describes the processes of man's moral ascendancy and purification.

Les mondes, qu'aujourd'hui le mal habite et creuse,
 Echangeront leur joie à travers l'ombre heureuse
 Et l'espace silencieux;
 Nul être, âme ou soleil, ne sera solitaire;
 L'avenir, c'est l'hymen des hommes sur la terre
 Et des étoiles dans les cieux.
 Les globes se noueront par des nœuds invisibles;
 Ils s'enverront l'amour comme la flèche aux cibles;
 Tout sera vie, hymne et reveil;

Et comme des oiseaux vont d'une branche à l'autre,
 Le Verbe immense ira, mystérieux apôtre,
 D'un soleil à l'autre soleil.

Hugo makes the ego of the world, which he calls God, serve as a source of man's moral purification and ethical evolution. This Deus is no longer coequal with that of Spinoza, but is a universal self-conscious spirit with an idea of its own. Spinoza's doctrine that God has an idea of His own contradicts his entire God-concept, but in Victor Hugo it supplements it. The contradiction in Spinoza's pantheism is sharply accentuated by Victor Hugo's philosophy of identity. God is not dead but alive. He is not anthropomorphic, but a self-conscious spirit and as such the hope of humanity.

Victor Hugo was not the only great French poet of the nineteenth century to come under the spell of Spinoza, for Alfred de Musset, Lamartine, Maupassant, Rimbaud, and many others were seduced by the great philosophical dream of the lens-grinder of Amsterdam. Although each gave some expression to Spinozism in his writings, Victor Hugo was most completely absorbed by Spinozistic thought.

To the present day Spinoza is still a vital force in literature. All varieties of poetry—lyrical, dramatic, and epic—are permeated with his spirit. Modern lyrical poetry, experiencing the totality of nature, speaks his language. Modern drama in which man's life is recreated as the whim of fate, chained to eternal laws from which he can never free himself, expresses his world-picture. Although modern drama is biographical and dynamic, it yet clings to that fatalism and determinism which is so characteristic of Spinoza. While his influence upon lyrical poetry, which is concerned with living

nature, is elevating, his hold upon the drama, which deals with man, is depressing. To the lyrical poet Spinoza revealed nature but to the modern dramatist he crucified man.

VIII

Spinoza, the mystic who denied the world, man, and empiric knowledge, influenced modern science more profoundly than did any other philosopher of modern times except Bacon. Nineteenth-century science, mechanistically orientated, was entirely dominated by Spinozism. Modern cosmology, although at variance with the mechanistic world-picture, is also orientated in Spinoza's spirit. Albert Einstein, the foremost cosmologist of modern times, has repeatedly affirmed his faith in the God of Spinoza. Reichenbach, Planck, and many other physicists of our day, although they may not entirely share Einstein's Spinozism leanings, have, nevertheless, been greatly influenced by Spinoza's world-picture. His determinism and his *una substantia* have shaped the cosmological conceptions of modern science.

But not so much in cosmology as in biology and psychology did Spinoza prove to be a potent force. As early as the end of the seventeenth century Friedrich Wilhelm Stoch, one of the foremost physiologists of his time, attempted to apply Spinoza's *una substantia* to physiology. He asserted that man represents not a duality of body and soul but a oneness. He anticipated eighteenth-century materialism by his bold assertion that mind is only the brain in operation, and that the soul, which is part of the mind, is something concrete and material. Although Stoch misinterpreted Spinozism, his views continued to prevail in science for almost a century and a half.

Eighteenth-century science, notably in France, was guided by Baconism. Yet the French materialism of that time was largely motivated by Spinoza's determinism. Although men like Holbach and Delametrie rejected Spinoza's metaphysics, they accepted his cosmology. His determinism helped to produce a materialistic world-picture, but his monism shaped the destinies of science long after materialism as a theory of science was overcome. Just as in philosophy Spinozism affected the development of rationalism and mysticism, so in science did he shape the development of mechanism and vitalism. The vitalist Miller and the mechanist Haeckel considered themselves to be true Spinozists.

Johannes Miller held Spinozism in such high esteem that he concluded his great work *Physiology* with a translation of a portion of Spinoza's *Ethics*. His doctrine of the specific energy of the senses, according to which every sense nerve reacts upon every stimulus in a given manner, is a necessary consequence of the conception of the oneness of the physiological fabric.

After Miller's star set, that of Ernst Haeckel, the foremost Darwinian of modern times, rose. During his entire intellectual career he engaged in numerous controversies. But his quarrel with theologians and Kantian philosophers overshadowed all his other disputes. His controversy with Kant, whom he brilliantly misunderstood, was caused by his passionate orthodox Spinozism, of which he saw only the deterministic end. Modern biology, in so far as it is dominated by Haeckel, is thoroughly Spinozistic.

It is a curious paradox that Spinoza, who denied man, nevertheless exercised a profound influence upon the

science of man. Fechner, Wundt, and Freud, three of its greatest representatives of modern times, testify to his remarkable hold upon psychology. Fechner, one of the foremost philosophers and psychologists of the nineteenth century, is best known to the intellectual world for his "Fechner law," which says that the sensation varies in the ratio of the logarithm of impression. This law is an application of Spinoza's doctrine of the two attributes of the one substance to modern psychology. Fechner assumed a parallelogram of the forces of body and soul which are two aspects of the same oneness. So overwhelmed was he by Spinozism that he, too, waged a lifelong war against Kantianism.

The second great psychologist of the nineteenth century was Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of physiological psychology. He was as deeply steeped in Spinozism as was his master Fechner. Not only did Wundt transform Spinoza's theory of the affections into a doctrine of religious psychology, deducing the religious myth from feeling, but he also presented Spinoza as the first philosopher who created a metaphysical ethics without an admixture of theology. But although Wundt was guided by Spinoza in his purely scientific studies, he rejected him as a metaphysicist and as a theologian. He expressed his wrath at Spinoza's identification of substance, God, and nature, which he considered to be rank atheism and blasphemy. Wundt was the only great scientist of modern times who was guided by Spinoza but yet did not accept him fully.

The third great representative of the science of man in modern times is Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. He applied the mechanisms of Spinoza's pantheism to the operation of the human mind. Just as Spinoza's nature obeys certain immutable laws so does

Freud's reconstructed human mind follow its own unchangeable order. His conception of mind is as intangible as Spinoza's conception of substance. Both are only imaginary magnitudes. If Spinozism is macro-panteism, Freudianism is micro-panteism.

Although Spinozism survived in the biological and psychological sciences because of its mechanism and monism, it was destroyed as a theory of physical science by Heidenheim in Germany, Dirack in France, and Bridgeman in the United States. Heidenheim was the first to point out the gaps in the law of causation. He demonstrated that this law is not infallible in astronomy, from which he properly concluded it is not a logical principle. Since Heidenheim's principle has not been refuted, Spinoza's theory of causation and determinism are dogmas of the past.

Just as Heidenheim destroyed Spinoza's theory of causation, so did Ernst Mach annihilate the theory of substance. It is not substance, he said, but the continued happening which is the essence of reality. Not statics but dynamics is the essence of all things. Moreover, everything in life must be reduced to a variety of elementary processes, which have a common kindling point. Avenarius, the founder of empirical criticism, arrived at the same conclusion independently of Mach. Both rejected Spinoza's substance, but still could not free themselves from his monism.

While at the moment Spinoza's influence in science has been eclipsed in part by the rejection of causation as a logical principle, it would be too bold to assume that his influence has been permanently eliminated from science. As long as Spinoza's world-picture will continue to dazzle humanity so long will it continue to influence science.

IX

Spinoza's vast influence on the development of the sciences is the more remarkable since he was never engaged in scientific labor as were Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant. He was a philosopher only. Kant, on the other hand, was as much scientist as philosopher. He is, in fact, highly rated as a scientist to the present day. Some of the foremost scientists of the nineteenth century as Helmholtz, for instance, thought highly of Kant as a scientist. A man like W. Hastie, in his highly learned treatise on *Kant's Cosmogony* dares the assertion that "all the science of our age may still gather new strength from his (Kant's) bold thought and fruitful suggestion." He goes on to say that "Kant was specially endowed with the peculiar gift of the scientific mind." A similar view is held by von Kirchman on Kant's scientific gifts and accomplishments. Not only was Kant familiar with all the scientific doctrines and theories of his time but he was actively engaged in many branches of science, notably physics and astrophysics. Especially his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, acquired for him a great position in the history of science. We still speak of the Kant-La Place theory. But still Kant's influence on the development of the sciences was nil, and Edmund Koenig in his work, *Kant und die Naturwissenschaft* (p. 66), complains bitterly that "the greatest and the most universal German thinker had not exercised any influence on the sciences at all." The explanation offered by Koenig—that the rise of the romantic school with its negative attitude to the analytical scientific mind had prevented Kant from exercising an influence on the sciences—is puerile; for the romantic

school did not retard the development of the sciences in Europe. However, while the scientific labors of Kant have not affected the march of scientific events in the least as was pointed out by Eric Adikes,³² the non-scientific Spinoza actually has shaped the scientific process in Europe in the course of the last one hundred and fifty years because of the overwhelming grandeur of his world-picture. Kant, with all his scientific endeavors and achievements, was primarily interested in men and hence his influence is felt in the domain of ethics, epistemology, economics, and politics. Spinoza, who was disinterested in man, but highly interested in the whole of things, which he identified with God, was privileged to influence the natural sciences. This testifies to Spinoza's strength, but not to the philosophical wisdom and depths of the great scientists who in most instances are either merely great technicians or mystics.

³² *Kant als Naturforscher*, Berlin, 1924, 2 vols.

THE MAN AND HIS RACE

I

ALL OF white man's culture can be divided into two categories, two types, one which is born of the ear and the other of the eye. Every culture is either musical, abstract, and algebraic, or it is spatial, concrete, and geometric.

Semitic culture is that of the ear, while Aryan culture is that of the eye. All myth, like all plastic arts, originates in vision. Hence Semitic culture is without a mythology, without a pantheon, and without a plastic art. The greatest Hebraic exclamation begins with *Shma* or "hear," which, by the way, also means "understanding," "perception." Aryan culture, on the other hand, is overwhelmed with myth, populated with gods and goddesses, and saturated with plastic art.

For every time the Old Testament mentions vision it mentions audibility ten times. The ancient Jews and the ancient Arabs could only hear; they could see nothing. In the desert, from whence they hailed, there is nothing to be seen except sand wastes, baked by the burning sun. The desert offers nothing to the eye.

Because of this undeveloped vision, the Jews have not developed a plastic art. It has been said of Professor Max Lieberman, president of the German Academy of Plastic Arts and the greatest German impressionistic painter of our day, that he paints with his ear, not with his eye; with his reason and not with his emotions. The same is true of many other Jews who dabbled in the plastic arts. A Jewish artist usually has a thesis in ad-

dition to a subject. First he rationalizes what he sees and then he paints. Even if it could be proved documentarily that El Greco, who painted with his eye, was a Jew, it would only show that the exception proves the correctness of the rule. Hebrew has a number of synonyms for vision, but all of these terms do not mean vision in Goethe's meaning of the term *Schauen*, but "perception," "understanding," and "foresight." Modern Jewry has produced a dozen first-rate musicians, but not many first-rate painters or sculptors.

Whatever the Jew has wrested from his creative mind in the course of thousands of years—abstract, artless religion; ethics; jurisprudence; metaphysics; poetry—is the creation of the ear and not of the eye. There is nothing in the Jewish culture that can be described graphically. Abstract Jewish monotheism, like every other metaphysical "ism," needs an organ of expression. The organ of expression of monotheism is not plastic art (as that of Aryan polytheism) but abstract, metaphysical poetry.

The realm of the eye is a realm of "sin." Sin is identical with nature, lust, and passion. Judaism, like Islam, is puritanic, and legalistic. It attempts to regulate man's religious emotions by reason and rationalizes all his other elemental desires. All of man's relations to the supersensuous, to the supernatural, to the transcendental, as well as to his fellow-man, are regulated by law, by the legal formula, which in turn is the creation of reason. Aryan religiosity, on the other hand, is purely emotional, non-legalistic, and a-rational. Emotion creates art. Cold reasoning creates legality and formulas. The Jew, like all Semites, cannot think in images, but only in definitions, terms, formulas, abstractions, concepts,

laws, and doctrines. All the prohibitions of ancient Judaism against the plastic arts—"Thou shalt not make an image before me, etc."—are only the codified experiences and inclinations of the race. If the race had an eye to see, such prohibitions would not have been enacted, for the religion of a race is always commensurate with its temperament.

The Jewish temperament kindles in time, not in space, and his mind functions algebraically, but not geometrically. Abstract thinking involves time, the order of succession. Concrete thinking involves space, the order of contiguity. To the Jew, time is everything, space nothing. For time he has several terms; for space, not even one. The Hebrew term *Mocom* means both "space" and "God." To the Jew of old, space is something that is vague and metaphysical, but time is such a reality that even God is in it and not outside of it.

"For a thousand years, O Lord, is like yesterday in thine eyes," the psalmist comforts himself. Judaism thus means time—history, not geography. The Jew never was burdened with geography. His history, however, begins with the very creation itself and will last until the day after eternity. His empire is in time, not in space, and hence is indestructible. For thousands of years the Jews said "ear" and the Aryans "eye"; the Jews "time" and the Aryans "space"; the Jews "reason" and the Aryans "emotion"; the Jews "history" and the Gentiles "geography."

The beliefs, predilections, tastes, yearnings, aspirations, and longings of both races were fixed, and expressed themselves in a given order until one day Baruch Spinoza appeared and tried to reverse the Jewish order: not time, but space; not algebra, but geometry;

not history, but geography, is the order of things. He was the first Zionist of modern times. He was the first to express the view that the Jewish problem is a problem of geography and of territory. He was the first Jew to think in geometric terms and to place religion on a purely emotional basis. Therefore, he became to humanity the God-intoxicated Jew, the man who was overwhelmed with religious emotion rather than guided by reason.

Judaism speaks of the fear of God while Spinoza speaks of the love of God. Religiosity, per se, is called in Hebrew *Yirath Shomaim*, the fear of God or of heaven. Fear is a product of reason, love of emotion. The stone knows no fear. Plants already have an inkling of fear, while the animal is positively fearful. Only the stupid is fearless. The higher the intelligence, the greater the fear. Love, however, has nothing to do with intelligence. It can be found in every sphere of nature, from the lowest organism to the highest type of man. It is the primary force and most striking feature of nature. The Jew says "fear" because he is a rationalist, an incorrigible intellectualist. The Aryan says "love" because he is an incorrigible emotionalist. Spinoza was the first Jew in history to say love of God to the exclusion of fear of God. In spite of the fact that he tried to think in geometric terms, he gave humanity the impression that he himself was a rationalist. His formula is "*Amor Dei intellectualis*," "intellectual love of God." The Jewish formula is "*Yirath Shomaim*," "the fear of heaven." Although the Jew, too, sometimes speaks of love of God, he does so because he was commanded to love God. But can there be love by command? The formula, therefore, remained the fear of God.

The attempt to replace the Jewish ear by the eye, time by space, reason by emotion, fear of God by love of God—in short, the attempt to graft upon Judaism an Aryan picture—called forth the wrath of the synagogue.

II

Science is the classified experience of man's mind, arrived at by inquiring, investigating, comparing, and analyzing. Knowledge is man's inner intuition and is innate. Science is acquired by a long-drawn-out process. A man may have all the sciences crowded into his brain but still know nothing. Many scientists know little, but a man *sans* science may know a great deal. Such knowledge is not exactly acquired. It is inner radiation, so to speak, the inner vision of the intellect, accentuated and attuned by highly developed instincts and enhanced by the sensitiveness peculiar only to such men. Just as there are individuals who have studied much and know little, so there are races whose wisdom is acquired either after a long process of development or is innate and intuitive.

It stands to reason that the Jews, emerging from the eastern prairies and from the desert, and always on the move, had neither the time nor the opportunity to behold, observe, and study nature. Hence, they had no scientific attitude toward it. In the Bible almost everything can be found except science and humor, because both are only the outgrowth of comparison; comparing and classifying phenomena is science and comparing situations is humor. In the Bible nothing was compared, although everything in life was referred to. To be sure, there are plenty of contrasts in the Bible—the

contrast of sinner and saint, of wise man and fool, of evildoer and lover of justice, of rebel and obedient citizen. These contrasts, however, were not made or looked at from the point of view of incongruity, but from the vantage point of piety.

Mathematics and physics of which the ancient Greeks were so proud were strange to the ancient Jews. One can see in the Bible the green lawns, the mountain peaks, the clouds which cover the earth like a garment, and the skies which appear like curtains, etc. Nature in the Bible, however, is purely lyrical and poetic, not scientific. Lyrical nature is common to all peoples, even to savages. Scientific nature is common only to those who actually attempt to penetrate into its mysteries and to wrest from it its secrets. The ancient Jews never made such attempts. What minimum scientific knowledge they did possess they used only for religious purposes. They knew of God not as a result of analytical thinking or scientific inquiry as, for example, Aristotle knew of God, but as a result of intuition. In science God is always, if he is there at all, a consequence, a final result. In Judaism he is the very beginning of things. Science may conclude with God, but Judaism begins with God.

The ancient Jews knew very little of evolution by way of science. Nevertheless, they did not imagine the world as having been created in one minute or one day, but in evolutionary stages. They did not know scientifically what modern biology has learned, namely, that water is the origin of all life. They felt, however, that the existence of water antedated the creation of the world. God did not create water, and in the story of

creation its existence was already presumed. The ancient Jews did not have the physiological and anatomical knowledge of the Greeks, but still the Greek term *pneuma* is identical with the ancient Hebrew term *neschoma*, both of which mean "breathing." The Jews had no psychological theories or laboratories, but they had a definite realistic conception of the soul—the *blood is the soul*.

Whatever they knew they knew by inner light, not through science, as did the Greeks or Romans. There was little analytical philosophy in ancient Judea. Yet the Bible contains two famous philosophical proofs for the existence of God, the cosmological and the moral. The older the Jew became, the more he learned, but he never changed his attitude toward science. He is still somewhat skeptical toward it even to the present day, believing that what is science today may be superstition tomorrow. His approach to the great problems of life, in spite of his rationalism, was not analytical but synthetic, not discursive but intuitive.

In his approach to the fundamental problems of life and of the world Spinoza seems to be a true Jew. He does not begin with analyses, presumptions, assumptions, suppositions, and hypotheses, but, in the manner of the Old Testament, with God. But by this similarity of approach Spinoza did not intend to indicate any agreement with this Jewish concept. It was rather a result of his acosmistic world-picture. If God is everything, it is inevitable that one must begin with him. But the beginning with God per se does not necessitate an acosmistic world-view. God may be the beginning, but the world may still be real.

III

Deity is the daughter of man's pride, for only a proud man has a God. Man, who feels himself at one with and part of nature only, has no human pride and consequently needs no God. Whatever man is, *bête noire* or angel, sin-laden individual or saint, he is an intelligent being, and as such is in need of a teacher. Nature, however, is stupid, and therefore chained to eternal laws because it would abuse any freedom granted to it. Only stupid beings must be guarded, chained, and tied down, since lack of intelligence would make the use of their freedom uncertain.

The Jew thinks of God that He is the incarnation of freedom and intelligence, who is not bound by any laws. The Jew thinks of nature that it is a realm of absolute necessity, immured in eternal, immutable laws because it is absolutely stupid. Man, carried away by a feeling of pride, and in need of a teacher and guide, for his mind is consumed by curiosity and thirst for knowledge, cannot possibly accept stupid nature as his intellectual guide. Hence, the truisms expressed by Voltaire, that if God did not exist He would have to be invented, and by Dostoievsky, that if there is no God everything is permissible. Man's pride and his contempt for stupid nature require and postulate the existence of a deity. The ancient Jews, an undomesticated, stiff-necked desert race, were like all peoples growing up in free space, a race full of pride and overwhelmed with a sense of human dignity.

The Jew has retained this pride to the present day. It is this pride, indestructible and imperishable, that has kept him in the picture all these centuries. Appar-

ently superfluous to the world and despised by everyone, he, nevertheless, considered himself indispensable to the fabric of the universe. Neither his trials nor his vicissitudes nor the deepest humiliations suffered at the hands of his enemies could break his pride.

This humiliated and insulted but proud race of Jews, when it appeared upon the scene of history, looked at nature and was impressed with its stupidity. In no other book of word-literature is more contempt expressed for nature than in the first book of the Pentateuch. What does the story of the flood symbolize? "And God saw the earth, and behold! It was corrupt, for all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth." Since the story of the flood there was little said in the Bible about nature for the reason that it was considered to be the realm of imbecility. In this embarrassment he wrested from his genius the picture of Jehovah, an omniscient and a prescient God and the very embodiment of intelligence, freedom, and ethical idealism. Only such a God, who spans over eternities in the fraction of a second, whose word makes the stars tremble in their courses, whose wisdom planned all that is to be found in infinite space, from the microcosmos to the macrocosmos, was commensurate with his aspirations for guidance. He even created the myth of being related to God, and of being part of deity. The older he became, the more he delighted in the thought of having part of the supreme intelligence as his God and master. In cases of distress and dire need he called Him not only "master," "teacher," and "judge," but also "father." To him, God was not only the embodiment of intelligence, but also the incarnation of all pity and compassion. "From the very depths, I call thee, O God!" exclaims the psalmist. But

suddenly a Jew appeared and cried aloud, "This master, judge, teacher, guide, and father is nature, and this Supreme Intelligence called 'God,' the embodiment of all freedom, is Himself chained to nature's immutable laws, and has neither will, intellect, nor soul. He is a prisoner."

God chained to nature's laws is more horrible, terrifying, and ghastly than a God who has been assassinated. Was it to be expected that the Jews of Amsterdam would tolerate one in their midst who attempted to imprison God and to humiliate Him by tying Him to and making Him at one with nature?

The conception of God as a prisoner of nature is more blasphemous than the vision of a God who is wedded to Eros. God identical with nature is such a horrible suggestion to any Jew, so humiliating and insulting an idea, that whoever uttered it was bound to arouse the ire of a proud race.

IV

Judaism as a world-picture is metaphysics, but not physics. Yet, all historians of philosophy, with the exception of Deussen, do not include biblical metaphysics in their works. They seem to deny that religious Judaism is a system of metaphysics. However, any attempt to understand the whole of things and to reduce everything to a first principle, as Judaism does, is metaphysics. Only because Judaism has stressed man more than God has its metaphysical import been overlooked. But even more than Judaism is metaphysics is its philosophy of history. It begins with the story of man, of the human race, and is conscious of man's historical character. It is aware from the very beginning that man is subject to the historical process, to development, and to evolu-

tion. He may suffer a relapse into barbarity, but then he slowly rises again and attains a new height.

The Bible as a book of history is a book of great happenings, full of dramatic tension. It is a book of conflicts, and hunger, rebelliousness and viciousness, peace and justice. It is not, however a book of love.² With the exception of the Ruth idyll and the Song of Songs there is very little love-making in the Bible. If it were a book of love, the Bible would not be a world-historic book and the great document of philosophy of history, but merely a collection of amorous episodes and romances. It would only be *belles-lettres*. But because it is a book of hunger, it is a book of saints and rebels, a book of powerful personalities. The Bible is a book of man. It is true that it begins with the creation of the cosmos, but thereafter man is the central figure. From the very beginning he is placed in a tragic position. He must work out his own salvation, in a terrific struggle against nature and God. In the course of this struggle he shows his different colors, and the best and the worst that is in him is brought out. In his struggle between the desires of his heart and the goal given him, he nearly perishes. He stumbles and rises again, with a simplicity that is captivating in its beauty.

There is nothing of the stillness of the desert in the Bible. It is full of motion, storm, and eruptive force. These are not isolated phenomena, but break forth out of a certain order of things, out of a certain scheme of life. They are historical phenomena and their description is that of a great historical process.

Judaism even as a system of metaphysics or ethics is philosophy of history. Its starting-point is the fall of

² See my *Psychology des jüdischen Geistes* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 194-204.

man and its conclusion is the figure of the Messiah. Even the attributes of God have a philosophic-historic meaning; God is peace unto Himself because He is one. His very oneness precludes conflict, for conflict presumes at least two. Being only one, He must be the incarnation of peace, and as such a model and a guide to man.

International peace became one of the veritable obsessions of Judaism. When one says "One God facing one humanity," one must say "Peace." The Jew visualized a gradual evolution of mankind, and international peace reigning supreme was his highest goal.

One of God's properties is justice. He is just and wants man to be just. The present, however, is full of injustice. Such a vision does not make the Jew pessimistic, for he forgets the present and pins his hopes to the future, when justice will reign supreme. There is a gradual development from a lower to a higher ethical state. Some day in the far future man will attain the highest ethical state, moral perfectibility. Hence, the Jew is an optimist. He suffers the worst and hopes for the best. He despises the present and clings to the future. This future-consciousness was developed by his spiritual eye. Its most powerful expression is the idea of Messiah, who will be of and for this world. He will redeem humanity not so much from sin as from injustice. Not meekness and humility but courage and virility will be his main qualities. But, not only the realm of man, but even the realm of nature will be permeated with the spirit of ethics and of peace, which will reign supreme even among the beasts of the field. Such is the vision which the prophet dangles before man's eye—the lamb and the wolf will dwell peacefully together, and

the lad will guide them. This eschatology, this future-music, is philosophy of history. Just as the ancient Jew imagined that the cosmos was created in evolutionary stages, so did he conceive world's history as a slow process of evolution, which made life worth living to him.

The ancient Egyptians, too, had an outspoken future-consciousness, but it found its expression not in the messianic hope, but in the pyramids, in the enormity of their plastic creations, and in the embalming of their dead. Their future-consciousness was purely materialistic, physical, concrete. One could almost seize it by the hand. But more than it was future-consciousness, it was an extension of the present.

The Jewish future-consciousness is something spiritual, abstract, and purely idealistic. There is no eternal present. There is a past, present, and future. The past was bad and the present is miserable. The great day, however, is the day to come, which will be, not a day of destruction, reckoning, or redemption, but one of reconstruction and reparation. The Messiah will not redeem souls, but will free the minds and purge the hearts.

Such was the hope the Jew carried in his soul through all the centuries. Such was the picture he had of life and its processes, the picture of the gradual rise of man after a hard fall. Such was the Jewish conception of the historic rhythm, until Baruch Spinoza came and tried to destroy this hope, to obliterate all the colors of this picture, and to reverse this conception of the historic process. There is no history of evolution, philosophy of history, historic plan, or fall and rise of man. There will be no Messiah, and man will never be liberated or redeemed, because life is not a process but a status. It is not dynamics, but mechanics. It is not ethics but anthropology;

that is to say, science, mechanics, and physics. To Spinoza the Bible is just a book, and, in part, a silly book. He says that the prophets of Israel, those storm-birds of world's history, who evolved the greatest philosophy of history, had only an inadequate idea of God. All that the Jew visualizes about himself and his relation to God is a false vision. His dream of the future is a false dream and his hope a false hope.

V

The dualistic world-picture is the heritage of man's experience. Anatomically man is a duality, and his eye beholds duality everywhere, heaven and earth, summer and winter, cold and heat, man and woman, etc. From time immemorial man considered heaven and earth to be two distinct and opposite realms. With his growing ability to think in abstract terms, the earth became the symbol of nature and heaven that of the spirit or of God. Even the psalmist sang: "The heavens are the heavens for God and the earth he gave to man." This dualistic conception of things became an organic part of every type of culture and religion.

Philosophically, dualism has at all times presented itself as either mind and matter, body and soul, or ideas and senses. Psychologically, it presented itself as sensuality and reason, definition and simile, concept and image. Religiously, it presented itself as God and Lucifer, Mary and the witch, or angel and devil. Every field of human thought has become permeated with dualism. Even monotheistic Judaism is not monistic but dualistic. The antinomy is God and the world, or spirit and matter. But, as a matter of fact, pure monotheism without any pantheistic admixture must be dualistic in char-

acter. If God created the world and equipped it with a set of autonomous laws by which it is governed, He cannot be a part of or at one with nature.

It was in view of these overwhelming facts that Houston Stewart Chamberlain asserted that all monistic thinking is only a perverted aberration of the human mind because reality as beheld by the human eye is not monistic but dualistic. Monism may be the postulate of metaphysics, but it is not the fact of life. All true philosophy begins not with postulates and suppositions, but with a classification of the facts of life. Even the ancient Hindus with their negative attitude toward life began with life's reality, although they later rejected it. To Western man dualism has been nothing short of an apodictic certainty, for it is neither a doctrine nor a hypothesis but a fact.

Monism, however, is a theory not only to the average man but also to many thinkers. Most philosophers of both ancient and modern times have been dualists.

Only two men of the West, Plato and Spinoza, clung to monism. To Plato it appeared that the highest idea, the idea of the good, is above all phenomena, senses, men, and gods. In many passages in his *Republic* he makes it clear that the idea of the good does not rest in Deity, but Deity rests upon the bosom of the highest idea. This highest idea is a supreme oneness, from which everything emanates. To Spinoza supreme oneness is substance, from which everything "follows." The human mind, however, can conceive of only two "emanations," extension and thinking, matter and spirit. In this manner Spinoza, the founder of monism in the modern world, became to modern man what Plato was to medieval mystics, the herald of the idea of oneness in a

world of diversity. Plato, having lived among a people free from religious prejudice, could almost attain the age of eighty without being disturbed and molested in his moods. But Spinoza, who lived among a people laden with tradition, could not attain his twenty-fifth year without being excommunicated.

Such is the explanation offered for Spinoza's excommunication by many of his followers and disciples. The fact is, however, that he was excommunicated, not because of his monistic world-picture or his theory of *una substantia*, but because of his doctrine that God and nature are identical, which to the elders of the Amsterdam community seemed to be the height of provocative blasphemy. Nature is impure, the incarnation of sin, lust, and desire. God is pure, incorporeal, and pure spirit. If, however, He is identical with nature, He, too, is full of desires and sin-laden, and nature's impurity becomes a part of the Deity. His identity with nature deprives Him of His power to lead, guide, choose, punish, and reward. The Jewish elders of the Amsterdam community recognized in Spinozism the most appalling and shocking blasphemy ever uttered by a Jew. If nature and God are identical surely nature and man are identical. Man, then, is not the crown of creation, but is only an erring caprice in a mechanistic universe. This was an unbearable thought to the elders. From their point of view there was nothing left to do but to excommunicate Spinoza. But by his very doctrine he excommunicated himself and the formal excommunication was superfluous.

VI

Has God a function? We need only page the first chapters of the Bible to be convinced that He has one—

to guide and inspire mankind and to witness the realization of the good. Since He made man in His own image, man, too, has a function—to do good.

Spinoza's God has no function because He is only the order of things and can neither desire nor postulate, command, nor choose. His man, too, being only one of the *modi*, has no function either. Everything concerning his life is predetermined and predestined, and consequently he is beyond good and evil. It was this latter feature which caused Nietzsche to be overwhelmed by Spinozism. Judaism, however, not only does not deny good and evil, but their admitted existence is the very basis of its entire structure. Few words are used as often in the first chapter of the Pentateuch as the word "good." Soon after man was created the problem of good and evil was formulated in such a powerful and impressive manner that it nearly became the central theme of all ancient Jewish metaphysics. Evil is as much a reality as is good, and both God and man are aware of it. Why a good God also created evil is one of God's puzzles. But man, so the ancient Jews thought, cannot and need not solve all of God's riddles. Man has a difficult-enough time to solve his own problem.

God, Himself, is often shocked by the revelation of the forces of evil. It took Him some time, so the myth goes, to recognize that man's heart is full of evil from his earliest days. The evil, however, is not entirely superfluous, for it serves a useful purpose. Good would not be good if it were not contrasted with evil. The entire ethical conception of ancient Judaism necessitates its existence. If man were good by necessity, because evil were nonexistent, his goodness would not be meritorious. Good in the ethical meaning of the term is so because it

requires an effort and is only possible by the existence of evil. Ancient Judaism attempted to explain in this manner the existence of evil and its compatibility with a good God. But then came Spinoza and explained that there is no good or evil, and therefore life has no purpose. Out of purely mechanical revolutions no ethical ends can arise. He thereby destroyed the very basis of the Jewish conception of ethics.

This a-morality was predestined to become to man a source of despair and the kindling point of pessimism. One who denies the ends, and who looks at the world from beyond good and evil, must necessarily deny the future also. Everything is one continuous present. Judaism, however, postulates that not only is there a future, but that it alone is all that men live for, because it is pregnant with so many possibilities for good. The mediate future was considered a period when good will prevail and evil will be eliminated. Only in the far future, in the last days, will man reach his great destination. He will be ready to receive the Messiah, the Liberator, whose very appearance will be symbolic of the disappearance of and the victory over evil.

This unbridgeable gulf between Spinozism and Judaism can be traced to a difference in the conception of God. To Judaism, God is the creator, who later on becomes the renovator. Instead of referring to the creation of the world, one refers to the constant and continued renovation of the world. To Spinoza, God is not a creator or a renovator, but is either *ens rationis*, a category of reason, or the given cosmic order. Because He is neither creator nor renovator, there is no border line between Him and nature. This identity obliterates the line of demarcation between being and becoming, will and intellect, and

is and ought. If nature and God are identical, then how does becoming originate? It can only originate in being. Becoming is nature. Being is God. He is identical with Being, and in Him all Being is embraced; nothing is outside of Him. When being and becoming coincide, there is no God and no process of evolution, but only mechanical revolutions. This point of view the Jews could not accept, for it reduces a living God to a dead mechanical principle which is divested of all reality.

VII

During the last eighty years many commentators, critics, and historians have cried that Spinoza's excommunication was not justified since his doctrine was traceable to Jewish sources. They trace his determinism to Crescas, his depersonalization of God and his *amor Dei* to Maimonides, his doctrine of attributes to Saadia, his immanence and omnipresence of God to Gersonides, and his pantheism to Abraham ibn Ezra. These theories and hypotheses have no foundation in fact, because, as will be shown in the following pages, there is nothing essentially Jewish in Spinoza's world-outlook. He is chiefly concerned not with recognition but with salvation, not with human welfare but with beatitude, not with social justice but with redemption, not with God but with destiny. The sum total of his doctrine is not Jewish but Buddhistic in character.

The medieval Jewish philosophers were concerned with one central problem, the existence of God. Whether He be deanthropomorphized, having only negative attributes, whether everything follows from Him by necessity, or whether His omnipresence presumes pantheism, do not contradict His existence as a personal, self-

conscious, and a living God. Even those medieval Jewish thinkers whose conception of God was tinted by pantheism have never denied His personality.

Abraham ibn Ezra's alleged pantheism expressing itself in God's omnipresence was not a revolutionary doctrine, but only a re-expression of the emanation of God of the Old Testament. All presume a personal God. In Spinoza's God-idea, however, the problem of emanation does not even arise.

Nor can it be said that Maimonides' deindividualized God was the background of Spinoza's impersonal God. Maimonides' God was only deanthropomorphized and not depersonalized. Even though we know only of his negative attributes, He still remains a living, personal, and absolute God, who as such is deeply concerned with man. Spinoza's God, however, being impersonal, cannot be concerned with man or with his problems.

Neither is Spinoza's determinism that of Crescas. The latter, like all philosophers with an atomistic world-picture, attempted to explain the unity of the forces of nature by the laws of natural motion. In the realm of nature he saw the realm of cause and effect. However, he did not apply his determinism to the spiritual world and did not attack the basis of ethics. To him God is still an ethical personality and is a guide and inspiration to man. Spinoza's determinism, however, is all embracing, extending both to nature and to spirit, to God and to man.

Saadia's doctrine of God's many attributes has been likened to Spinoza's doctrine of infinite attributes. The two theories, however, have nothing in common. Spinoza's theory is only an affirmation of the many-facedness of the substance. He actually misuses even the

term "attributes." He intended to demonstrate the many dead properties of the substance, and not its living qualities; for only a living God can possess attributes. His substance contains only two so-called attributes. The infinity of attributes of which he speaks has been proved by Edward von Hartmann to be only a figure of speech and not a philosophical reality.² However, the infinity of attributes of Saadia's God reflects an infinite, living God.

Whether or not the one or the other thought of the medieval Jewish philosophers coincides with Spinoza does not make him either a Jewish philosopher or the culmination point of medieval Jewish philosophical thought. There is one line of demarcation between Spinoza and the representatives of Judaism which can never be obliterated. Judaism teaches a living God concerned with man, while Spinozism teaches a dead God who cannot be interested in man.

Spinoza, like all major philosophers who created a synthetic world-picture, drew from many sources. There can be no doubt that many a thought was suggested to him by one or another medieval Jewish philosopher. But merely because a certain thought of a medieval Jewish philosopher coincides with one of Spinoza's ideas does not make him a Jewish philosopher, or the culmination point of Jewish philosophical thought. All the medieval Jewish philosophers taught a living God who was an ethical personality. Spinoza's God, however, being only the order of things, is a dead deity, divested both of ethical personality and of reality. It can thus be seen that there is a yawning gap between Spinozism and medieval Jewish philosophy.

² *History of Metaphysics* (Leipzig, 1899), I, 407.

VIII

The rabbis are crazy. The Bible commentators are dreamers and inventors of falsehoods, and the cabalists are jabberers.³ Such was Spinoza's opinion about the religious and intellectual representatives of his own people. He marshaled many authors to demonstrate the intellectual, moral, and religious inferiority of his race. He accepted the testimony of the Samaritans and of Tacitus, and convicted the Jews upon such evidence. He even attempted to ascribe to ancient Judaism the commandment to hate the enemy, citing not the Old Testament but Matthew, whom he surely knew to have misquoted the Pentateuch. Spinoza thus shows that his judgment was not objective, but was clearly biased. As if this display of prejudice were not sufficient, he shows his contempt for his race by observing that the principal reasons for the survival of the Jewish people have been the hatred of the Gentiles and the practice of circumcision.

He also had little respect for ancient Judaism as a cultural force, and such documents of ancient Hebraic religiosity as the Psalms and Job meant little to him. Neither the idealism and ethical purity of the prophets nor the great figures of the Old Testament impressed him. Under his hand the entire Old Testament became an inferior piece of folk lore, fit only for semicivilized people.

Spinoza has often been called a saint comparable only to Socrates and Jesus. Yet in relation to his people he was anything but saintly. His tragic fate at the hands of the Jewish elders of Amsterdam did not make him a tragic hero, who was purified by his experiences. He

³ *Theological Political Treatise*, chaps. ix and x.

saw only the fact of the excommunication, and overlooked entirely its religious and political justification and its psychological necessity. The struggling Jewish community of Amsterdam, which had but yesterday freed itself from the Spanish Inquisition, could not tolerate in its midst one who was engaged in undermining the very foundations of Judaism. Nor could it expose itself to the dangers lurking without. Even though Holland was nominally theologically liberal, this tolerance was limited chiefly to a toleration of older heresies and of such freethinkers who could not become dangerous to orthodoxy. The Dutch, however, were highly intolerant of any new teachings which struck at the roots of the orthodox creeds. If the Jewish community of Amsterdam had ignored Spinoza and his heterodoxies, it would have exposed itself to political persecution.

While at that time liberalism was strongly entrenched in Holland, the Dutch masses, as painted by Spinoza, were steeped in fanaticism. It required no Spinoza to grasp the ferocity of the fanatic Dutch rabble when aroused to provocation. They would either destroy or drive out the young Jewish community of Amsterdam. If Spinoza had viewed his excommunication as realistically as he regarded the state, he would surely not have resented his expulsion from the synagogue, which the elders intended more for self-protection than for punishment.

The refugees of the Inquisition in Amsterdam found it difficult to maintain the frontiers of Judaism, for the many Marranos who returned to the fold brought with them dubious religious ideas, which distorted the Jewish religious personality. Though the Marranos had exposed themselves to the greatest dangers in order to

maintain the forms of Jewish life, they nevertheless imbibed much of the spirit of the Roman Catholic church. Although an obstinate minority, they could not entirely free themselves from the inexorable influence of their environment. Although their morale is worthy of our admiration, their adaptability was impaired by the religious twilight in which they moved. The tragic career of Uriel Acosta is symbolic of the fate of many of his fellow-Marranos, who could not fully reorientate themselves upon their return to their ancestral faith. When they settled in Amsterdam, it was difficult for them to find their old Jewish anchor ground. The elders had to deal severely with those individuals who jeopardized the religious entity and the political security of the community. Spinoza's expulsion from the synagogue was necessitated by philosophical, religious, and sociological reasons. His keen mind could readily distinguish between the *Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh* of Judaism and the *En Kai Pan* of pantheism. He relied upon the innocence of the elders of the community to keep him within the fold; but he underestimated their critical intelligence.

Under more normal conditions the Jews are tolerant in religious and metaphysical matters. A perusal of medieval Jewish philosophy reveals many heterodoxies whose authors went unrebuked. Abraham ibn Ezra and Gersonides, two of the foremost Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, were of dubious orthodoxy. Yet they drew no censure from the synagogue. In the case of Spinoza, however, political considerations in addition to religious and moral motives made his excommunication inevitable.

A philosopher who thinks *sub specie aeternitatis* can be expected at least to take his own experience philo-

sophically. But by his attitude toward the synagogue he sinned against the temperament of the philosopher, and thus proved that there never has been a philosopher who could embody his philosophy in his person. As a man Spinoza was a saint, but as a former Jew he was a sinner.

IX

Just as the occident is predominantly Spinozistic and not Kantian, so, too, is the modern Jewish world predominantly Spinozistic. It is an irony of fate that the synagogue, which excommunicated Spinoza, was later partly conquered by his spirit. Today, two hundred and fifty-six years after his death, Jewish life in the West is permeated with his spirit. Three of the main currents of present-day Jewish life—the reform movement, inaugurated in Germany; the Haskalah movement, inaugurated in Eastern Europe; and the Zionist movement, initiated in Central Europe—are directly traceable to Spinoza.

Spinoza looked at Judaism from a purely secular point of view, and discovered in it many secular elements. Today the more westernized Jew no longer believes that Judaism is a purely sacerdotal, or priestly fabric. Even reform Jewry, to whom Judaism is only a religion, also admits that it contains secular motives as well. Whatever secularization Judaism in the West has undergone during the last one hundred and fifty years is primarily due to the influence of Spinoza.

Many Jewish historians attempt to trace reform Judaism to Kant, because of the many Jewish adherents of the Königsberg philosopher. Actually, however, it was primarily motivated by Spinoza. The mediator between the two was Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, whose

"Nathan the Wise" made his Jewish contemporaries accept his religious outlook which was primarily Spinozistic.

Lessing's friends, Moses Mendelssohn, the foremost intellectual Jew of this day, rejected Spinoza, and constantly fought against his doctrine. Yet, by this very controversy he introduced Spinoza to the Jewish intellectuals of his time. Several of his followers, notably Israel Jacobson and Jacob Baer, established the Jewish reform movement in Germany in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although these men were not original thinkers, their new enterprise succeeded, primarily because of the deep impression which Spinozism via Lessing made upon the Jewish generation.

Reform Judaism is definitely committed to several basic principles, among which are higher biblical criticism as established by Spinoza and subjective religiosity as propounded by Schleiermacher, a follower and disciple of Spinoza. The Theological Political Tractate opened new vistas to critically minded religionists. The founders of reform Judaism, like all enlightened men of their day, had a negative attitude to all dogma, mysticism, and religious myths. The emergence from the Ghetto necessitated a religious orientation and a readjustment to given Western conditions, namely, materialism in France and Spinozism in Germany.

With the shattering of the dogmatic structure, the critical replaced the traditional approach. To reform Judaism the Old Testament is a book of myths, religious legends, episodes, folk lore, primitive metaphysical ideas for primitive people, and the like, but it is not a book of dogma or of revelation. That is a Spinozistic innovation, but not Jewish tradition. Spinoza and his

Jewish followers failed to take into consideration that the Bible, besides being a book of laws, is also a description of the eternal cycle. Furthermore, it is an inexhaustible source of ethics. To the extent that the idea of the good is eternal is the book in which it is expounded eternal. Although the reformers often emphasize the ethics of the prophets, it is mere lip service in comparison to traditional Jewish ethicism.

Just as the ethics of the reformers has little in common with traditional Jewish ethics, so is their religiosity detached from the original Jewish sources. To them, as to Spinoza, prayer has little meaning, for their religiosity, too, is subjective and is not correlated to an ultimate metaphysical principle. To the early reformers, as to Schleiermacher and Spinoza, religiosity was either the expression of admiration for the adventure of life and its mysteries or a submissiveness to fate. It had nothing to do with any objective force.

Thus, higher criticism and subjective religiosity, two of the basic features of reform Judaism, are easily traceable to Spinoza. However, they do not possess him solely—they must share him with advanced Christian liberalism.

Not only did Spinoza enhance the cultural process in the German ghetto, but he was also of great significance to the march of events in the Jewish settlements of Eastern Europe. Just as Leibnitz was the founder of German *Aufklärung*, so was Spinoza the father of the modern Jewish enlightenment. Spinozism swept away more dust from Jewish life—superstition, fanaticism, false creeds, childish conceptions, petrified rabbinism, and stale, useless traditions—than did all the Jewish enlighteners of the eighteenth century combined. Her-

bart did not err greatly when he called Spinoza a Jewish enlightener.

Spinozism penetrated into the Hebrew literature of Eastern Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. Yet Spinozism seeped into the eastern ghetto at an even earlier date. Beginning with the middle of the eighteenth century, hosts of young scholars deserted the eastern ghetto and came to Germany to acquire secular knowledge. There they found the air charged with Spinozism, and in their turn, succumbed to it. Many of them later returned to live in the eastern ghetto, and brought their Spinozistic sympathies with them. In this manner Spinozism reached eastern Jewish life before it reached Hebrew literature.

Spinoza's influence on Hebrew letters began with Solomon Maimon, the annihilator of Kant, who introduced Spinozism to the Jewish scholarly world. It became a moving force in the entire Hebrew literature of the nineteenth century. Such eminent scholars as S. D. Z. Luzzato in the beginning, Solomon Rubin in the middle, and Nahum Sokolow at the end of the nineteenth century were occupied with Spinozism either positively or negatively.

The Jewish enlightenment movement had spent its energies by the end of the nineteenth century. Jewish life, even in the East, had become so secularized that it would have disintegrated, if not for the rise of a new force, Zionism. Although Theodore Herzl and Max Nordau were the formal creators of this movement, it was Baruch Spinoza who really created it. He was the first man in Western Europe who recognized in Jewry not a religious but an ethnic group. As a national group they are entitled to a national territory which is Pales-

tine. Thus, Baruch Spinoza was the first Zionist of modern times in Europe.

Spinoza, like Herzl, emphasized the secular and nationalistic character of Judaism, as well as the importance of anti-Semitism, for the survival of the Jewish people. This secular view of Judaism was adopted first by Kant and then by Schopenhauer, who popularized it among the intellectuals of the West. It was through this channel that it reached Arthur James Balfour, the author of the Balfour Declaration. With the rise of Herzl and Nordau, Zionism came as a surprise to western Jewry. But to the non-Jewish intellectual world it was already a well-known story.

Another powerful Jewish movement in Eastern Europe, whose adherents are counted in the millions—Chassidism—although it is not a consequence of, is a parallel to, Spinozism. It arose in the beginning of the eighteenth century as a reaction to rabbinic super-rationalism, with its hairsplitting scholasticism called “pilpul.” Chassidism, with its romantic religiosity and pantheistic motives, as symbolized in the person of its founder, captivated the Jewish masses of Central and Eastern Europe because it relieved them of a degenerate intellectualism, which had removed them from the realities of life. It also relieved them of the yoke of dry legalism imposed upon them by the rabbis. It brought them nearer to nature, which, to them, seemed to partake of the divine. God, as a personality, receded from the foreground and was replaced by deity, divested of individuality.

Southern Chassidism, confined to Poland, eliminated the term *Elohim*, “God,” and replaced it with *Elohut*, “deity.” Only the rationalistically orientated school of

Chassidism of the North continued to cling to the term *Elohim*, "God." However, even this wing of Chassidism stressed the fact that God is coequal with nature, and its formula is *Elohim, B'gimatria, Hateva*, "God, numerically, equals nature." In old gnostic manner, Chassidism deduces numbers from letters and uses them for all sorts of speculative theories. *Elohim* translated into numbers equals "86," while *Hateva* translated into numbers also equals "86." The founders of northern Chassidism never tire of stressing the quality of numbers inherent in the terms of God and nature. This, in itself, testifies to the deep-rooted pantheistic tendency in Chassidism.

In view of these facts, the assertion is justified that Spinoza's influence on the cultural process of his own race in modern times was almost as powerful as was his influence upon the general cultural process in the West. Spinoza, Plato, and Aristotle are the most popular philosophers in the Ghetto. Although Spinoza is still considered to be heresy personified, he is looked upon as the very embodiment of philosophical genius. The orthodox Jew, with his medieval outlook upon life, who beholds Spinoza and hates him, is yet proud of him, because he feels that he has accomplished something unusual for the cultural position of his race in the West.

Baruch Spinoza, the excommunicated Jew, made the Jewish cultural position in the West not only tenable, but impregnable. But the same Baruch Spinoza was actually responsible for the cultural anti-Semitism of modern Europe. He shaped the strong anti-Jewish attitude of his greatest admirers, followers, and adepts—Herder, Goethe, Hegel, and Fichte. They were outspoken Jew-haters. They admired Spinoza, but with their master hated his race and its world-picture. Men

who think *sub specie aeternitatis*, in contradistinction to *sub specie boni*, must necessarily hate Judaism.

The border line which separates Judaism from Christianity is not Jesus but Christ. Many liberal Jews may accept Jesus as a teacher of morality, but will not accept Christ as a part of the God-head. A Jew who speaks in terms of Christ ceases to be a Jew.

Baruch Spinoza was the only distinguished representative of his race who not only spoke in terms of Christ but who formulated a Christian doctrine in philosophical terms.⁴ It is reasonable for a Christian theologian to place Jesus above Moses, but it is paradoxical for a Jew to do so. In many passages of his *Theological Political Tractate* he states that Jesus represents a higher stage of spirituality than does Moses. "Moses imagined God only as a leader, lawgiver and king, as merciful, just, et cetera. All these are only attributes of human nature which may not be identified with the divine nature. This is valid only of the prophets, but not of Christ, for Christ was not so much a prophet as he was the mouth of God."⁵

Throughout this work Moses is described as a secular leader and not as a religious person. He is primarily an educator, political leader, and a lawgiver, whose laws are only valid for the Hebraic state. But of Christ, Spinoza says, the divine wisdom has assumed in him human form. Christ is the way of salvation,⁶ and he alone has received God's revelation.

The God-idea of Moses and the prophets was inadequate, that of Christ was adequate. The spirit of Moses is that of organization, the spirit of Christ is the idea of

⁴ Friedrich Jodl, *Geschichte der Ethik in der neuen Philosophie* (Vienna, 1892).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, chap. iv.

⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. 1.

God. Moses and the prophets only formulated temporary laws, Christ enunciated eternal truth. Moses and the prophets were legalists and utilitarians, Christ was an idealist and a moralist. The prophets were only concerned with the state and its preservation, Christ with humanity at large.

Throughout the *Theological Political Tractate* Spinoza affirms the attitude of the New Testament toward the Mosaic law, arguing that the rise of Christianity invalidated the old law. He sees the Old Testament through a Paulinic prison. It represents earthly things, the flesh, while the New Testament represents the spirit.⁷ The one is law, the other love; the one is statute, the other faith.

Although Spinoza was excommunicated from the synagogue, he never officially joined the church. Yet no man of modern times has sung a more moving paean to Christ than did Baruch Spinoza. "Only through the spirit of Christ, can we come to the love of justice and of our fellowman."⁸ He vied with medieval Christian theologians in picturing the figure of Christ as the most exalted and most divine. He was one of the few philosophers of modern times who legitimized Christianity philosophically.

There is nothing enigmatic in Spinoza's relationship to Christianity. Not his suffering at the hands of the elders of Amsterdam determined his attitude, but his love for Christianity compelled their attitude toward him.⁹ The pantheistic Spinoza regarded theistic Juda-

⁷ Spinoza, *Letters*, No. 75.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 76.

⁹ Jodl, *op. cit.*, I, 337-38, observes. "Die wichtigsten speculativen Wahrheiten des Christentums hat Spinoza auf philosophischem Wege gefunden und entwickelt, ohne sich dabei in mindestens der christlichen Vorstellung oder der christlichen Sprache zu bedienen—eine Erscheinung, welche man in der Geschichte der abendlandischen Literatur wohl gradezu als einzig wird hinstellen dürfen."

ism with suspicion and hostility. In Judaism he found what he hated most, viz., free will, moral ends, and the supremacy of man. But in Paulinic Christianity he found what was nearest to his heart, viz., a pantheistic God-conception, determinism, the quest for salvation, and the spirit of resignation arising out of a cosmic world-picture. In one of his letters to his friend Oldenburg he admitted that his God was the God of St. Paul.¹⁰ It was, therefore, entirely fitting that the Portuguese Jew, Baruch Spinoza, should find his last resting-place in a Christian church.

¹⁰ Spinoza, *op cit.*, No. 73.

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II

THE MAN AND HIS DOCTRINE

■

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF GOD AND THE WORLD

I

I AM not a Marxist," Karl Marx once exclaimed. "I am not a Spinozist," Baruch Spinoza could exclaim with equal justice. Any number of world-concepts, ranging from the grossest materialism to the cloudiest mysticism, from the vaguest form of pantheism to the most definite type of monotheism, are being identified with Spinozism. Whether the Spinozistic doctrine underwent three phases of development as Avenarius maintained, or was fully developed when first conceived by Spinoza, as Kuno Fisher believed, all historians of philosophy today agree that Spinozism represents a definite entity with fixed frontiers and demarcation lines. Because of the deep religious motive which underlies it, Spinozism, as a world-concept, has experienced the same fate as Platonism. Attempts were made to adjust it to every type of consciousness and thought and to every world-picture.

Whether Spinozism is, in the final analysis, monotheism as Friedrich Paulsen points out, or whether it is identical with atheism as taught by Jacobi, is less important than the fact that it revolves around the definite doctrine that God is coequal with nature. It is as clear and unequivocal a system of pantheism as any ever evolved since the days of the Upanishads. As pantheism, it is both mysticism and religion. Like all mysticism, it is primarily interested in establishing a definite relationship between the individual and the absolute.

And like all genuine religion it begins with God. A critical presentation of Spinoza's theories will clearly demonstrate that it is religiosity couched in philosophical terms, and that it is mysticism expressed in philosophical terminology.

It is not difficult to recognize Spinoza's mysticism even in his personality. Like most of the great mystics, he, too, was inclined to monasticism, solitude, and quiet contemplation. With all great mystics he could say, "This is not my world." No medieval monk has lived a more pious life, and no ancient Hindu saint was less concerned with this world and its hustle and bustle, than Spinoza. Not since the days of Buddha has world-history seen a man more retired unto himself, more disinterested in the lust and pleasures of life, than was Spinoza. It is true that unconcernedness with earthly life is not always characteristic of mysticism. The greatest of all medieval mystics, Jacob Bohme, stood with both feet in life, was an active paterfamilias, and managed his household with a certain feeling of joy. Some mystics have appeared actively in the rôles of reformers, while others practiced an asceticism which bordered on self-torture. Mysticism, too, has its extremists. Spinoza, however, was not an extremist. Neither was he active as a reformer nor did he practice extreme asceticism. He was satisfied with retiring from the world and dedicating himself to the realm of the spirit.

All mystics have in common a deep-rooted conviction that they are, in one way or another, in contact with God or with the absolute. The active mystics, like great religionists, believed that their spoken words are the words of God, and that they are only His passive

messengers. All their actions, movements, thoughts, feelings, and words were animated by God's spirit. The prophets of Israel were overwhelmed with the feeling that they were merely messengers of God. Their messages to the people began with the words "Thus spake the Lord." Men with such different temperaments as Socrates, Mohammed, and Jacob Bohme believed that they were moved or driven by a divine force.

Spinoza was not the only mystic who considered intuitive knowledge and recognition to be the highest forms of knowledge. Bohme, the greatest mystic of modern times, was so convinced that he was only an agent of the divine spirit that he exclaimed, "When I thus write, the spirit of a great wonderful recognition is dictating to me." Bernhard de Clairveaux, a medieval mystic, speaks of inner contemplation as the safest type of recognition of the invisible. Hugo de St. Victor, another great mystic of the Middle Ages, assures us that the inner revelation of man is the highest form of recognition. All great mystics expressed the same thought. The great modern mystic, Hamann, magus of the North, only repeats the words of Spinoza when he says that conviction by proof is only secondhand certainty and can never be considered real truth.

It is one of the main characteristics of the mystic that he yearns for absolute truth, and is never satisfied with empiric knowledge. Spinoza, too, had only contempt for empiric knowledge. Like all mystics, he trembled at the thought of the *regresus in infinitum*. Whence does man come? From the lower animal. Whence does the lower animal come? From the plant. Whence does the plant come? From matter. Whence does matter come? From the atom. But whence does the atom come, or the

nebulae or the energy which created these first forms of inorganic life? No one is able to answer these riddles. Empiric science is satisfied merely with the recognition of the laws governing the phenomena of life. That, says Spinoza, is not real knowledge. Only intuitive recognition can lead to true knowledge. Empiric knowledge based on analytical reasoning can only offer us an abstract picture of the combinations of the natural phenomena, but intuition reveals to us concretely the forces of nature and the qualities of natural beings. So convinced was Spinoza of the superiority of intuitive knowledge that he identified it with virtue. He considered it the force in life which makes man truly happy. Neo-Spinozists like Schelling and Fichte, in spite of their great critical powers, held with Spinoza that only intellectual contemplation or inner experience can lead to true recognition. Only immediate knowledge, mystical knowledge, is true knowledge. Only by intuition can the individual make his contact with the absolute. This intuition is primarily feeling. But feeling is religion, not philosophy.

Spinoza was not a mystic in the ordinary sense of the term. As a rule mystics are unable to control their feelings, are lacking in form and in style, and are intellectually confused. Spinoza, however, is the very incarnation of the clear and lucid mind. He was the only great mystic of history who could so master his feelings that he could express them in geometric terms. It is true that Spinoza's mind was sharpened by his early Talmudic and rabbinic training, but this alone does not explain his clarity and lucidity. Many great Talmudic scholars whose minds were equally deepened by mystical feelings lost themselves emotionally and were unable

to domesticate them. We must assume that before Spinoza formulated his conception of the relationship of God to the world, or of man to the absolute, there went on a terrible and an all-consuming struggle—between the two forces in his soul, reason and emotion. Only as a result of this inner struggle did he regain complete mastery over his emotions, so that he could press them into stiff and rigid geometric formulae. Like all mystics, Spinoza was convinced of his own truth, yet he was equally certain that he was a thinker and a philosopher, not a religionist or mystic. He believed that he proved everything in such a simple manner that only those who hate truth would not perceive it. Yet, mysticism is his very starting-point.

To be a Spinozist one must first be convinced of the primary truth, of the substance. However, not analytical reasoning or empiric knowledge, but religious belief, will cause a man to accept Spinoza's doctrine of the substance. If his premise is accepted it is necessary to accept all of his other conclusions, but this is practically true of all primary religions. If one accepts a transcendental and an extramundane God, who created the world which He rules from without, one must also accept all the other consequences which spring from this God-doctrine. Only a mystic can accept Spinoza's substance, because it is not philosophy but mysticism.

Other philosophers, too, have couched their mysticism in philosophical terms. Thus Schopenhauer can be said to have been a mystic, although instead of substance he speaks of will. The same is true of the so-called logos philosophy, which is mysticism rather than philosophy. Philosophy begins with reality, while mysticism begins with the absolute. There is not a gleam of mysticism in

the great philosophical systems of the English philosophers, because their starting-point is reality. We can thus understand why Spinoza made such little headway in England during the heyday of its philosophy, in the days of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But wherever, as in Germany, the human mind in modern times sought a direct contact with the absolute, Spinozism as a system of metaphysics became the potent force and reigned supreme.

Pantheism was not invented by Spinoza, but was known to humanity for thousands of years. It was not the doctrine of *Deus sive natura* ("God equals nature") alone that secured for the lone Jew of Amsterdam fame and immortality. It was the form in which he expressed his pantheistic thought that made him the central figure of modern culture. The mathematical form of Spinoza which, as will be seen later, is more than a method, is a strange mixture of rationalism and mysticism.

His denial of all teleology, of personality and self-consciousness, and the consequences following from this denial made him both the bone of contention and the source of inspiration to later generations. The meaning of Spinozism in modern culture cannot be understood by mere quotations from his books. It can only be appreciated from the individual features of his pantheism. To understand them requires a brief historical survey of the pantheistic doctrine since it was crystallized first in ancient India and then in ancient Greece.

Pantheism as a world-picture is the spiritual heritage of both the Eastern and the Western branches of the Aryan race. It reached Western Europe from these two sources. But while Eastern pantheism, as formulated in India, was mystical, Western pantheism, as created in

Greece, was intellectual. The kindling point of Eastern pantheism was man's own self—Atman—while that of Western pantheism was in the outer world. But Eastern pantheism, although kindled in the self, was universalistic, while Western pantheism, although kindled in the outside world—the universe—was individualistic. In the West man understood the phenomenon called life intellectually. Greek philosophical speculations begin with natural philosophy. One of the forces of nature, water, air, earth, or fire, was conceived to be the first cosmic principle. Aristotle only concludes the process of thought inaugurated by the early Greek natural philosophers. The only interruption in this process is Socrates. He delved in man's inner self as a reaction against Ionian naturalism. Like the old Hindu sages, he was more interested in man's soul than in the entire fabric of nature. He hated physics and loved metaphysics.

In ancient Greece pantheism was a conclusion; in ancient India it was the starting-point. In the East man approached the great problems of life in the spirit of deep sadness and extreme gloom; in the West, with a feeling of joy and exuberance. Ancient Greece, despite the Greek tragedy with its morose spirit and pessimism, appears to us today as one great festivity, while ancient India appears as a house of mourning.

The Eastern Aryan was overwhelmed with the phenomenon of death, sickness, pain, evil, and suffering, which determined his attitude to life. Buddha recognized in the sick, suffering beggar the apotheosis of life, and therefore concluded that it was wisest to escape from it. The ancient Hindu surrendered to the natural forces which he could not control: to the tropic heat

which weakened his body, and to the rains and moisture which made his life miserable. He could not gird his loins and fight the struggle for existence with courage and fortitude. Life to him became a valley of tears, a veritable hell from which one must escape, at least in spirit. It has often been remarked that Buddha attempted to escape not only from life but also from death. We can thus understand his yearning for Nirvana, the happiness and silent calm of non-being and the joy of dissolution, known in the Vedanta under the term of "Ananda."

In the West many outside factors made man's life more pleasant. A temperate climate and favorable topographical conditions enabled him to direct his energy to the best advantage. He was not awed by nature and could, therefore, take up the struggle for existence with the determination to conquer nature, and to improve upon life by regulating and regimenting it. He grew more virile, more enthusiastic, and increased his will to live. He developed a healthy individualism which found its most powerful expression in the Pantheon where frolicking gods and lovely goddesses reigned supreme. With his mental equilibrium stabilized, the Western Aryan was more attracted by the joyous phenomena of birth, growth, life, virility, and genius. Eros and Aphrodite became his companions and partly determined his attitude toward life. The picture of the beautiful Helen, the symbol of beauty and birth, inspired him with courage and joy. It made him capable of great deeds.

Despite its many gods and goddesses, the people of ancient Hellas had a clear conception of an animated and unified world. The Greek formula for pantheism is

En Kai Pan, the one and the whole, or one equals the whole, which summed up the pantheistic world-picture of the ancient Greeks. These are mystical and not philosophical words.

The analogy to the *En Kai Pan* of the ancient Greeks is *Tat Twan Asi* of the ancient Hindus. The Hindus pictured, not an animated physical universe, but a spiritual cosmos. They found the relationship of Brahma to the world in the analogy of a clump of salt, which has neither an inside nor an outside. While in ancient India as well as in ancient Greece the doctrine of the identity of God and the world was taught, each branch of the Aryan race gave it its own coloring. It is even a metaphysical cosmic principle which may be colored by its environment. Subjective mystical Eastern pantheism meant destiny to ancient India, just as objective and intellectual pantheism spelled destiny to ancient Greece. In ancient India, where pantheism was born out of man's inner self, where it was a projection of man's self upon the world, it nearly destroyed man and undermined the very basis of pragmatic civilization. It created a religiosity with Ananda and Nirvana as its goal. It created the feeling that man is a superfluous being, and that life is not worth living. Eastern pantheism made metaphysical thought man's central interest in life. Ancient Hindu pantheism, which later developed into atheism, showed man the way to self-destruction.

In the West, on the other hand, this same doctrine of the identity of God and the world, which was not born in man's self, but recognized in the order prevailing in nature, had entirely different consequences. While mystical and subjective pantheism in the East became one great lamentation, intellectual and objective pantheism

in the West developed into a song of joy. Instead of inhibiting, reducing, and contracting life, it enhanced and enriched it and created the foundation for a solid civilization. In the East, pantheism produced theology and rituals; in the West, science and art. Eastern pantheism is blind; it does not see images. Western pantheism looks with a thousand eyes upon a world full of variety. It is full of imagery and hence it is conducive to art. Western pantheism is hedonic in the same degree that Eastern is ascetic. In the East, the goal is either Ananda or Nirvana; in the West, it is *kalo kagaty*—the synthesis of the beautiful and the good. In the East, pantheism, being universalistic, overcomes personality; in the West, pantheism enhances personality. Schopenhauer noted that the mythology of Eastern and Western Aryans have a common root, but yet in the West the gods and goddesses are frolicking and are full of life and quarrels, and in the East they are mere shadows. In the West, pantheism is dynamic, in the East, static. In the East, where pantheism was created by the pensive and meditating soul, it is lyrical. In the West, where it was fashioned by the calculating and analyzing philosophical mind, it is dramatic.

Is Spinozism identical with Eastern or Western pantheism, or is it a synthesis of both? This question could be easily answered were it not for the fact that Spinoza was not only a pantheist but also a monist. He stresses his monism, the *en*, to the same extent that he stresses his *pan*. In spite of his pantheism, he could never free himself entirely from certain monotheistic traditions. His approach to the problem of God is reminiscent of the Bible. The Bible begins with the sentence, "God created Heaven and Earth." Spinoza starts, "By the sub-

stance, I understand that which is in itself." The oneness of God is to Spinoza as fundamental and basic a doctrine as is his *Deus sive natura*. His theory of the oneness of God is not merely a metaphysical theory, but is a religious outpouring of the heart. It is pure mysticism. Although Spinoza's God has no intellect or will and, therefore, cannot be the recipient of love, Spinoza admonishes man to love God. This fact alone places Spinoza's God more in a direct contact with man than did the ancient Greek Nus or Logos, or the ancient Hindu Brahma or Atman. His *amor Dei*, too, is reminiscent of the old biblical command, "Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart." "Heart" in Hebrew signifies both emotion and reason. "Give me the heart to understand," Solomon prays. Spinoza's *Amor dei intellectualis* is, therefore, also ancient Hebrew religiosity, reminiscent of ancient Hebraic monotheism. But monotheism and pantheism mutually exclude each other. Both represent two opposite world-views which kindle in two different sources. Monotheism is transcendence, pantheism immanence. Monotheism is not cosmocentric but anthropocentric. It kindles in the consciousness of man's dignity and man's own value. It leads to the deduction that although man is insignificant in comparison to the forces of life and its immutable laws, he is still sufficiently important to take a position in life, to be active, and to work for a better future. Beginning with an appreciation of man's power, the feeling of his insignificance upon this small planet, which is erring in the infinite space, vanishes. He becomes ambitious to master and to enslave nature. Monotheism clearly assigns a great task to man, which Hindu pantheism entirely denies to him. Monotheism focuses its attentions

on the phenomenon of birth rather than of death, as is indicated by the story of the death of Moses on an isolated peak far removed from all men. It is glorious to be born; it is a disgrace to die.

In contradistinction to the doctrine of the identity of God and the world, monotheism assumes that God and the world are not one, and that man is more than merely a part of nature. The man of the desert, who created monotheism, and who faced only infinite sand wastes and a blazing sun, saw nothing and heard nothing outside of himself, because everything around him was dead. All that he felt was his own ego. In the end he recognized that he was something apart from these things. He concluded that he who created the sun, the desert, the sand, and himself was also a personality. It is, therefore, no stupid coincidence that the primary monotheistic proof for the existence of God as formulated in the Old Testament is not ontological but is cosmological and ethical.

Spinoza's pantheism is not free from many monotheistic features in spite of the fact that they both exclude each other. It is this rare and strange bedfellowship of two mutually incompatible and contradicting world-pictures which makes Spinozism so complicated and difficult. However, since Spinoza was primarily a religionist, it is not permissible to inquire into the contradictions in him. Religiosity enjoys the privilege of being inconsistent.

II

The heirs to Spinozism in Germany—Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel—always mention Spinoza and Plato in one breath. They compared Spinoza with Plato, not because both have anything in common, but because

both occupy the same position in the history of the mind. Plato was the central figure of ancient Greek philosophy, while Spinoza is the central figure of modern Western European philosophy. Although Plato and Spinoza represent two distinct and totally contradictory world-concepts, Spinoza's world-picture can be better understood when it is projected upon a Platonic background. Even the personality of Spinoza can best be understood when compared with that of Plato. Plato was a wealthy man, an aristocrat; Spinoza was a ghettodweller, a lens-cutter, and a pauper. Plato was physically robust and attained a ripe old age; Spinoza was physically frail and died of consumption at the age of forty-five. Plato was a great lover and was identified by the ancients with Dionysos, the God of wine, growth, and love. He was full of erotic prowess and a glorifier of life. Spinoza was a monk little interested either in women or in wine. The attempts of novelists to make him the hero of a romantic tale have no basis in reality. Plato begins his career as a poet and playwright, Spinoza as a student of dry rabbinics. Plato was an artist, Spinoza a geometrician. Plato was a seer and thought in terms of pictures. The most abstract matters quickened with life under his touch. Spinoza was a great formulator to whom even God became a formula. Plato, like the prophets of ancient Israel, was interested in man, and his central motive was ethics, which later was translated into politics. To him neither epistemology, mathematics, nor any science transcends in importance the science of man. His two major works, the *Republic* and the *Laws*, are primarily dedicated to man and his interests. To Spinoza, on the other hand, man is only one of the *modi*, an insignificant thing, almost a super-

fluous being. Plato is primarily an ethicist with Socrates as his background. Spinoza is primarily a salvationist, a follower of Buddha and St. Paul. Platonism is primarily sociology, Spinozism is mysticism. Plato was in love with this world and with this life. Spinoza, however, could have exclaimed, "This is not my world." To Plato the world of ideas appeared as the world of true reality, and the highest idea is the idea of the good. To Spinoza, on the other hand, only the effective cause is real being. It is the one substance which contains an infinite multitude of attributes. In the system of Plato the idea of good expresses the essence of Deity. In the system of Spinoza the substance equals God, who is the sum total of infinite attributes. To Plato the recognition of good and evil is more important than all other forms of recognition combined. To him they are all actually valueless without the recognition of good and evil.¹ To Spinoza good and evil are only relative conceptions, the product of human imagination. Plato affirms, but Spinoza denies, the ends. To Plato truth is only secondary in importance to good.² To Spinoza what is important is not the good, but the truth. Plato's wisdom presumes man, the ethical character. So intensely interested was he in man that he even would exclude certain types of humanity from philosophical instruction.³

Plato expresses himself in allegories, similes, pictures, and images; Spinoza, in definitions and formulas. Plato's attempts to formulate and define are often vague and equivocal, but Spinoza's are always precise, concrete, and geometric. Both Plato and Spinoza were seers, but the one saw living forms and the other geo-

¹ *Charmensides* 174 O, D.

² *Philebus* 64 B.

³ *Republic* 486 B.

metric figures. Hence, Spinoza appears to us as being as clear as crystal, while Plato's thought often seems vague and obscure. Yet Spinoza is much the more inconsistent of the two. From afar Plato impresses us as though he were dancing upon the clouds, but upon closer examination one can readily see that he stands with both feet rooted in the earth. Spinoza, on the other hand, impresses us from a distance as being a hard-headed realist, but in reality *he* is the cloud walker. Plato says that thoughts must be seen with the eyes; ideas are merely visual recognizing. To Spinoza the dead geometric figure is the measure and standard of all truth. Plato, beginning with the living figure, with the *Gestalt*, in contradistinction to Spinoza's geometric figure, recognizes the ends at once. To him the world appears as a realm of ends, while to Spinoza, with his geometric figures, the ends do not exist. Plato recognizes that the senses—or, as he calls them, the “visible”—reveal to us the multitudinousness of things, the manifoldness in the phenomena; while reason—or what he calls the “invisible”—shows us the oneness of things, which is created by the idea, is the basis of all true knowledge. Without it neither knowledge nor experience is possible. The idea produces not so much logical definitions as visible pictures, creative onenesses. The physical eye alone beholds confusion and chaos. Only with the aid of reason can it behold totalities, onenesses, *Gestalten*. He often describes the ideas as prophetic guesses, poetic inventions, eternal patterns, or original pictures; but no matter what they may be, they are order-creating elements in a world of chaos.

In Plato's theory of ideas there is no systematic precision as there is in the theory of substance or in the

attributes of Spinoza. Sometimes he believes them to be merely conclusions of the impressions of the senses, while at other times he conceives them to be something in and for themselves. Nothing of this type of thinking is to be found in Spinoza. He does not guess, he does not hesitate, he does not grope in the darkness. While Plato makes frantic efforts to establish some anchor ground from which he may find a contact with being, or consciousness, or the world, Spinoza begins with apredictic certainty. "By cause of itself I understand that those whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing." To Spinoza being is something definite, something in itself. It is rigid, stark, stiff. Plato, however, thundered that one must not speak of being per se or permit others to speak of it, for being is only by, through, and in relationship to something else. To Spinoza the phenomena exist in themselves, but to Plato they are to be found only on the meeting ground of the reason and the senses. To Plato reason creates reality; to Spinoza, all reality emanates from God.

III

Only two views of this world with all its phenomena have been advanced so far, namely, the idealistic, teleological, and organic—and the universalistic, naturalistic, and mechanical. Plato's background is Anaxagoras and introduces the *nus*, "mind," as the force which shapes the world according to definite ends and purposes, while Socrates saw in man the final aim and purposefulness of the world. To Plato it is the ideas which shape life purposefully. He, the teleologist, understood that there is a sharp line of demarcation between the living and the non-living, between the organic and the

mechanical. With regard to life which is always purposeful, he clings to the formula *ex nihilo nihil est*, "from nothing there is nothing." Only life can give birth to life; but life means figure, shape, and form as distinguished from a machine. In the figure of a living being the whole is an organism which precedes the parts. In the mechanism the parts precede the whole and the sum is equal to its parts. In the organism the figure is cause and not effect; in the mechanism it is effect not cause. Since life is purposeful, the idea of the *Gestalt* involves the idea of purposes and ends. This does not mean that no individual process of life may be interpreted mechanically. If such were the case, science would be impossible. It means, however, that life as a whole cannot be interpreted mechanically, for it is organic, purposeful, and consists of living figures.

Plato speaks of the ends and of organic life, while Spinoza emphasizes geometric figures, schemes, and mechanics. Plato peers into life while Spinoza only looks at life. Therefore, Spinoza discovers life to be only a realm of immutable laws. Instead of *Gestalt*, a living figure, he sees only rigid, geometric figures. Plato, on the other hand, looking into life, sees primarily ends and purposes and recognized truth only in the idea of the purposeful. To Spinoza all teleology is superstition and prejudice. "But all these prejudices," Spinoza says, "which I here undertake to point out depend on this solely, that it is commonly supposed that all things in nature, like man, work to some end and indeed it is thought to be certain that God Himself directs all things to some sure end, for it is said that God has made all things for man, and man that he may worship God. This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring

firstly why so many are naturally inclined to embrace it. I shall then show its falsity and finally that there has arisen from it prejudices concerning good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and disorder, beauty and deformity, etc." In this manner he goes on to show that all teleology is merely prejudice of the human mind.

It is an irony of fate that the so-called neo-Spinozists—Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel—rejected their master's mechanism and accepted Plato's teleology. Thus Fichte states that each organized product of nature is its own purpose. Schelling asserts that mechanism and teleology coincide, for purposefulness means independence of mechanism and coincidence of cause and effect. Hegel explains that the end is the idea of its own existence.⁴ In his *Phenomenology of Mind* he states that the teleological moment belongs to the essence of the things.

All teleology entails evolution, while all mechanism involves rigid being. Thus God *is* pure being. He is not subject to change, to becoming, to evolution. From this Spinoza deduces everything in the cosmos that stretches before man in infinite space and happens in infinite time. But to Plato there is no pure being in itself. The old Heraclitean theory that everything is in flux, and that one cannot even wade through the same river twice, makes every recognition impossible. How is knowledge possible since becoming, too, cannot be a source of recognition. What we call "being," Plato states, has a share in our thinking and our ego, just as what we call "becoming" has a share in our perception. It is the task of thinking to bring changeable becoming to rest and to turn it into a definite figure. Only out of this synthesis

⁴ *Logik*, III, 216.

does recognition arise. Since, according to Plato, man actually creates the world, it can be easily understood why man occupies such a prominent position in his philosophy. Reality is born in man's mind, and presupposes and presumes man. It is man who creates the world. As against this subjectivism and idealism of Plato, Spinoza teaches, "By substance I understand that which is in itself and which is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed." Plato's world is thus born in man's mind and Spinoza's in God's mind.

In asserting that the essence of things as produced by God does not involve existence, Spinoza explains that God is not only the cause of the commencement of the existence of things, but also of the continuation of their existence. In other words, God is the *causa essendi rerum* and thus there is no active creation at all. Everything comes from God with mathematical mechanical necessity by mechanical evolvment, and not by a processual evolution. The historians of the philosophy of history ignore Spinoza, for from his system no philosophy of history can be deduced. Plato, on the other hand, making man the center of all things, has laid the foundation for a philosophy of history which, to the present day, is suggestive to all who meditate upon the historical subject. By wedding being to becoming through the instrumentality of man's mind, Plato creates the conditions of tension out of which a life-process arises. Not without good reason did the ancients instinctively connect the name of Plato with the God of creation, love, and growth, for he has connected the idea of creation with the idea of beauty and immor-

tality. In one of his dialogues he exclaims: "Love is not the love for a beautiful figure, but it is primarily something potential. This is love for a figure to be created by the beautiful. The mortal figure harbors within him an immortal power, the power to create, and so love is related to immortality. One, to attain immortality, creates children, while others whose creative power is centered more in the soul than in the body create works of the mind; but there is nothing mechanical in this creativeness. The stream of life comes and goes arithmetically, kindling in creativeness, beauty and love. Love is the connecting link between the mortal and the immortal because it itself is both mortal and immortal. It is mortal because it is subject to change, decay and death, but it is immortal because it always rises again after having apparently been dead. It does not possess durable life of divine mortality over which death cannot spread its wings, but it does not share the fate and destiny of that which is final."

To the extent that Plato's ideas are not logical categories, or hypotheses, or something metaphysical, there is an unbridgeable abyss between the world of ideas and the world of senses; but the oneness-seeking Plato could not be satisfied with this dualism, with this permanent separation of both worlds, and he tries in many ways to link them together. The suggestion that the world of ideas and beauty unites itself with the world of senses, only to be separated from it, leaving in man's soul a deep longing, could never satisfy Plato, the poet and philosopher. He attempted to solve this problem by creating a teleological relationship between the world of ideas and the world of senses and thereby elevated the world of senses to a higher plane. There is also

ideal beauty in the sensuous world, as can be seen in the beautiful figures and bodies of life which awaken in us love and longing. Just as the idea of the good enables us to recognize the objects of our thought, so does beauty reveal to us the oneness of the world. In many passages of his writings he actually identifies the idea of love with the cosmic principles from which he constructs a philosophy of history which is not only fascinating in its beauty but elating in its philosophical truth. Every world-outlook assumes that there is a real meaningful process of becoming which aspires to attain a certain goal. Plato's doctrine of love as the cosmic principle, which gives to the sensuous world a share in the divine and which causes the divine to assume sensuous forms from which emanate the highest forms of life, has established a basis for philosophic, historic meditations. There is in his doctrine an organic process of becoming, which is not to be confounded with the process of becoming as formulated by Heraclitus, for the Platonic idea of becoming is filled with reality and elements of being and of eternity. There is thus a historical process instead of mechanical evolutions.

"Thou shalt be like God," the author of Genesis warned man. Plato offered a similar program, but Spinoza, who does not start with man, could not say anything that was comforting to him. Man is a link in an infinite chain, a plaything of destiny, just one of the infinite modi, without any future, without even the possibility of redemption. His lord and master is the eternal, unchangeable, and immutable law—the law of blind necessity. Man is a prisoner and can never be freed.

The Platonic world-picture produced by love, regu-

lated by the idea and improved upon by the good, necessitates logics, ethics, and aesthetics. Spinoza's world, mathematized, deadened, and mechanized, precludes all of them. It is bereft of reason, goodness, and beauty, and is even much gloomier than the world of Buddha. That seer at least dangled before man's eye the future joy of Nirvana, the happy state of complete dissolution, of non-being. He gave man some hope, the hope of overcoming himself, the hope of detaching himself from a world of sin to which he was wedded in this material world; but Spinoza even fails to offer him such a questionable joy.

If every system of philosophy is a confession of the soul, then Plato's philosophy is a confession of hope and Spinoza's a confession of despair. The Greek freeman, Plato, looked at the world and recognized in it a play of free forces. Spinoza, the fugitive of the Spanish Inquisition and haunted Jew, looked at the world and discovered in it a prison of the Inquisition, in which man is handled by forces over which he has no control. Plato's philosophy has all the earmarks of the free, life-loving and life-enjoying Helen; the philosophy of Spinoza has all the earmarks of the prison of the Inquisition in which there is no hope and no future.

IV

The mystic is neither prophet nor philosopher. He is too a-social to be a prophet and too much concerned with establishing a contact with the absolute to be a philosopher. To a mystic the absolute, whether it be God, spirit, or ego, is always infinite, imageless, and indeterminate. To him the world of the senses is merely a passing shadow and an insignificant dream. His Deity is

remote from reality and has no connection with it. Spinoza's substance has all the characteristics of the God of the mystics. Thus Spinoza's general theory of knowledge is not the most characteristic feature of his system, for it neither begins with nor ends with knowledge. It begins and ends with a mystical hypothesis.

Despite his mystical starting-point, Spinoza, particularly in France, has been considered to be merely a disciple of the Western Descartes. However, even a superficial comparison of the epistemology of the two will prove convincingly that Spinoza is as far from being a Cartesian as he is from being a Platonist. Descartes aspired to establish a solid foundation for a theory of knowledge, which would be valid for all succeeding generations. Intellectual certainty and clear and adequate recognition were his goal. At the very beginning he wrested from his mind a criterion of truth, which he found in self-consciousness. His *cogito ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I am," is a tremor of ancient Platonism in a modern world. Descartes, too, was convinced that man's mind is creative of reality. However, he was not only a theoretician incased in epistemological formula, but was also concerned with religion. But, being primarily a philosopher, he began with philosophy and concluded with religion. God is both the conclusion and the peak of his system. Spinoza's starting-point, however, is Descartes's conclusion. From the very beginning he yearned only for intuitive knowledge in order to make a direct and immediate contact with the absolute. His goal was salvation, beatitude, and spiritual happiness rather than empiric knowledge and intellectual security. Such knowledge springs forth only from an immediate revelation of the object, God. Such is his earlier theory

of knowledge as formulated in his *Short Tractate on Man, God and Salvation*. It was this thirst for immediate knowledge, the knowledge of God, that earned for Spinoza the meaningful title, the "God-intoxicated Jew."

It is thus evident that Spinoza's approach to the problem of God does not resemble that of any other major philosopher of the West. His *Short Tractate* is reminiscent of ancient Eastern mysticism in which, too, God alone is reality. This identity of God and reality makes the possibility of science highly problematical, because man's relative mind cannot penetrate into the mysteries of the absolute.

To Descartes self-consciousness and to Spinoza God-consciousness were the sources of all knowledge. However, if God-consciousness is the standard test of all certainty, then knowledge must always remain passive, fixed, and eternal. It can be neither elevated nor degraded. It comes to man from without and overwhelms him. Not mind but the absolute, not man but the object, creates reality. Not "I think," but "it thinks in me"; not "I feel," but "it feels in me," are his epistemological formulae. The intellect, like will and feeling, is deprived of all freedom.

It is interesting to note that clear-thinking pantheists like Goethe, who rejected monotheism because they could not imagine a God who moves the world from without, accepted Spinoza's identification of God and reality. However, Goethe was a poet and as such had his own logic, which logic fails to understand.

The vexing problem in all major philosophical systems is the correlation of the realm of being to the realm of thinking. This problem does not arise for Spinoza, for

his realm of being is identical with his realm of thinking. In his *Short Tractate* he merely states that the two attributes, extension and thinking, are two different expressions of the same substance. If being and thinking are identical and the former is governed by the laws of necessity, then there can be neither truth nor falsehood, since all things are fixed and necessary from eternity to eternity.

Friedrich Nietzsche, who praised Spinoza for his rejection of teleology, could equally well have praised him for his rejection of truth and falsehood. Spinoza says that so long as we do not cling to a fragment of being, no error or falsehood is possible. Truth is the recognition of the whole, while error or falsehood is the recognition of only a portion of the whole. Empiric knowledge is knowledge only of the fragments, while intuitive knowledge, which is more to be visualized than conceived, is a knowledge of the whole. Spinoza shares this theory of knowledge with all great mystics.

Descartes, too, speaks of intuitive knowledge, but to him it is a geometric or arithmetic axiom which forms the basis of science. But to Spinoza, who by his *more geometrico* mathematized God, the world and man, intuitive knowledge is only the infinite divine being with which the human mind is to fill itself. To Spinoza, the mathematician, intuition is something mystical, while to Descartes, the religionist, it is mathematical.

Spinoza, like all mystics, begins with the knowledge of God and with God-consciousness and ends with *amor Dei*. But this God is dead. How can man love a God who has neither will, nor intellect, nor feeling; who cannot choose or determine, punish or reward? Spinoza's *amor Dei* is not a postulate of knowledge, but is a mysti-

cal vision, analogous to Buddha's doctrine of Nirvana, which he formulates as a union of the soul with the Absolute (Brahma). This conception is indissolubly connected with the theory that man is a slave of nature or of God. He is thus in a state of bondage, from which only *amor Dei* can redeem him.

A philosopher who begins with God-consciousness and ends with *amor Dei* thereby evades the problem of knowledge. Descartes, however, who begins Platonically, gives an adequate answer to this problem, thereby making modern science possible. Therefore, to consider Spinoza a disciple of Descartes is as logical as to consider mysticism the daughter of mathematics.

V

In his *Short Tractate* Spinoza gives a general outline of his doctrine. Had he been known, however, only as the author of this work, his position in modern history would be no different from that of any other mystic. He develops here a theory of determinism, which possesses all the characteristics of Eastern mysticism. It could not have escaped him that this doctrine would not be acceptable to philosophically minded men. Therefore, in his next treatise, *On the Improvement of the Human Mind*, a title symbolic of the progress Spinoza made since he wrote the *Short Tractate*, he developed a modified theory of knowledge and recognition. Here, too, he is concerned with how to attain the highest good. In developing this view he paints a sombre picture of daily reality, and attempts to show that the good to which the average man aspires is only an optic illusion. Certain passages of this work read like the lamentation of an old Hindu mystic. Every joy gives birth to suffer-

ing, every desire is the cause of another desire, every lust turns into depression. Man's life appears like an immense wheel, an eternal cycle of meaningless movements, which leads nowhere. This aimless movement cannot be the purpose of life, nor can it secure to man salvation and happiness. Only eternal being, which is perfect in itself and requires nothing else for its cause or support, can offer security to man's mind. The very thought of this state of being is likely to cool our passions, to cause us to collect our thoughts, and to make peace with ourselves and with the world. What is this being? It is that oneness which unites the spirit with the realm of nature, which is ruled by eternal and immutable laws to which we must subject ourselves.

While Spinoza describes man's goal in similar fashion in his first two works, he adopts a different point of view in his *Second Tractate*, as to how to attain this goal. At first he described man as the slave of God and as a passive onlooker, whose movements are directed from without. Later he showed that man's happiness is no longer dependent entirely upon objective forces, but that he harbors in his own mind the possibilities of happiness and salvation, which he can acquire slowly and methodically. He shows that truth and the highest idea can become the source of all other knowledge.

Such a view presupposes a totally different conception of truth, error, and recognition from that of the first tractate. Recognition is no longer passive, nor are truth and error dependent upon external factors, but upon the force and nature of the intellect itself. The objects of mathematical recognition furnish the best proof of this assertion. Geometric figures testify to absolute truth, although they are independent of and can ignore reality.

Truth can thus no longer be attained by perceiving the processes of the outer world, but by the mind's conceiving the infinite totality of things. The mind thus becomes an active agent. The starting-point of all metaphysics, therefore, can only be sought in the recognition of that which represents the form of truth itself. Once this recognition is acquired, we can deduce additional truths and thus arrive at the conception of an eternal order of things. Thus, Spinoza's starting-point here is not an objective force but the intellect itself. By turning from the objective to the subjective world, he partly turns from mysticism and salvationism to philosophy and knowledge. Although he finally attains a philosophical starting-point, he yet persists in rejecting empiric truth, which he holds to be only inadequate knowledge. Only synthetic knowledge, which begins with the simple elements which it combines in a definite manner, is true knowledge. The mind can understand completely only what is born out of the human mind in this fashion.

While Spinoza appears to have become a subjectivist, he does not fail to emphasize the fact that the order of things described above is not an order of thinking, but an order of being. The ideas must be so connected that man's mind reproduces the totality as well as the particulars of nature; yet this mind in progressing from the recognition of cause to effect is not determined by something outside of it, but by its own logical law. With this theory of mind and knowledge, Spinoza attains his main purpose, the dissolution of the ramified parts of real being into a system of necessary actual intellect. Cause and reason, or reality and recognition, are thus made identical. This identity is not a combination of the idea of physical cause and effect, but the absorption

of the idea of physical cause by mathematics. He visualizes mathematics, not in the light of analysis, but in the light of geometry, which to him is only a synthetic science of figures and images. To him mathematical objects are the very incarnation of the eternal and also creative things. Only the primary definitions are eternal, for they are deduced from being. Secondary or tertiary deductions, however, are already created. Thus mathematics in the hands of Spinoza became something different from what it was to all of his contemporaries and predecessors.

By thus identifying true knowledge with mathematics, one can understand Spinoza's suspicion of empiric knowledge. To him it is undetermined, passive, reaching the mind from without, from hearsay, or from the senses. Such knowledge can only be imaginary. Only when individual things can be subordinated to a general and immutable law, as in mathematics, can they become objects of knowledge.

The highest type of knowledge, however, is not synthetic but intuitive, because instead of deducing the particular from the general it visualizes both of them simultaneously. By this type of knowledge one gains a complete conspectus of reality without isolating from it the principles of being. Everything thus becomes visible from the point of view of eternity, for it is not concerned with parts and particles, but with the whole of reality as it is governed by eternal and immutable laws. Because man cannot possibly follow the changeable particulars, for they transcend his powers and capabilities and because he need not know all the particular things in life, intuitive knowledge is not only the highest but the most useful type of knowledge. Through

it he can grasp the eternal laws and deduce from them everything within his purview. This is the most economic type of thinking. What Spinoza proposes here can be reduced to this: instead of inquiring into the nature of the phenomena of motion, that is to say, in the nature of the physical world, and thus accumulate empirical knowledge which is inadequate and which can never mirror truth, we had better study the nature of motion itself, which is uniform and permanent, and proceed to deduce from it the particular things. Just as we must turn our attention to the oneness of things, so must we study the passions and the particulars of the mind from its oneness. To obtain pure a priori knowledge, we must attempt to realize the ideal of pure deduction. Rather than study every tree in the forest, let us study the forest itself, because it is easier and more economical to do so.

It did not occur to the universalist Spinoza that every individual not only represents the specie but is a world unto himself. Therefore, the knowledge of the specie, while very useful, is not the only knowledge that we wish to possess. Biology, for instance, would be cut off from the possibility of development were we to accept Spinoza's theory of knowledge, for not only the specie as such, but every individual of the specie, reacts in a different manner to a given phenomenon. The very first law of physiology is that every individual is governed by laws adequate to his personality. Therefore, physiological knowledge of the laws governing man as a specie would be of little use to medicine. What is true of physiology is also true of psychology, and of many other branches of knowledge.

Those who are familiar with the prevailing epistemo-

logical tendencies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will recognize in the "Cartesian" Spinoza a full-fledged adherent not of Descartes but of Hobbes. His theory of the genetic definitions, which is so vital to the whole system of Spinoza, he practically borrowed from Hobbes, just as he appropriated from Bacon the terms of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Hobbes, too, stresses the doctrine that we can only conceive that which has been created by our own minds. Not only mathematical but all other sciences can be acquired only by deduction. Only the principles conceived in our own minds, and not outside impressions or experiences, can become the basis of knowledge. In this manner, not only mathematics, but also the social sciences, can be reduced to a priori sciences, for just as our minds create the principles of geometry, so they create the principles of law and social organization.

Together with Hobbes, Spinoza recognized in geometry the prototype of all true knowledge. This agreement, however, does not necessarily mean that both men had the same philosophical aim in view. Hobbes wished to arrive at empiric reality by the way of deductive knowledge. He was not concerned with God and His attributes, or with any other problems of theology. To him deductive knowledge was only a method and of relative value. Born in man's mind, it cannot possess the validity of eternal laws, but only a relative validity.

Spinoza presents the opposite point of view. To him the ontologist, the idea itself, bears witness to its absolute truth and objective necessity. While it is true that the highest idea, the idea of God, or the substance cannot be explained geometrically, such an explanation is superfluous because in it idea and being, essence and

existence, are united. It is thus evident that in so far as Spinoza's theory of knowledge is traceable to any man, this man is not Descartes but Hobbes.

VI

The philosopher seeks truth, the religionist salvation and happiness. Baruch Spinoza sought salvation, which he found in God. In religion God is the starting-point; in philosophy and science the conclusion. Spinoza begins his main opus with God and concludes it with God's love. His a priori affirmation implies a denial of the world and of life. His very acceptance of God is conditioned upon the rejection of earthly values and pleasures. This approach distinguishes him from all other Western philosophers, and through it he reveals himself as a true religionist and mystic. Yet this salvation-seeking mystic, far from sermonizing God, mathematized Him.

Already in his *Improvement of the Human Understanding* he is convinced that he has proved that the mathematical approach is the only true avenue to philosophical inquiry. Like all true mystics, he has but little respect for empiric or historic knowledge. To him even an assertion such as "I shall die" is only vague experience. True knowledge can be visualized only from the point of view of eternity, and cannot be acquired empirically. Spinoza sees things not in their eternal organic growth, but merely in their eternal mechanical order.

To Spinoza the basis of genuine knowledge is our innate capability of recognition. Mathematical knowledge is the only valid knowledge, because it alone contains a system of apodictic truth. Really to recognize things is to see them in their necessary sequence, the

cause which brings them forth and the ground from which they follow. Only when premise and conclusion coincide is true recognition produced. Mathematics is the only science that follows the method of deduction and synthesis. It deduces from the general and simple to the particular and composite. In following this method we must by necessity arrive at the first and final principle which harbors in itself everything deducible. Only then can we explain all phenomena with mathematical precision and clarity, for we will understand that whatever is, is so by mathematical mechanical necessity.

Many historians of philosophy have attempted to explain Spinoza's mathematical approach to God and salvation by arguing that he, like the men of his generation, thought *more geometrico*, which was a reaction against the *more scholastico* of the Middle Ages. However, it was actually the religionism and salvationism of Spinoza that made the mathematical method indispensable to his system. Every true religionist is convinced of his own truth, but every true philosopher is always somewhat skeptical of even those truths of which he is most deeply convinced. Skepticism was as strange to Spinoza's mind as it was to any other religionist. Yet the religionist Spinoza sought to fortify the doctrine of whose truth he was undyingly convinced with an impregnable proof, which he believed to have found in the mathematical method. He expressed his religious truth not in symbols or similes, but in geometric definitions and axioms.

If additional proof were needed to show that Spinoza was basically a religionist, it can be found in the fact that his, unlike other major systems of philosophy, was

not developed through evolutionary stages, but was conceived as a mature entity. His basic pantheistic doctrine was already fixed and formulated in his *Short Tractate*, and was merely expanded in his *Ethica*. The only development of his original doctrine in his main opus is to be found primarily in its form, the geometric method. This method was chosen in the belief that it would make his mystical theory invulnerable to all intellectual attacks. But in this he gravely erred.

The mathematical approach to the world of spirit contradicts the very nature of religiosity, salvation, and mysticism. Mathematics and religion make strange bed-fellows, for the spirit of religion is the spirit of freedom, while the spirit of mathematics is that of necessity. Yet the religionist Spinoza overlooked this incongruity. Spinoza's prestige and influence have been greatly enhanced because he has been considered to be the philosopher who most successfully has applied mathematics to philosophy. But this application was illogical and artificial, for not only mathematics and religion, but also mathematics and philosophy, have nothing in common. Critical philosophy has always rejected the mathematical method,⁵ because mathematics can construe its own

⁵ Spinoza's mathematical method has often been investigated and found untenable and full of inner contradictions. The chapter on Spinoza in Johann Julius Baumann's still readable book, *Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neuen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1868), is to the present day the best analytical and critical comment on the subject. Baumann laid bare nearly every axiom of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and demonstrated its artificiality and untenability. He concludes that Spinoza either violates the very spirit and the rules of mathematics or loses himself in gross contradictions. Baumann sums up the chapter by saying that besides the gross logical errors of Spinoza's system, and the false and misleading analogies from mathematics, there are to be found in Spinoza's method such errors that not only the demonstrations but also the axioms become questionable (*ibid.*, I, 234).

Cassius J. Keyser, the author of *Mathematical Philosophy* and an admirer of Spinoza, also admits that Spinoza's mathematical method is one grand failure, but takes consolation in the fact that "illustrious failures fall to the lot of none but illustrious men" (*ibid.*, p. 36).

terms, which philosophy cannot do. A philosophical term, proposition, or idea is restricted to certain bounds, and may be subject to certain historical changes and developments. In logics a positive assertion excludes everything else, for every affirmation is at the same time a negation. A geometric figure, however, although it is rigid in form, is rich in limitless possibilities. A fertile geometric mind may, by drawing certain lines within a circle or square, discover in it certain new fundamental mathematical laws. If the mathematical method were applicable to philosophy, it should be equally applicable to biological sciences. But since organic life is not subject to measurement, its problems cannot be solved by the geometric method.

To the chemist life begins with the atom. He is primarily concerned with an inorganic, dead, and rigid nature, which is governed by mathematical mechanical laws. He numbers the elements formalistically and describes their operations and effects. Although inorganic nature is subject to single, rigid, and immutable laws, their totality cannot always be explained by the laws of cause and effect. While inorganic nature is in its individual phenomena subject to measurement, organic nature—and particularly the realm of man—is not. No two events in human life occur in exactly the same manner. Human history is not subject to the laws established by experiment, for it cannot be observed, weighed, measured, or reconstructed in the laboratory. It cannot be pressed into a definite, given formula. How this life moves can be seen by the genius with his intuitive eye, but not by the scientist with his analytical mind. Spinoza, however, attempts to visualize mathematically the totality of life after the fashion of the scientist, who

deals only with one department of inorganic nature. Vision and formula, however, are diametrically opposed to and mutually exclude each other, for the formulator or experimenter need not see or visualize but must only observe the results of his experiments. Therefore, Spinoza's mathematical approach to the problem of God and man is strange in the annals of philosophical thinking.

Mathematics is concerned with externalities, while religion busies itself with inner processes. All geometry, chemistry, physics, and biology are concerned with surfaces, which they observe from different points of view. They look at life from the façade and study its outer structure and component parts. Seers and artists, however, look beyond the façade. Their vision is horizontal, not vertical, for they raise their eye so that they can see above and beyond the façade and can visualize at one sweep the totality of life. To enable the analytically minded man to see as much of life as possible, he must sharpen his eye so that he can recognize reality. This is the purpose of all philosophical theories of knowledge. Spinoza, the religionist, the visionary, and the seer, instead of beholding the whole of the scene and seeing what is beyond and above the wall, looked only at the blank wall itself. In this he is like the curious countryman who eagerly attends an execution and stands outside the prison walls while the execution takes place within. All he sees is a blank brick surface.

After the mathematician solves a given problem, he leaves no room for further questions. Spinoza, with his mathematical approach to the problem of being, had to follow a given procedure, which even his most ardent disciples admit he failed to do. Often he fails to bridge

wide gaps; often he contradicts himself and leaves fundamentals unexplained. The seer, however, does not pretend to solve his problems in as absolute a manner as the mathematician or scientist. He understands that his eye is only that of a puny mortal. He knows that there is something in life that the human eye cannot behold at all, and which can be seen only by his inner eye.

Spinoza had an inner vision of the whole of the external world, which he attempted to express in mathematical terms. But the world visualized by the mystic eye cannot be measured or weighed, for it is a lyrical outpouring of the soul. The attempt to translate lyricism into mathematics was doomed from its very inception: It is a strange paradox that so penetrating a mind as Spinoza's failed to observe this simple truism.

Spinoza, by applying mathematics to philosophy, demonstrated his eagerness to attain apodictic truth. Yet the generation of thinkers succeeding him, from empiricists to idealists, were agitated by the question whether or not geometry did furnish that type of truth. Thus John Stuart Mill considered logics, arithmetics, and geometry to be empirical sciences, because he said their content is furnished by the 'senses. To him the mathematical axioms are merely a summary of sensual perceptions. Some of the most penetrating scientific minds of modern times, such as Helmholtz, Rieman, Mach, Poincaré, and Ostwald, stressed the empiric character of geometry. To them the mathematical laws are either abstractions from experience or ideas born out of experience, or pacts guided by experience. Ostwald says that mathematics, far from being apodictic, must, on the contrary, be considered to be an arbitrary creation of the human mind.

Just as Spinoza's application of mathematics to philosophy was faulty, so was his mathematical procedure of dubious character. In his main opus, *Ethics*, which he says is "*ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*" ("ethics demonstrated in geometric order"), he violates all the laws of geometry and heaps tautology upon tautology. Thus proposition 7 of the first part of the *Ethics* says, "It pertains to the nature of the substance to exist," and the demonstration is, "There is nothing by which substance can be produced. It will, therefore, be the cause of itself; that is to say, its essence necessarily involves existence; or, in other words, it pertains to its nature to exist." Is this geometry, and does this prove anything? If the substance cannot be proved by something else, it need not necessarily be its own cause, for it need not necessarily be at all.

Proposition 2 of the same part of the *Ethics* says, "Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another." This, he asserts, becomes evident from definition 3, which reads, "By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed." But definition 3, which is to prove proposition 2, says exactly the same thing. "Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another."

Proposition 3 of the first book of the *Ethics* says that "if two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other." This is proved by axioms 4 and 5, which repeat exactly the same thing.

A demonstration which adds nothing to the proposi-

tion or to the definition is not geometry but tautology. Whatever truth there may be to Spinoza's propositions is very seldom proved by his demonstrations. In geometry it is not the idea alone, but the accompanying figure which is used to develop a new content. Spinoza cannot emulate this method, for his definitions, propositions, axioms, and demonstrations are very limited in scope since they are not accompanied by geometric figures.

Spinoza also violates the laws of logics in attempting to apply mathematics to philosophy. One of the fundamental laws of logics governing the definition is that it must not be tautological, or merely identical with the general characterization, but specific and definite. Spinoza's axioms clearly violate this law. An axiom is, as the Stoics already understood it, a clear assertion. If we admit with Kant that the axioms are "synthetic a priori, in so far as they are immediately certain," then surely Spinoza's axioms are not axioms at all, for they fail to furnish that immediate certainty they presume to supply. In his *Metaphysical Thoughts*, Spinoza tries to make it clear that the idea of the ends, or of time, or of number and measure, are purely human and relative in character. They are pure anthropomorphisms, yet geometry, which involves the idea of measure, is used by Spinoza as the source of apodictic truth. If he were to agree with Hermann Cohen that measure is a category, his attempt would be understandable. However, his theory of measure and number contradicts that of all idealistic and critical philosophers. Thus he uses both conflicting theories at the same time. Either the one or the other theory must be false. Hence, from whichever point of view we consider his mathematical method,

whether from the purely logical or from the purely pragmatic vantage point, it is not applicable to philosophy.

Spinoza's system in its final form is preceded by definitions and axioms. Human thought, however, is not space and can be even less mathematized than biological nature. The spontaneity of the human mind scorns mathematization. If life and thought could be mathematized, science and philosophy would then depend only upon technical skill and not upon creative genius. Human thought consists largely of postulates, which are strange to mathematics. Therefore, since philosophy cannot deduce from spacial figures, not having space as an object of study, it cannot validly apply the geometric method. Consequently all the major philosophers of modern times have discarded this approach. While the dialectic method of Hegel also largely consists of unfounded presumptions, hairsplittings, and mental deductions, it still is preferable to and is much more valid than the geometric method. *Philosophy more geometrico condemns creative philosophy to sterility.*

Unwittingly Spinoza often transgresses the limitations which the geometric method imposed upon him. Although he deals with mathematical terms and geometric formulae, he, in order to express himself completely, introduces non-mathematical terms drawn from the empiric world. Thus instead of geometrizing his thought, he in fact degeometrizes it. His method resolves itself into a series of syllogisms, tautologies, and contradictions.

Spinoza, that pious soul, was animated by a much finer idealism than can be discovered in his *Ethics*, but his mathematization of man destroyed ethics. Thus he

ascribed to all creatures a desire for self-preservation, from which he deduces his utilitarian and selfish ethics. It need not be proved that he arrived at these axioms not by deductive but by inductive thinking, founded upon empirical knowledge which he rejects. It can easily be imagined that Spinoza's evaluation of man reflects his experience with them. Instead of evaluating man subjectively, he merely geometrizes his experiences. Hence, his negative attitude to man could not remain the mood of a lonely thinker, but was elevated to an eternal geometric truth, which in turn formed the basis of his *Ethics*. So has Spinoza's mathematical method impaired not only his theory of knowledge but also his ethics. By attempting to chain the free human mind, he almost succeeded in sterilizing it.

VII

Baruch Spinoza, the God-intoxicated Jew, who could not free himself entirely from the traditions of his race, opens the presentation of his system with God or substance, which he develops into the central theme of his theory. As a substance theoretician he is a typical seventeenth-century philosopher. He aims to explain a world which is not dependent upon a personal and conscious supreme being⁶ towering high in the sky or perched somewhere outside of the universe. He aspired to perceive the order of things in this life as a "manifestation" of one ultimate cause, which by its very nature must be considered absolutely necessary and whose very being already implies its existence. This ultimate reality, substance, God, or nature, is all embracing and all inclusive—the indeterminate, abso-

⁶ See pp. 374-76.

lute being. As such it can be only one, for if these were two substances the one would already be limited by the other and would not be absolute. With such a program it was methodically proper for him to begin with the idea of God, and to make it the very starting-point of his system. He could not possibly follow the naturalistic or the idealistic method, because the one never leads to any God-concept, while the other postulates it only as a conclusion. But Spinoza, who says that everything is in God, must begin with God. The presumption in this case necessitates the method.

Spinoza opens his *Ethics* with eight fundamental definitions, the first of which reads as follows: "By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing." This definition, queer and bizarre as it may seem to be, is the very backbone of his entire system. As such, however, it is much less original than most Spinoza scholars believe it to be, for it is essentially an old weapon taken from the arsenal of medieval Christian religious philosophy. The great English cleric, Anselm of Canterbury, who lived in the eleventh century and who was primarily interested in the strengthening of the faith of the church and not in philosophical truth, actually intimated as much in his ontological proof of God when he exclaimed: "We have an idea of being of the highest of which we can think." The resemblance of this famous proof for the existence of God with that of Spinoza testifies to the religious motives of Spinozism.

The pious soul knows of God and of His existence. Yet what does he know about God? Not the knowledge of His mere existence, but that of His essence is the source of inspiration of His religiosity. This was es-

pecially true of Protestant and Old Testament religiosity. It was also one of the major problems with which Spinoza grappled. The only solution he offered was that substance or God is free from every kind of limitation and determinateness. God cannot possibly be described by an idea, notion, or term derived from the world of finalities, for no matter how all embracing this term, idea, or notion may be, it would still contain a determination and hence a limitation. But the absoluteness of God precludes every limitation. Hence God cannot possess any attributes which theology may ascribe to Him. It should be clearly understood that the attributes of the God of Spinoza are not identical with the attributes of the God of theology.

Spinoza's conception of God or substance makes, upon first acquaintance, an impression of substantiality and content. However, when he says of substance that it is "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed," one becomes convinced that it is actually devoid of any definite content. Being the cause of itself and without any determinateness, this substance is free from all tension and from creative sources. It is not only removed from, but is actually devoid of, every reality. Many Spinozists have claimed that Spinoza's God resembles that of Maimonides, with his doctrine of the negative attributes of God. This analogy, however, is only an optical illusion.⁷

⁷ Bussolt and others, who are out to present Spinoza's *Deus* as a living God, because Spinoza says "in God there is an idea of His essence," forget that to Spinoza thought and ideas are not synonymous. Spinoza, in assigning to God an idea, does not mean to imply that God is conscious and thoughtful, or that He has a conception of His essence. He could just as well say that the tree has an idea of his essence and still not imply that the tree is self-conscious.

The God of Maimonides, while undefinable, is not exclusively immanent, for He is self-conscious and is above all ethical reality. Together with the God of the ancient prophets of Israel, He desires only the good. Spinoza's God, however, not being possessed of any consciousness or will, cannot contain any ethical reality. To Maimonides nature and ethics were not identical because nature and God were not identical, but to Spinoza the reverse was true. If his God is so detached from reality that nothing emanates from Him, how can the world be deduced from Him? How can a God who is self-sufficient unto Himself have any relationship to the world? Thus, the very definition of God by Spinoza creates problems for him which—as it will be established later—he never solved. Only a satisfactory answer to the question "What is God" and not "How can we know of His existence?" would satisfy the philosopher and religionist alike. In attempting to answer this question Spinoza developed his theory of the attributes and the *modi*. "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence." "By *modus* I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in another thing through which it is also conceived." These two definitions, scholastic, involved, and obtruse, purported to play the foundations for his explanation of the relationship of God to the world. Even if one knows that an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance or that the *modus* is the affection of the substance, one still does not understand the relationship between God and the world.

Even Spinoza's famous axiom which says, "That by God I understand being, absolutely infinite, that is to say substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one

of which expresses eternal and infinite essence," does not shed any light upon this problem. His only explanation of what is God is that He is free. It is, however, the sort of freedom that one enjoys only in prison. "That thing which is called free exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone." Since God's actions are determined, even though by Himself, He is not a free agent, but is gagged, bound, and fettered by His own laws. Thus arises a new God-figure in the great pantheon of gods who is absolute and infinite, but lifeless because He is devoid of all personality and self-consciousness. This God has infinite attributes of which man knows only two, namely, extension or space, with all that is in it, and thinking or mind. Both attributes are dominated by necessity which transform the world into a static mechanism. Freedom becomes only a false and ugly dream, the superstition of the ignorant. Necessity is the only truth and reality. Everything is determined and predetermined, following definite laws in an absolute and definite manner. The knowledge that God and nature are tied to their own laws is no answer to the question, what is God and what is His relationship to the world. Is God real substance—that is to say, a thing in itself? Is He merely the sum of the parts or is He something that is independent of the parts? The first assumption is the dogma of naturalistic pantheism, while the second is the conviction of idealistic theism. Spinoza has not always offered the same solution to this problem. "By the guidance of God," he states, "I understand nothing else but that fixed, unchangeable order of nature and by the laws of nature, by virtue of which

everything happens, I understand nothing else than God's verdicts which constitute eternal truth and absolute necessity." If the unchangeable order of nature is God's verdict, could He render a different verdict? Is He at liberty to dictate as He chooses? This question Spinoza answers in the negative. Therefore, the expression, "The laws of nature are God's verdict," is only a figure of speech which sheds no light upon the problem of God's relationship to the world.

What, then, is his God? Being identical with nature, He is also identical with its laws and His will is identical with His being. God, nature, or substance is nothing in itself independent of the world, but merely the eternal order of the world. Just as His will is identical with His being, so is it also identical with His intellect. Hence, He can possess neither will nor intellect, neither of which is to be found in nature, which is coequal with God. From this it follows that since He is thoughtless and will-less, He has no consciousness and is only a rigid, lifeless God. He is only the absolute law governing being. Instead of saying God is equal with nature, Spinoza could have said equally as well that God is the law of nature. The conclusion that there can be only one form of eventuation admitting of no exceptions, save to atheists in Spinoza's meaning of the term, becomes justified. God equals nature and nature equals the eternal order of the things and not the sum total of the individual things. God or nature, or a personality, or a conscious spirit is not an animated concrete whole, but a formal oneness, which must be considered the necessary order of occurrences.

Thus, Spinoza's God becomes only a logical category,

devoid of life, motion, and tension. The source of inspiration to all previous Protestant religiosity had been a God who wills and thinks. In such a world a will-less and thoughtless God was bound to become a storm center in theology and philosophy. But does Spinoza prove the existence of even this dead God? Although he was earnest in believing to have demonstrated both the existence and the self-existence of God, he overlooked the fact that because substance or God has no other cause it does not necessarily follow that it must exist in itself. The existence and eternity of the substance, which according to Spinoza is an apodictic truth, shrinks upon closer examination into a mere formal definition and a pious wish.

This unproved God or substance is not subject to change from within or without, and is only an immanent cause of the world. Ascribing to the substance many of the properties the theologians were wont to ascribe to God, such as oneness, infinity, eternity, and the like, it is understandable why he calls it God, although in reality it has no resemblance to any God-figure save that of Brahma. *He merely borrows a term from theology to develop a logical category, which, because it is nothing in itself, can have nothing in common with the God of theology.*

The attributes which were intended to explain the nature of the substance are also only logical in character. Like the substance itself, which as Deity resembles neither the Greek Nus, nor the Hindu Atman, nor the Hebraic Jehovah, the attributes, too, do not resemble those of the God of theology. Substance or God is one and is coequal with the whole and with the all of the things. Either one identifies substance with the physi-

cal universe, making the formula "substance equals God" identical with "substance equals nature," which is pure materialism, or one assumes that substance does not equal the physical world and is, therefore, unknown. As such the equation "substance equals God or nature" is the equation of one unknown equaling another unknown, without any suggestion or hint for its solution. Our knowledge is surely not enriched when we are told that x equals y , without being informed what x or y represent. Spinoza's formula *Deus sive Natura* or *Natura sive Deus* could be replaced just as profitably by the formula x equals y . But do these equations truly reveal God's nature to us?

Even the oneness of the substance remains only an assumption. The human mind, hemmed in by five senses, can recognize only the two attributes of God. Yet it is mere chance that man is equipped with only five senses, for were he equipped with more, he would recognize not only more attributes but perhaps more substances. The limitations upon the human mind are not valid proof of the existence of one substance revealing itself in only two attributes.

It can thus readily be seen that this substance or nature or God closely resembles the *En Kai Pan* of the ancient Greeks. *En Kai Pan* as an equation is absurd upon its face, violating all the laws of logic. One can only equal one but cannot equal all. That the mathematician and logician Spinoza failed to recognize this fundamental truth is one of the most astounding facts in the history of the human mind. However, the equation *Deus sive Natura*, the one equals the all, is typical of mystical thought everywhere. In the Occident it first manifested itself in ancient Greek religiosity. Later it

found its way into the philosophy of Heraclitus, into the two poems of Empedocles, and finally into the theology of St. Paul and Christian mysticism. To all of them the equation "one equals all" seemed logical.

The mystic does not recognize the world with its individual phenomena, but experiences it emotionally as a whole and as a oneness. He is repelled by the separations, divisions, analyses, and abstractions of the logician. The whole logical process is strange to his mind because he is disinterested in individual things. The logician and the scientist, on the other hand, are concerned with the single and remote things. They know that knowledge is only possible from the understanding of the single phenomena, and that the discovery of one law governing the microcosmos will shed a flood of light upon the laws governing the macrocosmos. Francis Bacon, the apostle and prophet of modern science, the rediscoverer of inductive thinking, was chiefly interested in the parts, while Baruch Spinoza, apostle and prophet of intuitive thinking, was mainly concerned with the whole. He is typical of all mystical consciousness, with its contempt for empiric knowledge.

Spinoza speaks constantly of recognition and knowledge, but he would have made himself infinitely clearer had he spoken of experience and feeling. To him the world appeared as one whole containing no gaps or abysses between subject and object, between ego and cosmos. His conception of the oneness of God is not a numerical oneness, but a metaphysical non-duality, God's oneness is conditioned by the totality of His being. It is oneness only because duality or plurality is only a product of the imagination, something anthropomorphic and hence not applicable to God. This con-

ception of oneness is common to all religion and is even shared by Hebrew monotheism. The ancient Hebraic formula for this conception of oneness is *Efes Bilodoi*, "there is nothing besides me." If the oneness of God is identical with the totality of being, then it cannot be quantitative and mechanical, but qualitative and dynamic. As such the substance must be conceived as a basic force from which a multitude of energies express and reveal themselves. God would then be the spirit and the mind of the world. Panlogicism or an animated universe in Spinozism would reduce it to either Hegelianism or Brunoism. However, there is nothing in Spinoza's system which bears out this presumption. To him God's power is identical only with His eternal being, and His activities are but the unchangeable order of the natural laws. God is not the supreme cause of the world with its manifestations and emanations. He is not the immediate cause of everything. Spinoza asserts that "God cannot properly be said to be the remote cause of particular things unless for the sake of distinguishing them from the things which He has immediately produced, or rather which follow from His absolute nature." If God is not even the remote cause of particular things, He is not the immediate cause of things at all. From a purely logical point of view it is even wrong to describe Spinoza's God as cause, for that implies effect, which He does not produce. The conception of cause implies the idea of creativeness, but Spinoza's God, being only the order of things, is sterile and important. Yet Spinoza applies the term *operari*, "operate," to Him. Just as motion presumes a mover, so does operation presume an operator. If God is only the order of things, the eternal revolution in the realm of nature,

where does operating fit into this scheme of things? If everything proceeds by virtue of eternal, definite, immutable, and unchangeable laws, the term "operate" in regard to this God has no more meaning than the term "creation" or "emanation" or "evolution."

During the past century innumerable treatises and dissertations, which attempted to explain the substance of Spinoza's substance, have been written. Every scholar has given his own answer to this question. Many of them have gone far afield and some even identified it with monotheism. Spinoza's own explanation explains little, when he says that there are an infinite number of attributes of which we know only two. If it is true that every affirmation is a negation, then even an infinite number of determinates contradicts the very conception of the substance. So why have the infinite number of attributes? Spinoza's answer is that the more attributes a thing may have the more reality it possesses. To give the substance a maximum of reality, he had to bestow upon it a maximum of attributes. Numbers are anthropomorphic in character, but Spinoza uses this very anthropomorphic element in order to bestow absoluteness upon his substance. By no stretch of the imagination can Spinoza be credited with having demonstrated the reality of the substance by the infinite number of attributes, for we cannot conclude one unknown from another. Since man can know only two attributes, these only can have any reality for him. It follows that Spinoza's substance, which is intended to be the absolute and the objective, is only an anthropomorphism and a projection of the human mind.

The substance is coequal with the mathematical order of things, but the mathematical order is rooted solely in

the intellect. This coequality makes the former purely subjective in nature. Spinoza, the mystic, despite all his philosophical protestations to the contrary, was a subjectivist who aspired to establish a direct contact between the ego and the absolute. To do so he hypothesizes the substance, believing it to be the incarnation of all reality, of which in truth it is devoid. Being an *ens rationis*, it is only a product of the human mind. Spinoza's substance or God is thus not definable, not knowable, not absolute, nor objective, nor is its existence proved. It is a Godless mysticism, for his term God or *Deus* is a misnomer.⁸ It is the shadow of a pale dream of a mystic.

Spinoza faced a world full of variety, manifoldness, multitudinousness, changeability, chance, and accident. Having experienced this world, he felt himself to be at one with it. He was consumed by the desire to bring oneness out of multitudinousness, order out of chaos, discipline out of confusion, and harmony out of disharmony. Therefore, he evolved the theory which became a physics of fate, which was to domesticate destiny by forcing it into mathematical, mechanical order. In so doing he repeated the feats of Buddha, St. Paul, and St. Augustine.

VIII

It has been shown that Spinoza's substance is indefinable and intangible. As such it cannot possibly be the

⁸ The identity of God and the world is his basic doctrine, but in a letter to Oldenburg he declares that "persons who think that my work presupposes that God and nature are identical err fundamentally." On the one hand he states that body and soul are identical, but the human mind cannot be destroyed with the body, and if body and soul are identical how can the soul survive the body? In one passage of the *Ethics* he states that the soul springs directly from God and hence must be mortal, but in another passage he states that the soul belongs to the realm of the created things. Such gross contradictions can be found in almost every page of Spinoza's *Ethics*.

cause of the world, unless it possesses something that is determinate and concrete. Spinoza himself was well aware of this shortcoming. To bridge this gap he evolved the theory of the attributes of God, which he described as "that which reason recognizes as the essence of the substance."⁹ But this seemingly clear definition only obscures the problem, for it will be established that it is as complicated, difficult, and contradictory as the problem of the substance. Since he defines the latter as absolute, indeterminate being, the question is justified whether such a being can have any attributes at all. An attribute is something that is definite and determinate. Since every determination is a negation or a limitation, the attributes must make the absolute relative. But if we were to overlook the attributes, how can God be equal with nature, which is something concrete and determinate? It is thus evident that God cannot be absolute and at the same time coequal with nature.

Spinoza must have realized the contradictory character of his doctrine of the attributes, for in one of his epistles he says that, in reality, there is no distinction between attributes and substance. Only for methodological and psychological reasons does he call attributes that which the human mind sees of substance, for, like the latter, they are self-contained and independently existent. But then there must be some distinction between attributes and substance, for if there were none the former would be superfluous. Spinoza's definitions failed to explain the discrepancies between them. The five foremost Spinoza scholars of the nineteenth century—Erdmann, Hartmann, Thomas, Fisher, and Freu-

⁹ All the contradictions, unevennesses and difficulties arising out of Spinoza's theory of substance are best summarized in Benziou Kellermann's dissertation, *Die Ethik Spinozas über Gott und Geist*, Berlin, 1922.

dential—have placed five different interpretations upon the apparent identification of substance and attributes, and the consequences arising therefrom.

In view of Spinoza's own identification of the attributes with the substance, Erdmann suggested that the attributes are not to be understood as being God's qualities or properties, but that they are merely forms of recognition. They are only intellectu, presuming the intellect and, therefore, not very different from the subjectivism of Kant. If this interpretation is correct, then God, being absolute and indeterminate, becomes totally unknowable and can never become an object of recognition. Both God and nature are victims of hallucination, for if attributes are only forms of recognition, nature vanishes entirely. But this apparently contradicts the theory of Spinoza, who does not teach the existence of an attributeless God. He maintains that God is knowable and recognizable, although we mortals can understand him only in a limited way through two of His attributes. If the attributes are only intellectu, the problem of the *modus* by which Spinoza proposes to bridge the absolute with the world becomes complicated and insoluble, for he declares that the intellect comes under the category of the *modus*. It would then seem that the attributes, being forms of the intellect, are derived from the *modus*, which is contrary to the theory of Spinoza. It is also difficult to understand how the attributes can only be forms of recognition since to Spinoza recognition is also coequal with being. They are not forms of recognition in the Kantian sense, for then even if we were to accept the substance as a reality it would be impossible to explain how the world follows from God.

What are the attributes? Spinoza himself makes frantic efforts, though to little avail, to show the distinction between the attributes and the substance by modifying his own definitions as he goes along. At first he says of the attributes that he understands of them that what reason recognizes of substance. But in another passage of his *Ethics* he defines the attributes "as that which can be recognized by the infinite intellect as the essence of the substance, that belongs to the one and unique substance." In short, the attributes are no longer that which reason recognizes of the substance, but that which the infinite recognizes of it. Since substance is absolute, infinite being, consisting of many attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, they differ from the substance only in that they are infinite in kind. Thus the attributes actually become modified substances.

Spinoza himself often identifies God with the sum total of His attributes and stresses their eternity. The infinite absolute per se would then become coequal with the infinite absolute in kind. This equation makes either substance relative or the attributes absolute and infinite. If the reality of the two attributes of the substance are contested, what reality can the infinite attributes have? Assuming that the infinity of attributes is reality, it must also be assumed that all the attributes are equally represented in the same manner in each modus. The two attributes, extension and thinking, are represented in equal amounts in every stage of individuality. Therefore, it must be assumed that all the unknown attributes are also represented in us, for there cannot be more attributes in the absolute than are to be found in the individual, but in such an undeveloped de-

gree as to be unnoticeable. Man would thus become a micro-substance in place of a mere modus. But these are logical conclusions of a mystical presumption.

Eduard von Hartmann in his *History of Metaphysics* maintains that Spinoza himself never assumed more than two attributes, from which the essence of the substance would be determined. It is his opinion that the doctrine of the infinite number of attributes was only a deductive whim. Freudenthal, on the other hand, in his *Spinoza* fully accepts Spinoza's explanation that the human mind is limited and finite and cannot possibly conceive the infinite or the infinite number of attributes. He, nevertheless, admits the difficulties and complications which arise from this theory.

The problem of the attributes also affects the doctrine of the recognizability of God. Spinoza believed that God is recognizable by man, for otherwise we could recognize nothing. The recognition of God presumes that we fully recognize His complete character. However, since we know only two of an infinite number of His attributes, we can recognize only an infinitesimal part of His character. How can we then assume that we have an adequate idea of God? Spinoza admits this difficulty without granting its consequences. In his fifth and sixth epistles he says, "We recognize God not wholly but only in some of His attributes, not all and not the greatest part of them. It is certain that ignorance of most of them prevents us from having some knowledge of them." Thus, Spinoza himself admits that the theory of recognition of God is incompatible with the theory of the infinite attributes, but nevertheless maintains that God is recognizable. Since the recognition of God was more important to Spinoza than His attributes, it would

seem that Hartmann was correct in his assumption that Spinoza did not take the infinite attributes seriously. We must, therefore, proceed on the theory that God has only two attributes with which He is coequal. This coequality instead of explaining God explains away nature, for if God is intangible, so are the attributes. Thus the question as to what are the attributes still remains unanswered.

Spinozism has been described traditionally as monism, for the *una substantia* is its outstanding feature. But the obscurities, complications, difficulties, and contradictions in the theory of the attributes make even this monism questionable. In fact, it has often been attacked on the ground that it is not monism but pluralism. Thus K. Thomas in his *Spinoza's Individualism and Pantheism* has pointed out that the attributes are substances, for there is little to distinguish the one from the other. If the attributes are substances, Spinozism itself spells pluralism and polycosmism. This assumption, however, contradicts the entire spirit of Spinoza, for while one may dispute his ontological proof, one cannot deny his intended monism, for he constantly asserts that outside of God no other substance can even be conceived. Whatever Spinoza's theory of the *una substantia* may signify when interpreted in the light of his complicated and contradictory theory of the attributes, it is certain that he utilized them to strengthen rather than to weaken his monism.

Kuno Fisher, the foremost historian of philosophy of the nineteenth century, believed to have ironed out these difficulties by assuming that the attributes are merely forces of God. If God is the cause of everything, the individual things are His manifestations. He is not

only the immanent, but also the creative, force of all phenomena. A multitude of phenomena presumes a multitude of forces, which Spinoza characterizes as attributes. The relationship of the attributes to the substance would be similar to the relationship of cause to effect. However, this interpretation must be dismissed, for Spinoza's God-conception precludes creation despite his juggling with the term *operari*. Furthermore, from a purely formalistic point of view there is no difference between the identity of God and His attributes and the coequality of God and His forces and phenomena. Such an identification is only a repetition of the old adage that God is identical with the universe. That Spinoza did not intend to identify *natura* with the universe can be seen from the fact that the former also includes the attribute of thinking. Kuno Fisher attempts to save Spinoza's monism by arbitrarily transforming it into gross materialism and naturalism. Then, having personally effected this transformation, he criticises Spinoza for being a naturalist.

If the attributes are not forces, as Fisher maintains, or substances as Thomas asserts, what are they? Spinoza characterizes one attribute as the idea and the other as the nature of God. The relationship of the substance to the attributes is coequal to God's idea, which is the totality of thinking, and to God's nature, which is the totality of being. Both attributes are identical, although they represent two kinds of actuality. They are the ideal and the real side of substance, or *natura naturans*, and have no independent existence. They are God's two visible cheeks to man, the two shining stars of the one absolute. Any other interpretation would make Spinoza a materialist and a naturalist.

This interpretation safeguards Spinoza's monism, but does not explain how the determinate and relative things follow from the indeterminate and absolute substance or God. Substance, being indeterminate and absolute, is so gloriously detached from everything determinate and tangible, and from everything that is either a negation or an affirmation, that it is not apparent what possible connection it can have with this world, unless one assumes that Spinoza's *natura* is identical with the physical universe. Such an assumption would contradict the very starting-point of Spinoza. The answer to the question as to what are the attributes is the same as the answer to the question as to what is substance. Both are intangible, mystical conceptions.

Spinoza must have felt that his theory did not clear up all the complications arising from his attempt to connect God with the world. He, therefore, proceeded to impose a superstructure upon his system, the theory of the *modi*, which is his third basic doctrine.

IX

While the substance and attributes can be understood by themselves, the *modus* can only be conceived through something else. "By *modi* I understand the affections of substance, or that which is another thing through which it is conceived." The substance and the attributes are infinite, but the single *modus*, as an individual thing or being, is finite and limited. Its relationship to the attributes has been compared to the relationship of the geometric figure to space, in which the first presumes the second. Spinoza described the *modi* as either modifications, or accidents, or contingencies. They are not free but are caused by necessity and are, therefore, called

res necessaria. In contradistinction to the attributes, they are only the transient and passing things in the flux of phenomena. There are, however, two kinds of *modi*: finite and infinite. The individual *modus* is finite and limited, but all the *modi* combined in their inner connection are infinite. They are the necessary order of empirical being.

The attributes of substance are thinking and extension. The *modus* of the attribute of thinking is idea and that of extension is body. The totality of all ideas is absolute infinite reason and the totality of the inner connection of all physical being is motion and rest. Thus the *modi* constitute reality, for without ideas thinking would be inarticulate and without motion and rest substance would be without actuality.

Everything that follows from the essence of the substance or God or from the attributes exists by necessity and is infinite. From this follows the necessity of the *modi* in their inner connection. Existence springs not only from the nature of the attributes, but also from the totality of all the *modi*. What, then, distinguishes the attributes from the infinite *modi*?

The finite and limited things do not follow from the infinite substance and attributes, but only from the infinite *modi*. The finite *modi* are only accidents of the attributes of God. It is thus evident that God can be the cause only of infinite things and not of individual or remote things. This naturally makes God a *chef de monde irresponsable*, a God who cannot be held responsible for what happens in this world, because being only the mathematical order of things He is a dead God.

Even if we assume that the *modi* are free from those complications, difficulties, and contradictions with

which the substance and attributes are replete, it would still be impossible to deduce the world from God. Let us keep in mind the basic doctrine that infinite things produce infinite effects and finite things produce finite effects. Substance being infinite can produce only something that is infinite. But how can the infinite modi resolve themselves into a multiplicity of finite modi? Thus that which was obscurity before becomes groping darkness now, for if the determinate and finite things cannot follow from the indeterminate and the absolute, what is the connection between God and the world? To get out of this difficulty Spinoza resorts to the formula of a twofold causality. The first is the source of existence and is called the power by which everything perseveres in existing, and the other is the cause only of the temporary limitation of things. Both types of causality are God. If He is the cause of the temporary limitation of things, He has a connection with the world, but this assumption undermines the foundations of the entire structure of Spinozism. The logician would argue that God either is or is not the cause of the remote things. But Spinoza, the mystic, answers affirmatively and negatively at the same time. On the one hand, God is not the cause of the remote things; He is responsible for them through His double causality.

The hypothesis of His double causality has contributed little to solving this vexing problem. Spinoza merely assumes the limited existence of being, without either proving it or indicating its origin. *Natura naturata*, physical nature, does not spring from *natura naturans*, substance, for the finite does not follow from the infinite. Even though Spinoza did not intend to deny the world he did so *malgre lui*, and thereby earned him-

self the title of "acosmist." From the point of view of the acosmist the world is a phantom *sans* reality and *sans* origin, in which man is but the shadow of a ghost. He is only one of the finite modi and not the aim and goal of creation. He merely becomes an accidental erring creature in a vast universe governed by immutable and eternal laws, to which he is chained for all eternity. He becomes a superfluous being without aim, goal, or purpose. Spinoza's theory of the modi makes this conclusion inevitable.

Substance and the attributes are intangible; and man as one of the modi, having no inner connection with either because he is finite and temporary, becomes only a whim of blind destiny migrating from existence to existence without goal or aim. This conception of man and God has made Spinoza the most contested figure in modern philosophical thought. In explaining away the world and in reducing man to an accidental, floating atom in the universe, Spinoza has only reproduced the mystical world-picture of the ancient Hindus.

X

God being the inner cause of everything is imbedded in Spinoza's system as *natura naturans*, but His necessary manifestations such as the modi of the attributes, both infinite and finite, are *natura naturata*. The world is supposed to follow from God, but not as an act of creation; for having neither will nor intellect He cannot create. Neither can the world be conceived as being an emanation, or an evolvment, or even an evolution of God. The idea of evolution involves a goal of higher perfection; but since He is perfectibility incarnate, He cannot become more perfect than He is. Neither could

the world have been evolved from Him directly, for it is not compatible with His nature. Both emanation and evolution assume a duality between God and the world which Spinoza denies. Thus, the problem of how the world follows from God or can be deduced from Him still remains unsolved. The infinite *modus* contributes little to the solution of this problem, for it has the same properties as the attributes from which it does not organically differ. But, on the other hand, it cannot be assumed that the many and infinite attributes are identical with the many and infinite *modi*, for then either the one or the other becomes superfluous. These attempts to introduce a duality of terms such as the twofold causality and twofold *modi*, do not clarify the main problem, for they purport to explain the unknowable through the unknowable.

The three basic doctrines in the system of Spinoza—substance, attributes, and *modi*—geometrically demonstrated and expressed in the form of apodicticity, have a threefold object: first to prove the existence and oneness of God; second, the reality of the world; and, third, how the world follows from God. But none of these three theses is proved. Even Spinoza's dialectic genius could not organically link a living world to a dead God. Since a God without will, intellect, or self-consciousness is the starting-point, no possible tension between God and the world and between God and man could arise. As tension is the very kindling-point of life, its absence precludes life. Just as tension in nature creates organic life, so does tension between God and man create ethics. Hence, Spinoza's man becomes an a-ethical creature, a piece of biological nature. In the light of Spinoza's lifeless God, the conception of His perfectibility becomes

paradoxical, for perfection can be applied only to a living and not to a dead God.

Spinoza denies both values and ends. All values have their origin only in feelings and emotions. When one says God is perfect, one defines a certain value; but when one mathematizes life, one eliminates all feelings and denies all values. The mathematization of the world, of God, and of man resulted in a theory of causation, which makes all values, whether moral, ethical, religious, and social, impossible.

Spinoza believed to have reached the heights when he taught that God has neither intellect nor will. Yet he thought that this God possessed a necessary idea of His own essence and all its necessary consequences. If this God has an idea of His own essence, He must possess consciousness, which implies will and intellect. Furthermore, He would be living personality. Yet, Spinoza stresses so often the a-personality of God, that it is simply not permissible to deduce any monotheistic doctrine from his God-conception as did Friedrich Paulsen,¹⁰ who apparently mistook monism for monotheism.

Eduard von Hartmann tries to explain Spinoza's self-contradictory God-doctrine by his Jewish heritage. He believes that his God has a theistic coloring, because He has an idea of His own. How, then, could Spinoza be accused of being an atheist? However, there is one thing that cannot be eliminated from Spinoza's system—God is coequal with nature, and with causation. If this God possesses a necessary idea of Himself, this contradiction can be explained only by the fact that Spinoza, being primarily a religionist, is full of inconsistencies, despite his use of the mathematical method and the ap-

¹⁰ *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Berlin, 1901), p. 318.

parent simplicity of his system. As a result of the inner contradictions in his system, he was at the same time called atheist and monotheist, monist and pluralist, acosmist and realist, rationalist and mystic, voluntarist and intellectualist. While he is far from being a theist, he cannot be called an atheist, at least not in the occidental meaning of the term. In the West, atheism connotes materialism and naturalism linked to atomism, neither of which can be ascribed to Spinoza.

Nothing is more characteristic of the mystical mind and yearning of Spinoza than his *Amor dei intellectualis*, the intellectual love of God, and his naïve belief in the recognizability of the noumenal world. Spinoza's God cannot be loved because, being without will or intellect, He cannot respond to love. The term "love" implies a partnership between two living objects. Hence living man cannot have any love for a dead God.

The true philosopher differs from the mystic in that the former denies and the latter affirms the possibility of the knowledge of the noumenal world. From the very beginning Spinoza sets out to prove the possibility of this knowledge. Even after his admission that we know only of two of the attributes of God, he still maintains that we can have an adequate idea of Him. This point of view is typical of all mystical consciousness because the mystic has an inner yearning for a direct contact with the absolute, which often overpowers his critical judgment. In his frantic efforts to establish a contact with the forces of eternity, and in his numerous attempts to argue God's personality out of existence, Spinoza typifies Eastern mysticism. It will be established that all the characters and features of Spinoza's thinking, which express themselves in the struggle of

universalism against individualism and in the struggle for a dead God, are only tremors of Eastern mysticism in a Western world.

XI

Man was discovered by Socrates through ethics, by the ancient Hebrews through religion, by the Italian Renaissance through science, and by the German Reformation through piety. The discovery of man signalized the end of the Dark Ages in Europe. "The greatest feature of the Italian Renaissance," states Jacob Burckhardt, "is its rediscovery of man." Descartes's *cogito ergo sum*, "I think; therefore, I am," is but another symbol of this powerful man-consciousness, which viewed him as the crown and aim of all creation. In this attitude Paracelsus and Agrippa, Taurellus and Kepler, Nicholas de Cusa and Martin Luther, agreed completely. Paracelsus regarded man as the essence of all things, superior even to the stars. Agrippa and Taurellus thought man to be the embodiment of all the sciences. Nicholas de Cusa likens man to a highly polished diamond which mirrors all things. Kepler believed that man has only to remember his knowledge, for all ideas are innate in him. He is the eternal measure of all things, because he is the image of God. The sole exception to this deification of man is to be found in Leonardo da Vinci, who, like all cosmic-minded artists, regarded man as only a floating atom in an infinite universe.

It is in the light of this conception of man that we must examine Spinoza's theory of man and ethics, which came as such a shock to the men of his generation. They who pictured man as the highest product of creation entitling him to a higher position in life, learned that man was only one of the *modi*, an insignificant

item in the multitudinousness of things. They were still more shocked to discover that the human mind is bereft of freedom, for it is only a part of nature subject to all its laws. Spinoza was aware that his conception would provoke the orthodox. He is, therefore, quick to state that man's position in nature is not that of a state within a state entitling him to special privileges. Being only a part of nature and not apart from nature, he is subject to all its laws without reservation. The idea of his freedom is only an illusion, a superstition. Man's conduct is not determined by whims, caprices, and uncertainties, but by definite and immutable laws, which reign supreme over things, beasts, and man.

The universality of nature necessitates the understanding of man's strength and weaknesses from the point of view of the one law common to everything in nature. The study of human conduct requires the methodology of any other natural phenomenon. If geometry is applicable to metaphysics, it is also applicable to ethics. If the whole of nature can be mathematized, surely man, who is only a part of nature, can be pressed into geometric axioms. This attempt to mathematize man, insulting as it may be to human intelligence, is justified from Spinoza's point of view. To him, man's mind becomes only a space upon which geometric lines and figures are drawn. He considers man's moods and caprices, stupidity and genius, creative power and vision, ambition and will, as a series of lines, planes, and solids. But can human passions, emotions, and feelings be explained mathematically? Is the conception of space applicable to the human mind, and can its movements be explained with the same precision as those of geometry? Can there be geometry of the human soul?

Spinoza answers these questions in the affirmative and formulates a number of principles which, to his mind, regulate the movements of the human soul with mathematical precision. Beginning with the law of self-preservation, Spinoza formulates three basic principles: *appetitus*, the desire for self-preservation inherent in body and mind; *cupiditas*, the outer desires of body and mind; and *voluntas*, or will, the inner desires of the mind. The human body may be affected by many things of differing natures. Those factors which increase or diminish the powers of the body, correspondingly increase or diminish the powers of the mind. Man's desire for self-preservation can be modified by his passions. How man's state of mind can be modified by the basic desire for self-preservation can be seen from the fact that the satisfaction of desire is joy, and the inhibition of desire is sadness.

These are the basic principles by which Spinoza proposes to explain the movements of the human soul. He distinguishes between primary and secondary affects. The primary affects, desire, joy, and sadness, are the only ones which, like substance, are not deducible from anything else. All the other passions which move the human soul, such as love, hatred, envy, jealousy, esteem, or contempt, are consequences and culminations of the primary affects. These psychological theories differed but little from the psychological understanding of the day. Only the mathematization of man, culminating in the absolute determinism of the soul, brought forth the shocked protests of his generation.

The desire for self-preservation, while it is the primary driving force in the life of man, is not the only force as Spinoza maintains. Only a superficial orientation in life

will prove how absurd it is to make this principle absolute. It is a common phenomenon for man to end his life because he is plagued by a guilty conscience, or driven to despair because of social disgrace or moral failure. Neither can Spinoza's mathematized soul explain the phenomena of penitence, asceticism, and adventure. Neither does it shed any light upon the abnormal state of the collective mind, which drives the group to riotous joys or to depressing gloom. To Spinoza the group as an organic unit is inconceivable. Just as his substance fails to explain the world, so does his basic theory of the human soul fail to solve the complicated psychological processes of the individual and the collective mind.

It has already been shown how Spinoza, by identifying substance with causation, sought to eliminate every possibility of free will and teleology from the life of man. Even in his theory of the soul he aimed at the same object by his parallelity of body and mind. Thus proposition 2 of the third division of his *Ethics* says, "The body cannot determine the mind to thought, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, nor to rest, nor to anything else, if there be anything." Not only the modern biologist and psychologist, but even the observing layman, will smile benevolently at this "geometric proposition." One can observe daily that the body does determine the mind to thought, and that the mind does determine the body to motion. Purely mental processes often cause not only psychical but also physical disturbances in man. Spinoza demonstrates this proposition by saying, "All modes of thought have God for a cause in so far as He is a thinking thing, and not in so far as He is explained by any other attribute. That which deter-

mines the mind to thought, therefore, is a mode of thought and not of extension, that is to say, it is not the body." But this entire proof is only formalistic scholastic jargon, based upon arbitrary presumptions, which have no basis in reality.

To Spinoza it is the absolute law of causation to which man is subject, which eliminates all teleology from physical and mental life. Since the attributes of extension and thinking are like parallel lines which do not affect each other, Spinoza argues that thinking cannot be instrumental in modifying extension. Just as God exists for no definite purpose, so can He not be moved to action by and for definite purposes. While nothing follows from God's nature, everything follows from God's essence, necessity. From this it follows that the idea of ends and purposes is only a human invention. However, the very presupposition that mind and body do not affect each other is not borne out by experience. The reverse is actually the case, and sometimes mind and body even shock each other. If Spinoza has no better proof for the absence of all teleology in the mental process than the absolute parallelity of thinking and extension, of mind and matter, then teleology is not only not an invention of the human mind, but is as hard a reality as extension and thinking.

Spinoza's mathematized soul simplifies the understanding of life. Man has within himself the desire for self-preservation. Joy is conducive to existence and sadness is inimical to it. Hence, man should aspire to find joy and to escape sadness. Therefore, we must discover the causes of our affects and eliminate those detrimental to them. Spinoza thus furnishes a program to man—to aspire to joy. Yet the feeling that man is

only a prisoner in a jail, from which there can be no possible escape, and that all his movements are pre-determined and predestined, is not likely to flood man's soul with happiness, but, on the contrary, to cause it to overflow with despair. He who was one of the most tragic figures in all history had no conception of the essence of the tragic. The idea that sadness inhibits life is only a partial truth. Often it deepens, widens, purifies, thereby furthers and fosters the life of both the individual and the group.

Spinoza's three primary affects, desire, joy, and sadness, are intended to explain love and hatred. Their causes are not isolated essences, but are closely connected with all other things which kindle in our soul. Love is joy produced by an external cause, and hatred is sorrow caused in similar fashion. Spinoza had no conception of love, and his definition of it is only somewhat less obscene than that of Kant. This misconception of love was one of the few ideas that both philosophers had in common.

Spinoza enumerates the affects, or the compassions, or the desire of the soul in geometric form. His definitions, forty-eight in number, are reminiscent of a psychological primer.

Favor is love toward those who have injured others.

Indignation is hatred toward those who have injured others.

Contempt consists in thinking too little of another person in consequence of our hatred for him.

Self-satisfaction is the joy which is produced by contemplating ourselves and our own power of action.

Repentance is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind.

Pride is thinking too much of ourselves through self-love.

Despondency is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow.

Benevolence is the desire to do good to those whom we pity.

Fear is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils by the less.

Ambition is the immoderate desire of glory.

Luxuriousness is the immoderate desire or love of good living.

Lust is the immoderate desire of love and sexual intercourse.

To the devitalized recluse of Amsterdam, the entire gamut of human emotions, passions, and affections was understandable only in connection with either *appetitus* or *cupiditas*. If the human soul is moved primarily by desire, everything to be deduced from it can only consist of selfishness, cruelty, meanness, and egotism. This attitude makes not only ethics but morality impossible, for ethics presumes at least the autonomy of the will, while morality presupposes a definite reaction to the voice of nature. Absolute automatism reduces the soul to a mechanism, which contradicts all human experience. If Goethe was correct in saying that the human mind cannot penetrate into the heart of nature, it is still more certain that the human mind cannot fathom the mysteries of the human soul. A part of it, at least, is an unknowable sea which is not navigable.

The mechanism of the human soul as constructed by Spinoza is as full of gaps and gashes as his cosmos. To be consequential he had to reduce his ethics *ad absurdum*. If God is causation from whom everything follows with mathematical necessity, then the soul, too, must be subject to the most stringent laws of causation, transforming it into a stark and rigid mechanism. To give to his ethical doctrine the appearance of logics, he often presses facts into formulas into which they do not fit. When Spinoza defines ambition as the immoderate desire of glory, or repentance as sorrow accompanied by the idea of something done, which he believes was done

by free decree of our mind, we are struck with its incongruency. Spinoza himself was surely ambitious, expressing itself in his attempt to reconstruct the world in his own mind. Yet, in justice to him, it cannot be said that he had an immoderate desire for glory, which was farthest from his mind. Ambition is the desire to do things for the sake of accomplishing something, regardless of whether it leads to glory or to disgrace. The scientist, artist, philosopher, religionist, or man of affairs is but little interested in reward or recognition, for he is primarily concerned with the accomplishment of the things themselves. Nor is repentance, "sorrow accompanied with the idea of something done which we believe has been done by free decree of our mind." He who repents is but little interested in whether or not his commissions were caused by the free decree of his mind. He only understands that the thing done should not have been done. It should be noted that in Spinoza's deterministic world there is really no room for repentance. Yet since it is a phenomenon which cannot be argued away, he reconciles it with his determinism in order to seem logical. Just as Spinoza had no adequate understanding of repentance, so was his conception of pride equally deficient when he defined it as "thinking much of ourselves through self-love." This is a description of self-admiration, not of pride. The humblest, meekest of men can experience pride without being egoistic.

A closer analysis of Spinoza's theory of affects would show that he was face to face with spiritual phenomena, which cannot possibly be traced to *appetitus* or *cupiditas*. Spinoza beholds the phenomenon of despondency and says that it is thinking too little of ourselves through

sorrow. Is that despondency, or is it rather a feeling of sadness often bordering on despair, which does not originate in our own ego? One may become despondent and depressed over certain facts, happenings, occurrences. Thus, Spinoza traced every manifestation of the soul to selfishness and desire. Even to those unegotistic emotions, such as despondency, he attributed egocentric motives.

In his theory of the origin and nature of the effects, desire is the substance and joy and sadness are the attributes. Forty-six of the forty-eight affects which he enumerates are caused by these three affects. None is caused by recognition or by idealistic impulses, since he who viewed this world *sub specie aeternitatis* could not at the same time view it *sub specie boni*. But if there are no idealistic impulses, what can good and evil mean to Spinoza? To him good is identical with usefulness and evil with uselessness. Virtue thereby becomes identical with the idea of might, which to him is the cornerstone of all ethical and political reality. Spinoza did not originate this idea, but borrowed it from the Stoics.

In reducing ethics to physics he logically proposed that since nature must follow its own course, man who is only a part of nature must subject himself to its law. His identification of man and nature, of virtue and might, necessitates a new conception of ethics. He discards the ideas and values of good and evil, which he replaces with necessity and chance. Determinism becomes the standard of ethical values. That which follows from immutable necessity is good and hence useful and that which does not follow from it is bad and useless. Spinoza thereby creates an ethical naturalism which justifies the *status quo*.

Since sadness in Spinoza's judgment does not contribute to preserve life or does not contribute to life at all, pity and compassion, as well as meekness and humbleness, are useless and injurious. This theory of compassion and meekness reveals Spinoza as being not such a true naturalist, but rather a true mechanist. The animated organic world is full of compassion and pity. The lonely dog, lying near the bed of his sick master with eyes filled with compassion, or following the funeral procession of his dead master with sunken head and eyes filled with sadness, proves that pity and compassion are known to the animal world. Only the inorganic world ruled by the laws of causation, the realm of static being as distinguished from becoming, is bereft of all feeling. The geometry by which Spinoza sought to explain his world-picture is still and rigid, and is only applicable to the inorganic world.

In mathematizing the human soul, he was forced to apply the laws governing inorganic nature to human life. His theory of causation excludes all teleology. However, human life, which can be perfected only through ethics, must have ends and purposes. If man is only a link in the eternal chain of causation, ethical postulates become impossible. Spinoza's determinism reduces man to a mere screw in a mighty machine, which is in perpetual motion and requires no outside mover. The function of this screw is predetermined from eternity to eternity.

Man, both physically and intellectually, is only one of the *modi*. His mind is dependent upon other beings, for its function is bound to the body and its affects. Not being independent, it is filled with inadequate ideas caused by limitations and finalities. Being confused and

inadequate, it can offer him but little consolation. Only when the mind becomes saturated with adequate ideas, with the idea of God and its attributes, can man consider himself to be free and virtuous. Not man, but God, becomes the purpose and aim of life. Not man, but the recognition of God, becomes the theme and center of ethics. Spinoza thereby turns from the grossest utilitarianism and solipsism to the most mystical intellectualism. Through it all he remains a naturalistic ethicist.

Spinoza's man, being deprived of free will, could never become the central subject of ethics. Therefore, Spinoza altered its fundamental theme. Not man, but God, becomes the main concern of ethics. Its central problem is not man's relationship to his fellow-man, but true recognition of God. Only such knowledge leads to redemption. However, the recognition of God is only the knowledge of the order of things. How can such knowledge help man to attain an ethical ideal, without which man is only a part of mechanical nature? This problem does not enter into Spinoza's consideration of ethics.

Spinoza's conception of ethics is that of the mechanist and utilitarian, not that of the mystic and intellectualist. Nature commands us to do only those things which are useful for our own well-being. However, this very nature also teaches us how to treat our fellow-man, for nothing is more useful to man than man. This conception of ethics is more dogmatic and farther removed from reality than the ethics of the extreme idealists. It may explain many sociological facts, but it leaves many ethical phenomena unanswered. Man is a social being not only because sociability is useful, but also because it secures him humaneness. Man as a social atom is

only an animal. The hermit who dwells in the woods or in the desert needs no logics, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence, or science. Only man among men requires these manifestations of the mind. I seek the company of my fellow-man, not because he is useful to me, but because he can comfort, guide, and solve for me the riddles which puzzle my mind. Spinoza's dictum that human sociability is based on utilitarianism is contrary to all human experiences. Since his science of man is based upon this extreme principle, his psychological, political, ethical, and juridic theories have no basis in reality.

XII

What is man's aim and purpose in a world governed by eternal, immutable, and unchangeable laws? Spinoza speaks only of God, not of man. God is the aim and purpose of life, and only in His recognition can man overcome his passions and find happiness and peace of soul. Man is free only when he does not contemplate about death. The recognition of God is the triumph of mind over matter, and can elevate man from a lower to a higher state of life. It stimulates man to the purest passion and the highest love, *Amor dei intellectualis*, the "intellectual love of God." This identification of recognition and love of God is one of the few Hebraic elements in Spinoza's God-doctrine, the Hebrew term *Daat Elohim*, signifying both recognition and love of God. This *Amor dei intellectualis*, being based upon both recognition and love, can never be changed into hate. It is a love which identifies man with God, by making him an immortal part of God's thinking. This God-passion, by overcoming human passion and stifling the finite in man, unites all men into one brotherhood. Man's love for

God becomes identical with man's love for his fellow-man, and man's salvation becomes the content of humanity. From recognition to salvation, to happiness, is Spinoza's goal for man.

In true Buddhistic fashion Spinoza concludes his *Ethics* by emphasizing recognition as the only source of salvation. But what is the object of recognition? If Spinoza was sincere in his declaration that God has many attributes and man knows only two, then he is unknowable. Hence his recognition is imperfect and cannot lead to salvation. Thus man's goal in life remains unanswered, because mysticism and true philosophy are strange bedfellows.

Spinoza is a mystical pantheist, not only because he teaches that God is coequal with the world, but because he assigns to the intellect the possibility of absolute knowledge. Thus a postulate presumes the identification of God and the world, and in his manner he draws pantheistic conclusions from rationalistic presumptions. This is another paradox of Spinozism.

It is difficult to reconcile Spinoza's apparent religious idealism with his extreme naturalism and mechanism, and yet these latter are fundamentally of greater importance than his doctrines of piety and salvation. Though his *natura* is not identical with the physical universe, not mind but nature is the ground of all things. Since God is coequal with nature which is governed by its own laws, He, too, must be bound by these very laws. Here Spinozism empties itself from mysticism into naturalism and mechanism.

Yet Spinoza cannot be called a naturalist, because from this vantage point he constantly reverts to mysticism. While rationalistic philosophy presumes that

human recognition is only relative, mystical philosophy presupposes that it is absolute. Only a mystic can assume an intellectless God and yet entertain an intellectual relationship to the world. Only a mystic could conceive of a God who loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love, who is still incapable of any feeling of joy. Only a mystic can deny personality to God and at the same time ascribe to Him affects and passions. However, affects, no matter of what sort and no matter of what nature, are determinate and cannot be reconciled with a God who is conceived to be indeterminate.

The same contradiction can be seen in Spinoza's description of God's consciousness and intellect. "There exists in God the idea or knowledge of the human mind," says Spinoza. But if God has an idea of the human mind and ideas can be conceived only through intellect, then God, too, has intellect and flies counter to Spinoza's assertions to the contrary. However, even if we assume with Spinoza that God cannot recognize man, it also follows that man cannot recognize God. The recognition of God follows from the human mind, which is only one of the *modi*. It is only a link in the eternal chain of nature which cannot detach itself from the other links. Hence, man cannot hope to achieve any salvation or happiness in this life. Salvation, the alluring and seductive aim which Spinoza dangled before man's eye, is only a phantom and an illusion.

Spinoza aimed to establish a theory of the world and a system of knowledge, but in both attempts he failed. The entire world-system of Spinoza rests upon the doctrine of God's immanence. However, God is not and cannot be the immanent cause of all things, because He is absolute, free, unlimited, and necessary, while the

modi are bound, limited, and not necessary, and therefore cannot be derived from God. There is an unbridgeable abyss between substance and modus, making it impossible to deduce reality from the ultimate cosmic principle. God and the world stare at each other. In place of salvation we meet only with perdition, instead of intellectualism we are only offered mysticism, instead of monism we behold dualism, and in place of idealism we are treated to naturalism.

Spinoza's attempt to establish a system of knowledge was no more successful than his effort to create a harmonious world-picture. He developed a theory of knowledge which had as its object a God who was unknowable. Since God and nature are identical, the latter is also unknowable. Furthermore, his epistemological triumph is only a Pyrrhic victory, because his theory of intuitive knowledge has no place in his deterministic world-picture.

Like all true Eastern mystics, Spinoza was interested not in man, but in the forces of eternity. By controlling the second he hoped to regulate the first, but this overweening ambition proved to be his very undoing. Only because he dared to make this bold attempt did he impress himself so powerfully upon the Western world. Spinozism, in its structure and essence, its aims and aspirations, is the most fascinating idea-poem that has ever been recited to man. But this outpouring of the soul of the pious Dutch Jew was but the Western echo of Eastern mysticism.

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III
VISIONS OF A DEAD GOD

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THE BACKGROUND OF HINDU METAPHYSICS AND BUDDHISM

I

THE tropics offer the least favorable conditions for the rise of a culture and a civilization; yet, in the land of the Ganges, with its abundance of tropic vegetation, unbearable humidity, and burning heat, there developed a culture without parallel in the annals of Aryan history. The birth of this culture in this tropic land tends to prove that heredity, rather than environment, is responsible for spiritual creations.

Long before the Aryans invaded the country from the northwest, the Ganges land was populated by a variety of tribes. Its autochthon inhabitants created little to secure immortality for themselves. Only with the appearance of the Aryan invaders did a culture grow out of the Indian soil. In Palestine a similar phenomenon can be observed. Many tribes and races inhabited the country prior to the coming and after the going of the Jews from that land. However, Palestine's fame and position in history as the land which gave birth to two great religions were determined not by the Canaanites or Moabites, but by the Hebrews. It may be said to be a law of history that races create, and environment modifies culture and civilization.

In the midst of the tropical environment of India, with its abundance of life and color and its superabundance of heat and humidity, man, humbled by the overpowering forces of nature, surrendered his initiative and turned slowly from the luring pleasures of life, its

sensuous joys, and carnal pleasures, and dedicated himself to the conquest of the spirit. Not only the climatic, but also the geographic and topographic, conditions favored this process. Hemmed in from the outer world by the Hindu-Persian mountain range in the northwest, by the Himalayas in the northeast, by the Sea of Persia in the southwest, and by the Indian Sea in the southeast, India is a country which is almost impregnable to the invader. The ancient Hindu was not burdened with the struggle for freedom and existence. He was spared the necessity of defending his soil and fighting for his independence and security. The fertility of the country relieved him of his struggle for food. His freedom from political and economic pressure enabled him to concentrate his attention upon matters spiritual.

It is characteristic of ancient Hindu thought that it is unrealistic, for it did not kindle in the worries of daily life. Hence, it was sovereign, without correlation to life or to science which springs from it. In the West philosophic thought originated in the problems and struggles of daily life. Socrates and Plato were concerned with man and his welfare. Ethics and politics were the kindling-points of their philosophical thought. In the Middle Ages theology, then the foremost power of life, was linked to philosophy. Later, during and after the Renaissance, the natural sciences were coupled with abstract thought. However, in ancient India philosophy always remained *spiritus purus*, independent of daily life and biological nature. The forms of Hindu thought, their immensity, their profound depths, and dizzying heights, were spiritual extensions of the topography of the country.

Although the Aryan invaders of India surrendered

their physical energy, virility, and aggressiveness in that tropic land, they yet retained their spiritual vitality. The energies of the Western Aryan were directed to the conquest of nature, while those of the Eastern Aryan were used for the conquest of the spirit.

By renouncing the struggle with nature, the ancient Hindu also gave up his struggle with man. He became resigned to his fate, renounced his freedom, and accepted a world-order in which, like in nature, arbitrariness and despotic power reigned supreme. The struggles centering about the state which form the content of Western Aryan history were strange to the Eastern Aryan. Yielding to the forces of nature and man, he neglected science and politics, and tolerated sacrificial superstitions and cruel caste rule. Hence, ancient Hindu philosophy while rich in metaphysics is poor in sociology.

Another characteristic of the ancient Hindu mind was its lack of curiosity. The Hindu was as disinterested in the phenomena of history as in the phenomena of nature. The ancient Greeks observed that the Hindu peasant was so indifferent to his surroundings that he continued to work with the plow while bloody battles raged about him. Absorbed by his own thought and his inner life, he lost interest in his fellow-man and gradually became a-social and a-political. His mysticism, springing from his own mind and not from contact with nature, assumed the form of solipsism. Salvation and not welfare became his goal.

Only the lack of social and political interests in ancient India explains such phenomena as the Brahminic priest régime and caste system. In no other country of the world has the priest attained such a high estate, such

despotic power, and such an invulnerable position. The Brahmins, who represent the prototype of the Pope-Caesar, held full sway over the masses. Richard Garbe states in his *Ancient Hindu Philosophy*:

They did not establish hierarchical concentration or ecclesiastical ranks. They wished to share personally in the government only insofar as the king was obliged to appoint a Brahmin as the household priest, who as such held also the office of prime minister. Nevertheless, they were exceedingly skillful in keeping the nobility and the whole people in their power, and their chief means to this end was higher knowledge, which they claimed, especially the conduct of sacrifices. For a scientifically presented sacrifice which might require weeks, months and even years the Brahmins, of course, demanded a fair compensation. Ten thousand cattle are prescribed as fee for a certain ceremony. The Brahmins are to be recognized, not only as divinities and revered at all times, but they are to be considered as divinities to the Gods themselves.

Only a tropical people made indolent by a tropical heat could tolerate such barbaric conditions for so many centuries. Just as no sweeping revolutionary movement ever arose in ancient India, so was no scientific discovery of any magnitude ever made in that land. Political revolutions require energy and interest in the state and in man, while scientific inventions require curiosity. The ancient Hindu lacked these qualifications. Being disinterested in man, he also was disinterested in his beliefs. Nowhere did religious toleration flourish as it did in ancient India. Garbe states: "Even those systems of philosophy which were heretic from a Brahminic point of view were considered orthodox as long as they recognized the class prerogatives of the Brahmins and the infallibility of the Veda." The confessions of faith in the Scriptures demanded by the Brahmins needed only to be nominal. They compelled neither full agreement with the doctrines of the Veda nor the

confession of any belief in the existence of God. The same Hindu priest who from egotistic motives punished political heresy tolerated religious and philosophical libertinism. However, what appears to be religious toleration was actually only an indifference and contempt for the views of their fellow-men. Baruch Spinoza, the greatest occidental representative of Eastern mysticism, who is to the present day the source of inspiration to despots and autocrats, advocated religious tolerance and intellectual freedom because he, too, was disinterested in man.

The Hindu mind, detached from earthly worries and from reality, made what it called knowledge its main interest in life. The Hindu thought abstract thoughts, devoid of all substantiality, and dreamt pale dreams which did not reflect life. The suffering and agony which he saw with his physical eye failed to arouse in him a spirit of social and religious rebelliousness. Instead it enveloped him in gloom and in metaphysical pessimism. The sight of this miserable world convinced him that it is a valley of tears, the most miserable of all worlds, which blind fate created in its caprice. These impressions aroused in him a number of moral, theological, and philosophical queries. What is the source of evil? Can it be overcome? How? What reality do the manifoldness of phenomena possess, which gives birth to this evil? Is this cosmos a madhouse in which things, beasts, men, and gods move about erratically without scheme or plan, or is there something beyond, over, and above these beings? These were the problems which occupied the attention of the ancient Hindu mind from its earliest awakening.

The Hindu, not being orientated in nature or in life as

was the ancient Greek, never grasped the meaning of the single things, the individual phenomena. His eyes never beheld definite lines of demarcation, but espied only confused phenomena without shape, form, lines, or contours. His anxiety to offer one all-embracing explanation for all that his eye beheld, and his frantic efforts to bring some order out of this chaos, caused him to regard all things, phenomena, happenings, occurrences, and events as but one thing, one happening. In pronouncing the All, the One, he merely projected the oneness of his own personality upon the outer world. He discovered the oneness of the world in his own soul.

Philosophical thought in India is either non-dualistic or purely monistic. In either form man discovers the cosmic principle by projecting his own self upon the unchanging cosmic self.

In all the endless months, years, small and great cycles, past and future, this self-luminous consciousness alone neither rises nor sets. It is the self which the unaffected spectator of the old drama of ideas related to the changing moods of waking, dreaming and sleeping. The self never dies, is never born—unborn, eternal and everlasting. The ancient one can never be destroyed with the destruction of the body. If the slayer thinks he can slay or if the slain thinks he is slain, they both do not know the truth, for the self neither slays nor is slain.

This basic thought of ancient Hindu metaphysics in which is expressed the eternal sameness of self and disinterestedness in man was already fully expressed in one of the oldest Vedic texts, *The Brahmana of the 100 Ways*, in which the rise of the ego as the cosmic principle is clearly described. Atman is the breath in which is anchored man's energy or functions. He is the central power from which all other breath forces draw their existence. "Tenfold breath verily dwelleth in man and

Atman is the eleventh and on him are based all the other breath forces."

This conception of Atman brought forth a pantheistic and monistic world-picture, which to the present day is the prototype of all pantheism and all monism. Atman is subject and object at the same time. He is the reality and the ideality of things, the all and the oneness. He is the law and the lawgiver. He is the lord of beasts, man, and gods, and at the same time he is in them and coequal with them. He is the substance, the world, God.

What Spinoza called substance the ancient Hindu thinkers called Atman. While Spinoza's substance never underwent any changes, Atman shows many stages of development. Originally He meant the cosmic ego, which later vanished, leaving only indeterminate, infinite, and inarticulate substance. From this cosmic principle the Hindu sought to deduce this world. This deduction seemed to be the more necessary since this is an articulate world, full of words, expressions, and thoughts, while Atman is indeterminate and inarticulate. This chasm between Atman and the world the Hindu bridged with Brahma, the holy word, accompanying the sacrificial rites. Brahma, or the logos, became the second cosmic force, and then united with Atman to form one cosmic principle. Both as a oneness represent the physical and the logical principle of the world.

Just as Spinoza called thinking the son of God, so did the ancient Hindus regard Brahma, the logical principle, as the first-born in this world. In this Atman-Brahma idea, ancient Hindu thought found its kindling-point and anchor ground. It, too, is no more a Deity in the theological meaning of the term than is Spinoza's *Deus*.

It is a mystical cosmic principle, a dead God. It does not demand that man pray to, adore, or venerate it. It does not pretend to be man's teacher and guide. Atman-Brahma means "I am the all," "I am the cosmos," and is expressed in the formula *Tat Tvam Asi*, "Thou art that." In this recognition man loses the feeling of limitation and finiteness, and feels himself to be a part of the infinite whole, a link in the infinite chain. He is at one with the world and with God, and hence need not face them in opposition. There is no inside or outside, no subject or object. The world is a oneness which manifests itself in variety. None of the parts is isolated from the whole. God's relationship to the world is identical with inner ground and outer manifestation.

Atman-Brahma is in the final analysis the identity of man with the world and its soul. It is often referred to in the Upanishads as *Karya Brahma*, the nature of Brahma, or what Spinoza would call *natura naturans*, as distinguished from *Karana Brahma*, or *natura naturata*. This Brahma has all the properties of Spinoza's substance and is the true *En Kai Pan*. He is the infinite in all things finite, and is eternal in all things fugitive. He is the ultimate and highest reality.

This conception presupposes a type of knowledge which cannot possibly be empirical in nature. The senses cannot possibly furnish us with the truth of the absolute. Empiric knowledge is only fragmentary in character. Only knowledge of the whole, which is created intuitively, can furnish us with truth. Only intuitive knowledge makes the unheard become heard, the unperceived perceived, and the unknown known. This form of knowledge also enables man to grasp the highest reality, frees him from passion and suffering, and unites his

soul with eternity. It is man's greatest spiritual treasure. This theory of knowledge is common to all mysticism, including Spinozism.

What did the intuitive knowledge of the Hindu create for him? By it he visualized a God deprived of all contact with reality. Atman-Brahma is as remote from reality as the *Deus* of Spinoza. He, too, is above joy and sorrow, anger and worry, for He is will-less and thoughtless and hence dead. As such He is in no way correlated to man, nor can He be concerned with or opposed to man. In Western religiosity, however, man and God are pictured as being in opposition to each other. The myths of Prometheus and of Heraclitus in ancient Greece, as well as the myth of the flood in the Bible, testify to an intense conflict between man and God. Even Christianity stresses the contradistinction between man and God. In the individualistic West, God is endowed with personality, which creates a state of tension between Himself and man. This conflict between God and man gives birth to ethics. In ancient India, however, God, constituting only eternal being and bereft of all personality, does not contain the possibility of ethics.

The Hindu conception of a cosmic principle by way of a purely mental process, not inspired by reality, was the first but not the only instance of its kind in history. The early acceptance of this doctrine, whose authorship was anonymous, by the Hindu people is powerful evidence that less than it was the theory of one man, it was the metaphysical tendency and aspiration of the entire people. The pantheism and monism expressed in the Atman-Brahma doctrine were destined to become the most creative religious and philosophical principle in

the history of the Aryan race. They stimulated the entire religious and philosophical process in the East as well as in the West. It should be noted that this Hindu pantheism and monism, although mysticism incarnate, operates with logical categories rather than with similes and symbols. Therein it differs from the mysticism of the West, which kindles not in the intellect but in nature and expresses itself not in categories but in symbols.

From the very inception of the cultural process in India, both its starting-point and goal were different from what they were in the Occident. In the West the object of all philosophical meditation was man and his welfare, in the East it was man and his salvation. In the West there was a sharp border line between philosophic and religious thought, but in the East the two blended into one. In the West mysticism was a mysticism of nature, in the East it was a mysticism of the mind. In the West philosophy and religion kindled in nature, in the East they originated in the human soul. In the West man was man's main concern, in the East an abstract cosmic principle was his chief interest. Hence, Eastern philosophy is rich in metaphysical speculation, but is poor in sociology and ethics. In comparison to Eastern subtlety of mind, the most intricate metaphysical system in the West is elementary and primitive. In the West most of the philosophical systems conclude with God, in the East they conclude with no God. In the West philosophers concentrate their intellectual energies to prove the existence of God, but in the East they devote themselves to prove the existence of no God. In the West atheism is still the shocking exception, in the East it is accepted as a matter of course, for it is not a vital problem.

Western philosophy is theistic and Eastern atheistic. However, the atheism of the West cannot be compared to that of the East, for while the first represents the height of impiety, the second constitutes the deepest piety. In the West the central problem of religion is God, in the East redemption. In the West redemption is based upon belief as expressed in the Tertullian maxim, "*Credo quia absurdum est*," "I believe because it is absurd." In the East not belief but recognition is the road to salvation. A Tertullian in India would be inconceivable, for there ignorance is coequal with eternal damnation. In the West the poor in spirit are blessed and man can be both ignorant and pious at the same time, for there piety presumes ignorance. In the East, however, there is no salvation without recognition, and no redemption without knowledge. There piety presumes not ignorance but intellect. Nevertheless, man's approach to the world in the West is intellectual and in the East moral. In the West all cosmic speculations kindle in curiosity and recognition, but in the East they originate in the yearning for salvation. In the West the problems of nature, man, and God weighed heavily upon man's mind, while in the East he was concerned mainly with guilt and merit, punishment and reward.

II

One of the central ideas of ancient Hindu thought is the transmigration of the souls and the theory of subsequent effects of action called Karman. From time immemorial the Hindu believed that every individual moves forward toward new existences after death, when he will either enjoy the fruits of a meritorious, or suffer for a sinful, life. Every Hindu philosopher, with but few

exceptions, acquiesced in this doctrine. The basic idea of the transmigration of the soul is the belief that unmerited misfortune can befall no one. However, since daily life shows that the bad prosper and the good suffer, it was assumed that the good and bad deeds of former existences are rewarded or expiated during the present life of the individual. In view of the continued suffering of man, it must be assumed that he has gone through unlimited existences in the past.

The cycle of life, known in Hindu terminology as Samsara, has no beginning and hence no end. Therefore, this Samsara is eternal and no deed remains either unrewarded or unexpiated, "For as among a thousand cows a calf can find its mother, so a previously done deed follows after the doer," says a Hindu sage. Man's actions thus become the cause of the eternal cycle, and in a certain sense even fashion the cosmic principle. It is action which is the cause of the continuation of life. If man would not act, reward or punishment would become unnecessary and life, which is identical with sin, would come to a standstill. But what is the cause of action? Both Buddha and Spinoza gave the same answer—desire. This desire or will is an a-moral principle; it is blind, sinful, and ignorant. So long as this principle remains in operation, so long will Samsara, or the eternal cycle, continue. Thus, because of the necessity of Samsara, man was condemned to eternal damnation.

The ancient Hindu was satisfied with the eternity of Samsara, for his yearning for salvation caused him to seek a way out of this dilemma. This solution he found in recognition or knowledge. Only knowledge saves. Through knowledge to salvation is the central theme of

almost every philosophical school of thought of ancient India.

The main problem of ancient Hindu thought was not what is the world and its phenomena, but what possibility is there to end suffering and sin. This problem necessitated an intense egotism and a profound selfishness. It was always my suffering, my sin, and my salvation.

The intellectual mysticism of ancient India posited a sin-laden nature, which it regarded as being intrinsically bad, identical with evil, and creative of suffering. Nature is blind and ignorant desire. Only through knowledge can it be overcome. The function of the intellect is to destroy will or desire and thus bring about salvation. This metaphysical conception of a great people only reflects its experience with nature, serpents, tigers, pestilence.

III

Atman-Brahma born in the jungle and Jehovah born in the desert were originally personalities and the incarnation of anthropomorphism. Atman means self in contradistinction to non-self. He spells breath, soul, and reality. He means self-conscious ego towering high above things, beasts, man, and gods. He first appeared as a giant of nature, as a superman or super-God, equipped with will and desire, and the power to act and to choose. He was primarily the lord of the forces of the breath and the sovereign of all gods. He, too, like Jehovah, was the creator of all beings. However, with the growing fatigue of man under the tropical sun of India and the loss of his aggressiveness and individuality, Atman himself became less anthropomorphic, less

personal, and less self-conscious. Slowly the living Atman was transformed into an abstract principle, a dead God. First He was depersonalized and then impersonalized. By a process of retrogression, He gradually became coequal with the cosmos and was spoken of as the whole of the world. His transformation from superego to pan corresponded with the change of the Hindu mind from dynamic individualism to static universalism.

Concerned with destiny rather than with man, with fate rather than with nature, the ancient Hindu turned to universalism. The older he became, the less he understood the single or the individual things. He recognized them as merely products of desire, as episodes in the eternal fate of coming and going, and as puppet plays of destiny. The single things, while meaningless metaphysically, are a source of physical and moral suffering. His devitalized personality could only see life as a curse to be overcome, which was man's main duty. The solution to the problem of life was to escape from life. In this morbid thought God died. The desire to overcome life is not compatible with a living God, who is interested in life and its perpetuation. The man who carries death in his heart cannot carry a living God in his soul.

The Western Aryans were more fortunate in selecting lands of temperate climates for their dwelling-places. Their bodies were not weakened by a tropical sun and their will to live was not undermined by a fever-infested jungle. Their gods were not only living but actually frolicking. In contradistinction to the God of the jungle, who regressed from superpersonality to dead formula, the gods of the Aryans and Semites retained their personality, self-consciousness, intellect, and will

during all the stages of their development. Even after Jehovah returned from the universe and from humanity, and chose one land and one people as the scene and center of His activity, and after His land was destroyed and His people dispersed, He still retained His personality although He shed His anthropomorphism.¹

The ancient Hindu in his attempt to escape from life also sought to flee from a living God. The ancient Jew by clinging to life thereby clung to a living God. Atman-Brahma and Jehovah, therefore, constitute the only two basic God-ideas which were visualized by the two most religiously creative races in world's history. Both God-ideas mutually excluded each other, and represent the two extremes in the pantheon of gods.

Upon Atman were showered all the attributes which religious genius could bestow. He is eternal, infinite omnipresent, above and beyond life, death, pain, and suffering. He is the all of things—the one and the all. Upon Jehovah, too, were showered all the attributes which religious genius could bestow. He, too, is eternal, infinite, the creator of all things, the lord of hosts, and the master of destinies. In addition He is the very incarnation of intelligence, justice, mercy, and forgiveness. What bearing do the attributes of the living and the dead God have upon the world? The attributes of Atman-Brahma are the severest and most devastating criticism of this world. God is one and the whole, while the world is manifold and individual. God is above woe and suffering, the world is only a valley of tears. God is infinite; life is finite. God is above birth and death, life is

¹ Maimonides, in his *Guide to the Perplexed*, states that we can know only the negative attributes of God—that He is not finite and not corporeal, etc. This is tantamount to saying that although He is not an anthropomorphic, He is still a self-conscious God.

a continuous process of living and dying. God is unchangeable, the world is changing. Hence, these attributes are a condemnation of life and a verdict against the world.

The reverse is true of the attributes of Jehovah. God is good and He desires man to be good. He is just and merciful and He wishes man to be just and merciful. He is the incarnation of intelligence, and He is anxious that man's mind should function. He is full of forgiveness, and He expects man to be full of forgiveness. His attributes are not only not a reflection upon the world, but actually an encouragement of the world. They are an inexhaustible source of optimism, and furnish man with a goal and aim in life—"*Eritis sicut deus*," "Thou shalt be like God."

Jehovah's interest in man produced a science of man—ethics, jurisprudence, and politics. Just as the Bible is sociological, so are the Upanishads a-sociological. In them Atman-Brahma is the central figure, while in the Bible it is man. The Upanishads are preoccupied with the relationship of Atman to the world, which expresses itself in profound metaphysical speculations. They are the deepest expression of pure religiosity. In the Bible, however, metaphysical thoughts are scattered throughout, but do not represent the main content. Everything revolves and moves about man and his interests. The central problem is not God or His relationship to nature or to the world, but God's relationship to man. Man is His only care and worry to the exclusion of all other creatures. So intimately connected is He with him that He becomes his personal teacher and guides him along a definite path. This relationship of God to man Micah presses into the formula, "O man, God told you what is

good." This relationship of God to man became the center of tension, from which the ethical genius of the prophets sprang forth.

It thus becomes evident that just as a dead and a living God originate in two different worlds, so do they both give birth to two different worlds. The one conceives a bad and the other a good world, the one a passive and the other an active world. The world of the Upanishads is as still and as petrified as cold lava, while the world of the Bible is reminiscent of the "field" spirit of Goethe. The realm of the Upanishads is a dying present, that of the Bible a living, flowering future. And so the living and the dead God slashed their way into immortality, the one by inspiring life and the other by extinguishing it.

IV

Hindu philosophy reached its height in the person of Sankara, who lived six hundred years after Christ. In him Hindu monism found its highest expression. His philosophy bears a startling resemblance to that of Spinoza. His monism was not oneness, but non-dualism. Only being, called *sat*, is true, unchangeable, unmodifiable, and without manifoldness. The single things which the naked eye beholds are merely optic illusions. They are *maya*, non-real. *Sat*, or being, is identical with Atman-Brahma and as such does not consist of any parts. It is absolute, necessary, indeterminate, eternal, and infinite. This *sat* is the prototype of the substance of Spinoza. Through poor or false knowledge we establish a contact with the manifoldness of nature, which, in itself, is only an optic illusion. Only through the knowledge of the whole or true knowledge do we recognize oneness, Brahma. Therein Sankara

anticipated Spinoza's theory of knowledge by a thousand years. Neither one explains the world; they only explain it away because they are acosmists, affirming Atman-Brahma or *Deus* and denying the world.

It is typical of Western intellectuality that it seeks recognition for the sake of knowledge, just as it creates art for the sake of art. It is equally representative of the Eastern mind that it yearns for recognition for the sake of salvation. When Sankara speaks of recognition of being, he is not overwhelmed by an urge for theoretical knowledge, whether scientific or metaphysical, but by an unquenchable thirst for salvation. His monism, with all its consequences, belongs less in the domain of metaphysics than in the domain of redemption. His conception of being has no epistemological value for the westerner. Of what philosophical avail is it to know that being is unknowable, indivisible, pure, indeterminate, absolute, and infinite? What light is thereby shed upon the phenomena of nature and of life? But to the easterner this conception of being is of great religious value, because it is the anchor ground of religiosity.

To Sankara, being or *sat* is identical with perfection and hence with holiness. By a similar train of thought Spinoza identifies substance with God. Becoming, the world of the senses and phenomena, is sinful, but being or *sat* is holy. Only holiness, not sin, can become a desirable object of knowledge. Here is uncovered the root of the contempt of the mystic for empiric knowledge. It should be noted that the metaphysical and religious speculations of Sankara and Spinoza are purely intellectual without any admixture of emotionalism. This intellectuality of religious and mystical speculations

created a subtle dialectic method in the East and a complicated geometric method in the West.

Mysticism cannot be taught, for it can only be experienced. However, Sankara and Spinoza, with their intellectualistic and rationalistic methods, developed a system of mystical philosophy which can be acquired by learning. The usual expressions of mysticism, such as symbols, cults, music, and dancing, were utterly strange to their personalities. They gave expression to their mysticism in philosophical formulas. However, while Sankara's doctrines are the rule in the East, Spinoza's are the exception in the West.

Monism was not the only religious expression of ancient India. The adherents of the Samkyha school of thought, one of the most important philosophical groups in India, propounded the absolute dualism of mind and matter. Yet, even the adherents of this system regarded knowledge as only a means to salvation. Man can attain the highest aim of religiosity only if he possesses true knowledge of the dualism of matter and soul. Only this recognition can free the soul from the agony of the endless flow of existence and bring the eternal cycle to an end by abolishing the necessity of rebirth.

All the systems of ancient Hindu philosophy were inspired by the same motive. Knowledge delivers, knowledge frees, only through knowledge is salvation possible. It is immaterial whether this knowledge is monism, dualism, theism, or atheism. Reason or knowledge, called *vidaya*, will free man from his burdens, worries, and suffering. "The cause of suffering is the desire to live and to enjoy the delights of the world, and in the last instance the ignorance from which the desire

proceeds. The means of the abolition of this ignorance and therewith of suffering is the annihilation of that desire, renunciation of the world." This view was held by all the Hindu sages from times immemorial, and was the starting-point of Buddha's new religion.

It has already been noted that Spinoza begins his system with the substance, without any preceding inquiry as to its reality. From there he proceeds to the attributes and thence to the modi in order to explain the world away. Sankara proceeds in the same manner. Brahma, or being, requires no further proof for its existence, because from it springs forth all possibility of thinking and recognition. To him intuitive and immediate recognition is the highest form of knowledge. He, too, visualizes the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. The totality of things he sees as an indivisible oneness, from which everything follows with mathematical necessity. All miracles and extraordinary events are as taboo to Sankara as they are to Spinoza, for to both everything happens only by absolute necessity. Both were engineers of fate who tried to incase it in immutable and unchangeable laws. It can thus be seen that the monism of both Sankara and Spinoza is correlated to pantheism in equal measure, because both represent the same type of consciousness.

As against the Hinduistic conception of knowledge, which makes reason an organ of death, the ancient Hebraic idea of recognition or Deah, although corresponding to the Hindu Vidahya, has a different function to perform. Vidahya seeks to overcome life and the world, Deah strives to prolong life and to conquer nature. Vidahya leads to redemption from sin, Deah to freedom from error, stubbornness, and ignorance. Just as Vida-

hya is a well of pessimism, Deah is an inexhaustible source of optimism. Vidahya recognizes the futility of life, Deah sees its worth. Vidahya is the negation and Deah the affirmation of the future. To the latter, life is not *maya*, an optic illusion, but God's creation and gift to man.

In pre-Buddhistic Hindu thought desire, called *karma*, and action were considered to be the forces of darkness, the source of all suffering and evil. Man is moved to action by desire and no matter how he acts, he errs. Action, the necessary product of sinful desire, drives man's soul from existence to existence. Man is mortal except for desire or *karma*, because it is the cause of new existences. Since it is the actual cause of the transmigration of the soul, it cannot possibly be the cause of salvation. Even a good action coming from a good desire is of no avail because it takes place in a world of finality. Every deed, no matter how good, prolongs and modifies this existence. Redemption, however, is above and beyond all finality. Its ultimate goal is to free man from life and the world, and to cause him to sleep a deep, dreamless sleep, free from all desire, lust, and pain.

Just as the Hindu Vidahya is comparable to the Hebrew Deah, so can the Hindu *karma* be likened to the Hebraic *maaseh*, "action," "deed." *Karma* is the cause of suffering, *maaseh* the source of liberation. *Karma* was synonymous with sin, *maaseh* with purity. Both *karma* and *maaseh* perpetuated man's existence, but the first regarded it as a curse and the second as a blessing. The Occident accepted the conception of *maaseh* and rejected the idea of *karma*. Thus Goethe exclaimed:

Nur wer strebend sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen.

The dynamic West understood action to be not only the source of all progress, but also the meaning of the world.

Desire and action are the two sources of evil which bind man to this world of finiteness, manifoldness, illusion, and misery, and pursue the soul from existence to existence. When Buddha formulated his doctrines, he took over bodily this popular view. He added nothing to it but merely drew its consequence, Buddhism, by which man redeems himself by escaping from both life and death. Buddha also drew the consequences of a dead God, because the problem did not concern him sufficiently to make an issue out of it. Man is left to work out his own salvation, which he can achieve only by recognizing this life as a vale of tears. The function of recognition is to destroy desire and thereby cause man to lose every interest in his fellow-man. It causes him to surrender his possessions and to exile himself to far-away lands, where he can suffer and expiate his sins and thus free himself from life. This physical freedom from kin and earthly wealth is already symbolic of his future spiritual freedom in a new existence.

So did the ancient Hindu visualize regression as a prelude to redemption. All he sought from life was a means to escape from it. His destination became Nirvana, not being. Here we already stand upon Buddhistic soil.

V

"What is wealth, honor, or lust of the senses?" asks Spinoza. The answer was that they are all optic illusions. Only in salvation is there genuine happiness. Twenty-three hundred years before him, Gautama Buddha, who examined life attentively and critically, gave almost the same answer to the foregoing question.

To him life was only a meaningless process of coming and going, a valley of tears and suffering. According to tradition, his first contact with reality was through a series of excursions to the gardens of the city in which he beheld a typical picture of Hindu life. He saw a helpless derelict, a begging monk, a dying man, and a rotting cadaver. He was most impressed by the figure of the begging monk in whom he recognized the apotheosis of deliverance from earthly travail. This contrast of suffering and redemption overwhelmed him with the desire to free himself from the ties of life. He abandoned his princely estate, his young wife and child, his relatives and friends, and began to live and preach a life of self-denial and asceticism. He sought freedom from desire, darkness, ignorance, and the narrowness of life. This release he found in the negation of everything that lives and breathes, for to him this is a world of illusion, suffering, pain, and futility.

The gloom and pessimism of Buddha is best expressed in the Buddhistic "Sermon of the Mount," known in Buddhistic literature as the address of Benares.

This, ye mendicants, is the holy truth of suffering. Birth is suffering, age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, united with the unpleasant is suffering, separation from the pleasant is suffering, and not attaining desire is suffering. These, ye monks, are the holy truth of the origin of suffering. It is the thirst which leads from rebirth to rebirth, including joy and desire, the thirst of lust, the thirst of becoming, the thirst of changeability. These, ye monks, are the holy truth of the elimination of suffering: the elimination of the thirst by totally destroying desire, by letting it go, by separating from it, by freeing one's self from it, by not granting it shelter.

No other philosopher or religionist has ever expressed the doctrine of pessimism more powerfully than young Buddha. His pessimism is tantamount to nihilism, for

it presupposes that existence has no *raison d'être*, that life is only misfortune and misery. It becomes our duty to transform this life into naught, for says Buddha: "Truth being originally naught must again become naught." Buddha did not originate this metaphysics of gloom, for he only represents the highest crystallization of ancient Hindu thought. However, he did draw the consequences of all the great Hindu doctrines propounded before him, and thought them through to their bitter end. Buddha synthesized ancient Hindu thought in the same manner as Spinoza synthesized formal modern thought. Buddha became the greatest religionist of all times by applying speculations of the Upanishads to pragmatic life. Rhys David, one of the foremost Indologists of modern times, says, "There was not anything in the metaphysics or principles of Gautama which cannot be found in the one or the other of the orthodox systems, and a great deal of his morality could be matched from earlier or later Hindu books." Oldenberg, another eminent Buddha scholar, also admits that Buddha acquired the bent of his religious thought and feeling from his spiritual ancestors.

Yet, Buddha, religionist and mystic, was also a rationalist, who more than any of his predecessors or successors systematized his religious views. He annihilates the will by the intellect, by teaching that only through knowledge can life be overcome. Thus, the intellect becomes an agent of death. Even Sankara, the greatest of Hindu philosophers, to whose intellectual subtlety there is scarcely any analogy in the annals of white man's thought, did not succeed in transforming the intellect into an organ of death, as did the prince of the jungle. But not only did Buddha teach how to escape

from life, but also how to flee from death. "To live on earth is weariness and there is no bliss beyond either."

Although tradition attributes the origin of his pessimism and nihilism to a sudden contact with miserable reality, one must not consider him to be an empiricist. His doctrine of suffering has deep metaphysical roots. "Now this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering," his disciples quote him as saying. "Verily it is the craving thirst that causes the renewal of becomings, that is accompanied by sensual delights and seeks satisfaction, now here, and now there; that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the senses or the craving for wealth." Twenty-three hundred years later Spinoza sang the same melody.

The transient is painful—only the eternal spells happiness. The transient means bondage, slavery, an eternal coming and going. It means birth, adolescence, maturity, age, decay, and death. But in the eternal there is no limitation, no finiteness, no change, and, therefore, no pain. "There are three things, O King, which you cannot find in the world, that which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death, that quality of anything which has nothing permanent, and that thing which is possessed of being."

If only the eternal is reality, it necessarily follows that everything subjective is not real. Hence, Buddha deduced that nothing on earth is self and everything is *anatta*, not-self. Only the intellect can distinguish between self and not-self. Ignorance and desire thus become synonymous.

By viewing life as an eternal process of becoming, Buddha visualized the order of things with a Heraclitic eye. Being, he said, is an optic illusion; only becoming

possesses some reality. Life is but a series of changes and transmutations and is impermanent. Empiric truth based upon the impermanent is dubious truth. Buddha thereby subscribed to Heraclitus' epigram that one cannot twice wade through a stream. Only the flux of things is steady; only change is real. This change, while it is the steady factor in the flux of phenomena, is not objective reality. We distinguish between the infant and the babe, the youth and the man, but actually they are as identical as the seed and the tree growing out of it. Only the flux gives the appearance of an uninterrupted identity, and creates the impression that the universe is a permanent existence. This life, which is and is not simultaneously, has no creator. There are acts but no actor; deeds, but no doer; events, but no eventuator; song, but no singer. We are all slaves to the immutable, unchangeable laws of causation, which are the basis and origin of all this continuity. Whatever exists arises from cause and conditions, is impermanent and hence must perish. All that is born must die. All the single component things must grow old and disappear. Everything is determined and predetermined, destined and predestined, by pre-existing conditions.

The critical mind of Buddha understood that the general law of causation does not explain or include all the phenomena of life. Therefore, like Spinoza, he resorted to a theory of external and internal causation. We may often fail to understand external causation, because our knowledge is limited and confined to the interrelation of the phenomena. We are, however, absolutely certain that internal causation is in operation, and that our will determines our acts. Will or *karma* is the source and kindling-point of all our actions and is the only reality.

“Everything that exists, exists by reason of *cupiditas*,” says Spinoza.

Although Buddha insisted that the universe is governed by necessity and causation, his conception of causation is much more refreshing than that of Spinoza. His causation, far from excluding evolution, presupposes it because its effects are not the mechanical succession of motion, but organic evolution in which one state is developing itself to another state. In a certain sense this evolution is actually creative, for it necessitates growth and the operating of the inner forces, in which we behold something that grows out of the seed. Hence, the world is one continuous, organic development, and not a series of chance phenomena without any inner unity.

But while Buddha and Spinoza disagree about causation, they agree about acosmism. Buddha completely denies the phenomenal world, and Spinoza causes it to be absorbed by the noumenal world. But if the world is not reality, whether because it is flatly denied or is absorbed by another world, the problem of the prime mover and planner does not arise. While Spinoza sees no plan in the fabric of nature, Buddha, although he considers it to be a mighty maze, admits that it is not altogether planless. But this plan has no planner or maker, for there is no beginning or end. The universe is ruled by a definite and immutable order called *pallie*, the process of eternal motion, and all life is a demonstration and manifestation of this law.

Buddha was one of the greatest rationalists of history and hence dogma was strange to his mind. In this respect he was intellectually more virtuous than Spinoza. While despising empiric knowledge, which is derived

from the senses, he was noncommittal about the absolute. If there is an absolute, it is unknowable, and cannot become the object of knowledge. Our mind, being hemmed in by five senses, cannot demonstrate something which is above and beyond the senses. Buddha refused to subscribe to such a dogma as Spinoza's substance. However, it must not be assumed that Buddha had a negative attitude to any doctrine of metaphysical reality. On the contrary, he recognized some permanent force beyond the flux of the phenomena. Yet his lack of outspokenness about metaphysical principles earned for himself the reputation of being an atheist. This insinuation is ill founded. Buddhism is a-theistic, that is to say, its center of gravity is not Deity and is not correlated to Deity. However, it is not atheistic, that is to say, denying Deity. Buddha's mind was too subtle to consider this world as a wild devil's dance, or as a product of a crazy caprice of fate. He guessed an ultimate reality, which he indicated in his admonition to his monks, "There is an unborn, an unoriginated, an unmade, an uncompounded. Were there not, mendicants, there would be no escape from the world of the born, the originated, the made, and the compounded." By giving man a ray of hope, redemption became theoretically possible. This in itself refutes the charge that Buddha was an atheist. But Spinoza, not offering man any hope, because of his implicit denial of an extramundane reality, thereby exposed himself to the accusation of atheism.

Just as Buddha did not dogmatize about metaphysical reality, so did he not dogmatize about the soul. Life, being impermanent, is doomed to destruction. Consciousness, consisting of feeling, perception, and intelligence, which is constantly changing, is also transitory.

That which is transitory and hence evil cannot be the eternal or soul, for we know nothing about it. This theory has a much more modern ring than the ideas of those psychologists who attempt to locate the soul in some part of the body, in the nervous system, or in the brain.

Buddha repudiated and discarded the conception of the individual ego, and denied the reality of the phenomenal self. The object with which we identify ourselves is not true self, but something transitory and condemned to destruction. Since the world and the individual ego are in a state of flux, how can transitory being say "I am not transitory, I am permanent; I am not changeable, I am eternal"? Not for the suggestion of a moment are we the same, for we are constantly subject to continuous change. So did Buddha raise a Heraclitic voice, which caused scholars to consider Heraclitus as having been orientated by the East.

The rationalist Buddha was primarily a critic, who vacillated between skepticism and criticism. He refused either to negate or to affirm the essence of things, stating that it was beyond man's innate ability to do so. Oldenberg's view that Buddha would not commit himself to anything positive, for reasons of policy or for lack of courage, is not tenable. Buddha cannot be charged with intellectual cowardice. Any thinker who draws the bitter consequences from certain premises so closely and sharply must be possessed of great courage. One must also remember that in ancient India the problem of God was not the measure of orthodoxy or the central problem of philosophy. In saying little about the ultimate reality, Buddha merely followed the traditions of his country. Furthermore, as a salvationist, he was not concerned with purely theoretical problems which

had no bearing upon his doctrine. Like all great religionists, he was also a pragmatist and hence limited his speculations to his own doctrine.

It must not be assumed, however, that Buddha completely ignored the problem of ultimate reality. His conception of Nirvana demonstrates that he had some conception of an ultimate metaphysical reality. Nirvana to him was not a lapse into the void, but a positive return of the earthly self to a metaphysical self. However, the essence of this metaphysical self he never explained. He maintained that to make any positive assertions about it would transcend the frontiers of our knowledge, which his theory of recognition would not permit him to do.

The central theme of his philosophy was the origin and the elimination of suffering, which is imbedded in his holy truths of the principle of suffering. "These, ye mendicants, are the noble truths of the origin of suffering. The two holy truths are these: the elimination of suffering, the elimination of the thirst by totally annihilating desire, by giving it up, by freeing one's self from it, by separating one's self from it, by not granting it any shelter."

It can thus be seen that Buddha considers life with its vicissitudes and turns of destiny as an elemental misfortune from which man must try to escape. As the will to live is the ground of existence, it must be annihilated. What is the origin of this will to live, of this thirst for existence? It is the law of causation, the linkage of cause and effect, which unites the parts with the whole. This doctrine of causation was the first deliberate attempt to mold destiny into definite forms, and to

forge fate into definite laws in order to present a plausible world-picture.

Buddha deduced the phenomena of life from ignorance, which he calls non-knowledge. Personality and corporeality originate in recognition of the six objects, that is to say, the five senses and thinking. From these objects emanate relationships (between the senses and objects); from relationships originate feeling; from feeling, thirst; from thirst, existence; from existence, becoming; from becoming, birth; from birth, age and death, pain and lamentation, suffering, worry, and despair. Vision and recognition kindle in non-knowledge, and the elimination of the one means the destruction of the other. The annihilation of recognition carries with it the collapse of the chain of life beginning with personality and corporeality and ending with suffering, worry, and despair. Since knowledge is the only medium with which to overcome life objectively, non-knowledge is the origin of all existence. Subjectively, however, consciousness is the origin of life and is called "recognition" in Buddhistic terminology. This long and obscure formula is more fully explained in a dialogue between Buddha and his favorite disciple Ananda. Buddha asks his adherent:

"If recognition, Ananda, would not sink into the womb, would corporeality and name arise?"

"No sir."

"And if recognition, Ananda, would have abandoned the womb after it penetrates there, would name and corporeality or birth participate in this life?"

"No sir."

"And if recognition, Ananda, would be lost from the boy or the girl while they are still young, would name and corporeality grow and increase?"

"No sir."

Thus Buddha established that consciousness, being the cause of all subjective life by being suppressed at its very conception, would end life.

All life manifests itself in six elements, namely, earth, fire, water, air, ether, and recognition. This latter element is superior to the other five, for it is undemonstrable, infinite, and all-glowing. This force is the connecting link between the various existences during the migrations of the soul. Some of the Buddhistic holy texts offer a slightly different version of the order of causality. They say that corporeality gives birth to recognition. Man's body is always his own, running through different existences. His body is the permanent element in the flux of existences. Each new existence is caused by the good or bad deeds of a former existence, from which no one can escape, although it may not come to an immediate fruition. It will always follow the doer no matter where he be, whether "in the midst of the ocean or on the mountain," and determine his fate in his new existence. Thus, corporeality, name or personality and recognition or consciousness, are interlinked and interwoven.

Karma or action is the source of all becoming and leads to the process in which recognition connects itself with corporeality and name. It is in this connection that the spirit finds its body and the body its spirit, and it is here that the subjective and objective worlds meet. This union produces the six objects which face the six domains of the outer world, namely, light, sound, smell, taste, touch, and determinism, or *damaha*. Just as the body faces the eye, so do the spirit and mind face the *damaha*. The six objects develop touch, which in turn gives birth to feeling. Feeling produces thirst, which

leads from rebirth to rebirth. Man exists because he thirsts for life, and he suffers because he thirsts for joy. Only those who can overcome their thirst can conquer pain and suffering.

Some Buddhistic commentators identify thirst with the state of being seized, an entirely passive state, from which they deduce the phenomena of life. From it arises becoming and from becoming birth, age, death, suffering, worry, and despair. This version intensifies the gloom of Buddhism, for it transforms man into a plaything of fate.

It should be noted that in the Buddhistic doctrine the category of non-knowledge or *avijja*, the most basic principle of life, is the primary cause of things. But what is this mysterious *avijja*? It is only the *maya* of the old Brahminic theosophy, the optic illusion of things. But while Brahminism considered reality as being, Buddhism regarded reality as non-being. The aim of life became non-being, and can be attained only by the knowledge of the four holy truths, which are: not to know suffering, its origin, its elimination, and the way leading to it. Only through this knowledge can man be redeemed and attain Nirvana.

VI

The doctrine of causation, the center of gravity in Buddha's philosophy, is interwoven with his theory of determinism, which assumes the form of fatalism. In its main features it resembles that of Spinoza. Man is tied to predestined forces, from which there is no escape, was Spinoza's conviction. Man has within himself the possibility of redemption, was Buddha's belief. His four holy truths are an attempt to attain salvation by pierc-

ing the iron wall of the law of causation. The possibility of escape from a predestined life to Nirvana implies a theory of being which is less rigid and less immutable than that of Spinoza. Thus, Buddha says, "The reality of things is to be found in the oscillations between being and non-being." This is the content of existence. The world is because it is, and it is not at the same time. For the simple the world is, and for the wise it is not. When it is, it is the source and origin of suffering. When it is not, it is redemption and salvation. The worlds of Buddha and Spinoza are prisons, but in the one there is a crack, and the other is hermetically sealed.

For all pragmatic purposes, becoming and not-being is of primary importance. It is the eternal coming and going that gives rise to suffering, which is not individual in nature but is suffering per se. Only life is coequal with suffering, but as you and I are parts of life, we both suffer. In addition, in this stream of Samsara, there are no real you and I, but only an illusion of both. Only the ignorant conceive personality as something real. But, if so, what is real about man? Buddha's answer was—the all of the things about man and not anything in particular. This denial of the personality as a particular thing included his conception of the soul. His doctrine of the personality is best demonstrated in the famous dialogue between the monk Negasena and King Milinda.

The king asks the holy Negasena:

"How does one know you and what is your name, sir?"

"I am called Negasena, O great king. But Negasena is only a name, an expression, a mere word, but not the subject."

The king is greatly astonished and asks the holy Negasena:

"Is, sir, your hair Negasena?"

"No, O great king."

"Is, sir, corporeality Negasena?"

"No, great king."

"Are the feelings Negasena?"

"No, great king."

"Are the imagination, conception, or recognition Negasena?"

"No great king."

"Is, sir, the combination of corporeality, feelings, imagination, and recognition Negasena?"

"No, great king."

"Oh, sir, outside of corporeality and feelings and imagination, is there no Negasena?"

"No, great king."

"Wherever and whenever I ask you, sir, I find nowhere Negasena."

"A mere word, sir, is only Negasena."

"But what then is Negasena?"

The king is greatly astonished and does not know how to answer. To explain his point, Negasena questions the king.

"Are the wheels your chariot?"

"No."

"Is the yoke your chariot?"

"No."

In similar fashion the king is forced to admit that the other parts are not coequal with the chariot. So, answers Negasena, just as all the things of which the chariot consists are called chariot, so are all the parts of man—his skin, bones, hair, corporeality, imagination, conception, and recognition—called by a certain name, although it is not the subject in the strict meaning of the term. It is only in this sense that Buddha denies the soul. To him, as well as to Spinoza, the soul is subject to the processes of coming and going. It is only one of the *modi*, one of the single things. Buddha, too, would say not "I think," but "It thinks in me"; not "I feel," but "it feels in me"; for life is only the state of being seized. It is an illusion—a figure of speech.

Life to Buddha consists only of two sides—eternal

restlessness and change, caused by causation, and eternal peace, Nirvana, caused by redemption. Since the realm of causation is the realm of suffering, redemption is necessarily the state of being wherein causation does not prevail. This realm is Nirvana, not being, which is a condition of being rather than extension in space. Life, which is linked to causation, can be compared to an eternal fire, from which the sage can save himself by extinguishing it and by quenching his thirst or will to live. Only knowledge will bring life to a standstill and will prevent man from wandering from existence to existence.

How to overcome this world of suffering and illusion is indicated in the fourth of the holy truths, which represents Buddha's system of ethics.

"This, ye mendicants, is the holy truth of the way to eliminate suffering. It is this holy eightfold path, which is right belief, right resolving, the right word, the right deed, right life, right striving, right remembering, and right meditating."

Although this principle of ethics appears to be the incarnation of innocence, it yet includes a rigorous system of abstinence and asceticism. While this eightfold path forms the general basis of a rigorous discipline of life, its actual ethical principles are reduced to three in number—righteousness, meditation, and wisdom. These categories are often compared with the three stations of a journey, whose final destination is salvation. Righteous life, receiving its inspiration from pious wisdom, is the most basic virtue of Buddhistic ethics. Righteousness is based on wisdom. Ethics and morality are not based upon God or upon any other metaphysical principle, but are inspired by the vision of the

goal—Nirvana. In the Buddhistic as well as in the Spinozistic world-picture, morality is linked with usefulness. Morality is rewarded and immorality punished. Although no one commands or admonishes man to be good, yet he follows the path of righteousness. He will benefit by it and his life will be attended by joy.

Buddhistic ethics, being purely utilitarian in character, contains no positive commandments. Righteousness dissolves itself into a series of recommendations in the form of suggestions, known as the fivefold justice, which are: not to kill a living creature, not to seize the property of another, not to touch the wife of another, not to say an untruth, and not to partake of intoxicating beverages. A sixth recommendation, not to marry, is made exclusively to monks. The suggestive character of Buddha's ethics can best be seen from his instruction to a mendicant, that he can participate in righteousness by omitting to kill living creatures, by lifting the staff, and by laying down the weapon. It is equally characteristic that Buddha does not command the mendicants not to slander, but merely suggests that they refrain from uttering slander.

All ethics implies activity, but those of Buddha connote passivity. Ethics require commission, Buddha suggests omission. He teaches an order of self-denial and a discipline of asceticism. Ethics is concerned with man exclusively, Buddha with living creatures. The goal of ethics is human welfare, that of Buddha salvation by abstinence. It can be attained only if you will not steal, kill, slander, speak falsehoods, or covet your friend's wife, and if you will not follow the lust of your heart, and if you will not quench your thirst. Ethics teaches to love man, Buddha not to hate him. Ethics teaches to

help man, Buddha not to harass him. Even his more positive ethical recommendations, such as to forgive your enemy, have a utilitarian motive. If you will not hate your enemy, his hatred of you will die. It is thus useful not to hate your adversary, because forgiveness is advantageous. Western ethics commands man to give to the poor, Buddha to give to the monks. This is the only positive commandment in Buddhistic ethics.²

Buddha summed up his ethical ideals in the following words spoken to the nun Gautami, "Whatsoever teaching thou art sure, it leads to passion and not to peace, to pride and not to humility, to the desiring of much and not to the desiring of little; to the love of society and not to the love of solitude, to idleness and not to earnest striving, to a mind hard to pacify and not to a mind easy to pacify, that Gautami is not the law."

Buddhism, not being concerned with man and his welfare, was equally disinterested in man and his interests. Hence, jurisprudence, politics, and economics were not within the purview of Buddhistic ethics. Its indifference to the caste system, which was iniquity personified, can thus be understood. Buddha was indifferent to the *status quo*. He did not condemn the burdensome and demoralizing domestic rituals, although they were meaningless to him. Only salvation, redemption, and the elimination of suffering were his concern, Nirvana his goal. Nirvana he compared to the expiring flame, and said

² "Meditative, calm, full of kindly feeling takes for the early Buddhist the place of prayer. It is a condition which is aimed at by both the Yogi and the Buddhist adept for the attainment of peaceful, serene aloofness, leading to the highest estate" (H. W. Hopkins, *Ethics in India*, p. 136).

"The original Buddhist has been called an egotistic Hedonist. The term is harsh, but at any rate his whole concern was with his private salvation, which lay in his own hands. To secure that salvation he became moral, serene, kindly disposed" (*ibid.*, p. 143).

that it was a state beyond pain and sorrow. It is the very end of all physical life. It is the emancipation from everything reminiscent of flesh. It is absolute extinction, beyond all being and becoming, and outside the pale of causation. But what Nirvana means in positive terms, Buddha failed to explain.

Buddhistic literature describes two types of Nirvana. The first type is *upadhisesa*, in which only human passion is extinct, and the second is *anupadhisesa*, in which the whole being is extinct. Most European scholars, including Oldenburg, Rhys Davids, and Dahlke, are inclined to the view that Nirvana means *anupadhisesa*, complete extinction. Most Hindu scholars, however, take the opposite view. "Whenever it is said that the people attain Nirvana in this world, the *upadhisesa* Nirvana is meant," argues Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy*. This interpretation implies that Nirvana is only mental repose, which is free from the distress and strife of life, and is a state of positive blessedness. It is perfection and not annihilation.

A restatement of the essence of Nirvana in positive terms would imply, first, an interest in metaphysics, and, second, the formulation of a dogma, neither of which was ever possessed by the salvationist Buddha. The suggestion rather than the definition of Nirvana gave rise to varied speculations as to its nature and essence. In early Buddhistic literature it is described as a sleeping soul enjoying eternal rest and bliss, or as returning to the stream of being, which is unperturbed by the law of causation. Nirvana is a state of unconditioned freedom, in which all positive existence is dissolved. But whether it is transmundal or transcendental has never been explained satisfactorily. Buddha

never encouraged any speculations about Nirvana, because it is beyond reality and hence unknowable. Nevertheless, he often described it as a union with the cosmic principle, Brahma. As such it is identical with Spinoza's *amor Dei intellectualis*.

It can thus be seen that the main features of Spinoza's mysticism, with but few exceptions, can be retraced to Buddha, and his background, the Upanishads. If Buddha is not as God-intoxicated as Spinoza, and is less overwhelmed by Brahma than Spinoza by *Deus*, it is due to the fact that the central problem in Eastern philosophy is not God but salvation.

Like Spinoza, Buddha, too, is an intellectualist and a rationalist. He, too, is a salvationist; he seeks redemption via the intellect. Both Spinoza and Buddha are determinists, who extend the law of causation to the realm of the spirit. Both explain desire as the origin of all life and both indicate how it may be overcome. Both are disinterested in man and are ethical utilitarians. Both are fatalists, who are overcome by the spirit of resignation. Spinoza's *Deus* is as dead and as impersonal as Buddha's Brahma. Both are moralists and not ethicists, a-theists and not atheists. Both are universalists and acosmists denying the world and man. The resemblance between the basic ideas of Spinoza and Buddha is not obliterated because Spinoza begins with God and Buddha with suffering, or because Spinoza is concerned with metaphysics and Buddha with religiosity. The difference in time, environment, climate, and topography of the two men gave each a different approach to the same world-picture. The thoughts, views, and sentiments which Buddha expressed in long and boring dialogues Spinoza formulated in the nomencla-

ture of Western philosophy. To both human life was only an elegiac episode in the cosmic order. Both represent a tragic type of consciousness common to suffering humanity in the East as well as in the West. Both believed that human life is only a typographical error of eternity, purposeless, aimless, useless, meaningless. To both life was a minus or an irrational magnitude, for they peered at it from the vantage point of a grave digger espoused to a midwife.

Buddha etched his world-picture upon an Eastern canvas. Spinoza upon a Western screen. The one illuminated it with proverbs, similes, legends, and pious meditations, and the other with geometric formula and logical categories. Buddha, pious soul that he was, left for man a needle hole of escape, but the embittered, excommunicated Spinoza did not even grant him that comfort. Two still, blessed islands, from which all life and its attending worry and pain are banished, are the final goals of Spinoza and Buddha. But these goals, purposes, and ends presuppose a-teleology. Such are the paradoxes of religiosity.

As against this world-picture of universalism, pessimism, asceticism, and acosmism, there stands out in bold relief its reverse, the individualistic, theistic, optimistic, and anthropocentric world-picture created in the Arabian desert. Buddhism can best be understood by the westerner only by comparison with its reverse, ancient Hebraism. It will then become clear that in the last analysis only two types of religiosity, that of the jungle and that of the desert, are the content of the religious progress. All other types are only compromises, mixtures, combinations, and syntheses.

THE WORLD-PICTURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

I

MAN, in the course of his religious experiences and struggles, has created but two types of religiosity: the transcendental and the immanent, the personal and the pantheistic. The first begins with man, the second with the cosmos. In the one, man regards himself as the center of the universe, as the crown of creation. He gathers courage to take up the struggle for existence, and to conquer for himself a definite position in life. But in the other, man beholds the universe and discovers his own insignificance. His mind becomes enveloped in gloom and pessimism. Life vanishes from his horizon, and he sees only the monotony of the eternal process of coming and going. Life becomes so boring that he seeks to overcome it.

From times immemorial these two types of religiosity have faced each other in hostility. Both formed the content of the history of religion, which in the course of time came to be expressed in two precise and definite formulas. Neither form of religious consciousness is confined to any given race, for both are deeply anchored in the physical world, in climatic and geographic conditions.

The oldest type of pantheism, that of the Eastern Aryans, arose in the jungle, while the oldest form of monotheism, that of the ancient Hebrews, was born in the desert. The assumption is justified that there is some inner connection between pantheism and the jun-

gle, and between monotheism and the desert. Whether specific topographic conditions, such as mountain and vale, stimulated the formation of these two types of religious consciousness is only a matter of speculation. How the thought was born in man's mind that he is either a part of nature or apart from nature, either identical with it or different from it, will never be definitely established. History has no laboratories, and religious ideas are not chemicals with which to experiment. We only know that the man of the jungle saw life in all its colors, while the man of the desert saw nothing, for there was nothing to be seen. In the jungle man was part of its colorful life, in the desert he was alone. There he felt his own ego more intensely and he became convinced that he was not a part of this vast sand expanse, but was something apart from it. He felt that He who created the sun, the desert, the sand, and himself was also a personality. The less life he saw about him in the desert, the more intensely did he feel his own ego. But the more life he saw about him in the jungle, the less was he aware of his own existence. *Thus, the desert proved to be the cradle, and the jungle the grave, of the personality.*

Man is either a part of or apart from nature, and similarly God is either being or ego. If He is ego, man is free and is the master of his own destiny; but if He is being, He Himself is chained to His own laws and man becomes only a slave of nature. If He is ego, He is a living God; but if He is being, He is a dead Deity. If He is being, life becomes meaningless, for it is one uninterrupted chain of suffering, one valley of tears. Man is subject to blind fate, from whose clutches he can never extricate himself. Human life has no meaning, purpose,

or object and becomes merely a mechanical process of coming and going. At best its goal becomes Nirvana.

If God is ego, man is free and his life meaningful. God is not chained to any laws and His freedom is as infinite as His life. The most solemn oath of the ancient Hebrews was *Chai Adonoi*, "As God liveth." God as being is disinterested in man, but God as ego is concerned chiefly with him. God as being cannot possibly have any attitude toward this world, for He is above and beyond all joy, sorrow, and tragedy. God as ego is possessed of will and intellect and is subject to gladness, sadness, and misfortune. Nothing can stir the Brahma or the Atman of Buddha or the *Deus* of Spinoza, for they are both chained and bound. But the God of the ancient Hebrews, the most tragic figure in the pantheon of ancient deities, is a free God facing a free and a living world. There is always a state of tension existing between Him and the world of man, and between Him and the world of nature.

The living God of Israel is the apotheosis of the tragic because He is the incarnation of defeat. His descent is the more overwhelming since He began His career not as a local Deity, but as a God of the cosmos and of all humanity. Even the very beginning of His career as narrated in the Old Testament is overwhelmingly tragic. He was alone in the infinite void, surrounded only by water, and He felt lonely. To overcome His solitariness, He separated the water from the land and created nature. He brought forth living creatures and thought that all His creations were good. His loneliness was now at an end, for He was no longer the God of a dead void, but the God of a living world. His realm was no longer that of deep darkness, but was now permeated

with life and light. And yet all these works did not content him. Mountain and vale, stone and tree, fish and bird, monsters of land and of sea, could not sing His praises. He desired to be prayed to, praised, thanked, admired, loved, and feared. Only a being fashioned in His own image could satisfy His longing for recognition. "And God created Man in His own image . . . male and female He created them."

Only upon man, the crown of creation, did He bestow His special blessing. But man disobeyed His injunctions, and to punish him He cursed him. "Cursed is the ground for thy sake. In toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, and thou shalt eat the herbs of the field. In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread, till thou returnest unto the ground."

Soon afterward man, who was created so that he could be like God, committed fratricide, the most outrageous of crimes. God was again defeated by His own creature and again He cursed him, "And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand. When thou tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be on the earth." But to the same extent that his maker expected goodness from him, man progressively increased in wickedness. And God said, "I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the earth, both man and beast, both the creeping things and the fowl of the air, for it repenteth me that I have made them." He brought about the flood to destroy both man and nature, for nature too had become wicked. This decision is an expression of the fury of His defeat at the hands of His

creatures. But having seen life and having listened to its voice, He could no longer face the void, and He said, "I will not again curse the ground for man's sake, for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth; neither will I again smite any more everything living as I have done." Out of His interest in and love for man, God adjusted Himself to the natural in man.

One may read the Old and even the New Testament from beginning to end and see in it first a defeated God, then a defeated people, and finally a defeated Messiah. The Old Testament is one tale of the continuous defeat of God. He is defeated by nature, He is defeated by man, and He is defeated and betrayed by His own people. In the end He sees His land destroyed, His people dispersed, and His temple burned. Such is the tragic experience of the God of the Old Testament. But of such tragedy, Brahma and Atman, being dead deities, knew nothing. They were beyond victory and defeat and also beyond tragedy.

The living God of the Old Testament is deeply concerned with man and his welfare. He makes him the object of His only care and worry. He often changes His own decision and abides by that of man in order to please him. Thus, at first, He wanted man to eat only vegetable food, but after the flood He permitted him to eat meat as well. He decided to annihilate His own people, but then because of the intervention of Moses He changed His plan. He commanded His people not to appoint a king, but later not only yielded but actually helped them to choose one.

Both God and man possess a will, and the Old Testament can be viewed as a permanent conflict between His will and that of man. But if man is dependent upon

God, God is equally dependent upon man. Only to man can He reveal Himself and manifest His power. The deep-seated thought that God and man are bound together by mutual ties ripened into the conception of a formal covenant between the two. God is bound to promote man's welfare and man is obligated to do Him homage by being serviceable to his fellowman. If he breaks the covenant he thereby forfeits His favor and support. This alliance best characterizes God's interest in man and was consummated not because of a passing fancy, but because man is His only *raison d'être* as a God. Even His interest in the universe is motivated by His interest in man, for all of creation was *a posteriori*, only a prelude to the creation of man.

The Old Testament is a book of man and describes the eternal cycle of his life. In it one finds the first attempt at a philosophy of history, and the first clear conception of the oneness of the human race. "This is a book of the generations of man." This philosophy of history concludes with an eschatology, which pictures not the processes of redemption or of salvation, but those of the reconstruction of society with the Messiah as its central figure. The Old Testament is not concerned with the world beyond—the hereafter—or with abstract speculations. Its point of gravity is man, his future, and his fate, which is the concern of both man and God. What is man's future? "Thou shalt be like God," he was told from the very beginning. God became his guide in life and His attributes were to fashion man's actions.

The Old Testament is a book of sturdy optimism and indulges but little in wailing that evil is the content of life, or that man's birth constitutes sin. It affirms life and unequivocally advocates its improvement and em-

bellishment. This is the prevalent motive of Old Testament ethics and is expressed in the phrase, "So that thou might live." All the ethical commandments were given to man so that his life should be prolonged and made secure. It is God's highest gift to man, and He desires him to take the best possible care of this offering. In man's orderly management of life, God is assured of the continuity and sensibleness of His creation. Man thus becomes the guardian and guarantor of God's work. This is the metaphysical anchor—ground of Old Testament optimism.

Old Testament optimism is not empiric in nature. The tragic experience of the God of the Old Testament and of His people certainly furnished no plausible reason for optimism. The God who drowned His own creation, because of the evil with which it was permeated and the people whose forehead was branded with the symbol of defeat, still clung to the hope of victory. This superabundance of optimism in the Old Testament, in contradistinction to the paralyzing pessimism of the great documents of ancient Hindu religiosity, is the eighth wonder of the world. It is metaphysically motivated and is organically interlinked and interwoven with the basic idea of a personal God, who is concerned with man and his future. This pulsating optimism testifies most clearly to the independence of man's spirit, and of the suzerainty of his mind.

Optimism and intellectualism are spiritual twins. Every optimistic philosophy is intellectually motivated, while every pessimistic philosophy is voluntaristically inspired. Thus Leibnitz, the father of modern optimism, is also the founder of modern European intellectualism. Schopenhauer, the foremost representative of pessi-

mism in modern Europe, begins his system with the sentence, "The world is my will and my illusion." To him, will was both a metaphysical and a cosmic principle. Old Testament monotheism, the incarnation of optimism, is also synonymous with intellectualism. Ancient Hebrew contains more synonyms for the term "intellect" than does any other language of antiquity. Just as the ancient Hindus and Greeks conceived of an animated nature, so did the ancient Hebrews visualize a nature in the process of rationalization and humanization. To the present day the traditional Jew praises his maker, not only for having favored man, but also the rooster with reason. The doctrine of the primacy of intellect is one of the outstanding features of Hebraic thought throughout the ages. Not the belief in God, but the knowledge of God, is the essence of ancient Hebrew religiosity. "Know the God of thy fathers and honor him." The world will be full of the knowledge of God, visualized Isaiah. Maimonides epitomizes the doctrine of the primacy of the intellect in Judaism by teaching that when in the hereafter man is brought before God, he will first be asked, "Did you study logics?" and only afterward will he be asked, "Did you study the law?"

The knowledge of the Old Testament, called Deah, is not identical with the Vdhya of the Upanishads. Vdhya leads to Nirvana, Deah to a prolonged life. Vdhya visualizes the world as the dwelling-place of suffering, Deah knows it as a good world, created by an intelligent and merciful God. Vdhya smacks of the grave, Deah of the cradle, for Deah means both recognition and love. Deah ushers in the long day of life, Vdhya the long night of naught.

Deah is the cornerstone of Old Testament ethics, in which man and not living creatures is the central theme and object. This ethics is correlated to logics in the same manner as is Platonic or Kantian ethics. It is replete with categorical imperatives, directed to and concerning man. "Thou shalt not kill" of the Decalogue *means thou shalt not kill man*. But the suggestion in Buddhism not to kill means *not to kill any living creature*. The killing of any living creature is as much a sin as the killing of man. Nature is thus not elevated to the dignity of man, but man is degraded to the level of brute nature. Thus ethics is the morale of a living God, while morality is the ethics of a dead God.

God's law, whether for nature or for man, is not a mechanical rule, for it admits of exceptions. The laws of nature are often overcome either by the power of the ethical personality or by the destiny and will to live of the nation. Elijah's ethical personality prevailed upon God to revive the dead child of the widow of Zarephath. The nation's will to live caused the sea to split and the sun to stand still. Such miracles are inherent in a living God, but are impossible in a dead Deity, for then nature's laws are all purely mechanical. Hence, absolute determinism is always linked with a dead God.

The one living God faces one humanity. All men are equal before Him and His law, and hence are also equal before each other. Since the divinely motivated Jewish ethics continues itself into jurisprudence and politics, the one living God becomes the source of religious, ethical, political, and juridic equality, and thereby becomes the source of all democracy. Even the creation of one man as the father of all humanity apotheosizes the equality of man. The descendants of a common ances-

tor cannot boast an exclusive and select lineage. All the democratic tendencies in the Old Testament—the supremacy of the majority, the puritanism of court life, and the restriction of the king's power to be subject to rather than the source of the law—are traceable to the idea of the one living God who is the source of all equality.

From the very beginning there is in the Old Testament an aversion not only to a minority régime but also to despotic rule. Redemptive religiosity, being disinterested in man, is also unconcerned with his political status. Hence, it is politically tolerant of the existing order. Buddha was not concerned with the injustice of the caste system, and Jesus advocated "render unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar." The Old Testament, however, is opposed to all forms of iniquity, whether political, economic, or social. Its uncompromising attitude to every form of injustice has its source in the knowledge of one living God who will violate natural laws for ethical reasons, but who will not transgress ethical laws for natural reasons.

The conception of the Kingdom of God or the kingdom of man, the denial of the world or its affirmation, man as a creature or man as the crown of creation, man looking backward or man looking forward, man listening to the voice of nature or to the commandment of God, man seeking salvation or seeking justice—these and all similar antinomies and contradictions are the consequences of either a dead or a living God.

If man is apart from nature, religion becomes objective and intellectual; but if he is a part of nature, it is subjective and psychological.

Aryan religiosity is lyrical in nature, soft, romantic,

full of symbolism, enchanting mysticism, and beautiful fables, supported by a powerful myth. Monotheistic religiosity, on the other hand, is hard, didactic, formalistic, and mythless. It projects religiosity even upon biological nature, and visions the day when the lamb and wolf shall dwell peacefully together. Aryan piety teaches that religiosity comes from within, Semitic religiosity from without. To the one religion has an immanent, and to the other a transcendent cause. The God of Eastern Aryan religiosity is a dead God within a bad world; the God of the Old Testament is a living God outside of a good world.

The greatest paradox in the nature of these two types of religiosity is that each represents the reverse of the temperament of the race which brought it into being. The fiery, intensely emotional Semite created legalistic religiosity, while the rational, sober Aryan evolved sentimental, emotional, and lyrical religiosity. The stiff-necked, reckless, uncivilized, and undomesticated Semite called into being nomocracies and theocracies, while the steady, calm, and pragmatic Aryans brought forth a type of religiosity which has scarcely any bearing upon political, economic, and social life. Emotional and lyrical religiosity continues itself in morality and actually precludes ethics. That which Spinoza and Buddha call ethics is not ethics but morality, for it kindles in feeling and is utilitarian in character. Ethics and morality, however, are two different domains. Ethics, as Plato, the prophets of Israel, and Immanuel Kant have demonstrated, presumes logics and has its root in reason, not in emotion. Morality, however, kindles in the emotions, in blind nature, and has no anchor-ground in reason. A man may be highly moral and at the same time alto-

gether unethical. The most hardened criminal, killer, robber, or burglar, to whom human life is valueless, may often be overwhelmed with compassion for the horse, the dog, or the cat. He will actually kill a human being in order to protect even the "honor" of his pet animal. The moral but unethical man is not limited to the hardened criminal, but is to be found in all strata of society. The old English maiden who leaves her wealth to establish an old cat's home, the European anti-vivisectionists, and the many groups devoted to the protection and care of animals are all overwhelmed by morality, but are lacking in ethics. In many instances these individuals are subhuman in the sense that they feel themselves to be closer to nature than to man. If man is the object of ethics, they are the incarnation of decadence. Buddhism abounds in this type of morality. A Buddhist would not drink any water which is suspected of containing living creatures. A Buddhistic legend even relates that Buddha died by giving himself as food to a hungry beast. Such is the spirit of Buddhistic morality.

The Old Testament teaches that ethics is the gift of a living God to man. He equipped man with reason to understand and with freedom of will to choose. But morality is the consequence of a dead God, for man is a living creature. Since morality is nature's voice—a matter of the senses—the type of religiosity linked with it is also inspired by nature. But this emotional morality and religiosity, although it may redeem the individual, is socially destructive, for it is not correlated to organized society. Medieval Europe was intensely pious and deeply religious, but at the same time was politically and socially iniquitous. Only through the rediscovery of the living God by the Reformation, and ancient classical

individualism by the Renaissance, was selfishness replaced by social consciousness.

Max Müller, the great Indologist, attempted to press all religious psychology into one formula: "*Nihil est in fide quod non ante fuerit in sensu*," "There is nothing in the faith that was not before in the senses." The senses are thus declared to be the source of all religiosity. Innumerable scholars and scientists have confirmed this view. All types of religiosity, except that of the prophets of Israel, is replete with eroticism. Arnold Ruge, historian and theologian, once stated that mysticism is theoretical voluptuousness, and voluptuousness is practical mysticism. Both are born in the emotions.

Religion and sex have always been closely related, for religion has been inspired by nature. If man is only a part of nature, spiritual redemption and elation are as lustful as erotic longings. Just as man's soul seeks salvation, so do his erotic emotions cry out for redemption. The one seeks redemption through union with the religious affinity, while the other relieves the tension through a physical embrace. Erotic and religious ecstasy originate in the same source—in the deeply felt need to perpetuate the self, to free it from the realm of the finite, and to secure its continuity. The intensification of these motives leads to mysticism in religion and to voluptuousness in love.

As Goethe's Pater Ecstaticus bursts forth in Faust:

Ewiger Wonnenbrand
Glühendes Liebesband
Südender Schmerz der Brust
Schäumende Gotteslust
Pfeile durchdringen mich
Lanzen bezwingen mich
Keule zerschmettert mich

Blitz durchwettert mich;
 Dass ja das Nichtige
 Alles verflüchtige
 Glänze der Dauerstern
 Ewiger Liebes Kern.

Spinoza's *amor Dei* is, in the final analysis, only erotic mysticism. It is interesting to note that his disciple, Novalis, suggests the doctrine of cosmic sexualism, visualizing the cosmic fabric as one erotic fabric. But, if man is apart from nature, his religiosity is above and beyond eroticism. The one living God, by His very oneness, precludes all sex. He is *spiritus purus*, without any admixture of sensuality, and hence He is holy. Man's relationship to a God who is pure spirit is necessarily spiritual and intellectual, to the exclusion of all sensuousness. More than the Old Testament admonishes man to love God, it commands him to recognize and to fear Him. In biblical terminology, piety is called *Yirath Shomayim*, "fear of God," and not *Ahavath Shomayim*, "love of God." Since Hebraic religiosity kindles in the intellect rather than in the senses, how does this intellectuality translate itself into religiosity?

God, as pure spirit only, is no different from Brahma. But God as pure ethical action is a living God, Who becomes a model for man. The recognition of God implies not merely the knowledge of His essence, but also of His attributes. It is thus through this recognition that holiness is born, and the religious process originates. However, Hebraic holiness and Buddhistic sanctity are not identical, for the one implies activity, the other passivity. Hebraic piety originates in man's concern with life, Buddhistic holiness, in the denial of life. To emulate God, who is *spiritus purus* and action, and to be in-

spired by His attributes, is the essence of ancient Hebraic religiosity.

Pantheistic religiosity prides itself in uniting man with God. This assertion implies that monotheistic religiosity creates an unbridgeable abyss between man and God, makes man a lonely and forlorn figure, and deprives him of initiative and courage. This implication is ill founded, because while monotheistic religiosity emphasizes the dualism between God and nature, it also stresses the spiritual correlation between God and man, in that his soul is a divine spark. Man's dual citizenship in the realms of nature and mind, far from relieving his ethical tension, intensifies it. Pantheistic religiosity, however, by identifying man with God or with nature, sterilizes man's ethical creativeness, because pantheism spells determinism, which is the graveyard of all ethics.

Thus did the free son of the desert evolve a world-picture, which is a projection of his freedom and individualism upon the forces of eternity.

II

The Old Testament is not a textbook of metaphysics, but nevertheless contains many metaphysical ideas, which have since become organic parts of Western culture. The most outstanding of these conceptions is the idea of God, which in its highest development is expressed in the formula, "I shall be that I shall be." It is a synthesis of being and ego, of universalism and individualism.

Two proofs for the existence of God, the cosmological and the ethical, are clearly defined in the Old Testament. The cosmological proof is dissolved in the story of creation. In place of formalistic arguments that this

cosmic fabric presumes a creator or a mover, Genesis begins with the story of the creation of one world by one God. Although the Bible makes constant references to this proof, it is not fundamental to the conception of the God-idea of the ancient Hebrews. To them the ethical was the primary proof for the existence of God. If man is apart from nature, he requires a master, guide, and teacher, for dumb nature is incapable of directing him. The spiritual primacy of man necessitates a living, i.e., an ethical God. God, as an ethical pattern for man, is far more important than God as the creator of the universe, for man transcends, in importance, the entire universe. The Jews have never dogmatized about the story of creation and, therefore, never quarreled with modern cosmology and evolution. But to the ethical God they have adopted a definitely circumscribed attitude, and have made no concessions or compromises. God is divine primarily because of His ethical attributes, which affirm this life.

This God of ethics later developed into a God of logics, and became the center of Jewish philosophical speculations. The God of logics was often subjected to severe criticism, some of His critics even going so far as to declare Him to be nonexistent. However, as a God of ethics, His position has always been impregnable. Thus Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, rejected Him as the God of logics, but in his *Critique of Practical Reason* he affirmed Him as the God of ethics. The view that man is the central theme of creation, transcending all nature in importance, makes ethics the presupposition of his continued existence, for if his realm remains unregulated, what will distinguish him from brute nature? But even more than motion requires a mover does ethics

necessitate an inspiring force. This ethical guide cannot possibly be a mathematical formula, or rigid causation, or indefinite Brahma. He can only be transcendental, self-conscious, and personal. But His personality need not be anthropomorphic in character, for in this instance personality and finiteness are not synonymous.

III

Ancient Hebraism, reduced to its ultimate principle, means the humanization of nature, not the naturalization of man. It was visualized in the eschatology of the prophets, when they taught that in the remote future nature will be governed, not by the blind laws of causation, but by the ethical laws of man. The ideal of peace and concord would even be realized in the animal kingdom. Nature will purge itself by domesticating its instincts, and by emulating the example of man. This hope was based upon the certainty of the sovereignty of the spirit and its final victory over nature. Therefore, the ancient Hebrews made no attempt to enslave nature as did the Western Aryan. Their attitude to biological nature as expressed in the Old Testament was only poetic, not scientific. Non-lyrical nature, however, was considered to be the realm of wild, untamed instincts and the personification of the a-logical and the a-ethical.² It contained nothing from which man could

² These cultural ideals of ancient Judaism, springing from a definite negative attitude toward biological nature, were forces contributing to the alienation of the Jew from the realities of life. The devotion to the spiritual resulted in a loss of direction in life. The ancient Jewish world-picture was not conducive to science, to philosophy or art, save to such abstract arts as poetry. Estranged from reality, the Jewish ethical law, with man as its center and object, lost its original dynamic force and became a static *din*, rabbinical decree. As a result of the overvaluation of the spirit, Judaism was reduced to a pale literary tendency in world-history instead of developing into an active historical force. Rabbinic Judaism became a-historical and lost its relationship to time and space. The dogma became the very center of

learn. This view harmonized completely with Socrates' foundations of ethics.

Man as a part of nature is keenly aware of his organic weaknesses, which he seeks to overcome by his inventive powers. By his material accomplishments he extends himself into nature and excels it. His poison gas is more venomous than the serpent's fangs. His torpedo is more destructive than the shark's molars. His bombing plane is more devastating than the eagle's claws. While man has sought to overcome nature by creating engines of civilization, he has thereby only imbedded himself all the more in nature. The problem of man he has left unsolved.

The ancient Hebrews were primarily concerned with man as a spiritual being, not with him as a weakling of nature. Since nature to them was the realm of brute feeling, they were not interested in penetrating into its secrets. They felt that an intimate contact with nature would distract them spiritually, and, eventually, would naturalize them. Hence they resisted nature and desisted from civilization. No passage of the Old Testament sheds more light upon this attitude than does I Sam. 13:19, "Now there was no smith to be found through all the land of Israel. . . . So it came to pass in the days of battle, that there was neither sword nor spear that went with Saul and Jonathan." Later, when Solomon built the temple, he had to beg Hiram, king of

life. The Jewish mind, therefore, became deproblemized with its intellect condemned to serve the purposes of a static jurisprudence and a static theology. Instead of being orientated in life, the Jew began to take his cue from dead books, in which the once-living God of Israel was buried. Mohammed's description of the Jews as a People of the Book is but a dubious compliment, for the Tibetans, too, are a people of the book. Disinterestedness in biological nature transformed living intellectualism into a dry rationalism. It is against this dry rationalism of rabbinic Judaism that emotional Christianity revolted and emerged victor.

Tyre, to send him skilled woodcutters, because there was none to be found in his kingdom.

The Hebrews, although they never built pyramids, fortresses, roads, or bridges, created great books. If great structures are symbolic of civilization, great books are symbolic of culture. After their dispersion, the only reminder of civilization which remained in Palestine was the Wailing Wall, but the marks of a great culture were very numerous. Their disregard of civilization and their emphasis of culture were determined by their negative attitude to biological nature. Would the abyss separating man and nature remain for all eternity? Such a prospect could not satisfy the prophetic genius. The problem could only be solved not through the naturalization of man but through the humanization of nature. He visioned the last day as marking not the destruction of nature but its reconstruction along ethical lines.

The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together. . . . And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together, and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. . . . They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.

It becomes increasingly evident that if the ideal is the humanization of nature, not the naturalization of man, his attitude toward his fellow-man cannot be based upon emotions and feelings which are part of nature, but upon reason. Reason implies personality, and consequently Hebraic ethics is as much concerned with personality as Buddhistic ethics is unconcerned with it.

It was not the spirit of paradox which prompted Max Müller to place Hebraism in juxtaposition to Buddhism, for they represent the two opposite poles in the realm of

spirit. What Judaism affirms, Buddhism denies. Judaism emphasizes a living God, man's personality, future, and spiritual supremacy. It affirms life and decrees its regulations through ethics, based upon logics. It is anthropocentric and optimistic. It commingles jurisprudence, politics, and economics with ethics. It does not unconditionally surrender man to the state or to the church, but makes ethics the all-powerful regulator of these institutions. All these views, tendencies, and postulates are rejected and denied by Buddhism. A dead God is not concerned with man, his future, his personality, or his well-being, but only presumes Nirvana.

When these two extreme and irresistible tendencies met in Alexandria and in Babylonia in the third century before Christ and descended upon Palestine, the El Dorado of all nations, a new combination of forces was bound to arise. Its consequences became destiny for the human race through the rise of Christianity and the dispersion of the Jews. The Diaspora was necessitated not by the rise of Christianity but by the inroads of Buddhism. The living and the dead God could not dwell together peacefully under the same sky.

IV

The differences of metaphysical and theological views, which for over two thousand years have kept the white man's camp divided, have had their bearings not only upon the spiritual but also upon the economic, political, and social life as well. Hence these differences have more than an academic meaning.

It is not at all immaterial for the march of daily events whether man is only part of nature or apart from nature, for not only questions of ethics but of jurisprudence and

politics as well are being formulated by the respective answer to the above-mentioned problem. That pantheistic religiosity is incompatible with true ethics Hermann Cohen has demonstrated with admirable clarity and precision. The ethics of pure will cannot have its kindling-point in biological nature where only the law of causation reigns supreme. It is, however, necessary to state that pantheism also shapes the destinies of jurisprudence and economics. How is it that *jus civile* represents the primacy in Roman law while *jus gentium* is the product of a much later development, while in the ancient Hebraic law *dina degavra* (*jus gentium*) precedes *dine momenoth* (*jus civile*)? It has never been observed yet that in spite of the eighth commandment theft, according to biblical and rabbinic law, does not constitute a felony but merely a grave misdemeanor and is not punishable by prison but by a fine. It is the only criminal code in which theft is considered a misdemeanor only. Nor the ancient rabbis venerate the institution of property, although the early Christian communistic tendencies were totally strange to the minds of the early fathers of the Synagogue. According to rabbinic law, the paying of debts is primarily an ethical rather than a legal obligation. Maimonides in his code, *Yad Hachasakah*, summing up the various legal provisions of the Talmud relative to property makes it quite clear that the ancient rabbis thought of property rights as contingent upon the welfare of man. There is, for instance, a provision that the creditor must not even show himself to the debtor if the latter is too poor to pay his debts. Nothing is more amazing in the history of ancient jurisprudence than the rabbinic law governing interests on loans. Not only is taking of interest totally forbidden, but even

“dust” interests in the form of compliments to the creditor or smiling to the creditor or doing him any favor to appease him is strictly forbidden. In short, money per se has no rights, property is not an idol; it is not something that is sacrosanct, but the rights of man, *dine degavre*, is sacrosanct. He who insults, offends, or puts to shame his fellow-man publicly will not have a share in the hereafter, and he who merely lifts his hand against his fellow-man is already a villain, decreed the rabbis. All property rights again are made subservient to the rights of man. The creditor has no right to take away the dowry of a widow-debtor though she may be wealthy, because the widow has special rights, and so have the orphans, and the poor generally have economic claims not as a matter of charity but as a matter of right, *zdokoh*.

What have these amazing legal provisions to do with the metaphysical world-picture of the Old Testament?

If man is only a part of nature, if he is only *homo phenomenon*, he has no special rights, for in the pantheistic scheme of things the sphere of right is delimited by the sphere of might. It is to Spinoza's credit that he made this clear. If man is only a part of nature, he has no more rights than nature, than things, than property, for he is then only one of the *modi*, governed by the law to which all the *modi* are subjected. But if man is apart from nature and is also *homo noumenon*, he must be subject to a law different from that of nature, and in this case *jus gentium* precedes *jus civile*. While in the pantheistic scheme of things the right of man is only a part of the right of nature, because man is only a part of nature, in the theistic scheme of things the center of gravity is not property rights but the right of man.

The rabbinic literature, to the extent that it is legal in

character, is dedicated to the right of man. Patrological literature is not interested in man but in God. In the one case, the problem is man's welfare; in the other, it is man's salvation or redemption. In the one case, life is affirmed and an attempt made to regulate it by law; while in the other case life is denied and an attempt is made to get rid of it. The denial of life makes not only ethics but also jurisprudence impossible. But since life would not permit those who deny it to destroy it, and continues to develop independently of those who wail and lament, it develops an ethics and jurisprudence without any idealistic orientation. He who lamented most about the worthlessness of life, Schopenhauer, and made the negation of the will to live the kindling-point of his entire philosophical system, correctly stated that right is only the denial of wrong. The moral world-order is immorality and the good is only an interruption of the evil just as joy is only an interruption of sadness or fortune an interruption of misfortune. But if the living God is primarily a God of justice, the reverse is true. Hence the optimistic and idealistic fervor of the Old and the pessimistic sighing of the New Testament. Hence the anthropology of the rabbis and the mystic theosophy of the Fathers of the church.

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INDIA IN THE WEST

I

THE military annals of ancient Greece are unique in that they record the compassion of the victors, for such of the vanquished who were blessed with beautiful physiques. The ideal of beauty haunted the Greek even upon the battlefield. The beautiful was his sole compensation for the trials and tribulations of life. But the same ideal which softened his heart upon the battlefield often hardened it when his senses thirsted for beauty amid an atmosphere of peace. Nietzsche contends that the fair Helen was the justification for the shocking brutalities displayed by the Greeks in their numerous wars. She personified the Greek idea of beauty, and the adoration of her assumed the form of a cult. The Hellene regarded the attainment of the highest artistic form as the greatest accomplishment in life. His basic world-idea was the beautiful.

In India, however, the Aryan was utterly disinterested in the beautiful and aspired only to holiness. Not the senses, the anchor ground of all beauty, but the spirit moved him. To establish a contact with the spirit, he had to overcome and subjugate the senses; to attain beatitude he had to overcome life with its myriad of colors and sounds. Not the worship but the denial of the senses was his idea. From times immemorial asceticism was predominant in India. Long before the rise of the Yoga philosophy in India, there already existed an ascetic practice, which sought to attain the holy.

Ananda and Nirvana were a state of non-sensuality and, therefore, the highest form of holiness.

Between these two extreme Aryan ideals, the one based upon the affirmation and the other upon the denial of the senses, the one aspiring to the beautiful and the other to holiness, there arose a mediating force in the ancient Hebraic idea of the good. Although it positively affirmed life, it refused to worship the senses. The highest goal was not the beautiful or the holy, but the good. Such an ideal presupposed the curbing, but not the denial, of the senses. The good is attainable as a result of a permanent conflict or tension between the senses, and the ethical consciousness which is orientated in the intellect. In contrast to the Hellene, the ancient Hebrew rejected nature as a source of inspiration, and, unlike the Hindu, he rejected it as a source of lamentation. Thus, in the course of his intellectual and spiritual struggles, ancient man evolved but three basic world-ideas: the aesthetic, the spiritual, and the ethical.

Among the many things the ancient Greeks and ancient Hebrews had in common was the conception of an active world. The Greek Eros and the Hebraic Messiah both presumed a dynamic universe. Although both viewed it from different angles, they discovered in it a constant process of revitalization and organic evolution. The men of the great synagogue taught the believers to pray to Him, "Who in His goodness renews the world daily." Likewise, every great representative of ancient Hellas was overwhelmed with the idea of an active and dynamic world. The Eastern Aryans, however, although related by blood to the ancient Greeks, evolved a picture not only of a dead God, but also of a passive and still world. Just as the Greek Eros and the Hebraic

Messiah are the very embodiment of activism, so is Brahma the very incarnation of stillness. His absolute being is to the exclusion of all becoming. He is stiff and motionless, for, being beyond life, he is also beyond all dynamics.

It is one of the most astounding paradoxes in the history of man's spiritual development that not the active world-idea of the Greek or the Hebrew, but the passive world-idea of the Hindu, became predominant in the Western World. But the paradox is easily explained when one considers that the representatives of the active world-idea had exhausted themselves through centuries of combat and strife with each other. When the sources of subjectivism and individualism in Judea and Greece had spent themselves, the spirit of passivity and pessimism of the Middle East settled upon the Grecian polis and upon the Judean hamlets. The figure of the ancient Greek Eros transformed itself into the penitent God-seeker, and the virile and courageous prophet of Jerusalem was replaced by the meek and will-less scribe.

Hinduism in its Buddhistic form finally overwhelmed the Western world, not because its world-idea was inherently superior to that of the Greek or the Hebraic, but because, being passive and still from the very beginning, it had not spent itself as did the other two world-concepts. With death as its goal it could not die, for nothing is more immortal than the cemetery.

After the death of Gautama, Buddhism stole into the Western world and rooted itself into the soil. It spread its wings over the dying cities of the Aramaic lands and even enveloped the great seats of Hellenistic civilization. And just as the Eastern Aryan, because of his weakened physique, surrendered to nature, so now did the Western

Aryan, in his hour of exhaustion, surrender to the spirit of the East.

Although from times immemorial there were certain contacts between the Eastern and the Western Aryans, the logic of history demanded that Palestine become the meeting-ground of East and West. This was not due to any blind caprice of fate. Palestine is geographically situated midway between the settlements of the Eastern and Western Aryans, and was thus the logical battleground for the two contradicting world-ideas to encounter and to decide man's spiritual destiny for a thousand years. Buddhism closed in on Palestine from Persia and Babylonia on the east, and from Greece and Egypt on the west. The struggle between the Buddhist and the Hellenist in Palestine destroyed not merely the Greek but also the Jew.

The triumph of Buddhism in Palestine led to the greatest religious upheaval in the world's history, resulting, first, in the destruction of Judea; second, in the rise of Christianity; and, third, in the destruction of ancient Rome. All historians and scholars, except St. Augustine, agree that the rise of Christianity spelled ruin to ancient Rome. Not the aggressive barbarians, but the ascetic saints, who planted Eastern holiness in the Western world, were the true destroyers of Rome. It is equally true that not the Roman Caesar, but the Buddha Gautama, destroyed Judea. Not the desolation of the land by the Roman legions, but the dilution of Judaic culture by Buddhism, destroyed the entire fabric of Jewish life in Palestine. The moment when the spirit of Buddhism infiltrated into Palestine and led to the formation of sects, which were opposed to the Hebraic ideal of the supremacy of man and the value of

earthly life, the die was cast. The Essenes, the Man-deans, and the various Nazareans, which were permeated with the spirit of a more or less diluted Buddhism, brought there by Buddhistic monks and missionaries, spread the gospel of salvation, redemption, and beatitude through self-denial, resignation, and the deadening of the senses. There the ideal of the holy as against the ideal of the good or the beautiful destroyed the devitalized and decadent Hebraic culture and set the stage for the elimination of ancient Hebraism as a force in the world's history.

In describing the process of the origin of Western redemptive religiosity, it will become evident that the powerful tendencies emanating from the East, which had reached their culmination point in Buddhism, continued themselves in St. John, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. Their spirit uprooted and destroyed the civilization of classical antiquity and forced upon occidental humanity a new mentality. Paulinic Christianity is a new mentality rather than a new religion.

II

One of the strangest phenomena in Greek history was the destruction of Sybaris, a Hellenic city known for its frivolity, carnal lust, and joy of living, by the ascetic followers of Pythagoras. The Greeks had made a cult of the senses and were given to play, frivolity, and joy. Pythagoras, however, whom his own countrymen considered a stranger and who was the founder of a new religion rather than a new philosophy, introduced a discordant note into Hellenic life. He was the holy, silent island in the sea of stormy but beautiful Greek life. Although a philosopher and a mathematician, he was

also a religionist who headed a fanatical religious order. Philosophers are tolerant and are more interested in the truth per se than in missionarizing it. Pythagoras, however, was always eager to impose his truth upon his environment by means of military and political force. The destruction of Sybaris was not an isolated phenomenon, but probably represents the culmination point of a struggle of the Pythagorean asceticism against joyous paganism. Pythagoras was the very embodiment of intolerance, puritanism, asceticism, and self-denial. He is inconceivable as a purely Hellenic figure, for the Greek was religiously neutral. After his death many legends clustered about his name, including one which reported that he had spent several years in India. Even if this tale had no foundation in fact, both his personality and his doctrine testify to the influence of the East.

During the past century almost all Indologists and historians agree that Pythagoras drew from ancient Hindu philosophy. Sir William Jones already pointed out the analogies between the Samkhya and the Pythagorean systems. Samkhya means "number," which to Pythagoras was everything. Furthermore, the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis is analogous to the Hindu tenet of the transmigration of the soul.

About fifty years ago Leopold von Schroeder, a celebrated German Indologist, pointed out in his essay, *Pythagoras und die Inder*,¹ that all the doctrines ascribed to Pythagoras, both speculative and scientific, were already current in India as early as 600 B.C. Even the so-called Pythagorean theorem of the irrational number was developed before him in the Culvasutras in India. The very character of the Pythagorean organization, the

¹ Leipzig, 1894.

religious fraternity, was Hindu and not Greek in origin. Whether he acquired his Hindu wisdom in India or in Persia, there can be no doubt that he represents an Eastern tendency in Western thought. The same can also be said of Empedocles, who, by the way, was also considered a stranger by his countrymen. According to Garbe,² not only Empedocles and Pythagoras, but also the Eleatics, Xenophanes, and Parmenides, represent oriental wisdom in the Occident.

The most striking resemblance—I am almost tempted to say sameness—is the all, the one in the Upanishads and the philosophy of the Eleatics. Xenophanes teaches that God and the Universe are one, eternal and unchangeable, and Parmenides holds that reality is due alone to this universal being, neither created nor to be destroyed, and omnipresent. Further, that everything which exists in multiplicity and is subject to mutability is not real, that thinking and being are identical. All these doctrines are congruent to the chief contents of the Upanishads and of the Vedanta system founded upon the latter.

Many scholars have already observed that Heraclitus' theory of the eternal change corresponds to a similar doctrine of the Samkhya philosophy. His doctrine of the innumerable annihilations and reformations of the universe is, according to Colebrooke,³ one of the best-known theories of the Samkhya system.

There are also many elements in the philosophy of Plato which are of Hindu origin. In all likelihood Plato, who was an admirer of Pythagoras, drew his inspiration not from contact with India, but from the founder of the first ascetic order in Greece. A thorough examination of the century-old controversy about Hindu-Greek relationships justifies the assumption that both branches of the Aryan race were in touch with each other. The

² *The Philosophy of India* (Chicago, 1897).

³ Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays*, I, 241.

analogies and parallels in the philosophical thought of both cultures are so striking that they cannot be explained by logical continuity alone.

Ancient India was never hermetically sealed to the outer world. From times immemorial it was reached by traders from Western and Central Asia. A country with as rich a culture as India, which was constantly visited by traders from many countries, was bound to color the historical process of those countries which were in contact with the West. The cultural stream moved westward from India, and not eastward from Greece, for the Eastern Aryan matured intellectually before his Western cousin. Alexander's attraction to the East was stimulated, not by a sudden vision of the Orient, but by older Greek tradition.

While all the details of pre-Buddhistic contact with the West are not yet a matter of philological knowledge, India's post-Buddhistic relationships with the West are well known. A generation after the death of Alexander, Indian potentates were already dispatching diplomatic emissaries to the West. King Osaka, the Constantine of Buddhism who lived in the third century B.C., followed this tradition so meticulously that he actually developed a new diplomatic technique. Within two generations after the death of Alexander, regular trade routes connected India with Greece, and a steady stream of exchanges took place. The Occident was fascinated by the spiritual influx from the East, which stimulated in it a desire for still closer contact. Selenius of Antioch sent Megasthenes as his ambassador to the court of Patna, with special instructions to furnish him with a complete description of India. Ptolemy of Alexandria sent Dionysius to India for the same purpose. In addition,

a continuous and steady stream of communication was maintained between East and West since the third century B.C. via the Caspian Sea, the Caucasuses, and Armenia. There was also a sea route via Ceylon. Through many channels, communication between the centers of culture of the two branches of the Aryan race were kept open.

The traders, emissaries, ambassadors, and missionaries from the East brought with them to the West, not isolated Eastern ideas, but the framework of a definite system of culture, namely, Buddhism. The rock inscriptions of King Osaka relate that as early as the third century B.C. Buddhism was already highly organized, legalized, and missionarized. From one of his inscriptions it appears that the Buddhistic trinity—Buddha, Darmah, and Samgha—God-father, God-son or Logos, and the Holy Spirit—had already been carried by Buddhistic priests to all parts of the Western world. In the second century B.C. many cultural centers in Asia Minor were thoroughly familiar with Buddhism.⁴

Alexandria and Rome became the goal of Hindu missionaries and propagandists. King Osaka knew the potentates of Syria and Macedonia by their full names, and mentioned them in his inscriptions as followers of his law. In the West, Seneca compiled a work upon India which, however, was lost. The fate of this work also overtook many other contemporary occidental works upon India. These defections explain the sporadic mention of Buddhism in the early writings of the Fathers of the church. Only Clemens of Alexandria,

⁴ This becomes evident from a passage of Alexander Polyhistor, preserved by Cyril of Alexandria, in which the Buddhists are referred to as Samanos.

who lived in the second century after Christ, mentions Buddha by name.

Buddhism stormed into the Western world at a time when the creative genius of the ancient Greeks had already spent itself. Its commingling with a decadent Greek culture resulted in a new spiritual orientation, which found its expression in neo-Platonism, neo-Pythagoreanism, and Gnosticism. A similar metamorphosis took place in Palestine, when it, in its turn, was overwhelmed by Buddhistic influences. Essenism, Mandaeism, Ebionitism, and Nazareanism were the Palestinian products of the encounter between Hebraism and Buddhism. These sects are the connecting link between Buddhism and Christianity.

III

In no other great religious document are the doctrines of free will, the primacy of the intellect, and the affirmation of life expounded with such clarity and forcefulness as in the Old Testament. It may be said without exaggeration that these three doctrines constitute the essence of Old Testament religiosity. He who denies any one of them rejects the Old Testament as a religious document.

During the rebellion against Roman tyranny and oppression in Palestine, there sprung up the sect of Essenes, who, while confessing to a belief in the Old Testament, rejected the three basic doctrines referred to above. Instead they taught determinism, fatalism, the denial of life and the primacy of the emotions. Thus, while they formally accepted the Old Testament, they actually repudiated it in substance. To consider them to be a Jewish sect is to misunderstand completely the

entire historical process. The sect was originally the Ashi, a Chaldean word for bathers or Baptists. Their very name already indicated that religiously they deviated from the traditions of their race, which ignored baptism as a religious act. All the characteristics of Buddhistic life—celibacy, communism, puritanism, passivity, contempt for sensuous pleasures, the refusal to take an oath, and the like—testify to their non-Jewish character. Like all Buddhistic religious groups, they were organized as an order, and as a closed fraternity. Although they numbered only four thousand, they erected an insurmountable barrier between themselves and their people. Like all Buddhistic groups, they too turned away from life. They refused to participate in political affairs, and were disinterested in the state and its welfare. Their final goal was the Kingdom of Heaven, a spiritual state having no bearing upon reality, to be attained in the remote future. To attain this goal it was necessary to withdraw from the hustle and bustle of life. Gradually the Essenes withdrew from the religious and national affairs of their people and completely surrendered their national consciousness. They appeared as a religious sect, having no relationship to their religious and national environment. Unfortunately their main document, the Megillath Chassidim, which summarized their religious and political doctrines, has been lost.

Philo of Alexandria left two records of the Essenes at their highest peak of development.⁵ Although Philo never saw their mode of life, for he never visited Pales-

⁵ William King, *The Gnostics and Their Remains*, p. 1: "Their [the Essenes'] chief doctrines had been held for centuries before in many of the cities of Asia Minor. There, it is probable, they first came into existence as mystae, upon the establishment of direct intercourse with India, under the Selencidees, and Ptolemies."

tine, he described them in such positive terms that he must have possessed first-hand information about this strange sect.

They do not lay up treasures of gold or silver, nor do they acquire large portions of land out of a desire for revenues, but provide themselves only with the absolute necessities of life. No makers of arrows, darts, spears, swords, helmets, breastplate, or shields—no manufacturer of arms or engines of war, nor of things belonging to war, or even of such things as might lead to wickedness in times of peace, is to be found among them. Traffic, inn-keeping, or navigation, they never so much as dream of, because they repudiate every inducement to covetousness. There is not a single slave to be found among them, for all are free and mutually serve each other. They leave the logical part of philosophy to the word catchers, and the natural part to the astrological babblers, excepting for those problems which treat of the existence of God and of the origin of the universe. The ethical part they thoroughly work out themselves. They are instructed in piety, holiness, righteousness, economy, politics, in the knowledge of what is truly good, bad and indifferent, so that they can choose those things which are necessary, and reject the unnecessary.

The account of Josephus about the Essenes agrees in all its details with that of Philo. From his account, too, it can be inferred that they were not a Jewish sect. Both accounts stamp them definitely as a Buddhistic sect. Their conception of the immortality of the soul establishes their philosophical dependence upon Buddhism. "The soul is neither mortal nor immortal." This view represents a mystical type of consciousness that was utterly strange to the logical Greek or to the rationalistic Hebrew. Only the mystic can affirm and deny in the same breath. Only the mystic can accept monotheism and trinity at the same time.

The Essenes were allied with many other sects of similar persuasion, such as the Ebionites, the Therapeutae, the Hemero-Baptists, and the Eranos. Except for the

last group, all the others practiced asceticism, and were carried by religious mysticism, which was incomprehensible to the sober-minded Judeans. All these sects and brotherhoods were conceived in the spirit of Buddhism.

Although we no longer possess first-hand information about the philosophic and religious doctrines of the Essenes, we are more familiar, however, with the theories of the Mandeans, an important related sect.

Two industrious scholars, Litzbarsky and Richard Reitzenstein, have recently, independently of each other, thrown some interesting light upon the intellectual background of the Mandeans. Litzbarsky believes that their original dwelling-place was the Jordan Valley; that they were identical with the sect of John the Baptist; and that, like the Essenes, they were also called Nazareans. A small Mandaean group survived, and is still to be found in the valley of the Euphrates.

According to Litzbarsky, Brandt,⁶ and others, the prophet of the Mandeans is John the Baptist. Their principal sacred work is called *Sidra Rabba*, in which is developed a metaphysical principle, which is reminiscent of the Atman-Brahma theory of ancient India. Their cosmic principle, *Mana Rabba*, the All, is bounded only by itself and all things emanate from it. It is the golden egg of the Brahminic cosmogony, and corresponds to the Hindu Atman. In the Mandaean metaphysics, there is already fully developed the principles of the trinity, consisting of *Pira Ayar*, *Mana Rabba*, and *Demutah*—God-father, God-son, and the Holy Spirit.

Richard Reitzenstein, one of the foremost authorities on comparative religion, states that "the doctrines of the Mandeans bear no resemblance to those of Juda-

⁶ *The Mandeans, Their Religion and Their History* (1915).

ism.”⁷ Ado, the founder of the sect, was a wandering mendicant, and in all probability a Buddhistic monk. This semi-Buddhistic sect in accepting John the Baptist as its main prophet became one of the spirits which made it possible for Christianity to arise.

Buddhism penetrated into Palestine, not only through Chaldea, but also through Greece. The famous Indologist, Lassen, who denies that ancient India ever affected Hellenic thought, admits its influence upon neo-Platonism and Gnosticism. In his major opus, *Indian Antiquity*, he says, “The Hindu elements in the Gnostic systems were derived from Buddhism and exercised a considerable influence upon the spiritual life in Alexandria.” Lassen maintains that Gnostic cosmogony is of pure Buddhistic origin. There are many analogies and parallels between Gnosticism and Buddhism, chief among which are the identification of soul and light and the contrast of soul and matter.

But even more than the influence of Gnosticism, Essenism, Mandeism, and other similar sects, with their metaphysical and theosophical doctrines, has the Logos-idea been instrumental in shaping Christianity. The Logos of Christianity must not be confused with the Logos of Heraclitus and the Stoics. Only to Christianity did it signify something purely theosophical—the second person of God or the intermediary between God and man.

Whether the Logos of Heraclitus is Hindu in origin is a matter of debate, but there can be no doubt that the Hellenistic doctrine of the Logos as developed by Philo of Alexandria is of Eastern origin.⁸ In its days, Alexan-

⁷ *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium* (Bonn, 1921).

⁸ O. William, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, I, 89.

dria seethed with Buddhistic missionaries, who not only spread the gospel of Buddha, but also propagated the philosophical teachings of their race. Philo's doctrine of the Logos was colored by these currents,⁹ which originated in the Rigveda, in the conception of *vach* or voice or the word. Even his God or Theos-idea has nothing in common with the Old Testament, since it too bears the brand of the East. To him God is identical with being, with the unchangeable, with the pure unmixed oneness, with the infinite and the perfect, who faces matter which is unreal, non-being, evil, imperfect, finite, and changeable. He is the efficient cause unto Himself. The world is inefficient and dependent, and hence cannot be deduced from Him. He is supersensuous, inconceivable, incapable of affection or passion, and not within space and time. There is an absolute dissimilarity between God and all the creatures, including man. He is above and beyond all attributes and properties. Only the name "being" befits Him.

Philo's Theos is nothing else than the Hinduistic Brahma or Atman idea in Hellenistic garb. He, too, is a still, motionless, static, dead God. A dead God is not an explanation for a living world. If God is dead and the world is alive, who created it? But since Philo was a Jew by blood and a Greek by culture, and thus still overwhelmed with individualism, he could not permit a dead God to swallow a living world, as Spinoza did later. Therefore, he resorted to the Logos, which served as an intermediary between a dead God and a living world.

⁹ Weber, *Indischen Studien*. Almost all historians of philosophy assume that Philo's Logos was inspired by the Stoics. That this is not the case can be seen from the fact that, while the Stoics' Logos meant either destiny or pneuma, an all-penetrating moral and rational force, but not a metaphysical principle, Philo's Logos is a cosmic, metaphysical entity, resembling the attribute of thinking of Spinoza's substance. See also bibliographical notes.

It is God's representative ambassador and archangel to its world, whose function it is to administer it for God. It is also the world's representative and high priest to God, whose function it is to lay the prayers of the world before God. He is the Son of God and the first-born. Man, himself, is a divine being only to the extent that he participates in Logos. As God's Son, Logos is the second God. He is uncreated in the earthly sense, but is an emanation of God.

Many other Buddhistic elements, such as the idea of God impregnating a virgin, causing her to give birth to His Son, are to be found in Philo.

The idea of a dead God, the conception of a mediator between God and the world, and the mythical vision of a God remote from reality, begetting a Son from a virgin, were not only strange but even revolting to the ancient Hebraic mind. It is, therefore, a misunderstanding of history, which has caused innumerable theologians and historians to regard Philo as the connecting link between Hebraism and Christianity. As a matter of fact, he is the most direct link between Hinduism and Christianity. His Logos-idea and his conception of salvation and its attainment by self-denial point to ancient India.

These theories foreshadowed early Christianity and paved the way for the coming of John the Baptist. "In the beginning there was a Logos. . . ."

IV

The village and the ghetto are not subject to change, and their skyline never varies. The ghetto of today differs little from the Palestinian ghetto of two thousand years ago. Those who are familiar with its life have oft-

en observed pale, emaciated figures moving through its crooked lanes, as if in a trance. They glide slowly and noiselessly like shadows, and carry themselves like cloud-walkers. They are pious, saintly men. They talk little, but when they speak their subject is mainly Messiah, or the hereafter. Their desires are few and their main concern is the world to come. Like all saints, they have a deep contempt for earthly life, which to them is only a prelude to a life of eternal bliss in the hereafter. These dreamers of the ghetto are mainly apocalyptic figures, who are shaped and chiseled by a tragic fate. Only the Eastern landscape, with its deadening monotonous planes and its desert-like stillness, interrupted by cries of agony and woe, can produce men to whom life is only a vale of tears.

When Pontius Pilatus ruled supreme in Palestine in the name of Caesar, the land was no longer the Jewish country, although its inhabitants were mainly Jews, but a ghetto formed by the political, economic pressure from without and the Hellenizing process from within. Like all other ghetti, it produced its holy men, saints, cloud-walkers, and dreamers, who denied life because life had denied them everything.

Jesus of Nazareth was such a holy man of the Palestine ghetto. He was the incarnation of piety, humility, meekness, and spirituality. Just as today not the holy but the learned man in the ghetto is its central figure, so then not Jesus but the Pharisees, the cast of scholars, the legalists, were the all-important men. But destiny and the logic of history willed it that not a learned but a holy man of the Palestine ghetto should become the central figure of the world's history. Destiny willed it that the humble carpenter's son of Galilee be elevated

to the position of Christ and become the greatest and most inspiring figure in all history—as if history wanted to affirm that not legality but morality, not intellect but emotion, is the primary driving force in life.

Like all pious figures of the ghetto, Jesus of Nazareth, too, was neither a philosopher, a rabbi, a theologian, nor a social reformer. He was but little concerned with earthly life, and hence had no problems to solve, no questions to answer. His only message to humanity was that of apocalyptic hope. His was a dream world, through which He moved like a shadow, silently, noiselessly, pensively. In the case of Jesus of Nazareth, history marched with seven-league boots to make His fate a symbol of world-historic magnitude. Here was a citizen of two worlds, with sufficient strength of character to surrender completely His citizenship rights in the realm of matter and to identify Himself exclusively with the realm of the spirit. Here was a man whose heart was as pure as that of a child, who lived in the Roman Empire but was scarcely aware of it, who moved in the shadow of the rigorous Jewish legality but was hardly affected by it. This childlike innocence, amid the legions of Caesar, the rigor of the rabbinic legalists, and the noise of Hellenistic paganism, captivated and fascinated humanity. History has never seen such purity of heart in a perverted, decadent, corrupt world. Hence, the tragedies of the problemizing Socrates, the pacanizing Bruno, and the geometrizing Spinoza are pale episodes in comparison to the grandeur of His tragic fate.

The figure of the emerging Jesus in a dying world is reminiscent of a tear ossified into a pearl. His contempt for the flesh, for earthly life and its pleasures, originated in an existence which was studded with corpses still

breathing. His sighs were deep and heart-rending, because they welled from a pure and innocent soul. Even before His coming the country was charged with religious tension. Everyone expected the Redeemer and prayed for the Savior. Messianic memories of old, the message of salvation and redemption breaking forth from the East, and the growing contempt for life as the result of oppression and pain led to the formation of innumerable religious movements and sects, each of which possessed its own gospel of salvation. The Essenes, the Mandeans, the Nazareans, the Ebionites, and innumerable others offered their own messages of hope and redemption. A *Stimmung* of tense religious expectancy had settled upon the villages and hamlets of Galilee. All eyes were turned to heaven, all hands were folded in pious prayer, all eyes were filled with tears. Amid these prayers, tears, and religious expectations there suddenly appeared the overwhelming figure of John the Baptist, who personified all the tendencies, currents, and thoughts of his time and environment. The Semitic desert in which the Hebraic law of all life originated now became the goal of a penitent, preaching apostle, who denied both the law and life. In him the Roman *Lex* and the Hebraic *Chok* found an uncompromising adversary. He fiercely hated everything Roman and Hebraic, everything civilized and cultured. Just as later St. Paul was attracted by the city, so was this mighty apostle attracted by the desert, whose monotony and lifelessness meant to him a symbol of purity.

John preached penitence, announcing in flaming words the end of the world and the coming of a Son of Man, who is not identical with the Jewish Messiah, who would destroy this sinful and sin-laden world. John pic-

tured the last day as a day of flames, which would consume the world.

John the Baptist was the first of the great religious figures of his time who broke with Jewish religious tradition. His religiosity is not Jewish or even Essenic, but is Mandaic, a mixture of Buddhism, Chaldaic myth, and diluted Parseeism. It was the call of John the Baptist which aroused Jesus. Like his guide, Jesus too became enveloped in an apocalyptic spirit. He too visioned only the world to come, not the world that is. He hoped that the redeemer would soon come and cause the world to expiate for its sins. When he was completely absorbed by the certainty of the coming of the Redeemer, it flashed upon him that He, Himself, was the Redeemer. At first he barely dared to admit it to himself; later he slowly revealed it to his friends, who spread his message over the entire countryside: "The Redeemer is coming." While those who were close to Him believed in his mission, He Himself was still tortured by doubts, and the possibility that He was in error robbed Him of His peace of mind. At times He felt that His power was waning and then He was on the verge of a collapse. These doubts and fears testify to His purity of heart and honesty of purpose, for, living in an apocalyptic world, He could not ward off the visions of terror and despair, of hope and salvation, which overwhelmed Him.

No man could say of himself more justly than did Jesus, "I am not of this world." Nothing upon the surface of the earth or anything which grew out of it attracted Him. Caesar and high priest, skyline and landscape, colors and sounds, labor and wealth, meant nothing to Him. He was not a saint because He never had to struggle with the forces of sin and to overcome them.

Hailing from the village with its naïve, childlike people and their primitive piety, Jesus was not interested in the problems of life. When he treaded the streets of Jerusalem his eye was not delighted with the skyline nor was his ear elated by the voice of the city. Not like a stranger, but like a ghost, He flitted through the city streets. As His few remaining days of earthly life passed, His personality softened and all bitterness vanished from His soul. His childlike innocence and His pity for His fellow-man drew Him back to the hamlets of Galilee. He had but one message to humanity—the Kingdom of God—a doctrine which had but little in common with the hereafter of the rabbis. Not this world, not this life with its many turns of the wheel of fate, with its tragedies and comedies, but the Kingdom of God is the goal of man. Not ceremonials, rituals, or prayers, but faith in God, is man's purpose, care, and aim. Since this world is not man's final goal, everything in it is valueless and meaningless. This new doctrine by its affirmation of God denies life, man, and the world. Since man cannot serve two masters, God and mammon, it is necessary that he dispose of his earthly goods to the poor in order that he may gather celestial rewards. To serve God it is necessary to free one's self from all ties of earthly life, to forego human relations, loves and friendships, rights and privileges, to suppress all natural urges, to endure injustice and disgrace, to offer no resistance to the enemy, but to love and to bless him for the sake of Christ.¹⁰

It was with this doctrine of self-denial¹¹ and negation

¹⁰ Matt. 5:39.

¹¹ There is a legend telling that Buddha died by giving himself to a pack of hungry beasts to still their hunger and thus diminish their suffering. Jesus died by giving

of life and the world that Jesus broke with the traditions of His people. It was not necessary for Him to violate or to deny the law to bring about this separation. It was tragic because it was necessary.

Jesus can be understood only as the incarnation of the apocalyptic spirit of His time and country, which defied tradition, and had no regard for the past. He did not consciously break with His people, but was driven away from them by forces over which He had no control. To Judaism the Messiah is a political and ethical figure, linked with a thousand ties to the national aspirations of the Jewish people. To Jesus, His messiahship was neither political, economic, or social, for it was not of this world. Like all other Essenes, he was entirely unconcerned with earthly life and its future. His aspirations were purely religious, and it is questionable whether he even hoped to become a religious reformer. Every reformer must affirm earthly life and must have worldly interests, but Jesus and His Kingdom were not of this world. Not man's welfare but the saving of man's soul was His main concern.

Ancient Hebraism affirmed life, the world, and man. Only in a later period of its history did it learn of another world. In renouncing His citizenship of this world, Jesus renounced Judaism. In creating the impression that He considered Himself to be the mediator between man and God, He aroused the ire of His people, for the primary tenet of Judaism teaches that God faces all humanity and does not require an intermediary. Although Jesus was of Jewish blood, His mind was not

himself as a redeemer of humanity. St. Paul's scheme for human redemption is like that of Buddha, freeing man from sin and death. Buddha says desire, flesh, body, St. Paul says desire, flesh, sin.

hewn from pure Jewish rock, for His main doctrines originated not in the valley of the Jordan but along the banks of the Ganges.

V

Jesus is the most prominent and at the same time the most misunderstood figure in white man's history. From times immemorial, theologians and historians have made frantic efforts to link Him to the prophets of Israel, and to present Him as the peak of Jewish spiritual development. With the exception of Friedrich Nietzsche, not one Christian thinker ever observed the discord between the Old and the New Testaments, for there have never been two great religious documents having so little in common with each other, which have been combined under the same covers, for the one is a Semitic and the other is an Aryan religious document. The one begins with the story of creation and the other with the biography of a God. In the one book is described how man can best secure his welfare, and in the other how he can best save his soul. The one is a sociological and the other is a purely religious and metaphysical document. One book has its origin in the desert and the other in the jungle.

Whether or not Jesus was a Jew by race is of little importance; that He was not a Jew in spirit only dogmatists will deny. The reputation of Jesus is not affected and His influence not jeopardized even if He appears as the Buddha of the West rather than as the last prophet of Israel. But unfortunately Christian theology was never as critical, impartial, and unbiased a branch of learning as is Buddhistic or Islamic theology. That Jesus is the last prophet of Israel or even that he is a development

of Judaism is only a prejudice of dogmatic theology, but is not historical truth.

A half-century ago, Rudolph Seydel, the great German historian of religion, published a book¹² in which he clearly demonstrated that all the tales, miracles, similes, and proverbs of the Christian gospels have their counterparts in the Buddhistic gospels.¹³ He compared the original texts and sources of both gospels, and without drawing any conclusions he demonstrated the remarkable analogies and parallels between the two. He compared the strikingly similar legends of the royal origin and of the holy conception of Buddha and Jesus. One need only compare Luke, verses 129-135, with the Buddhistic tale of the immaculate conception:

Thou wilt be filled with the highest joy, a son will be born to you, whose limbs will be decorated by significant signs, a noble issue of royal dynasty, a highly noble king of kings. When he will leave lust, kingdom and residence to enter to the state of sainthood, because of his love for all man, he will be worth the sacrifice of three worlds, and it will be the Buddha.

Buddha's mother was the holy virgin Maya Devi and Jesus' mother was the holy virgin Mary. Both virgins were holy brides, betrothed to the Holy Spirit, and both gave birth to godly sons. The immaculate conception of Maya Devi is as important a dogma in Buddhistic theology as is the immaculate conception of Mary in Christian theology. The prenatal story of Buddha is an exact analogy to that of Jesus. Buddha means the enlightener, the redeemer; Christ means master, savior, redeemer. The tales about Jesus in the New Testament—that as a child he was lost and sought by his parents,

¹² *Das Evangelium von Jesus—in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha—Sage und Buddhalehre.*

¹³ See bibliographical notes.

the fast in the desert, the Baptism in the Jordan, the temptation, the first preaching, the first blessing, his pity for the people, his power as a healer, and many other episodes in the life of Jesus—have their exact parallels in Buddha's life and career. In many respects the two gospels are so similar even in expression as to become almost indistinguishable.¹⁴

It has been urged that these similarities, analogies, and parallels are merely chance coincidences, which do not prove a direct Buddhistic influence upon Christianity. Yet the fact remains that Buddhistic canons were already known to the Western world before the coming of Jesus. Today hardly any Indologist of note denies an organic connection between the two redemptive religions. So close is the connection between them that even the details of the miracles recorded by Buddhism and Christianity are the same. Of Buddha, too, it was told that he fed five hundred men with one loaf of bread, that he cured lepers, and caused the blind to see.¹⁵

Long before the death of Clemens of Alexandria, who mentions Buddha by name in 220 B.C., the Buddhistic doctrine and legend were known to scholars of the Western world. In the light of these facts, it is preposterous to assume that the poets of the New Testament originated their own folk lore. Long before the coming of Jesus, Buddhistic doctrines had made heavy

¹⁴ Edmunds, *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels Compared* (Philadelphia, 1907).

¹⁵ Even a scholar like Max Muller, who at first refused to admit any inner connection between Buddhistic propaganda in the West and the rise of Christianity, stated in his famous lecture, "Coincidences," that these were too numerous to be independent of one another. In the end he went farther than all previous Indologists, by asserting that Roman Catholicism is a carbon copy of a certain brand of Buddhism. He believes that the Roman Catholic services, with its two choirs, its barrels of incense, its blessing of the people by the pastor with his right hand outstretched, its image worship, processions, and litanies, were borrowed from Buddhism. Also celibacy, the confession, and the fasts are Buddhistic institutions

inroads in the Western world. Innumerable sects, preaching some form of Buddhism, made their appearance in the century preceding the birth of Jesus.¹⁶

Rudolph Seydel, a man of the deepest Christian piety and theological conservatism, states that it is not permissible to admit an independent origin of the parables, legends, similes, and proverbs of Christianity and Buddhism. Inasmuch as Buddhism precedes Christianity by some five hundred years, one cannot escape the assumption that the newer religion was inspired by the older. The principal canon of Buddhism, called the Pali Canon, was fixed eighty years before Christ. No Christian scholar of note has asserted that the Synoptic Gospels influenced Buddhism, but numerous scholars long ago discovered Buddhistic elements in the Gospel of John and also recognized the Buddhistic background of Essenism, by which Jesus was greatly influenced.¹⁷ The conclusion is inescapable that Palestine, together with many other parts of Asia Minor, was inundated by Buddhistic propaganda for two centuries before Christ. The world in which Jesus lived was Buddhistic territory in the spiritual meaning of the term, and not Hebraic or Judaic. Hence Christianity, including the personality of its founder, is not an offshoot of Hebraic religiosity, but of Buddhistic theology. Only this phenomenon explains the gigantic struggles within the young Christian church, and the various schismatic tendencies, sects, and controversies in the first five hundred years of its existence.

Jesus, like Buddha, was not of and for this world, and

¹⁶ Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, III, Part I, 285-87.

¹⁷ Among the great theologians of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Straus was the first to admit the dependence of Jesus upon the Essenes.

hence Christianity, like Buddhism, is not concerned with this world. Christianity, far from being legalistic, as would be expected of a daughter-religion of Judaism, is as permeated with redemptiveness as is Buddhism.

Jesus, not having been of this world, did not deliberately establish anything for this world. When he died scarcely five hundred people in the land believed in him, yet a half-century later a powerful Christian church threatening the very foundations of the Roman Empire and challenging the lords and masters of this world had come into being. This feat was accomplished by St. Paul, the greatest organizer in all history, who used the figure of Jesus to impose upon Western humanity an Eastern-world picture. In accomplishing this feat, he did to the Jewry of his day what Spinoza performed sixteen hundred years later to the synagogue.

VI

In ancient times the city of Tarsus was the metropolis of Southwestern Asia Minor. In the days of Jesus it was an Eldorado composed of many nationalities, races, and cultures. It was an important commercial and cultural center, and was an important seat of Greek learning. For many centuries it was a meeting-place of the East and the West, and the scene of Buddhistic propaganda. It was politically a Roman city, culturally a Greek city, and religiously a center of Parseeism and Buddhism. In addition, it harbored a small Jewish community whose members were internationally minded and whose Judaism paled with each generation. It was divided into many religious groups and sects and lacked a Jewish common denominator. It never became known as a center of Jewish learning.

It seems that the family of St. Paul who lived in the city belonged to the sect of the Pharisees and were socially prominent. Saul of Tarsus attended neither the Greek nor the Jewish schools of the city. His Jewish education was highly defective, and his knowledge of the Bible was highly dubious. He was entirely unfamiliar with the Old Testament in the original, and, therefore, his unsupported statement that he was one of the disciples of Rabban Gamliel is highly improbable. So garbled was his knowledge of the Old Testament that he assigns a verse from Isaiah to the Pentateuch.¹⁸ Having been bred in a metropolitan environment, he retained a love for the metropolis to the end of his days, and was always attracted to the city. Proud of his Roman citizenship, he was attracted to Rome and to the West.

Tarsus, the native city of St. Paul, can best be compared to a modern Levantine city, which is a meeting-place for many nationalities, races, and cultures. Such an Eldorado, possessing no center of gravity, has no assimilative force and, therefore, everyone imitates everyone else. The Levantine man, therefore, possesses not a dual but a multi-personality. This multiplicity of personality enables the Levantine to disguise his own inner personality.

Physically St. Paul was not attractive. "His figure was diminutive, his eyesight defective and his speech ineffective. In addition he was bowed and had a hooked nose like an eagle's beak." He constantly complained about ill health and physical pain. While the exact nature of his ailment is not known, we do know that he was both epileptic and neurotic from his very birth. This

¹⁸ I Cor. 14 21.

sickly, epileptic, unlearned, and highly neurotic "levantine" Jew from Tarsus became the founder of a new church and indelibly impressed his personality upon fifteen centuries of white man's history. Just as Mohammed introduced himself to Eastern humanity as the prophet of Allah, so did Paul present himself to Western humanity as the Redeemer's prophet.

St. Paul's mother-tongue was Aramaic, the Yiddish of his day. He spoke no Hebrew, and his knowledge of Greek was a match to Spinoza's Latin. This intellectually undisciplined, physically defective, and temperamentally unbalanced Jew jumped from extreme to extreme, from the days of his youth. As a Pharisee he was a fanatical zealot who denounced the new faith; yet before he was thirty years of age the alleged Rabbi Saul of Tarsus had already become St. Paul.

Like Spinoza, St. Paul never married and was utterly indifferent to women. Just as Spinoza's celibacy enabled him better to serve his mistress, philosophy, so did St. Paul's bachelorhood make it possible for him better to serve the Lord.¹⁹

Like Buddha and Spinoza, he freed himself from all family, communal, and national ties. The priest has no fatherland and the religionist is not concerned with the *amor soli natalis*, for the spirit knows no frontiers or borders. By temperament and disposition St. Paul was a missionary, and like all genuine missionaries acknowledged no other loyalty except that of the church. Like Buddha and Spinoza, he also renounced all earthly pleasures. The beautiful meant nothing to him, and thus testifies to the fact that Greek culture was only grafted upon his mind. Actually he despised it. He

¹⁹ I Cor., chap. 7.

also rejected Greek philosophy, of whose importance for the newly rising church he had no conception. When he appeared in Corinth, he characterized himself as a layman in oratory and boasted that he would make no use of Greek rhetorics and dialectics. Later he visited Athens, toured the city, and gazed upon its edifying sanctuaries and great monuments of art with an air of indifference. Like a true Eastern religionist, he turned away from this world, for his only goal and object was not even the Kingdom of God, but Jesus Christ as he conceived Him. This ascetic, epileptic, visionary Jew, who conquered the Western world for Christianity, displayed an energy and power of endurance which was out of proportion to his physical strength. Neither hunger nor thirst, neither torture nor humiliation, could turn him aside from his prescribed goal and weaken him in his activities as the prophet of Jesus Christ. His missionarizing activities developed in him remarkable diplomatic skill and dramatic talents.²⁰

From the first moment of his conversion in Damascus to the last moment of his life, we meet him only in large cities—in Jerusalem, Tarsus, Antioch, and Rome. It was the metropolitan temperament of St. Paul that was instrumental in transforming the apocalyptic religiosity of the Galilean countryside into a world-religion. St. Paul had nothing in common with the first disciples of Jesus, who hailed from the countryside. Psychologically, they could not understand each other. Like all metropolitanites, St. Paul was a rationalist in spite of his mysticism, a thinker in spite of his apocalyptic feelings. Jesus was not confronted with any problems, for, like every simple villager, he was guided only by his

²⁰ Karl Peiper, *Paulus, seine missionarische Personlichkeit und Wirksamkeit*, p. 71.

emotions and instincts. Only the city-dweller has problems which he solves by reasoning. If Jesus was a child in outlook, even when mature in age, St. Paul was already a man when he was but a child in years.

Buddha, St. Paul, and Spinoza, despite their religious mysticism, were all rationalists. Not their hearts but their minds were their guides. Jesus' spirit of resignation was incomprehensible to St. Paul, who never resigned himself to given situations. He wanted to change things, to make conquests, to alter the world, to forge human destiny, and to impose a new order upon humanity. He was a missionary, a propagandist, an agitator, a man of action. Therefore, he left the static East behind him and moved toward the dynamic West. Within three generations after the days of Jesus he had brought Christianity to Rome. It is entirely due to the missionary activities of St. Paul that Christianity, an Eastern religion, made much more rapid headway in the Occident than it did in the Orient. This success of St. Paul was partly due to the fact that he carried westward not the Eastern Jesus, but the Western Christ, the Logos which was known in some form to the entire Western world of that time. He Christianized the Western world by westernizing Christianity. His main doctrine is the doctrine of salvation, which has as its goal redemption from this world. Man in this life is under the rule of the flesh, of sin, of the law, and of death. These are powers which represent frightfully mysterious forces, and which reign whimsically and despotically. Christ redeemed man from all these dark forces.

Christ is not Jesus of Nazareth, the humble carpenter's son, but is a heavenly being who pre-existed in God. He became man only to redeem the world, and

His work of salvation began upon becoming man. The redemption of the world was accomplished through His death and rise from His grave, for He thus freed Himself from the serfdom of this world. By the fall of Adam this world became filled with unredeemable sin, and the human race would have been doomed if not for the death and rise of Christ.

This highly subjective conception of the deed of Jesus was interpreted by St. Paul as an objective occurrence, which has nothing to do with personal experiences and inner processes. He who accepts these doctrines obediently is *ipso facto* redeemed. This doctrine became St. Paul's main obsession in life. It moved him to accomplish immortal feats, and it gave him the strength and power of a conqueror. It also brought about his break with the synagogue.

It may reasonably be assumed that soon after his vision in Damascus, St. Paul had already decided to break with the synagogue. The immediate occasion presented itself when the question arose of the admission of heathens to the church. He recognized that if the acceptance of the Jewish law were made a condition precedent to joining the church, his doctrine of Christ would remain confined to a small circle. He therefore decided to permit the heathens to join the church unconditionally. To justify this act he began to abuse and malign both the ceremonial and the ethical laws, which he represented as an obstacle to the acquisition of holiness and virtue. He made it appear that the law, far from securing virtue and salvation, was actually the source of sin. Man inclines toward sin for the flesh is weak and the law cannot restrain it. To annihilate sin and death, God handed over the Messiah, His son, to the forces of death, only to bring Him to life again. He became the second Adam

who wiped out original sin, overcame death, and restored eternal life. Thus, Jesus Christ means the end of the law, and he who believes in Him is already righteous and has a share in His life which is free from sin and temptation. The Jewish Messiah was supposed to redeem the nations from the yoke of oppression, but Jesus Christ redeemed them from sin. Thus, St. Paul conceived Christianity to be the opposite pole to Judaism. The latter is based upon law; the former, upon freedom and grace. The law is void, while Christ is supreme. In this manner St. Paul invalidated Judaism as a religion among the nations of the West.

St. Paul was justified, from his point of view, in rejecting Judaism entirely. His doctrine consists of a diluted Buddhism. Both Buddha and St. Paul were confronted with the same problems—the worthlessness of life, its sinfulness, its futility, and its evil; both had a negative attitude to it; both had the same starting-point—original sin. Both sought to attain holiness and eternal happiness—by overcoming life, by rejecting it, by estranging one's self from it, and by not participating in its joys and pleasures. Both had the same eschatology. Buddha's central goal was Nirvana and St. Paul's was Christ, which is more tangible because St. Paul was not an easterner but a westerner, both by education and by experience. The God of St. Paul is as unsubstantial and lifeless as was Buddha's Brahma. Like Buddha, St. Paul, too, tries to escape both from life and from death. He was not satisfied with the thought that Jesus purified life, but was very happy that He freed man from death. This paralyzing fear of death is one of the outstanding features of all redemptive religiosity. Death is terrifying and must be overcome.

Buddha and St. Paul both used many terms to de-

scribe man's sinful disposition. Both identified flesh with sin and taught that the age of fulfilment is the age when the flesh will be overcome. St. Paul's term of spirit is as ambiguous as Buddha's term of soul. Their doctrines are not of and for this world. Both denied and maligned man, and to neither was man the measure of all things. St. Paul expressed his contempt for man by exclaiming, "Neither did I receive it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." He made it appear that his Christology was not an intellectual calculation but a religious inspiration.

Buddha described Nirvana as the union of the soul with Brahma, and St. Paul described Christ as a being in whom God and man are joined. Buddha speaks of man's innumerable existences; St. Paul speaks of Christ as having pre-existed in God. To Buddha the first-born was "Logos"; to St. Paul it was Christ; and to Spinoza it was the attribute of thinking, or Logos. The spiritual relationship of St. Paul thus becomes easily discernible.

Many theologians of modern times take it for granted that although St. Paul drew from many sources, he did not borrow from Philo. But these assertions notwithstanding, the fact is that Paul's Christology, if it is traceable to any source at all, is reducible to Philo's Logos. Philo identifies the Logos, first, with the rock that followed Israel into the wilderness; second, with the image of God; third, with the first man who is archetypal man; fourth, with the Son of God and high priest; fifth, with the first-born son; sixth, with the man of God; seventh, with the Paraclete; and, eighth, with the mediator.²¹

St. Paul refers to the rock which followed Israel in

²¹ Gerald Friedlander, *Hellenism and Christianity* (London, 1912), pp. 86-87.

the wilderness, which he names Christ. He speaks of Christ as the image of God. He also speaks of Him as the second Adam, the antithesis between Adam, the first man, and the Messiah. These are purely Philonic conceptions. Philo considered the first Adam, the Logos, as the heavenly man and the second as the one who sinned and died, while St. Paul reversed this order. His Messiah is the head of every man or the man of archetypal ideal, and His divine acts include the creation of the universe, the redemption of humanity, the last judgment, and the restitution and renewal of all things. He speaks of Jesus as of the Lord, implying the God-head. "One Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we through Him." To him the Lord is always identical with the Hebrew Adonai and the Greek Kirios, and identifies Messiah or Christ with God, who has been pre-existent and is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation and the second Adam or the heavenly man.

Although Paulinic theology is largely Philonic, it is not traceable to any other Jewish source. No theologian can successfully demonstrate that Paul's theology is of rabbinic origin, for all his utterances about Christ are anti-Hebraic and anti-rabbinic in character. Not only his Christology but also his entire world-picture is strange to the Jewish mind. His Christ is not the Hebrew Messiah, his redemption is not the Hebraic Geulah, and his doctrine of the two Adams has no foundation in Judaism. These concepts are to be traced to the Book of Wisdom or to Philo. If it is true, as the ancients said, that Philo Platonized, it can be said with much more justice that St. Paul Philonized.

Just as Philo's Logos is only a Greek edition of the

while the Gnostics concluded with an offensive war against the Old Testament.

Since Christianity is not entirely identical with Paulinism, we observe in its development during the first centuries two opposite tendencies, the one beginning with Marcion and leading to Manicheism, and the other beginning with Arius and leading to the Reformation. The one represents the Hinduistic and the other the Hebraic tendency. The starting-point of the one is Christ and of the other is Jesus.

VIII

St. Paul declared that the Old Testament was fulfilled, concluded, and replaced by a new religious development. At the same time, however, he called upon the Old Testament as a crown witness to prove his doctrine. The incongruity of this method is obvious, for the Old Testament could not serve two contradictory religions at the same time. Marcion logically demanded that the Old Testament be entirely eliminated as a source of the Christian faith, for he declared that it was made obsolete by the New Testament. His keen eye could not fail to observe the inner incongruity between both Testaments. Christ and Jehovah could not be pressed between the same covers. Hence, Marcion not only stressed Christ to the exclusion of Jehovah, but even warred upon the latter. To him the God of the Old Testament, being the creator of the world, is also the creator of and identical with evil, and Jesus as Christ is the incarnation of redemption, the embodiment of the good. The creator of evil cannot possibly be the highest God and can only be a demiurg. However, the highest God, that of the New Testament, dispatched His son,

Jesus, to this world to dissolve the law of the Old Testament and to destroy the work of its God. In this juxtaposition of two deities representing good and evil, Persian dualism can easily be recognized.

The Old Testament is the Bible of the Jewish God, the creator of evil, while the New Testament is the Bible of the God of the Redeemer. Marcion was the real creator of the Christian scripture, which was entirely detached from the Hebrew spirit and background. It is a purely oriental creation, teeming with oriental myth, which it stresses in preference to dogma. Both his metaphysics and his ethics betray his Hinduistic and Parseeistic leanings. Jehovah, whom he identifies with evil, can be overcome only through the subjugation of the senses. This repression necessitates self-denial, asceticism, and celibacy. His doctrine represents the ancient struggle between oriental universalism and occidental individualism.

Marcion and his school gave early Christology, which was still deeply anchored in occidental Hellenism, a decided oriental turn. Light and darkness as recognized by the Parsees has eternal purposes, and Jesus occupies the same position in the theory of Marcion as does the Logos in the doctrine of Philo. He is the mediator between light and darkness and as such He becomes the creative cosmic principle.

Marcion almost succeeded in Parseeizing Christianity and in establishing a new church to replace the Paulinic. A century-long struggle now began, which resulted in the rejection of Marcionism by the Western church, and in its being reduced to the position of an unimportant sect.

Although Hellenism implies a Graecized Orient, it

nevertheless could not entirely free itself from Hellenic individualism, the rock from which it was hewn. St. Paul, by Hellenizing Christianity, effectively prevented the complete orientalization of the church. Marcion was rejected not for his antinomy of the Old and New Testaments, but for his attempt to de-Hellenize the church.

Marcion's disciples, particularly Karapokrates of Alexandria, Basilides, and Valentinies, who developed the Gnostic doctrines, attempted to continue the orientalization of the church. They set the stage for the appearance of Mani, a Babylonian of Persian origin, steeped in Mandaean doctrines, who at the age of twenty-eight revealed himself to humanity as the last prophet, preceded only by Buddha, Zarathustra, and Jesus. If Marcion was a menace to Hellenized Christology, Mani became a menace to Christianity at large. In the religion which he founded, he drew the logical consequences of Marcion, just as Marcion drew the logical consequences of St. Paul. The response to Mani's appeal was so enormous that for several centuries Manicheism seemed destined to replace Christianity and to become the dominant religion of the world. Mani's dualism is undiluted Parseeism. He taught that in the beginning there were two cosmic forces, not light and darkness, but the devil and the glorious superman. The union of two resulted in the birth of the visible world, which is again a combination of light and darkness. Man's life is one uninterrupted aspiration to redemption by light. The end of the world will come when light and darkness will be completely separated. In Manicheism Jesus appears as a messenger, as the God of light, while the prophets of Israel, from Moses to Ezekiel, appeared as the instru-

ments of the devil. He continued the tradition of Marcion and elevated ante-Judaism almost to a cosmic principle.

Within a short time this doctrine spread to Syria and Northern Africa. Because its occidental adherents used Christian terms, they were often regarded as a Christian sect and as such were either tolerated or persecuted by the bishops of the church.²³ Because Manicheism appealed powerfully to the oriental mind, it spread so rapidly that it became a deadly menace to Christianity. Only the successful fight of St. Augustine, who himself began life as a Manichean, against this religion saved the day for Christianity and for Judaism. Mani, however, bestowed a little testimony of his esteem to the Christian world in the form of diabolism, which overwhelmed the medieval church.

Despite the influence of Marcion and Mani upon the march of events, monotheistic memories still lingered in Christianity.

Although there is theologically little in common between Mani and St. Paul, metaphysically they have the same starting-point. St. Paul speaks of flesh and spirit, while Mani speaks of devil and superman. In the final analysis the nomenclature of the antinomies is of little significance. In substance both men are permeated with the same metaphysical dualism. Not Marcion, but Mani, drew the final logical conclusion from the doctrines of St. Paul.

The figures of Arius and Pelagius indicate that memories of the old living God were still strong even when the idea of a dead God was triumphant throughout the

²³ The Priscillians in Spain and France and the Katharians in Southern France were the target of bitter persecution by the church during the third century.

civilized world. Both were pious men but invited opposition from many quarters, because they would not yield to those who taught mysteries instead of dogmas. In the career of Pelagius one can observe the struggle between a rational mind and chaos and irrationality. He taught a more rational God-idea. His God does not confer His blessing upon man arbitrarily but only as a reward for good deeds. Pelagius completely rejected the theory of predestination, which is only a theological equivalent for determinism, because his was a living and rational God. Despite the predilection of the time for religious mysteries, Pelagius' teachings found many adherents in all parts of the then civilized world. When St. Augustine discovered that the doctrines of Pelagius were popular even in Northern Africa, he organized an opposition against him and even interested the influential Hieronymus in his cause.

St. Augustine, the powerful bishop of Hippo, considered himself to be the founder of a new church. He recognized that to secure his own position and to make his own theology safe for the church, he must annihilate both Pelagius and his teachings. The latter, however, openly flouted the intrigues against him and exclaimed, "And who is Augustine anyhow!" Augustine submitted the Pelagius controversy to many synods but none championed his cause. He even appealed to the bishop of Rome, who would not render a decision. Some time thereafter there was installed a new bishop of Rome, allegedly of Jewish origin, who decided in favor of Pelagius. Finally, St. Augustine converted the Emperor to his cause, who at the Council of Carthage in 418 had Pelagius declared a heretic and expelled from Rome. Thus, the Council confirmed the doctrine of St. Augus-

tine that Adam became mortal through his original sin. It swallowed St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination, which later became a bone of contention in the Christian church. For reasons of expediency the church could not accept a doctrine which reduces God to an irrational, cruel, and whimsical being. However, St. Augustine, in formulating this doctrine, only transmuted philosophical determinism into theological predestination.

IX

In the ancient world the struggle for a dead God reaches its highest peak in the teachings of St. Augustine. He represents the transition between antiquity and the Middle Ages. All the spiritual *leitmotifs* of the time settled in the mind of this remarkable man. He is the originator of the occidental Christian dogma, the founder of scholastic theology, the oracle of the Latin church, the predecessor of Descartes, the most powerful apostle of Christianity since St. Paul, and, even to a measure, a forerunner of the Reformation. In addition, he was a poet, rhetorician, artist, saint, statesman, and organizer.

Born in 354 in Northern Africa, of a heathen father and a Christian mother, he already displayed at an early age an inclination toward sensuousness, criminal passions, and voluptuousness. In his *Confessions* he testifies that at an early age he was overcome by a lust to steal, not because he suffered want and hunger, but because he was attracted to evil.²⁴ Before he outgrew his childhood, he had already become the father of an illegitimate child. As a youth he was an enthusiastic pagan, as a young man he became a passionate adherent of

²⁴ I, 30; II, 9.

Mani, and as a mature man he was reconverted to Christianity. As a Christian he made a great career. As a Manichean he only became an "auditor," the lowest religious rank, but as a Christian he became in succession a presbyter and bishop.

Despite his checkered and spotted career, he became the greatest saint of the church, because he was a man of great religious passions, and the prototype of Roman Catholic piety which expressed itself in loyalty to the church rather than to religious principles. His blind, unswerving loyalty caused him to persecute all whom he suspected of disloyalty to the church. As a Manichean he persecuted all anti-Manicheans, but his religious zeal as a Christian assumed pathological proportions. His philosophical principles he changed even more often than he changed his beliefs, and explains why such an irreconcilable variety of principles are traceable to him. Whipped and tossed by religious and intellectual passions, tortured by a variety of contradictory motives, which stormed in upon his mind, he shot from one extreme to another. An intellectual of the purest water, he confesses that if not for the authority of the Catholic church, he would never accept the gospels.²⁵ An extreme determinist, he was nevertheless the spiritual father of the Inquisition. Meditating upon the transcendentality of time, he at the same time taught the physical and literal reality of hell. A believer in one God, he maintained to Apuleius the possibility of many divine beings. He relates that he came to Christianity through love, but then advocated that men should be dragged into the church by force. He complained of the many dubious converts in the church, but yet pro-

²⁵ "Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas."

posed that the guiding principle of the church be not the Christianity of Christ, but that the bishops should prevail. These contradictions caused Harnack in his *History of Dogma* to conclude that "St. Augustine made the doctrine of the church unsafe, both in importance and in volume."²⁶ Augustine was not philosophically creative or theologically inventive. His philosophical doctrine is eclectic and a brew of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. In its final form, his God-idea is reminiscent of Plotinus, Philo, and many of the Gnostics. It is the timeless, attributeless, intangible oneness, removed from all reality, and is a dead Deity. It is as bereft of will or intellect as Buddha's Brahma, Philo's Theos, and Spinoza's Deus.

This Deity is only a lifeless cosmic principle of which we can say that it exists only in order to exclude the idea of its nonexistence. As bare existence, it cannot possess even ethical attributes, for any attribute, property, or quality would place a limitation upon it and impair its absoluteness and oneness. For the same reason, intellect cannot be ascribed to him, for intellect differentiates and distinguishes, and becomes manifold to the exclusion of oneness. Thus, just as this God is beyond will and intellect, so is it also beyond good and evil. As an absolutely attributeless God, He is stone dead.

It was this neo-Platonic God-doctrine, the Western echo of Brahma, which crowded Manicheism out of St. Augustine's mind and brought him close to the Christ of St. Paul.

St. Augustine began his theological career as a pagan pluralist, continued it as a Manichean dualist, and concluded it as a neo-Platonic monist. He never became

²⁶ To the same effect see Eduard von Hartmann, *History of Metaphysics*, Vol. I.

a monotheist, for that doctrine affirms God's life, while his monism affirms God's death.

X

St. Augustine, like all mystics, identified God with being per se. God is unnamable because He has no attributes, and He is unknowable because we can know nothing about Him. Our knowledge of God is purely negative. We only know that He is not identical with any of the phenomena of nature or mind. Since God is everywhere, He is also in man's mind and hence it has some perception of Him. It can have a premonition of Him, although it cannot visualize Him. God, being the timeless absolute, can have no attributes and hence cannot be identical with substance, for in Him substance and attributes are identical. Substance is a particular being while God is a general being. The only thing in contradistinction to God is non-being. Of this highest being called God we have an intuitive knowledge that cannot be expressed in words. Even our noblest words are soiled by the touch of earthliness, and hence are not worthy to describe Deity. He cannot even be called the unspeakable, for in doing so we already speak of Him.²⁷ But while we cannot speak of God, He is known beyond all indubitability.

Thus, St. Augustine, following in the footsteps of Plotinus, used only negative formulas to indicate God's ineffability. Although he speaks of the triune God, and as such makes Him appear tangible and substance, He is yet inexpressible, indefinable, and unknowable. He is identical with the one of Plotinus.²⁸

²⁷ *De doctrina Christiana*, I, vi, 6.

²⁸ *St. Augustine et ce néo-Platonisme*. Paris: B. Grandgeorge, 1896.

Like the one of Plotinus, St. Augustine's God also transcends time, for time is the measure of corporeal motion and where there is no corporeal motion there is no time. In God, however, there is no motion and consequently there can be no experience of time. Hence, God can know only the present. He is pure being, and for Him whatsoever is only is.²⁹

How this dead God could create a living world, or how a dynamic world can be deduced from a static Deity, St. Augustine answered as ineffectually as did Spinoza. Although Spinoza evaded the problem of creation, St. Augustine, whose mind was crowded with conflicting biblical, Platonic, and Stoic thought, states clearly that the world has not always existed; that it was created out of nothing in a given instant; and that, with its creation, motion and time began. He fails, however, to state what purpose the world was intended to serve in the economy of a dead God. The same St. Augustine who denies God's intellectuality also asserts that God created the world by an act of His own free will.³⁰ The same St. Augustine, who cannot explain God's relationship to this world, or its reality, nevertheless paints a detailed picture of creation. The same St. Augustine, to whom God is bare being, suddenly individualizes it and evolves the doctrine of the Trinity. *St. Augustine attempted to synthesize the impossible—biblical individualism and neo-Platonic universalism.*

St. Augustine, in assuming creation is orientated in biblical traditions, and in developing a doctrine of Trinity, is guided by Plotinus, in whose doctrine of the three hypostases of the divine a Trinity theory is discernible.

²⁹ *De diversis quaestionibus*, I.XXXIII.

³⁰ *De civ. dei*, XI, XV.

What is vague and barely intimated in the hypostatic doctrine becomes sharply drawn in St. Augustine's dogma or the Trinity.

All the phases of St. Augustine's thought show the same tendency to improve upon old theories and to color them with new passions. Thus, like Buddha, he calls wisdom, reason, or Logos God's son, who is co-eternal with God the Father, and begotten of the same substance. Although wisdom is the son's special attribute, it may also be assigned to the Father from whom he inherited it. Logos or wisdom is God's voice, for He spoke and through His word the world was created. This Word or Logos is the idea of the world as well as its plan and purpose, and the visible world is only a copy of the world contained in the Word or Logos. This idea is purely Platonic in character.

While creation took place through the Logos, the triune God manifested itself in the process of creation. God the Father is the origin of the world; God the Son is its enlightenment; and God the Holy Spirit is its goodness. All three members of the Trinity are of the same substance, the Son having been begotten of the Father and the Spirit having emanated from both the Father and the Son. This metaphysical mystical conglomerate, replete with inconsistencies and contradictions, was defended by Eduard von Hartmann in his *History of Metaphysics*, I, 199, on the ground that it is of little importance in itself, because the center of gravity in St. Augustine's world-picture is not theory but practice. Not the Trinitarian God-doctrine, but the doctrine of grace—not the theory of knowledge, but the theory of love—is important in St. Augustine's metaphysics.

But the metaphysical aberrations and the philosophi-

cal contradictions in his philosophy cannot be explained by or charged to St. Augustine the churchman and organizer, for he occupied a position not only in the history of the church, but also in the history of philosophical thought. Although many modern philosophical thoughts are traceable to him, his own philosophy is corroded with dogmatism, mysticism, mysteries, and superstitions. In addition, it is thoroughly eclectic.

It is remarkable that St. Paul means much more to him than Jesus. Although his Christological alpha and omega also consist of the birth of Adam and the rebirth of Christ, it almost seems as if Christ's entrance into his world is more or less accidental. Not his rebirth, but Adam's sin, is of prime importance. If Christ is not of elemental significance, the historical Jesus is of still less importance. St. Augustine was attracted to St. Paul, not primarily because of his Christology, but because the main features of the world-picture of both men coincided.

St. Paul's dualism of flesh and spirit is translated by St. Augustine into the city of the devil and the city of God. Like St. Paul, Augustine, too, is overwhelmed by the problem of sin and grace, and in his African zeal vies with St. Paul in transforming his cruel determinism into barbaric predestination. Man's fate is sealed before his birth. Most men are predestined to eternal damnation as a matter of justice, while a few are chosen for eternal happiness as a matter of grace. None can succeed in having this cruel verdict set aside. Over and above beasts, man, and gods, there is a blind force which rules arbitrarily over this universe, and capriciously predetermines the destiny of every creature. The most superstitious form of oriental fatalism is thus dignified

and elevated to the position of a cosmic principle. It is needless to say that this doctrine makes all ethics impossible, because it renders futile all human efforts to improve upon the world and upon man.

Although St. Augustine was the founder of the Western church, his was an Eastern trend of thought. He hated the world with its dynamic life and cursed and condemned it. In his hostility to life, he came to deny it and thereby arrived at the very doctrine of self-denial and asceticism—to which Buddha and Spinoza also subscribed. Although inconsistent in all other respects, he was consistent in his Buddhistic motives of thought. This world is a valley of tears and sin-laden; this life is not worth while living and futile. It is illusion, *maya*, and not reality. It is full of false dreams and ghastly errors and must be overcome. It can be conquered only by self-denial, and the price of conquest is salvation—God, dead being, Nirvana.

XI

It will be noticed that from the appearance of St. Paul until the end of the fifth century, the God-doctrine in the West was not only mystical in form, but was actually transformed into a mystery. The simple, clearly defined God-doctrine of the Old Testament, which grows more involved in the New Testament, becomes more beclouded with each succeeding generation, until finally it develops into mythology at the expense of theology. This process is primarily due to Philo and to the later neo-Platonists. It is true that both Philo and Plotinus speak definitely of one God, or of the One, to the exclusion of a second, but nevertheless this oneness of God is

accompanied by some form of Trinity. It is the triune God and not the one God who is in contact with the world. The One of the neo-Platonists is timeless, absolute, attributeless, an abstract cosmic principle, impersonal and hence a dead God. Only with the aid of the Logos does this One establish a relationship to the world. However, the Logos mysticism or the Logos mystery marks the end of a personal and living God in the West, for this Logos is of Eastern origin. It signalizes the triumph of Eastern mysticism over Western rationalism.

The mystic knows no personal God because personality has limitations, barriers, and boundaries, and contradicts the very spirit of cosmism and universalism. Personality means I and thou, and the mystic refuses to draw any line of demarcation between himself and God. He yearns to be part of God and at one with Him. But such a conception implies pantheism and not monotheism. Although the mysticism of the early Christian Fathers culminates in a trinitarian God-doctrine, it is yet permeated with Eastern pantheism, which is always attended by asceticism.

The mystic feels that only by overcoming the senses can he attain unison with God. Hence, he declares war upon life or what he calls flesh, which he places in contradistinction to the spirit. Although Western pantheism need not be ascetic, Eastern pantheism is necessarily so. Whether the mystic practices asceticism to lose himself in ecstasy, or whether it is religiously motivated, is of little importance. By self-torture and by inflicting hardships upon himself the mystic imagines that he expiates his imaginary sins. This expiation produces the eternal light in which he sees God.

It is this state of mind which dominated the first five centuries of church history. It was not based merely upon a belief or dogma alone, but was grounded in mysticism which was based upon the will to God rather than the will to man. This outlook necessitated the denial of free will and reduced man to a mere plaything of fate.

To St. Augustine, for instance, free will was un-Christian, for if everyone could choose the good of what need is a Redeemer? The conduct of man, he explains, is the necessary fruit of either a good or a bad tree. He who is the master of his own will is a slave of God and the very embodiment of evil; but he who is predestined by God to eternal grace is both a free and a good man, for only divine grace makes man free. Man is unable to do good. "The descendants of all man," says St. Augustine, "are begotten in lust and thus at the same time poisoned, are incapable of good." But why God should condemn the one and bless the other, he does not explain. This conception of man in its relationship to the forces of eternity is both Buddhistic and Spinozistic. *From Spinoza we learned that man is the slave of God, and from Buddha that man is the fruit of a tree.*

St. Augustine's God is as petrified as that of Buddha or St. Paul, and his doctrine of predestination is only an exaggerated form of Buddhistic determinism applied to religious life. In the light of predestination, life is as valueless as it is in the life of Buddhistic determinism; and if life is futile and valueless, man too is a worthless creature, for he was convicted even before conception and can never expiate his sin. Of what value is a Redeemer to a man who is chained to the laws of causa-

tion? How can He bring salvation? The very assumption of man's predestination to eternal damnation or to grace makes all efforts to attain salvation superfluous. Did Spinoza or Buddha say less? But still this very St. Augustine who established the principle that it is impossible to doubt one's own living existence became the forerunner of Torquemada and also the predecessor of Descartes and Calvin.

FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO BARUCH SPINOZA

I

IF THERE is any basic idea in the world-concept of the Fathers of the church in the first five centuries of its existence, it is the fact that God alone is reality and hence that He actually swallows the world. In comparison to Him, nature and man are almost nothing, only dust and ashes. This God-idea implies a degradation of man and of the world. Man appears like a crawling worm on an erring planet, without aim and purpose, and his only object in life is to surrender himself to God by losing his own personality, by giving up his own will, and by renouncing his own reason. Not only St. Augustine but most of the Christian medieval philosophers expressed this idea in some form. Man has but one goal—his return to God. This God, swallowing man and nature, is not a personal deity but a God whose name is *pan*, whose appetite, like that of the Leviathan, is insatiable. This God-idea, a dead God consuming a living world, necessitating an ascetic order of life, was the basic thought in Christian medieval mysticism. Since man's goal is his unison with and return to God, he may as well renounce earthliness and concentrate upon Godliness.

It is worthy of note that in the days of St. Augustine, when Western humanity was overwhelmed with asceticism and with the denial of life, at a time when the Fathers of the church vied with one another in overlooking man, there developed in the Aramaic lands, and es-

pecially in Babylonia, a new literature known as the Talmud, which represents an opposite tendency, a theory of civilization which presupposes the affirmation of life and of man. While the Fathers of the church taught man to escape from and to overcome life, the talmudic schools in Nehardiah and Pumpaditha created a new jurisprudence which could not be enforced since the Jewish state had long since been destroyed. This new talmudic jurisprudence, shaped in part by Roman law, may seem to have been a futile effort, for of what avail is the law without a state to enforce it? Nevertheless, the attempt to create a new system of Jewish jurisprudence at that period was only a restatement of the Hebraic theory of life—that life is to be lived and not to be wasted, that man is not to wander aimlessly through life, but is to make this a better world in which to live. The rabbis of the Talmud taught that those who do not busy themselves with the affairs of this world may not be sworn as witnesses, because, being disinterested in life, they may perjure themselves.² Asceticism as an ideal of life was not held in high esteem. God created the world that it be populated, civilized, and made comfortable for man's use. The prime consideration is a busy, useful life and not the flight from life. This attitude presumes a continuation of human life. At a time when the Fathers of the church were proposing celibacy as an ideal, the talmudic rabbis were decrying it as being contrary to God's plans. This world must not be depopulated, they said, and the human race must increase in physical strength.

To the extent that patrology is overwhelmed with the God-idea, with speculations about the God-head, the

² *Tractate Sanhedrin*, chap. iii.

triune God, and the relationship of the first to the second person in God, so is the Talmud almost an atheistic work in the sense that God is scarcely visible in it. Not God, but man, is its central figure. One may page whole tractates of the Talmud without finding a reference to God, but the church Fathers, from Justin the martyr to St. Augustine, have but one theme—God—to the exclusion of man. Not the order of life or of the world, but the search for God, is man's sole task. These Fathers of the church, the more God-intoxicated they became, the more they estranged themselves from a living, personal God and embraced a pantheistic deity. St. Augustine, the most God-intoxicated of all the Fathers of the church, was nearest to pantheism.² Not only in his patristic but also in his scholastic philosophy can the same tendency be seen. In this theological world-picture is expressed a contempt for man to which there are only two analogies—Buddhism in the East and Spinozism in the West.

Although the influence of the East upon the West had ceased by the third century, it had succeeded in putting a set of ideas into circulation which were to overwhelm the Western mind for more than a thousand years. The Middle Ages are distinguished by their contempt for man, his rights and liberties. Both man as an idea and man as an individual are meaningless. Man is a creature who deserves no consideration, and must obey the commands of those in power. The opposite tendency is visible in medieval rabbinic literature. In it is to be found a complete restatement of the rights of man and of his duty to maintain his dignity at all costs. Just as the Old Testament is a book for and of this world, a book for

² Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*.

and of man, so is rabbinic literature equally concerned with man, his rights, liberties, and duties. But patristic literature has only contempt for man, because God alone is the all-overwhelming and all-absorbing idea. Union with God or with Christ, a reverberation of the old Buddhistic yearning for Nirvana as a union of the soul with Brahma, is man's final goal. Life becomes superfluous, a burden, and a liability, which must be overcome. This is the central theme of medieval church mysticism.

It is symbolic of the tenacity of the ancient Hebraic spirit that long after the Jewish state was destroyed and its people exiled and dispersed, a law was created which, although it could not possibly be used for practical purposes, was yet an impressive demonstration of a supreme faith in life. Just as patristic philosophy deprives man of his dignity, his rights, and his free will, because everything is predestined, so does the Talmud affirm not only man's rights but also his autonomy of will. Determinism is applicable to the realm of nature and not to the realm of man. Otherwise man has no moral responsibility, no ethics, and no ambition to continue the struggle for a better life in a better world.

II

As against the cold rationalism and legalism of Nehardiah and Pumpaditha, there stands out in bold relief the irrationalism and mysticism of the Fathers of the church and of the scholastics. In its mystical fervor the Western church excelled the Eastern. The representatives of the Greek church recognized in Christ the trinitarian figure whose place in the God-head was the subject of debate and of theological speculations. But the

Roman church, beginning with St. Augustine, introduced the new thought of living in Christ as a personal matter. "I believe," St. Augustine says, "that God became man to be to us an example of humility, to show us God's love, and to help us to realize and to hold in our hearts that the self-abasement in which it pleased God to be born of a woman, to be scorned, rejected and put to death by man, is the best remedy for an inflated pride. He was crucified and now it depends upon thee to take his poverty upon thyself: far from thee He lived, but in poverty He comes nigh unto thee." Thus, St. Augustine repeats St. Paul's mystical exultation: "Let the same mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus." To the Fathers of the Western church, Christianity was no longer a well-defined religion, but became a mystical state of mind, expressing itself in the love for humiliation, scorn, suffering, and contempt for worldliness.

This negative mysticism was made positive by Bernard de Clairvaux, one of the greatest figures of the medieval church. His doctrine, that it is the duty of the Christian believer to have a part in Christ by having a part in His sufferings, became the main motive of Western piety for many centuries. He who follows the Redeemer in poverty, who exhausts himself in deeds, penitence, and asceticism, and outdoes himself in self-denial, is assured communion with the Redeemer. Such moments of exultation offer man worldly pleasure. This desire for a union with Christ translated into human terms means to empty one's self of all human desires, to overcome one's senses, and to attain beatitude. This beatitude is the Western term for the eastern Nirvana.

This progressive subjectivization of Christian religiosity

ity was even farther developed by the scholastics, who aspired not merely to a union with Christ, but to the absorption of the soul by the triune God. Only by becoming part of God, the Father Himself, can existence be made a true reality. This union, teaches Duns Scotus, requires the complete surrender of the will. Only in this manner can the soul be merged with God. This de-individualization of man, forming as it does the high-water mark of medieval Christian universalism, became the driving force of Christian piety of the Middle Ages. Surrender, relinquish, became the cry word of medieval mysticism; everything is meaningless, worthless, and unreal, and only Christ, or, as the ancient Hindu said, Brahma, is real. This a-cosmistic mysticism, too, is the daughter of fatalism, and the confession of medieval man that he was incapable of coping with the forces of eternity. Resigned to his fate, he gave up all attempts to improve this life. The more he neglected it, the faster it ravished and consumed him and intensified his spirit of resignation. Stupefied by the constant disaster called "life," he turned aside to heaven and surrendered.

III

Subjective religiosity, based upon inner experience, found its highest expression in the joyous mysticism of the thirteenth century, of which Master Eckhardt is the outstanding figure. While many of the scholastics and representatives of the patristic philosophy still vacillated between pantheism and a vague theism, Father Eckhardt is a full-fledged pantheist, whose doctrine resembles the metaphysics of Sankara. To Father Eckhardt, God is the pure essence of being, and to Sankara, God is identical with being. To both, God is in-

discriminate, the negation of finiteness or being. He is and He is not at the same time. He is denaturalized nature, revealing Himself as naturalized nature. This theological, metaphysical terminology has its analogy in Spinoza's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.

Like all pantheists, including Spinoza, pious Father Eckhardt asserts that not only is God beyond good and evil, but He is not good, and man need not be grateful to Him for His love, because it is caused by eternal compulsion. God loves nothing outside of Himself, and all His love is absorbed in Himself. Nevertheless, all creatures aim at becoming like God. God is everywhere, in everything, and is the all-embracing reality. "It is the father's nature to beget the son and it is the son's nature to be born and that I should be born in Him: Likewise, it is the spirit's nature that I should be consumed in him and be transformed into pure love. God has become man that I might become God. God has died that I might die unto the world and all that is therein." To avoid all misunderstandings, the pious Father Eckhardt teaches that between God and creature there comes about a relationship with mutual surrender which is equally essential to both, and that God can do as little without man as man can without Him. When man's will becomes God's will, all is well; but when God's will becomes man's will, that is perfect. In the first instance, man only subjugates himself, and in the second, God is born in Him, and the aim of creation is attained. Man, who surrenders his will, becomes by grace what God is by nature, and He is as near to us as the water which we drink. This doctrine contradicts the assertions of the Fathers of the church—that there is a sharp border line between the kingdom of grace and the

kingdom of nature. Father Eckhardt obliterates this frontier, for to him God is everywhere. But he was courageous enough to draw the logical conclusions from his bold doctrine and asserted, though in guarded terms, that since God is in all things, grace too is everywhere, and hence there is no need of priestly service in the entire sacramental fabric.

The pantheistic Eckhardt, too, paved the way for Spinoza's doctrine of subjective religiosity, which in the Western world had its origin in St. Augustine's doctrine of inner religious experience. Just as the Augustinian influence upon the development of medieval mysticism culminated on the one hand in the personality of Master Eckhardt, it also led on the theological side to the development of the ontological proof of God by Anselm of Canterbury.

IV

The man who most influenced Spinoza's doctrine of God was none other than Anselm of Canterbury, whose ontological proof of God is to be found in undefined form in the writings of St. Augustine. Anselm, an Italian by birth and by training, was archbishop of Canterbury from 1079 until his death in 1109, and administered his office according to the principles of Pope Gregory VII. Anselm represents the very incarnation of medievalism in philosophy. He urged the faithful to acquire scientific knowledge, but only upon the condition that their Christian creed remain unaffected by the knowledge thus gained. If the facts of science and theology clash, the first must remain subservient to the second. But the fame of Anselm rests not so much upon his orthodoxy, but is connected chiefly with the ontological

proof for the existence of God, which he presents in his *Prosologium*.

The ontological argument is the attempt to prove the existence of God from the very idea which we have of Him. By God we understand the greatest being that can be conceived. This conception is to be found in the intellect of every man whether orthodox or atheist. Since there can be nothing in the intellect which is not a reflection of reality, our conception of God must, therefore, reflect reality. The fact alone that we think of God proves His existence.

By his ontological proof of the existence of God, Anselm became the father of that medieval scholasticism whose most striking feature is word realism. This method of argument testifies to the critical innocence of the medieval mind. Because many people can conjure up the devil does not mean that he is a reality. If Anselm's ontological proof is valid for the existence of God, it is equally valid for the existence of the devil. But not only logically, but also historically, is Anselm's position untenable.

The God-consciousness of St. Augustine is not a presumption, but a deduction. He presumes certain phenomena and attributes, such as the beautiful, the eternal, and the truth, which he imagines to be God. To Anselm, however, God is not a deduction, but a presumption. "God is the most perfect being. Existence belongs as a condition of perfection. Thus this most perfect being or God must exist." In comparison to the ontological proof, the cosmological proof in the Old Testament is highly philosophical. It is based upon an inquiry into first causes and concludes that there must be an ultimate first cause, God, the creator of the uni-

verse. The cosmological proof, although it is based upon a naïve realism, the first stage in the development of the philosophical mind, is concerned with some sort of reality, while the ontological proof is not concerned with any reality.

Although for many centuries Anselm's ontological proof was regarded by the clerics as the peak of medieval philosophical thought, it was riddled by the critics soon after it became a philosophical standard of Christian truth. The monk Gaunilo, who lived in the generation after Anselm, disposed of the ontological proof by the witty remark that if our thought of God, because He is a superlative, is already proof for His existence, then our thought of the most beautiful island must also prove its existence. But despite all onslaughts upon it, Anselm's intellectual heritage remained effective in medieval philosophy. When it began to lose its potency because of the Reformation and Renaissance, Spinoza appeared and gave it a new impetus.

V

The next great medieval philosophical figure whose God-doctrine forms one of the backgrounds of Spinozism is Jacob Boehme.

To him as to Father Eckhardt, God is eternal rest, a stillness without being, causeless, and will-less. God is nothing definite, but is rather an eternal nothingness without sorrow or joy, without quality or motion. He is nothing and at the same time all things; He is neither light nor darkness, and is divested of all reality. He is not essence, but at the same time the cause of all essences. He is not revealed, not even to Himself.

This reducing of God to nothing, which is character-

istic of both Father Eckhardt and Jacob Boehme, is also symbolic of all pantheism. God is either personality or *nulus*.

Eckhardt, Anselm, and Boehme furnished part of the background for Spinoza's mysticism. From Anselm, Spinoza borrowed the ontological method, and from Eckhardt and Boehme, the doctrine of a still and motionless God as it was first developed in India.

In his doctrines of God and man Spinoza added little to the teachings of ancient oriental and medieval occidental mystics. From Buddha to Spinoza all mystics looked tremblingly at fate and attempted to compress it into eternal, immutable laws. Determinism, predestination, and pessimism were the necessary consequences of this turn of mind, for what can man hope to attain in a world in which everything has been predetermined by the forces of eternity, even to the minutest details? The wheel of fate revolved around eternal, immutable laws, enslaving both man and God. Buddha and Spinoza cry out as with one voice, "We are slaves of nature, slaves of the eternal, immutable law." This consciousness of man's eternal captivity is the kindling-point of the world-pictures of both great religionists.

The eternal law is the only reality which protrudes from this world-concept. It alone binds nature, man, and God, and by its very effectiveness grinds them into nothingness.

Knowing that the eternal law is the only effective force, man necessarily views life from the cosmic rather than from the human point of view. Not *sub specie boni* but *sub specie aeternitatis* guides his thinking. Man becomes lost in this vast universe, for he feels that he is only one of the countless insignificant creatures of the cosmos. His coming and going proceed with machine-

like regularity and purposelessness. His heart fills with despair at his own unimportance and this life appears to him as a vale of tears. But if his own life is insignificant, that of his fellow-man is, at least, equally so. Man becomes a-social and a-ethical and surrenders to the forces of eternity. Despairing of life, he is not eager to improve upon it. He discards ethics, whose aim it is to improve upon life by debeastializing man. Ethics also presumes a certain measure of freedom for man, which, however, is denied to him by Spinoza and Buddha.

Overwhelmed by metaphysical fear, man becomes concerned only with his own soul, his own future, his own salvation. Only by overcoming life can he be redeemed from it. He must subjugate his senses and must conquer his will to live. His highest aspiration is to attain the blessed state of eternal peace, the Nirvana of Buddha or the *amor Dei intellectualis* of Spinoza.

Such a metaphysical idyl would seem to imply passivity and eternal peace. But, strange as it may seem, its consequences are brutality and despotism. The Spinoza who says, "Obey the laws of nature, for they are the only reality," must also acquiesce to brute force in human life, for might is one of nature's blind laws. Spinoza's theory of the state and Buddha's indifference to the brutality of the caste system support the implication that causation as the only reality extends the realm of brute nature to the realm of human history.

In the worlds of Spinoza and Buddha, man, overawed by the eternal immutable law, vanishes from the picture. And with him disappear all that revolves about man—history, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, social service, and true philanthropy. All that remains is the ceaselessly revolving wheel of fate which stares at the puppet show called human life.

NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SPINOZA IN GERMANY

It seems that the German travelers abroad were the first to introduce Spinoza to the German public. Thus, Christian Kartholt, in his book *De tribus impostribus magnis*, branded Herbert Cherburg, Hobbes, and Spinoza as fakers, and complained that the German travelers bring back from abroad erroneous and false religious ideals, when they "recommend Herbert, Hobbes and Spinoza and similar elements of religion to the German people." Deit Ludwig von Seekendorf, in his book *Christenstaat*, which appeared in 1685, also characterized Spinoza as a dangerous atheist. In the last two decades of the seventeenth century there was created in Germany an anti-Spinoza literature of considerable size, to which the most eminent theologians of the time, like Theomasius, Rappolt, Calro, and Bomenberg, contributed. By the end of the century a Leipzig scholar named Gamchen deemed it advisable to publish a list of Spinoza books, entitled *Catalogus scriptorum anti-Spinozianorum*. The main reason for the outburst against Spinoza was the activity of the first German Spinozist, Matthias Knutsen, the founder of the first German Spinozist, Matthias Knutsen, the founder of the religious sect of Conscientiarii, who advocated the abolition of organized religion and the expulsion of the priests from the state, because "there is neither God nor devil." The theologians of the time felt that Spinozism, as interpreted by Knutsen, would in the end undermine their position. The representatives of organized religion were already on their guard, and when the book of Friedrich Wilhelm Stosh, *Concordia rationis Ethridi*, the first meritorious *pro* Spinoza book in Germany, appeared, it caused such a sensation and was so bitterly decried by the representatives of religion that it was actually denounced from the pulpits as an atheistic document. In the Protestant churches of Breslau, for instance, it was announced that all those who possessed Stosh's book would be fined five hundred thaler and flogged. Another contemporary adherent of Spinoza, Theodore Ludwig Lau, published in 1717 a book entitled *Meditationes philosophicae de mundo et homine*, which brought grief to its author and caused him to be expelled from Germany. The hatred against Spinoza was extended to Spinoza's

native country, and the theologians of the time compared the Netherlands with Samaria of old.

By the end of the second decade of the eighteenth century, the anti-Spinoza movement in Germany had spent itself and Spinoza was forgotten in the Fatherland for almost six decades.

HERDER AND SPINOZA

Herder's main criticism of Spinoza is directed against his doctrine of the attributes. How could Spinoza maintain that extension or space is one of the attributes of God, since he distinguishes between time and eternity and thus places space on the same level with time? This error in Spinoza, Herder traces to the Cartesian influence, but, nevertheless, Herder defends Spinoza not only against the accusation against atheism, but also of pantheism and fatalism. It is nothing short of humorous when Herder tries to transform Spinoza's clean-cut determinism into "a lightful, thinking necessity."

Herder interprets Spinoza's Deus as a thinking, personal—superpersonal—Deity. Under Herder's hand Spinoza's Deus becomes an ethical personality. Herder was under the impression that Spinoza's God is not above joy and sorrow and motion and thought, but is a God with ethical attributes. This thesis he develops in his booklet, *Gott* (Gotha, 1787). The fact is that more than Herder was a Spinozist, he was an anti-Kantian. He rejects Kant's epistemological dualism, and insists upon the monism of recognition. It is the task of the process of recognition to transform variety into oneness, and this, by the way, is not only typical of the human mind. Herder argues that all forces of nature are endowed with a gift to bring oneness out of a variety. To visualize the all in nature is the highest attainment. Carried away by a monistic enthusiasm, he felt himself attracted to Spinoza and recommended him warmly to the theologians, not only as a philosophical, but also as a religious source of inspiration. It is mostly for this reason that Herder prefers Spinoza to Leibnitz and Locke. See R. Hyam, *Herder*, pp. 135 and 668.

LESSING AND SPINOZA

In the lonely Jew of Amsterdam, Lessing recognized not only a revealer of philosophical truth but also a representative of general cultural progress, for every powerful expression against organized religion was then considered symptomatic of cultural progress. How deeply interested Lessing became not only in Spinoza,

the theologian, but also in Spinoza, the philosopher, can easily be discerned from two essays on metaphysical problems in which the main thesis of Spinozism is discussed with utter candor and frankness. It is no small irony of fate that both essays were addressed to Moses Mendelssohn, the arch anti-Spinozist. In the one essay, *The Reality of Things outside God*, Lessing tries to argue every metaphysical dualism out of existence and to prove that there can be only one philosophical truth, monism. Taking the cue from Spinoza that everything is in God, he argues that there can be nothing outside God and hence the world and God are not a duality but a oneness. Spinoza's metaphysical formula of *Deus sive natura* is here presented with frankness and lucidity. The fact that it is impossible to prove the existence of the world outside God proves best that world and God are one. Lessing thus flatly denies the idea of a transmundane God and accepts the doctrine of an immanent God without any reservation. But in spite of Lessing's clean-cut pantheism, Moses Mendelssohn tried to save the great name of Lessing for traditional religiosity by asserting in his *Morgenstunden* that although Lessing denies an extramundane God, he did not deny an extramundane world.

The second Spinoza essay was written in April, 1763, in the form of a letter to Mendelssohn. Here again Lessing tries to make his attitude to Spinoza as clear as possible. He contests Mendelssohn's assertion that Leibnitz' theory of pre-established harmony between body and soul is also the theory of Spinoza. Lessing states correctly that since Spinoza is a monist, the problem of soul and body is solved by his very monism. Leibnitz, who admitted a division of body and soul, needed an outside force to unite them. Here again Mendelssohn either tries to save the day for orthodoxy or misrepresents Spinoza as a result of his misunderstanding.

It is true that Lessing always refused to be classified as an adherent of a given philosophical system, and to this extent he was not a Spinozist just as he was not any other *ist*. However, his pantheism is so outspoken and defended with so much courage and his admiration for Spinoza is so deep that he was more of a Spinozist than many of those of his contemporaries who took pride in calling themselves Spinozists. When Jacobi came to him and told him that he knows Spinoza's works better than most of his contemporaries but that he cannot accept him as his philosophical *spiritus rector*, Lessing intimated to him to accept him fully and give up the struggle against him. It was also established beyond a shadow of a

doubt that everything Jacobi told in his writings about Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza is neither over- nor understated.

Since Lessing's influence on the march of events in Germany is in many respects as powerful as that of Goethe, he and Lessing's interest in Spinoza was more theologically motivated. It was in the course of his theological studies that he familiarized himself with Spinoza's theological political tractate in which he found his own theological liberalism clearly formulated. If Lessing quickly outgrew not only church orthodoxy but also the enlightenment movement as inaugurated by Leibnitz, it is also traceable to Spinoza's influence.

Lessing and Goethe can be said to be the two most potent forces of Spinozism in the fatherland. Through Lessing's mediation Spinoza became a force of general cultural progress in Germany while through Goethe he became the great literary inspiration.

GOETHE AND SPINOZA

Vorlander, in his learned treatise, *Goethe's Relationship to Kant*, only proves that Goethe had an intimate knowledge of Kant, but not that Goethe preferred Kant to Spinoza, as Houston Stewart Chamberlain maintained. Goethe grew up with the Spinoza tradition, and the name of the Amsterdam philosopher was known to him from his early youth. Goethe himself tells us that in his father's library he found an anti-Spinoza book, in which the philosopher was vilified and described as a menace to Christian humanity. He became interested in Spinoza and desired to ascertain whether or not these attacks were justified. In 1774 Goethe became an intimate friend of Jacoby, who, although an anti-Spinozist, knew almost all of Spinoza by heart and could never free himself entirely from this influence. In his autobiography, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Goethe stresses primarily the moral impression Spinoza's doctrine made on him. Already in his *Prometheus* his Spinozism finds a poetic expression. In *Faust*, however, Goethe's Spinozism bursts forth with full force. "Call it happiness, heart's love. I have no name for it. Feeling is everything. Name is sound and smoke, benumbed, celestial glow. All hearts and all places proclaimed it under the heavenly days, each in its own language, why not I in mine?" In a letter to Jacoby dated June 9, 1785, Goethe says, "Spinoza does not prove the existence of God, but that existence is God, and when others call him atheist, I would rather call him the

greatest theist and the greatest Christian." It was in the spirit of Spinoza, when the poet Goethe exclaimed:

War' das Auge nicht Sonnenhaft
Die Sonn' konnte es nie erblicken
Lage nicht in uns des Gottes eigene Kraft
Wie konnte uns Gottliches entzucken.

Not only Goethe's poetry but his science is Spinozistically motivated. Convinced of the oneness of nature, he approached it with a certainty to discover in it oneness, and his discovery of the *os intermaxillare* in man, which influenced the development of comparative anatomy, is one of the by-products of his Spinozistic sentiments. In his theory of the metamorphosis of the plants, which he expounded scientifically and poetically, he also expressed a good deal of Spinozism. Spinoza enabled him to read the various pages of nature as one book.

Goethe respected Kant and may be described as a Kant scholar, but he was a Spinoza adherent. His world-picture is Spinozistic and not Kantian.

SPINOZA IN ENGLAND

Ralph Cudworth was probably one of the first Englishmen to busy himself with Spinoza. In his book, *The True Intellectual Systems of the Universe* (London, 1678), in discussing Spinoza's doctrine of miracles he says, "We find his discourse in every way so weak, so groundless, and inconsiderable that we could not think it here to deserve confutation."

Another writer of the same period, Henry More, had already made a thorough study of Spinoza's work, and wrote of Spinoza's philosophy in the first volume of his *Opera omnia* (London, 1679). These true controversial essays belong to the most venomous pages ever written on Spinoza in England. Instead of refuting Spinoza, More calls him such names as "philosophaster" and "sophisto," and he speaks of the *sordidus animus Spinozii*. He tries to refute Spinoza the materialist, presuming that determinism is identical with materialism. In 1682 a certain William Lorimer appears with a criticism of Spinoza's views of the Old Testament. It is a discourse proving the divine original authority of the five books of Moses. In 1683 an anonymous author published a booklet entitled *Miracles*, directed against Spinoza's doctrine of miracles. At the same time there also appeared many translations of Spinoza's *Theological Political Tractate*. Since 1680 the English bishops be-

gan to pay more attention to Spinoza. Many of them published booklets against Spinoza's theology. One of these divines, Bishop Boyle, says that "Spinoza deserves not a place in libraries, but among the lowest forms of inferior animals." The whole tenor of Spinoza's discussion in England at that time is scarcely different from the Spinoza controversy in Germany. It was Spinoza's misfortune that in both Protestant countries he was primarily known as the author of the *Theological Political Tractate*, and aroused the interest and ire of the divines.

The philosopher of the time, Locke, knew little of Spinoza and admitted it in a conversation with the Bishop of Dorchester. When he discussed with the latter the question of immortality, he also refers to Spinoza as well as to Hobbes as those "decried men." See Locke, *Works* (London, 1812), IV, 77.

Many historians of philosophy believe to have detected Spinozistic elements in Shaftesbury, but it is an established fact that Shaftesbury did not know Spinoza at all. John Howe, in his book, *The Living Temple* (London, 1712), devotes a whole chapter to Spinoza. He says of Spinoza that "although he and his followers would cheat the world with names and with especious show of piety, his skin is directly leveled against all religions, as any of the most avid atheist is."

The first writer of that time who found it worth while to study Spinoza seriously, and to take him seriously, is Samuel Clark. In his *Collective Lectures* he demonstrates the being and attributes of God, more particularly in answer to Messrs. Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers. He examines very minutely Spinoza's monism and determinism and rejects both, especially determinism because it would transform the dynamic into a still and the active into a passive world. He refers to Spinoza's terminology as a mere jargon, and words without any meaning, and says of him that he is the most celebrated patron of atheism of his time.

It is noteworthy that Locke, Clark, and Howe, as well as many other contemporaries, when speaking of Spinoza always refer to him as "he and his followers," which justifies the assumption that Spinoza was already popular or notorious in England before the close of the seventeenth century. The extent of his popularity can best be judged by the fact that Richard Blackmore, in his famous poem *Creation* (1712), dedicates five stanzas to Spinoza.

Neither Berkley nor Bollingbrooke, who were familiar with Spinoza's writings, had the slightest understanding or appreciation of his doctrine. Berkley speaks of Spinoza as of the celebrated

infidel (*Works* [London, 1871], II, 288), or as a great leader of the modern infidels (II, 333). Berkley's whole attitude toward Spinoza is best summarized by his observation: "Allow a man the privilege to his own definitions of common words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer conclusions which in one sense shall be true and in another false, at once something paradoxical and manifesting truism. For example let that Spinoza define natural right to be natural power, and he will easily demonstrate what every man can do and has a right to do. Nothing can be plainer than the folly of these proceedings."

Henry Bollingbrooke knew his Spinoza well, but his understanding of him is typical of seventeenth-century England. He couples Spinoza with Calvin. On account of their determinism he despises both. Spinoza appears to him to be very pious and obscure. See Bollingbrooke, *Works* (London, 1809), VIII, 328-29.

It was only with the appearance of Coleridge that any true appreciation of Spinoza in England was forthcoming.

Many of the Spinoza biographers, commentators, and critics assert or imply that Spinoza's Absolute is to be regarded as a self-conscious individual being. Even Pollock asserts that Spinoza has nowhere denied God's consciousness. It is well to remember that Spinoza, who was an admirer of St. Paul, takes him to task for ascribing to God mercy, grace, wrath, etc. Spinoza explains that it is on account of human weakness that he accommodates his words to the minds of the people. The ethical personality of God is thus flatly denied by Spinoza. But God is not an intellectual personality either, because he is not a personality at all. Spinoza takes great pains in denying God's intellectual personality. In a passage in his *Short Treatise* (Part I, chap. vii) he says, "It is now time that we consider the things which are ascribed to God, but which do not belong to Him as omniscient, merciful, wise, etc., which things because they are merely definite modes of the thought reality, in no way can exist or be conceived without the substance of which they are modes, and cannot be attributed to a self-existent thing. Thus wisdom and omniscience cannot be ascribed to the Absolute." In another passage of the same work, he emphasizes that "We have already said that no manner of thinking can be attributed to God, except those which are in the very things." In other words, it is only as the totality of being that God thinks, but as a cosmic principle, as the Absolute, He does not think, just as He does not love or hate, desire, choose, or plan. To this conception Spinoza clung all his life. God's freedom, of which Spinoza speaks—God being a

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free cause—means only that He is not subject to external pressure. Everything results from His nature, as the three angles result from the nature of a triangle.

In proposition 31 of the *Ethics*, Spinoza goes a step farther and states, "Real intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, has also will, desire, love, etc., and must be referred to *natura naturata*, but not to *natura naturans*. In one of his letters he repeats, "I think I have demonstrated clearly enough that intellect, even tho infinite, belongs to *natura naturata* and not to *natura naturans*. *Amor Dei intellectualis* has nothing in common with the religious term "love of God." In *Ethics*, V, 32, Cor., Spinoza defines it. "From the third kind of knowledge arises necessarily the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises joy, accompanied by the idea of God as cause. That is the love of God, not as He is presented by the imagination, but as perceived by the intellect to be eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of God." The third kind of knowledge is *scientia intuitiva*, about which Spinoza himself confesses that the things he himself has learned from this science are extremely few—in fact, none—and thus admits that never having learned anything worth while from intuition, he never has experienced an intellectual love of God, which arises only from intuitive science. But, nevertheless, Spinoza has always been described as a God-intoxicated Jew, who stood nearer to God than any other mortal.

But what is the famous *amor Dei intellectualis*? It is nothing else but intellectual joy as the result of an intellectual process. To Spinoza love is not a relationship to the object, but the knowledge of it. This is not extreme but eccentric rationalism. The highest good is not God but is intellectual experience *in sola speculatione et pura mente*. Spinoza's Deus, like that of Buddha's Brahma, is above love and hate, joy and sorrow, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the term "God." In this connection it may be interesting to note that less than fifty years after Spinoza's death a theologian by the name of Jean le Clerc published a statement which is to be found in Volume XXII of the *Bibliothèque ancienne et moderne* (Geneva, 1724), in which the assertion is made that in the original version of Spinoza's *Ethics* the word *Deus* or "God" never appears, but that it was interpolated after his death and substituted for the word *natura*. Jean le Clerc was minister of an extremely reformed Christian sect in the Netherland, and a well-known biblical scholar and editor of the work *Erasmus and Hugo Grotius*. He was a well-reputed man and honest scholar. There is no reason to suspect his

honesty and earnestness of purpose. In the statement referred to above he says, "I have it from a very trustworthy man, who gave it to me in writing, that Spinoza has composed his *Ethica* in Flemish and that he gave it to a physician by the name of Louis Meyer to translate it into Latin, and that in the Flemish text the word God never occurred, but nature, which Spinoza conceived as eternal being. The translator was afraid of the terrible scandal that would follow from the publication of a book in which the existence of God is denied and he, therefore, substituted the word God for the word nature. Nature is a more proper word to emphasize—not the creator, but creation or creature. Spinoza approved of this change and the book appeared just as Meyer advised him."

Fritz Mauthner, who published the text of Le Clerc's statement in its French original in the second volume of his *Atheism and Its History in the West*, observes that although he has no reason to mistrust the sincerity and honesty of Le Clerc, the fact stated by Le Clerc seems dubious to him, for in many passages of the *Ethics* the term *natura* instead of *Deus* would make the entire work unintelligible. But whatever the case, it is certain that Spinoza's *Deus*, being stripped of everything godly and being nothing in itself, has no resemblance to any positive God idea.

LOGOS-VAK

Modern historiography is decidedly against the assumption that the Alexandrian Logos doctrine is to be traced to the Logos idea of Heraclitus. Spengler observes in reference to the Alexandrian Logos, "Der eigentliche Kernbegriff des gesamten Denkens der Pseudomorphose ist der Logos, in seiner Anwendung und Entwicklung ihr getreues Sinnbild. Von einer Einwirkung griechischen—antiken—Denkens kann gar keine Rede sein; es lebte damals kein Mensch, in dessen geistiger Anlage der Logosbegriff Heraklits und der Stoa auch nur von fern Platz gefunden hätte."

SPENGLER, OSWALD. *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, II, 281.

See also WEBER, J. S. *Indische Studien*, IX, 473.

DEUSSEN, P. *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, 146.

WILLMANN, OTTO. *Geschichte des Idealismus*, II, 89-90.

MAX MÜLLER's three lectures on the Vedanti philosophy.

Modern Protestant theologians, HOLTZMANN, GUNKEL, and many others, are also inclined to the view that the New Testament religiosity is an oriental and not an occidental product.

See GUNKEL's interpretation of the New Testament in the *Monist*, XIII, 398-455.

In view of all these facts and expert opinion, it is difficult to understand what made Dean Inge assume (*The Philosophy of Plotinus*, I, 18) that the Logos of Plotinus is so different from the Logos of Christianity. A. Aall, in *The History of the Logos Idea* (Leipzig, 1896), confines himself to the history of the Logos in Greek philosophy and in orthodox fashion links the Alexandrian Logos idea to that of Heraclitus and the Stoics. Whether he was ignorant of the ancient Hindu model of the Greek Logos or whether he purposely confined himself only to the Greek Logos idea, without wishing to enter into a discussion about its origin, need not be discussed here.

See also REVELLE, J. *La doctrine du Logos dans les Gnostics, évang.* Paris, 1881.

Also HINGE, W. R. *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*. London, 1907.

SIMON, T. *Der Logos*. Leipzig, 1902.

HEINZE, J. M. *Die Lehre von Logos in der griech Philosophie*. Oldenberg, 1872.

LUDWIG, A. *Der Rigveda*, I, 164; II, 644.

EDMUNDS, ALBERT J. *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels, Being Gospels Parallel from Pali Texts*. Philadelphia, 1908.

The old muted question which occupied theologians for over a half-century, whether Christianity has influenced later Buddhism or vice versa, was once and for all settled by the publication of Edmunds, *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels*. Even a superficial perusal of these parallels will convince the reader that there is scarcely to be found anything in the Christian gospels which cannot be found in the Pali text of the Buddhistic gospels, which by far antedate the birth of Christianity.

The foremost Christian myth is that of the supernatural and holy birth of Jesus. In comparing the Buddhistic with the Christian legend of nativity, it would seem that the former has little in common with the latter. But still one need only read the dialogue on "Wonders and Marvels," *Middling Collection*, Dialogue 123, to be convinced that the legend sounding the birth of Buddha is also based on miracles and wonders and are attended by supernatural processes.

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, the four sons of the angels, who keep watch over the four quarters, approach him and say: “Neither mortal nor demon shall harm the future Buddha or his mother.”’

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, she is pure from sexuality, has abstained from taking life, from theft, from evil conduct in lusts, from lying, and from all kinds of wine and strong drink, which are a cause of irreligion.’

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, there arises, not in his mother any lustful intent toward men, and she is inviolable by the impure thought of any man.’

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, she is possesst of the five pleasures of the senses: she is surrounded by, establisht in, and endowed with the five pleasures of the senses.’

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, she has no sickness at all, but is happy, with her body free from pain, and sees the future Buddha transparently in the womb (*literally*, gone across the womb) in full possession of all his limbs and faculties. Even as a cat’s-eye gem, Anando, being radiant, fine, octagonal and well wrought, is therefore strung upon a dark blue string, or upon a tawny, or a red, or a white, or a yellow string, so that any man with eyes, upon taking it in his hand, may reflect: “This cat’s-eye gem, being radiant, etc. . . . is therefore strung upon this dark blue string, or yellow string,” even so, Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother’s womb, she has no sickness at all, but is happy, with her body free from pain, and sees him transparently in the womb, in full possession of all his limbs and faculties.’

“‘Moreover, Anando, while other women bring forth after a gestation of nine or ten months, the future Buddha’s mother does not act in the usual way with him: just ten months does she carry the future Buddha before she brings him forth.’

“‘Moreover, Anando, while other women bring forth sitting or lying down, the future Buddha’s mother does not bring him forth in the usual way: she actually brings him forth standing.’

“‘Anando, when the future Buddha leaves his mother’s womb, he does not touch the earth: four sons of the princes (*or* angels) receive him and present him to his mother. “May Your Majesty be blessed,” they say, “unto you is born an eminent son.”’

“ ‘Anando, when the future Buddha leaves his mother’s womb, he leaves it quite clean, undefiled with matter or blood, but pure, clean and undefiled by any impurity. As in the case, Anando, of a gem or a jewel laid in Benares cloth, the gem or jewel does not defile the Benares cloth at all, nor the Benares cloth the jewel or the gem (and why?—because they both are pure): even so, Anando, when the future Buddha leaves his mother’s womb, etc. . . . undefiled by any impurity.’ ”

“ ‘Anando, the new-born future Buddha stands sheer upright on his feet, walks northwards with a seven-paced stride, with a white canopy held over him, and looking forth in all directions, utters the taurine speech, “I am the chief in the world, I am the best in the world. I am the eldest in the world. This is my last existence: I shall now be born no more.” ’ ”

“ ‘Anando, when the future Buddha leaves his mother’s womb, then in the world of the angels, together with those of Maro and Brahma and unto the race of philosophers and Brahmins, princes and peoples, there appears a splendor limitless and eminent, transcending the angelic might of the angels; and even in the boundless realms of space, with their darkness upon darkness, where yonder sun and moon, so magical, so mighty, are felt not in the sky, there too appears the splendor limitless and eminent, transcending the very might of the angels, so that beings who are born there consider among themselves by reason of that splendor: “Friend, it is said that other beings are born here, in this myriad-fold universe quakes and shakes and tremendously trembles, a splendor limitless and eminent appears in the world, transcending even the angelic might of the angels.” ’ ”

SERVING THE SICK, SERVING THE LORD

Matt. 25:44, 45

“Then shall they also answer, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungered, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? Then shall he answer them, saying, “Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me.”

MIRACULOUS WATER PROCEEDS FROM THE SAINT

John 7:38

He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.”

THE WAY TO SUPERNAL KNOWLEDGE

Patisambhida-maggo, l. 53

"What is the Tathagato's (Christ's) knowledge of the twin miracle? In this case, the Tathagato (Christ) works a twin miracle unrivaled by disciples: from his upper body proceeds a flame of fire, and from his lower body proceeds a torrent of water. Again from his lower body proceeds a flame of fire, and from his upper body a torrent of water."

DISPLAY OF PSYCHICAL POWER FORBIDDEN

Mark 8:11, 12

"And the Pharisees came forth, and began to question with him, seeking of him a sign from heaven, tempting him. And he sighed deeply in his spirit, and saith, Why doth this generation seek a sign? Verily, I say unto you, there shall no sign be given unto this generation."

Minor Section on Disciple, V, 8

(C.T. Mahicasaka Vinayo, trans. in *SBE*, XX, 81)

"Ye are not, O monks, to display psychical power or miracle of superhuman kind before the laity. Whoever does so is guilty of a misdemeanor."

THE SAVIOR IS UNIQUE

John 1:14 and 18

"The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we behold his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth. . . . No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."

Numerical Collection, IV, 36 (S.T. in *Samyukta*)

"Once the Lord had entered upon the main road between High-town and White-town. Now Dono the Brahmin entered it likewise. And he saw the wheels on the Lord's feet, with their thousand spokes, their tires and naves, and all their parts complete. Having seen them, he thought to himself: 'Wonderful and marvelous indeed! These cannot be the feet of a human being.'"

"Then the Lord, stepping aside from the road, sat at the root of a tree in the posture of meditation, holding his body erect, looking

straight before him, and collecting his mind. And Dono the Brahmin, following the Lord's feet, saw him sitting at a tree-root with serene and pleasing looks, his faculties and mind at peace, with the highest control and calm, in the attainment (of trance), subdued and guarded. Upon seeing the hero (*literally*, the elephant) with his faculties at peace, he approacht the Lord and said:

" 'Are you not an angel?'

" 'No, Brahmin: I am not an angel.'

" 'Are you not a celestial genius?'

" 'No, Brahmin: I am not.'

" 'Are you not a goblin?'

" 'No Brahmin: I am not a goblin.'

" 'Are you not a man?'

" 'No, Brahmin: I AM NOT A MAN.' "

I HAVE OVERCOME THE WORLD

John 16:33

"Be of good cheer: I have overcome the world."

Numerical Collection, IV, 36 (S.P. in Samyukta) (1)

"I am born in the world, grown up in the world, and having overcome the world, I abide by the same undefiled."

THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD

John 103:12

"Jesus spake unto them, saying, I am the light of the world.'"

John 9:5, 6

"When I am in the world, I am the light of the world. When he had thus spoken, he spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and anointed his EYES with the clay."

Classified Collection, LVI, 38 (C.T. in Chinese)

"Even so, monks, so long as there arises no Tathagato (Christ), a Holy One, a perfect Buddha, so long is there no appearance of great glory, of great splendor. Then is there gloom and darkness dense. There is no proclamation of the Four Noble Truths, no preaching thereof, no publication, no establishment, no exposition, analysis, elucidation. But when, O monks, a Tathagato (Christ), a Holy One, a perfect Buddha, ariseth in the world, then is there appearance of great glory and of splendor great; gloom and dense darkness are no more; then is there proclamation of the Four Noble

Truths; there is preaching thereof, publication, establishment, exposition, analysis, elucidation."

Long Collection, Dialogue 16 (C.T. 2)

"Too soon will the Lord enter Nirvana! Too soon will the Auspicious One enter Nirvana! Too soon will the Light of the World (*literally*, Eye in the World) vanish away!"

KING, REDEEMER, AND CONQUEROR OF THE DEVIL

John 18:37

"Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice."

Sela-Sutta

(Double Text: Collection of Sutta and *Middling Collection*

Dialogue 92) (1)

"I am a King, O Selo!

An incomparable King of religion:

By religion I set rolling a wheel,

An Irresistible wheel."

LION ON HIS RACE

Revelation V, 5

"Weep not: behold the Lion that is of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath overcome, to open the book and the seven seals thereof."

These are only a few examples copied from Edmunds' two volumes of the parallel gospels.

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INDEX

INDEX

- Adikes, Erich, 117
 Alexander of Macedonia, 305
 Anselm of Canterbury, 359.
 Aristotle, conception of, of man, 39, 62
 Arnold, Mathew, and Spinoza, 45, 90
 Augustine, St., 5, 61, 204, 303, 340, 344, 345, 346, 347, originator of occidental Christian dogma, 341; predecessor of Descartes, 341, as a Manichean he persecutes all anti-Manicheans and as a Christian he persecutes all Manicheans, 342, his God is the timeless, attributeless Oneness, removed from all reality, and is a dead deity, 343, like Buddha, he calls wisdom or reason God's Son, 346, 350, 351, 352, 356, 359, 360
 Avenarius, Richard H., 30, 153.
 Bacon, Francis, one of the sources of Spinoza's terminology and naturalism, 201
 Balfour, A. J., 145
 Bayle, 37, 55
 Berendt, Martin, 74
 Bergson, Henri, 75
 Berkeley, 157, 373
 Bible, the, is anthropocentric, 11
 Bismarck, 48; and Spinoza, 32, 34; spirit of the rule of the bourgeoisie, 34
 Blackmore, Richard, 372
 Boehme, Jacob, 154, 155
 Bollingbrooke, Henry, 372
 Boniface VIII, 17
 Bouffon, 46
 Brahma, the dead god, 12
 Brandt, L., 311
 Bruner, Constantine, 62
 Bruno, 18; rhapsodist, 50; greatest martyr in the history of philosophy, 50
 Buckle, 4
 Buddha, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 159, 204, 257, 258, 259, 324, 347, 350; not concerned with lot of lower castes, 14, 15; like Spinoza, he resorted to the theory of double causation, 260; *karma* of, and *cupiditas* of Spinoza, 261; considers life elemental misfortune, 264; theory of non-knowledge, 265; determinism of, 266, ethics: passive, utilitarian; Buddha not interested in man and hence indifferent to the *status quo*, 272; never encouraged speculation about Nirvana, like Spinoza, he is an intellectualist and a salvationist; like Spinoza, he is a determinist, like Spinoza, he explains that desire is the origin of life; like Spinoza, he is disinterested in man, 274; Brahma of, is the prototype of Spinoza's Deus; both are dead deities, 274; unlike Spinoza, he begins with suffering not with God, like Spinoza, he represents tragic types of consciousness, 275; world-picture of, etched upon an Eastern canvas, Spinoza's upon a Western screen, 275; mother of, the holy virgin Maya Devi, 322
 Buddhism: as a tendency in history, 2, 5; negates life, 9; coequal with pessimism, 12; closing in on Palestine, 302, destroying Judaism, 302; Buddhist Trinity: Buddha, Darmah, and Samgha—God-father, God-son or Logos, and the Holy Spirit, 307
 Cabanis, 70
 Calvin, 351
 Carlyle, 87; and Spinoza, 88
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 16, 58
 Christianity, synthesis of Eastern universalism and Hebraic and Western individualism, 12
 Clairvaux, Bernard de, 155, 356

- Clemenceau, 48
 Cohen, Herman, 6, 20; revives Kant, 62
 Colebrooke, D., 305
 Coleridge, 87, and Spinoza, 88
 Condillac, 36
 Confucius, 6
 Cousin, Victor, 91; and Spinoza, 92
 Cudworth, Ralph, 374
- Davids, Rhys, 273
 Delametrie, 70, 113
 Descartes, 22, 91, 116, 183, 218, 351
 Deyling, 51, 80
 Diderot, 36
 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 57
 Dostoevsky, 8
 Duns Scotus, 357
- Eckhardt, Master, 357, 358, 359
 Edmunds, Albert J., 323
 Empedocles, 201, 305
 Erdmann, E. J., 205, 206, 354
 Essenes, the, a Buddhist but not a Jewish sect, 303, 317, 324; origin of, 309
 Ethics: logic of a living God, 15; not born in the emotions, 16; of Spinoza like Buddhist ethics, utilitarians, 201
- Fichte, the philosophical patron saint of the Romantic movement; made the ego, the center and source of all things, 65; overwhelmed by spirit of Spinoza, 65, attempt of synthesis of the philosophies of Kant and Spinoza, 66; denies a personal God, 66; meant to secure a basis for ethical idealism, 66, a salvationist rather than an ethicist, 66
- Fischer, Kuno, 153, 205, 210
 French Revolution, ignores Spinoza, 37
 Freudenthal, Jacob, 205
 Friedlander, Gerhardt, 332
 Friedlander, Julius, 74
- Garbe, Richard, 305
 Germans, the, responsible for the re-discoveries of the Bible, Spinoza, and Shakespeare, 50
 Gnosticism, 308, 312
 Goethe and Spinoza, 55, 119, 255, 288; young Goethe and Spinoza, 57, 85
 Gorki, Maxim, 30
 Graetz, H., 91, 324
 Greco, El, 119
- Haekel, Ernst, 113
 Hamann, Magus of the North, 155
 Harnack, A., 343
 Hartmann, Eduard von, 16, 205, 208, 209, 216, admits Spinoza's influence, 75
 Hastil, D., 116
 Hebraic individualism, 10; monotheism, 9
 Hegel. and Spinoza, 35; in Hegel, Spinoza reached the height of his influence on the German mind, 68; panlogist, 70; like Maimon and Schelling, he identifies Spinoza with acosmism; accepts Spinoza's monism; his critic of Spinoza is doctrine of substance, 70; creates a synthesis of Spinoza's universalism and his own individualism, 71; philosophy dissolved into its component parts after his death; is a combination of the theories of Heraclitus, Plato, Spinoza, and Schelling; is nevertheless the most influential philosopher of the nineteenth century, 71; said that in order to refute Spinoza one must first accept him, 71; at first defended Spinoza against the approach of atheism and immorality, 72; at the end he not only rejected but scorned Spinoza, stressing the true Christian nature of his own philosophy and incompatibility of Spinozism with Christianity, 72; Hegelians do not share the master's view of Spinoza, 72, 75
 Hegelianism, lines sharply drawn, 25

- Heine, Heinrich, and Spinoza, 45, 97
Helmholtz, 116, 189
Helvetius, 70
Hemans, F, 58
Heraclitus, 201, 259, 305, 312
Hillel, 23
Hindu mind-abstract: devoid of all substantiality, 239; in philosophical thought monistic, 240, Atman co-equals Spinoza's substance, 241; regarded Brahma a logical principle—the first-born, Spinoza called thinking the Son of God, 241, metaphysics rejects empiric knowledge, 242; philosophy is atheistic, 243; theory of Samsara, 246; yearning for salvation—Atman a dead deity, 248; Atman's attributes—a criticism of life, 249; conception of knowledge—Vidya, 254; theory of *karma*, 255
Hindu universalism, 10
Hitlerism, Hegelianism via Spengler, 35
Hobbes, 42, 183, state, suspended law of nature, 43
Holbach, 36, 70, 113
Holderlin, 69
Howe, John, 372
Hume, 157
Isaiah, 8, 9
Ivan the Terrible, Lenin's background, 29
Jacobi: presents Spinoza as a German, 54; recognizes in Spinoza the root of modern materialism and identical with atheism and so fights him to a finish, 54
Jehova, the living God, 12
Jeremiah, 9
Jesus, 4, 14, 83, 315, 322, 324, 325, 347; a Nordic, 58; His religiosity Buddhist but not Jewish, 318; His affirmation of the Kingdom of God the denial of earthliness, 319; incarnation of the apocalyptic spirit, 320; renounces Judaism by renouncing earthliness, 320, of little importance whether He was a Jew by race, 321
Jodl, Friedrich, 47, 48
John, St, 303, 311, 317, 318
Jones, Sir William, 304
Josephus, 310
Judaism. affirms life, 9; coequal with optimism, 12; matter of the ear not of the eye, 118; abstract, puritanic, legalistic, 119, time, not space; reason not emotion, history, not geography, 120; fear of God in contradistinction to *Amor Dei*, 121, no relationship to biological nature, 123; God-concept of, 125, God is alive, free, omniscient, and omnipotent, 126, God is master and teacher, 127; man's ethical guide, 128, eschatology of, and its meaning of history, 130
Kant, Immanuel, 14, 20, 75, 83, 206, 286, 291; spoke in terms of categorical imperative, 5; completed the work of Martin Luther, 60; and biblical metaphysics, 61; crushed by Spinoza and Maimon, 61; and the Old Testament, 61, Spinoza's only adversary in the West, 62; created the only school of thought, 62, very embodiment of idealism, 62; ends with God, 63; created only a new school of philosophy, 64; established the frontiers of the human mind, 64; of concern to philosophers only, 64; objectivism of, 65; subjectivism of, 65, and Judaism, 84, like Spinoza, he had a negative attitude to the Old Testament, 84; view of the Old Testament shared by Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, 85, and modern science, 116, theory of the axiom, 191
Kantianism: lines sharply drawn, 25; product of man's critical mind, 64
Karthold, Christian, 367
Kellermann, Benzion, 205
King, William, 309
Kirchman, von, 116
Klopstock, 24

- Lachman, Benedict, 33
 Lanson, 105
 Laotze, 6
 Lau, Theodore Ludwig, 367
 Law of history and nature, 1
 LeClerc, Jean, 374
 Legalistic religiosity, grammar of conscience for all men, 15
 Leibnitz, 5, 20, 81, 116, political idealist, influenced by Plato, 44
 Lenin, Nikolai, 34, 48, class struggle a metaphysical category, 30; great inquisitional figure, also concerned with saving souls, 30; a Spinozist, 31, and Spinoza, 31; state of, proclaims Spinoza Russia's philosophical patron saint, 31; spirit of the proletariat, 34
 Leninism, régime of the Inquisition, 30
 Lessing, Ephraim Gotthold, 81, 82, 83; calls Mendelssohn a second Spinoza, 54
 Lieberman, Max, 118
 Lincoln, Abraham, 48
 Litzbarsky, O., 311
 Locke, 157
 Logos: that of Philo and Heraclitus, 313; Buddhistic elements of, 314, 349
 Lorimer, William, 374
 Lotze, 75
 Luther, Martin, 218; creator of new German language, 24
 Luzzato, S. D., 144
 Mach, E., 30, 189
 Machiavelli, 42
 Maimon, Solomon, 61, 70, 145; first to introduce Spinoza to Eastern Jewry, 145
 Maimonides, God of—deindividualized but still an ethical personality, 137, 195, 249
 Mandeism, 312, 317
 Manicheism, 336
 Marcion, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339
 Marx, Karl, 4, 23, 31, 154
 Megasthenes, first Western ambassador to the court of Patna, 306
 Mendelssohn, Moses, 143, 369
 Messiah: apotheosis of Old Testament religiosity and optimism, 12, versus Nirvana, 300; versus Brahma, 301, national political figure, 320
 Micha, 9
 Mill, John Stuart, 189
 Miller, Johannes, 113
 Milton, 24
 Monotheism: born in the desert, 277; cradle of personality, 277; and geography, 279, not to be identified with monism, connotes a living God, 286
 Montaigne, 22
 Montesquieu and Spinoza, 37
 Morality. logic of a dead God, 15; reaction of, to physical suffering, 16
 More, Henry, 374
 Moses, 5, 9; historicity of, unimportant, 4
 Mosheim, 80; and Spinoza, 51
 Mueller, Max, 288; places Hebraism in juxtaposition to Buddhism, 294, 323
 Mussolini, 48
 Napoleon, 3, 7, 65
 New Testament: opens with biography, 11; lacking in the science of man, 14
 Newman, Francis, and Spinoza, 89
 Nietzsche, 4, 6, 8, 10, 34; and Spinoza, 33; spirit of the rule of the superman, 34
 Nirvana (the state of not being), 12, 270, 271, 348; visualized by Buddha as expiring flame, and is the state beyond pain and sorrow (Nirvana as *upadhisesa*; Nirvana as *anupadhisesa*), 273
 Nordau, Max, 145
 Old Testament: crowded with powerful figures, 10; full of biography, 11; book of hunger, 11; formulated the

- science of man, 14, 21, living figures of, captivated Western man, 25, rather eschatology than archaeology, 77, not concerned with the world beyond—a book of sturdy optimism, 281, optimism of, not empiric, 282; optimism of, intellectualistic, 283, ethics of, correlated to logic, 285; ethics of, gift of a living God to man, 289, not a textbook of metaphysics, 290, a book of man for man, 298; three salient features. doctrines of free will, primacy of intellect, and affirmation of life, 309
- Oldenberg, M., 273
- Osaka, the Constantine of Buddhism, 305, 307
- Pantheism: Eastern is mystical while Western is intellectual, 159; in ancient Greece the conclusion, in ancient India the starting-point, 159; in India it shows man the way to self-destruction, 161; Eastern pantheism ascetic, Western hedonic, 162, of Spinoza, Eastern not Western, 163; born in the jungle, 277; grave of personality, 278; connotes a dead God, 286
- Pascal, 87
- Pasmanik, D., 23
- Paul, St., 5, 9, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 201, 204, 303, 325, 338, 339, 343, 347, 350, 356; scheme of redemption like that of Buddha, 320; family of, 326; epileptic and neurotic, 327; like Buddha and Spinoza, he renounces all earthly pleasures, 327; unmoved by beauty, 328, love for the metropolis, 328; real founder of Christianity, 328, attracted by the dynamic West, 329; ignores the historical Jesus, 330; invalidates Judaism, 331; starting-point of, the worthlessness of life is Buddhistic; so is eschatology of, 331; like Buddha, he identifies flesh with sin; like Buddha, he has the greatest contempt for life, 332; Kingdom of God of, only a Western copy or analogy to Buddhistic Nirvana, 334;
- Christ of, as a-historic as Brahma, 335
- Paulus, a Kantian, first German translator of Spinoza's works, 62
- Peiper, Karl, 328
- Pelagius, 339, 340
- Philo of Alexandria, 309, 310, 312, 314, 333, 337, 348, Logos of, a Greek edition of the Hindu Vach, 334
- Pilatus, Pontius, 315
- Plato, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 286, 305
- Plotinus, 348
- Pollock, F., 373
- Prophets of Israel, 5, 6, 14, 286, 338
- Ptolemy of Alexandria, 306
- Pythagoras, 303, 304, 305
- Rabelais, 22
- Redemptive religiosity, appeals to lowly, 15
- Reformation, formulated science of man, 14
- Reitzenstein, Richard, 311
- Renan and Spinoza, 45, 46, 91, 92
- Renouvier, 75
- Robespierre, 3
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 36, theory of, of a nation, 47, 53
- Rubin, Solomon, 145
- Sankara: highest expression of Hindu monism, 251, 357; theory of Oneness, 252, Sankara and Spinoza, 253
- Schelling, 70; made Spinozism the cornerstone of his system, 66, absolute Oneness of Spinoza central motif in philosophy of, 67; cosmos vitalistic of, not mechanistic, 68
- Schiller, Friedrich, and Goethe, 58; applies Spinoza's universalism to internationalism of his drama, 58
- Schleiermacher: theory of religiosity of, 86; influenced by Spinoza, 87
- Schopenhauer: and Spinoza, 6, 16, 157; admitted indebtedness to Spinoza, 73; recognizes in Spinoza's *Deus* the

- old Jehovah minus personality, 73, criticizes Spinoza's alleged optimism, 74, admits that Spinoza and Bruno stand out conspicuously in the realm of thought, 74, recognized in Spinoza an Eastern plant on Western soil, 74, Spinoza's *cupidas* and Schopenhauer's *Wille*, 75
- Schroeder, Leopold von, 304
- Schwartz, Carl, 52
- Selenus of Antioch, 306
- Seydel, Rudolph, 324, compares striking similarity of legends of royal origin and holy conception of Buddha and Jesus, 322
- Socrates, 5, 38, 218
- Sokolov, N., 145
- Spencer, Herbert, 75
- Spengler, Oswald, 35, 70
- Spinoza, 5, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 36, 39, 42, 348, 359; Benedictus and Maledictus, 19; influences both idealists and romanticists, 38; mechanist, 41, nature governed by laws of absolute causation, 41; no conception of history, 41, state, tamed beast, 43; politics appeals to Bolshevik and Junker alike, 45; saint and Machiavellist, 46, acosmist, 47; seer, 49; monism, 49; first prominent monist and pantheist, 50, attracted every great German philosopher with exception of Kant and Herbart, 51; already known in Germany during last years of seventeenth century, 51; character attacked by first opponents in Germany, 51; emerges victor in fight with scholasticism and hair-splitting rationalism, 52, overshadowed by Descartes in France, 53, eliminated from English philosophical thought by English empiricists, 53, and Lessing, 53; and Mendelssohn, 54, universalism introduces in Germany spiritual nationalism, 56; and Goethe, one of the most important chapters in the history of modern culture, 58; and Kant, two polar forces in the history of modern thought, 59, overwhelmed Kant in the *Vaterland*, 60, the anti-Jew overwhelms Kant, "the Jew," 61; gave birth to new culture and religion, 62, representative of extreme naturalism, 62, begins with God, 63, created new world-picture, 64, reconstructed new world out of old one, 64, attracts attention of everybody, 64; universalism, 65, theory of religion, 78; representative of higher criticism, 79, belittles the Bible, 79; first northerner to make direct attack upon the Bible, 80, rationalist, 85, influence of, on modern poetry, 93; and Goethe, 94-97, and Ruckert, 97; and Heine, Holderlin, Hebbel, Lennau, Immerman, Schaefer, and Stefan George, 98; in English literature, 99; Shelley, 99-105; Byron, 105-7; and Victor Hugo, 107-11, and modern science, 112, influence of, on cosmology, biology, and psychology, 112; French materialism and Spinoza, 113, and Johannes Miller, 113; and Haeckel, 113, and William Wundt, 114, and Fechner, 114, and Sigmund Freud, 114; and the modern theory of causation. Heidenheim, Dirack, and Bridgeman, 115; Spinoza's theory of substance refuted by Mach and Avenarius, 115; as mystic influences all branches of modern science, while Kant the scientist has no influence on science at all, 116, excommunication of, 133; not the theory of *una substantia* but the identification of God with nature, 133, God of, only *ens rationis*, a dead deity, 135, and Crescas, Gersonides, and Abraham ibn Ezra, 136; and Maimonides and Saadia, 137; not a Jewish philosopher, 138; and the rabbis, 139; and the Old Testament, 140; poor sport, 141; looks at Judaism from purely secular point of view, 142, Spinoza and reformed Judaism, 143, and higher criticism, 143; and subjective religiosity, 143; the father of Jewish enlightenment, 144; influence of, on Hebrew letters, 145; and modern Zionism, 146; and Chassidism, 147; with Plato and

Aristotle, the most popular philosophers in the Ghetto, 147, responsible for modern cultural antisemitism, places Jesus above Moses; belittles the prophets, decries the rabbis, admires Christ and St Paul, 148-49, mysticism of, 154, and Plato—a contrast, 165-69, and Descartes—Spinoza's starting-point is Descartes's conclusion Spinoza's God-consciousness is Descartes's self-consciousness, 176, winds up with *amor Dei* but it is a dead *Deus*, 178, laments like any mystic, 178, starting point of—the intellect, 180; suspicion of, of empiric knowledge, 182, adherent of Hobbes but not of Descartes, 183, sought salvation, 184, acceptance of God the rejection of the world, 184; mathematics, 186, mathematical method of, a myth, 188, mathematics and philosophy, 189, geometry of, tautology, 191, evaluation of man, 193, theory of substance—unsubstantial, 195, God of, is not free but is identical with nature (God's guidance are only laws of nature), 198, fails to prove existence even of his dead God, 199; substance of God closely resembles *En Kai Pan*, 200, and Francis Bacon, 201; does not demonstrate the reality of substance by infinite number of attributes, 203, substance of God of, not only not knowable but not absolute, not objective, 204, admits that theory of definition of God is incompatible with theory of infinite attributes, 208; God-conception of, precludes creation, 210, theory of, of the *modi*, 212-14, theory of, of double causality, 213; Jewish God-traditions of, 217, theory of, of man, 219-25; science of man identical with science of nature, 225-29, mathematizes not only God but man and his soul, 228; like Buddha's, ethics of, utilitarian, 228; political and juridic doctrines of, extremely naturalistic, 229; recognition of, the source of salvation, 230; theory of, of intuitive

knowledge incompatible with deterministic world-picture, 234, like ancient Brahmins, religiously tolerant, 239, *amor Dei* of, erotic mysticism, 289.

Spinozism: like Buddhism—religiosity rather than philosophy, 20, lines not sharply drawn, 25, teaches rationalism and mysticism, 26, heralding a new culture, 52, changing world-picture, 52, spells anti-biblicism, 53; changes world-picture of Germanic race, 53, attained height in Germany when it overwhelmed Herder and Goethe, 54, bulwark of philosophy in Germany and of poetry in England, 54, today no longer what it was a hundred years ago, 76

Stahl, Fritz, founder of Prussian Junkerism, 23

Stosch, Wilhelm, 367

Strauss, Friedrich, 324

Taine, Hippolyte, 4, 91, 92

Tertullian, 245

Thomas, K., 205, 209, 210

Torquemada, 351

Trotzki, Leon, 3, 23

Upanishads. book of deep thought, 5, 10, cosmocentric, 11; full of cosmic lamentations, 11

Vaininger, Hans, 33

Victor, Hugo de St., 155

Voltaire, 91, and Spinoza, 36, admires but rejects Spinozism, 37

Wagner, Richard, 33

Weber, Max, 4

Weber, I., 313

Willman, O., 312

Wolff, first German thinker to defend Spinoza's personality, 81

World-history, not identical with European history, 5

Wundt, Wilhelm, influenced by Spinoza, 75

